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V     . 


THE 


REIGN    OF    LAW. 


BY  THE  DUKE   OF  ARGYLL., 


Let  knowledge  grow  from  more  to 

But  more  of  reverence  in  us  dwell ; 
Thai  mind  and  soul^  according  welt, 
May  make  one  music  as  before, 


But  -vaster. 


IN  MEMORIAM. 


NEW   YORK: 
JOHN  B.  ALDEN,   PUBLISHER. 

1884. 


PREFACE  TO  THE  FIFTH  EDITION. 


IN  preparing  a  Fifth  Edition  of  this  work,  I  have  to  ac- 
knowledge the  favor — far  greater  than  I  expected — with  which 
it  has  been  received.  The  argument  which  it  maintains  is  at 
variance  with  the  philosophy  of  some  of  the  most  active  and 
popular  thinkers  of  the  time  ;  and  on  a  few  important  points  it 
deviates  from  the  view  commonly  adopted  by  men  with  whom  I 
am  more  generally  agreed.  Some  adverse  comment  was  there- 
fore not  only  to  be  expected  but  desired.  Most  sincerely  do  I 
thank  those  who,  in  numerous  Journals  and  Reviews,  have 
undertaken  this  duty,  for  the  uniformly  courteous  and  even 
kindly  spirit  in  which  their  criticisms  have  been  expressed. 

In  this  Edition  no  alteration  has  been  made  involving  any 
change  of  principle  or  opinion.  Here  and  there  words  have 
been  added  or  removed  according  as  individual  passages  appear 
to  have  been  misunderstood.  Throughout  some  of  the  chap- 
ters substantial  additions  have  been  made  in  reply,  direct  or 
indirect,  to  my  principal  opponents,  whilst  discussions,  more 
detailed  than  were  suitable  for  the  text,  have  been  committed 
to  Notes  at  the  end  of  the  volume. 

These  additions  and  Notes  have  reference  chiefly  to  the  fol- 
lowing articles  which  appeared  in  review  of  the  "  Reign  of 
Law  :  "— 

i  st.  An  Article,  by  Mr.  Alfred  R.  Wallace,  in  the  Quarterly 
Journal  of  Science,  for  October,  1867.  This  article  is  in  defence 
and  illustration  of  Mr.  Darwin's  "  Theory  on  the  Origin  of  Spe- 
cies." The  eminence  of  Mr.  Wallace  as  a  Naturalist,  the  ex- 
tent of  his  researches  in  some  of  the  most  remarkable  Faunas 
of  the  world,  and  the  fact  that,  before  the  publication  of  Mr. 
Darwin's  book,  he  had  come  to  kindred,  if  not  identical  conclu- 
sions,— all  render  him  peculiarly  competent  to  defend  the  "  The- 


IV  PREFACE    TO    THE    FIFTH    EDITION. 

ory,"  and  to  present  it  in  the  strongest  light.  I  have  therefore 
added  to  the  text  several  passages  suggested  by  the  challenge 
he  makes,  and  by  the  reasoning  he  employs.  A  further  discus- 
sion of  his  paper  will  be  found  in  Note  A. 

2d.  An  Article,  by  Mr.  George  H.  Lewes,  in  the  Fortnightly 
Review,  for  July,  1867,  dealing  with  the  main  argument  and 
conclusion  of  this  work  from  the  well-known  point  of  view  of 
the  "  Positive  Philosophy."  Wherever  in  the  text  there  seemed 
a  fitting  place  for  doing  so,  I  have  inserted  passages  which  deal 
with  the  reasoning  of  his  paper,  or  with  the  same  reasoning  as 
it  appears  in  a  more  systematic  form  in  the  Prolegomena  to  Mr. 
Lewes's  "  History  of  Philosophy." 

3d.  An  Article  in  the  Dublin  Review,  for  April,  1867,  which  I 
am  permitted  to  attribute  to  the  learned  editor  of  that  periodi- 
cal, Dr.  Ward.  The  more  special  object  of  his  adverse  com- 
ment is  the  view  I  have  taken  of  the  doctrine  of  Free  Will — a 
doctrine  which  Dr.  Ward,  with  some  warmth,  accuses  me  of 
having  virtually  abandoned  whilst  professing  to  defend  it.  A 
slight  alteration  in  the  text  may  perhaps  help  to  remove  some 
objections,  which  rest  entirely  upon  a  misunderstanding  of  the 
sense  in  which  particular  words  are  used.  But  behind  and  be- 
yond any  misunderstanding  of  this  kind,  there  lies  apparently  a 
substantial  difference  in  respect  to  which  my  view  remains  un- 
altered. This  difference  will  be  found  discussed  in  Note  F,  at 
the  end  of  the  volume. 

4th.  An  Article  in  the  Contemporary  Review,  for  May,  1867, 
by  Mr.  J.  P.  Mahaffy.  With  reference  to  his  observations,  as 
well  as  to  those  of  some  other  critics,  I  have  somewhat  ex- 
panded several  passages  which  deal  with  the  Supernatural,  and 
with  the  various  relations  in  which  miracles  have  been  con- 
ceived to  stand  towards  the  "  Reign  of  Law."  I  have  also,  in 
a  special  Note  (G),  replied  to  a  criticism  in  this  paper,  referring 
to  the  subject  of  Necessity  and  Free  Will. 

Other  Notes  have  been  added  in  illustration  or  support  of 
various  passages  in  the  text. 

As  regards  the  intention  I  had  at  one  time  entertained  of 
adding  a  chapter  on  "  Law  in  Christian  Theology,"  further  re- 
flection has  only  confirmed  me  in  the  feeling  that  this  is  a  sub- 
ject which  cannot  be  adequately  dealt  with  in  such  a  form.  J 


PREFACE    TO    THE    FIFTH    EDITION.  V 

can  only  again  ask  my  readers  to  remember  that  although  some 
ideas  which  belong  to  this  subject,  or  touch  it  at  various  points, 
cannot  be,  and  have  not  been,  avoided,  yet  the  desire  and  in- 
tention to  postpone  it,  in  so  far  as  it  was  possible  to  do  so  has 
left  blanks  which  every  careful  eye  must  see. 


PREFACE  TO  THE  FIRST  EDITION. 


SOME  portions  of  this  work  have  already  appeared  at  various 
times  in  the  Edinburgh  Review  in  Good  Words  and  in  Addresses 
to  the  Royal  Society  of  Edinburgh  during  the  years  in  which  I 
had  the  honor  of  being  President  of  that  Body.  The  deep  in- 
terest of  the  matter  dealt  with  in  those  Papers  has  induced  me 
to  expand  them,  to  add  new  chapters  on  other  aspects  of  the 
same  subject,  and  to  publish  the  whole  in  a  connected  form. 

Among  many  other  deficiencies  which  may  be  observed  in 
this  Volume,  there  is  one  which  demands  explanation,  lest  a 
serious  misunderstanding  should  arise.  I  had  intended  to  con- 
clude with  a  chapter  on  "  Law  in  Christian  Theology."  It  was 
natural  to  reserve  for  that  chapter  all  direct  reference  to  some 
of  the  most  fundamental  facts  of  Human  nature.  Yet  without 
such  reference  the  Reign  of  Law,  especially  in  the  "  Realm  of 
Mind,"  cannot  even  be  approached  in  some  of  its  very  highest 
and  most  important  aspects.  For  the  present,  however,  I  have 
shrunk  from  entering  upon  questions  so  profound,  of  such  crit- 
ical import,  and  so  inseparably  connected  with  religious  con- 
troversy. In  the  absence  of  any  attempt  to  deal  with  this 
great  branch  of  the  inquiry,  as  well  as  in  many  other  ways,  I 
am  painfully  conscious  of  the  narrow  range  of  this  work.  I 
can  only  offer  it  as  a  very  small  contribution  to  the  discussion 
of  a  boundless  subject. 


CONTENTS. 


CHAPTER  I. 

PAGE 

THE  SUPERNATURAL 1-33 

The  term  Supernatural  employed  in  different  and  contradictory 
senses — The  Natural  casting  out  the  Supernatural — Nature,  in 
its  widest  sense,  to  be  understood  as  including  all  causal  agen- 
cies, especially  Man's  Mind  and  Will — Man's  agency  the  most 
Natural  of  all  agencies — Man's  Mind  and  Will  regarded  as  be- 
longing to  the  Supernatural — Relation  of  Man's  agency  to  the 
physical  laws  of  Nature — "  Supernatural  "  power — Is  it  Power 
independent  of  the  use  of  means  ? — Relation  of  God  to  the  rules 
of  His  Government  called  "  Laws" — Mansel's  position,  that  a 
Miracle  is  a  Superhuman  work — Gibbon's  attempt  to  account 
for  the  spread  of  Christianity  by  Natural  causes — Preservation 
of  the  Jews  by  means  employed  to  effect  a  Divine  Purpose — 
Nothing  in  Religion  incompatible  with  the  belief  that  all  exer- 
cises of  God's  power,  ordinary  and  extraordinary,  are  effected 
through  the  instrumentality  of  means — Principal  Tulloch's  view 
of  Miracles — Locke's  idea  of  Miracles — The  great  truth  he 
misses — Truths  and  Difficulties  of  Religion — their  type  in  the 
course  and  constitution  of  Nature — Guizot's  argument,  that 
Man  is  the  result  either  of  Material  forces  or  Supernatural 
power — The  Development  hypotheses — No  distinction  in 
Scripture  between  Natural  and  Supernatural — "  Silent  Mem- 
bers "  in  animal  frames — Perception  of  Correspondences  as 
much  a  fact  as  the  sight  or  touch  of  the  things  in  which  they 
appear — Fertilization  of  Orchids — Intention  the  one  thing 
which  Darwin  sees — Orchids  in  all  their  marvellous  forms  de- 
veloped out  of  the  archetypal  arrangements  of  Threes  within 
Threes — Ideas  of  Order  based  on  Numerical  Relations  meet  us 
at  every  turn  in  Nature — The  distinction  drawn  between  the 
Natural  and  the  Supernatural  a  distinction  artificial,  arbitrary, 
and  unreal — Belief  in  the  existence  of  a  Personal  God  essential 
to  all  Religion — Decay  of  many  Creeds  and  Confessions 
through  dissociating  the  doctrines  of  Christianity  from  the  anal- 
ogy of  Nature. 


Vlll  CONTENTS. 

CHAPTER  II. 

PAGE 

LAW:  ITS  DEFINITIONS , 34-75 

Reign  of  Law  in  the  world  around  us  and  within  us — Importance  of 
looking  sharply  on  Forms  of  Words  professing  to  represent 
scientific  truths — Religion  and  Science  closely  connected — The 
Instinct  which  seeks  for  harmony  in  the  truths  of  Science  and 
the  truths  of  Religion  a  higher  Instinct  than  the  disposition 
which  pretends  there  is  no  relation  between  them — The  idea 
that  Prayer  to  God  is  only  a  good  way  of  preaching  to  our- 
selves— Essence  of  the  belief  in  Prayer,  that  the  Divine  Mind 
is  accessible  to  supplication,  and  the  Divine  Will  capable  of 
being  moved  thereby — Law,  human  and  Divine,  the  authorita- 
tive expression  of  Will  enforced  by  Power — The  FIVE  differ- 
ent Senses  in  which  Law  is  habitually  used : — First,  as  applied 
to  an  observed  Order  of  Facts — Secondly,  to  that  Order,  as  in- 
volving the  action  of  some  Force,  or  Forces,  of  which  nothing 
more  maybe  known — Thirdly,  as  applied  to  individual  Forces, 
the  measure  of  whose  operation  has  been  more  or  less  defined 
— Fourthly,  as  applied  to  those  Combinations  of  Force  which 
.have  reference  to  the  fulfilment  of  Purpose,  or  the  discharge  of 
Function — Fifthly,  as  applied  to  Abstract  Conceptions  of  the 
Mind — These    great  leading   significations   circle   round  the 
Three  great  questions  Science  asks  of  Nature — the  What,  the 
How,  and  the  Why — The  Three  Laws  of  Kepler  the  simplest 
illustration  of  Law  applied  in  the  First  Sense — An  Observed 
Order  of  Facts  can  only  arise  out  of  the  action  of  some  com- 
pelling Force — Law  of  Gravitation  the  great  example  of  Law 
in  the  Third  Sense— The  "  Verifiable  Element  "—Laws  in  the 
first  three  senses  explain  nothing,  save  that  the  order  of  sub- 
ordinate phenomena  is  due  to  Force — Law  of  Gravitation  the 
best  example  of  what  Law  is,  and  what  it  is  not — Languages 
grow  according  to  rules  of  which  the  men  who  speak  them  are 
unconscious — What  happens  around  us  in  Nature  the  result  of 
/different  and  opposing  Forces  nicely  balanced — Principle  of 
Adjustment  as  the  instrument  and  result  of  Purpose  always 
reached  at  last  in  the  course  of  every  physical  inquiry — Law 
in  the  highest  Sense — Combination  for  the  accomplishment  of 
Purpose — Some  Philosophers  say  the  question  "  Why  ?  "  should 
never  be  asked — The  facts  of  Adjustment  and  of  Function 
constitute  not  Final  but  Immediate  Purpose — The  Function  of 
an  organ  is  its  Purpose — Doctrine  of  Contrivance  and  Adjust- 
ment not  so   metaphysical  as  the  doctrine  of  Homologies — 
Impossible  in  describing  physical  phenomena  to  avoid  phrase- 
ology moulded  on  our  own  conscious  Personality  and  Will — 
Ultimate  fact  of  Astronomical  Science  not  the  Law  of  Gravi- 


CONTENTS.  IX 

PAGE 

tation,  but  the  Adjustment  between  that  Law  and  others  less 
known — Revolution  of  the  Seasons  depend  on  a  multitude  of 
Laws,  Astronomical,  Chemical,  Electrical,  Geological,  etc. — 
Chemical  Science  rich  in  illustration  of  Forces  in  mutual  Ad- 
justment— "  Theine  "  and  "  Strychnine  "  differ  from  each  other 
only  in  the  proportions  in  which  they  are  combined — How  our 
Wills  exercise  a  large  and  increasing  power  over  the  Material 
World — Laws  of  Nature  immutable  only  in  one  Sense — Laws 
of  Nature  employed  in  the  System  of  Nature  in  a  manner  pre- 
cisely analogous  to  that  in  which  we  employ  them — Examples 
furnished  in  the  Shells  of  Barnacles  and  in  the  Menai  Bridge — 
Purpose  never  attained  in  Nature  save  by  the  enlistment  of 
Laws  as  instruments — Battery  of  the  Torpedo  compared  with 
Man's  Electric  Battery — The  Ptirpose  what  we  know  in  the  Bat- 
tery of  the  Electric  Fish — We  forget  that  Man's  works,  no  less 
than  Nature's  are  done  through  the  means  of  Law — Fifth  mean- 
ing of  Law — the  designation  of  some  purely  Abstract  Idea,  as, 
for  instance,  the  First  Law  of  Motion  in  Mechanics — This  Law 
never  operates  in  itself,  but  is  complicated  with  other  Laws, 
producing  a  corresponding  complication  in  result — Suggestions 
of  Materialism  lie  thickest  to  the  eye  on  the  surface  of  things 
rather  than  below  it — Physical  Science  cannot  do  more  than 
widen  the  foundation  of  intelligent  Spiritual  beliefs — The 
modern  idea  of  Law  known  instinctively  to  Man  since  first  he 
made  a  Tool  and  used  it  as  the  Instrument  of  Purpose — Two 
great  enemies  to  Materialism ;  one  rooted  in  the  Affections, 
the  other  in  the  Intellect — Transcendental  character  of  the  re- 
sults of  Physical  research — All  Nature's  realities  are  in  the  re- 
gion of  the  Invisible — Life,  according  to  Huxley  and  Carpen- 
ter, the  Cause  of  Organization — Material  Force,  a  force  which 
acts  on  Matter — Our  Conceptions  of  Force  traced  to  their  foun- 
tain-head— Force  of  Gravitation  regarded  by  Herschel  as  "  the 
direct,  or  indirect,  result  of  a  Consciousness,  or  a  Will,  existing  ' 
somewhere " — The  idea  of  a  Personal  Will  apart  from  the 
Forces  which  work  in  Nature,  is  said  by  some  men  to  be  a 
mere  Projection  of  our  own  Personality  into  the  world  beyond 
— A  Watch  the  abode  of  a  "  Watch-force  " — The  greatest  mys- 
tery of  all — the  analogy  between  Man's  works  and  the  Crea- 
tor's. 

CHAPTER  III. 

CONTRIVANCE  A  NECESSITY  ARISING  OUT  OF  THE  REIGN 

OF  LAW 76-102 

Necessity  of  Contrivance  for  the  accomplishment  of  Purpose — 
Contrivance  in  the  Navigation  of  the  Air — "The  Way  of  an 


CONTENTS. 


Eagle  in  the  Air  " — Force  of  Gravitation  the  principal  Force  in 
flight — Resisting  Force  of  the  Atmosphere  the  next  Law  ap- 
pealed to — Elasticity  and  reacting  Force  of  the  Air  another 
Law — Great  Force  of  a  downward  Blow  from  a  Bird's  Wing 
— Convex  and  Concave  Surfaces  required  in  Wings — The 
Feathers  must  underlap  each  other — How  the  power  of  for- 
ward Motion  is  given  to  Birds — This  Theory  of  Flight  may  be 
tested  by  the  eye — Experiment  with  a  Heron's  stretched  Wing 
— Why  no  Bird  can  fly  backwards — The  heavier  a  Bird  the 
greater  its  possible  velocity — Erroneous  notion  of  Birds  having 
Air-cells  for  the  inhalation  and  stowage  of  heated  Air — What 
Forces  the  movements  of  flying  animals  are  governed  by — 
Birds  whose  Wing  is  adapted  for  diving  and  flight — Wings 
rather  long  than  broad  in  Birds  of  great  powers  of  flight — A 
long  Wing  nothing  but  a  long  Lever — Description  of  the  Al- 
batross sailing  or  wheeling  round  a  ship — Sharp-pointed 
Wings  also  possessed  by  such  Birds — What  sharpness,  or 
roundness,  of  Wing  depends  on — On  what  the  propelling 
power  of  a  Bird's  Wing  depends — How  Birds  can  remain  sta- 
tionary in  the  Air — Use  of  the  Tail  in  Birds — How  Birds  turn 
in  flight — Humming  Birds  the  most  remarkable  examples  of 
the  machinery  of  flight — Adjustments  to  Purpose  in  a  Wing- 
feather — Why  Man  has  failed  in  Air  Navigation. 


CHAPTER  IV. 

APPARENT   EXCEPTIONS  TO   THE   SUPREMACY  OF  PUR- 
POSE  103-123 

Structures  of  which  we  cannot  see  the  use— Mr.  Darwin's  curious 
mistake  about  Green  Woodpeckers— Adapted  coloring  in 
Nature  for  purposes  of  Concealment — Only  employed  under 
certain  conditions — The  Green  Woodpecker  does  not  come 
under  these  conditions — Strongly  contrasted  coloring  in  Wood- 
peckers— Birds  amongst  whom  the  assimilated  coloring  pre- 
vails— Purpose  of  Concealment  in  the  Woodcock's  plumage — 
In  the  Snipe — Insects  in  which  imitation,  with  a  view  to  Con- 
cealment, extends  to  Color,  Form,  and  Structure— Beauty  in 
Nature  a  Purpose,  an  Object,  and  an  End — Ornament  as  much 
an  End  in  the  Workshop  of  Nature  as  in  the  Jeweller's  Work- 
shop— Instance  in  Nature  where  Ornament  takes  the  Form  of 
Pictorial  Representation — In  many  Animal  structures,  perhaps 
in  all  save  one,  there  are  parts  the  presence  of  which  cannot 
be  explained — Those  aborted  limbs  parts  of  a  universal  Plan — 
A  Plan  of  this  kind  itself  a  purpose — African  Notion  that  the 
Ostrich's  toes  correspond  to  Man's  thumb  and  forefinger — 


CONTENTS.  XI 

PAGE 

Aborted  Wings  of  the  Ostrich  really  correspond  to  the  Fingers 
in  Man — Homology  in  Structure  and  Analogy  in  Use — Origi- 
nal conception  of  the  framework  of  Organic  Life  has  its  last 
development  in  Man — In  Nature,  Use  must  be  interpreted  as 
including  Actual  Use,  Potential  Use,  and  Ornament. 

CHAPTER  V. 
CREATION  BY  LAW 124-162 

Law,  according  to  Physiology,  is  never  absent  as  a  Servant — A  like 
Order  in  the  existing  World,  and  in  the  past  History  of  Crea- 
tion— Gradual  modification  of  Type  in  Animals — No  knowl- 
edge of  the  Forces  to  which  the  phenomena  of  Life  can  be 
traced — Development  Theory  in  its  earlier  forms — Conse- 
quences of  hiding  our  Ignorance  of  the  causes  of  Phenomena 
by  declaring  them  the  result  of  Law — Darwin  does  not  profess 
to  trace  the  Origin  of  New  Forms  to  any  definite  Law — Dar- 
win's Theory  not  a  Theory  on  "  The  Origin  of  Species  " — His 
Theory  incurs  the  risk  of  being  self-condemned — Humming 
Birds  as  exhibiting  Mysteries  of  Creation — Absolute  Distinct- 
iveness  from  all  other  Families  of  Birds — Bond  that  unites  all 
the  forms  of  this  Family — "  Centres  of  Creation  "  as  regards 
Humming  Birds — Differences  generic  and  specific  between 
Humming  Birds — Plan  in  which  mere  Variety  has  been  an  aim 
— No  connection  between  the  Humming  Bird's  splendor  and 
any  Function  essential  to  life — "  Coquette  "  Humming  Birds — 
Curious  example  in  Humming  Birds  of  Variety  for  Ornament's 
sake — Mere  Beauty  and  mere  Variety  for  their  own  sake — 
"Natural  Selection"  does  not  account  for  the  origin  and 
spread  of  Humming  Birds — Each  new  Variety  must  be  born 
Male  and  Female — Possibility  of  new  Births  being  the  means 
of  introducing  new  Species — Principle  of  "  Natural  Selection  " 
has  no  bearing  on  the  "  Origin  of  Species  " — "  Correlation  of 
Growth  " — Correlation  of  Growth  in  the  Inorganic  world — 
Correlation  of  Growth  having  reference  to  Mental  Purposes — 
Mr.  Darwin  has  not  pointed  out  clearly  the  distinction  between 
these  two  kinds  of  Correlation — Wonders  of  Correlation  re- 
vealed by  Disease  and  Malformation,  etc. — Correlation  between 
the  internal  Structure  of  the  Teeth  in  Animals  and  the  Struct- 
ure of  distant  portions  of  their  frame — One  Force  directs  the 
Form  and  Structure  of  every  Organism — No  conception  of  any 
Force  emanating  from  external  things,  and  moulding  the  Struct- 
ture  of  an  Organism  in  harmony  with  themselves — Forces  of 
Organic  Growth  worked  under  rules  of  close  Adjustment  to  ex- 
ternal conditions, — Examples  of  this  in  Ducks,  Gulls,  and 


PAGE 


Xll  CONTENTS. 


Divers — More  correlated  Correlations. — Wing-feathers  and 
Auricular-feathers  in  Birds — New  Species  can  be  created  only 
by  a  Creative  Will  giving  to  Organic  Forces  a  foreseen  direc- 
tion— Scientific  men,  in  seeking  expression  for  ultimate  ideas 
arrived  at  by  physical  research,  are  forced  to  borrow  the  lan- 
guage of  mechanical  invention — Mr.  Darwin  presenting  under 
one  phase  two  Ideas  radically  distinct — "  Adherence  to  Type  " 
and  "  Correlation  of  Growth  "  not  in  the  nature  of  Physical 
Causes  but  of  Mental  Purposes — Correlation  of  Growth,  in  the 
sense  of  external  adaptations,  the  most  general  of  Nature's 
Laws — The  only  senses  in  which  we  get  a  glimpse  of  Creation 
by  Law — No  reason  why  Inheritance  should  produce  Organ- 
isms unlike,  or  only  very  partially  like,  each  other — Affinities 
and  Differences  between  Man  and  the  Lower  Animals — The- 
ory of  Creation  by  Birth  clashes  with  the  Theory  of  "  Natural 
Selection  " — No  fictions  in  Nature,  and  no  bad  jokes — Some 
essential  Resemblances  between  all  forms  of  Life — The  two 
Theories  of  Man's  Origin — We  see  the  Purpose,  not  the  Method 
— All  ultimate  Truth  beyond  the  reach  of  Science — The  Reign 
of  Law — the  reign  of  Creative  Force,  directed  by  Creative 
Knowledge,  worked  under  the  control  of  Creative  Power,  and 
in  fulfilment  of  Creative  Purpose. 


CHAPTER  VI. 
THE  REIGN  OF  LAW  IN  THE  REALM  OF  MIND 163-192 

Phenomena  of  Mind  under  the  Reign  of  Law — One  Force  in  Na- 
ture the  Source  and  Centre  of  all  the  rest,  and  all  governed  by 
Principles  of  Arrangement  purely  Mental ;  we  know  nothing 
directly  of  the  ultimate  Seat  of  Force  in  any  form  ;  the  nearest 
conception  we  can  have  of  it  is  derived  from  our  consciousness 
of  Vital  Power — If  these  conclusions  be  true,  it  need  not  sur- 
prise us  to  see  that  Law,  in  the  same  Sense,  prevails  in  the 
phenomena  both  of  the  Material  world  and  of  the  world  of 
Mind — The  Mind  not  conscious  of  its  dependence  on  Material 
Organs — No  Series  of  Facts  more  complete  and  conclusive 
than  the  chain  connecting  the  functions  of  the  Brain  with  the 
phenomena  of  Mind — Thought  not  to  be  confounded  with 
Brain — Phrenology  mere  Confusion  of  Thought — Physiology 
can  never  be  the  basis  of  Psychology — Connection  between 
Mind  and  Brain  a  Law  only  in  the  Sense  of  Law  as  applied  to 
"an  Observed  Order  of  Facts" — Severe  Thinking  attended 
with  expenditure  of  Force — Difficulties  from  misconception  of 
what  Matter  is  and  the  Forces  we  call  Material — Large  class 
of  phenomena  connected  with  Mind,  of  which  Consciousness 


CONTENTS.  Xlll 

PAGE 

does  not  inform  us — Men  often  impelled  by  Motives  they  are 
unconscious  of — How  we  can  detect  the  action  of  Forces 
which  have  told  upon  our  Minds — Origin  of  Ideas ;  how  far 
due  to  Experience  or  to  Intuition — Muscular  Contractions  of 
two  kinds — Almost  certain  that  the  Mind  has  automatic  facul- 
ties and  others  which  work  independently  by  Experience — In- 
tuitive Power  of  numerical  Computation — In  discussing  the 
Origin  of  Ideas,  there  is  great  want  of  Definition  in  the  use  of 
terms — An  Idea  is  as  it  were  an  organic  Growth : — its  Materials 
from  the  external  world,  its  Structure  from  within — Intuition 
in  the  Young  of  the  Lower  Animals,  when  removed  from  their 
Parents — In  Birds,  which  have  comparatively  no  Infancy — In- 
heritance of  Physical  and  Mental  qualities — Orderly  progress 
of  Events  in  the  history  of  Nations — The  aggregate  of  Motives, 
or  Forces,  which  move  the  Mind,  may  be  called  the  Laws 
which  determine  Human  Action  and  Opinions — The  Lower 
Animals  moved  by  fewer  Motives  than  Men,  and  Savages  by 
fewer  Motives  than  civilized  Men — Difficulty  of  predicting  Con- 
duct proportional  to  the  number  and  kind  of  Motives — Secret 
of  the  boundless  Difference  between  Man  and  the  highest  An- 
imals below  htm — Man  never  free  from  relations  pre-estab- 
lished between  the  Structure  of  his  Mind  and  the  System  of 
Things  in  which  it  is  formed  to  move — Real  Progress  on  the 
question  of  Necessity  and  Free  Will — Still  clearer  Definitions 
needed — Perfect  Knowledge  must  be  perfect  Twr-knowledge — 
"  Spiritual  Antecedents  " — Reconcilement  of  Freedom  of  Will 
with  the  idea  of  Causation — Mr.  Mill's  contradictory  positions 
as  to  the  Interference  of  Will — Comte  on  "  Changeable  Will  " 
— Stability  of  Character  inseparably  connected  with  a  variable 
Will — An  "  Arbitrary  "  or  a  "  Capricious  "  Will — To  operate 
on  Human  Character  we  must  place  it  under  favorable  outward 
Conditions. 


CHAPTER  VII. 
LAW  IN  POLITICS „ 193-232 

Direct  appeals  to  the  Reason,  or  the  Feelings,  of  men,  useless 
when  those  faculties  have  not  been  placed  under  favorable 
Conditions — How  far  these  Conditions  are  Subject  to  the  Con- 
trol of  Will  through  the  Use  of  Means — The  Collective  Will 
of  Society  operates  on  the  Conduct  of  its  members  in  two 
Ways — by  Authority,  and  by  altering  Conditions — True  Con- 
ception of  Natural  Law  founded  on  the  Progress  of  Physical 
Investigation — Plato's  odious  Conception  of  Human  Society — 
Aristotle  occasionally  and  almost  unconsciously  resorts  to  true 


CONTENTS. 

methods  of  Scientific  Reasoning — Why  he  missed  the  great 
Secret  of  modern  Political  Science — Necessity  of  groping 
among  little  and  common  things  a  hard  lesson  for  the  Intellect 
— Forces  in  Human  Nature  so  constant  that  they  affect  the 
great  majority  of  men — How  these  are  to  be  controlled — The 
word  "  Natural  " — Laws  founded  on  a  right  exercise  of  Reason 
are  Natural  Laws  in  the  best  and  highest  sense — The  most  dif- 
ficult Problem  in  the  Science  of  Government — Two  great  recent 
Discoveries  in  this  Country  in  the  Science  of  Government — The 
one  great  Error  of  Ancient  Systems  of  Political  Philosophy — 
How  opposite  the  doctrine  of  modern  Politicians — Law  of  Spain, 
prohibiting  Gold  from  leaving  the  country — Essential  idea  of  the 
Old  Commercial  Policy — Of  the  New — Adam  Smith's  Denunci- 
ation of  Laws  restricting  free  Interchange  in  the  Products  of  La- 
bor and  in  the  free  Employment  of  Labor  itself — Connection  of 
the  work  of  James  Watt  and  Adam  Smith — Watt's  reduction 
to  obedience  of  one  of  the  most  tremendous  Forces  of  Nature — 
How  Adam  Smith's  work  was  harder  than  James  Watt's — 
Watt's  history  a  signal  illustration  of  the  P'ollies  of  Restriction 
—Order  of  Progress  in  Mankind — Long  Ages  of  comparative 
Silence  and  Inaction  brought  to  an  end  by  shorter  Periods  of 
almost  preternatural  Activity. — Illustrations — Statute  of  Ap- 
prenticeship in  the  time  of  Adam  Smith — Spinning  and  Weav- 
ing in  1760 — How  the  Survivance  of  the  Ancient  domestic  In- 
dustries became  no  longer  possible— Beginning  of  the  Factory 
System— System  of  Apprenticeship  in  the  earlier  Mills— Phys- 
ical Degeneracy,  Mental  Ignorance,  and  Moral  Corruption  in 
the  Factories — The  first  Factory  Act,  introduced  by  the  elder 
Sir  Robert  Peel— Abandonment  of  the  Apprenticeship  System 
—Exhausting  and  demoralizing  Labor  in  Factories  by  Children 
—The  great  Parliamentary  Debate :  How  far  it  is  wise  or  legiti- 
mate to  interfere  for  Moral  ends  with  the  Freedom  of  the  Indi- 
vidual Will— In  what  Sense  the  Children's  Labor  was  "  free  " 
and  was  "  not  free  "—Arguments,  founded  on  the  Constancy  of 
Natural  Laws,  against  Legislative  Interference  with  the  "free- 
dom "  of  Individual  Will— The  supporters  of  Restriction  them- 
selves ignorant  of  the  fundamental  Principles  at  issue— The 
true  doctrine  of  Necessity  exemplified  in  the  Conduct  of  Em- 
ployers and  Employed— Antagonism  between  Natural  Law 
and  Human  Law— Results  to  be  attained  only  by  the  higher 
Faculties  of  our  Nature  imposing  their  Will  in  authoritative  Ex- 
pressions of  Human  Law— The  Factory  Acts  the  first  Legisla- 
tive Recognition  of  a  great  Natural  Law— Double  Movement 
in  Legislation  since  the  First  Factory  Act— Principle  on  which 
the  great  counter-movement  depends— Progress  in  Political 
Science  nowhere  happier  than  in  Factory  Legislation— Exam- 
ple how  External  Conditions  and  Mental  Character  can  be  af- 


CONTENTS,  XV 

« 

PAGE 

fected  powerfully  by  positive  Institution — Adjustment  in  the 
Realm  of  Mind  by  setting  one  Motive  to  counteract  another — 
How  new  Motives  may  be  evoked — The  Spirit  of  Association 
— a  Force  in  the  Realm  of  Mind  -  The  Law  of  Competition — 
Good  effected  by  Combination  a  higher  Good  than  that  result  . 
ing  from  Factory  Legislation — Combination,  an  Appeal  to  the 
Law  of  Contrivance  ;— the  Power  of  Adjustment — Sources  of 
Error  which  pervert  the  Aims  of  voluntary  Association — His- 
tory of  Combination  among  the  Working  Classes  until  lately  a 
sad  history  of  Misdirected  Effort — Difficulties  of  our  time  to 
be  met  by  unshaken  Faith  in  great  Natural  Laws  and  in  the 
free  Agency  of  Man  to  secure  by  appropriate  means  the  work- 
ing of  those  Laws  for  good — The  Law  of  Inequality  not  to  be 
violated  with  impunity — Substantial  economic  Advantage  se- 
cured wherever  the  Hours  of  Labor  are  reduced  without  a  cor- 
responding Reduction  in  Wages — The  very  attempt  of  the 
Working  Classes  to  govern  through  Combination  their  own 
Affairs  is  an  Education  in  itself — Nature  a  great  Armory  of 
Weapons  and  Implements  for  the  service  and  use  of  Will — As 
regards  the  great  Science  of  Politics,  men  still,  as  it  were,  only 
at  the  break  of  day — We  look  on  the  Facts  of  Nature  and 
Human  Life  through  the  dulled  eyes  of  Custom  and  Tradi- 
tional Opinion — Natural  Openness  and  Simplicity  of  Mind 
characteristic  of  the  individual  men  who  have  exerted  the  most 
powerful  Influence  for  good  on  Society — Power  of  the  Agen- 
cies which  the  whole  Constitution  and  Course  of  things  offers 
to  Knowledge  and  Contrivance — Instinct  on  her  own  narrow 
path  a  surer  Guide  than  Reason — Some  Causes  no  longer  in 
existence  which  produced  the  Overthrow  of  the  great  historical 
Nations  of  Antiquity — Memorable  Examples,  in  the  last  and 
present  generations,  of  the  Reign  of  Law  over  the  course  of 
Political  Events — Modern  Civilization  presents  the  phenomena 
of  Development  and  Growth — The  most  certain  of  all  the 
Laws  of  Man's  Nature — This  the  Law  to  which  Christianity 
appeals — An  immense  satisfaction  to  know  that  the  Result  of 
Logical  Analysis  but  confirms  the  Testimony  of  Consciousness, 
and  runs  parallel  with  the  Primeval  Traditions  of  Belief — Our 
Freedom  a  Reality — not  a  Name — Laws  of  Nature  come  visi- 
bly from  One  pervading  Mind — Their  Purposes  best  fulfilled 
when  made  the  Instruments  of  intelligent  Will  and  the  Ser- 
vants of  enlightened  Conscience. 

NOTES 233.248 

INDEX 249-265 


LIST  OF  ILLUSTRATIONS. 


PAGE 

The  Swift .facing  88 

Wing  of  Gannet 92 

Wing  of  Golden  Plover 94 

Sparrow-Hawk — Merlin — Kestrel  Hovering 96 


THE  REIGN  OF  LAW. 


CHAPTER  I. 

THE   SUPERNATURAL. 

THE  Supernatural — what  is  it  ?  What  do  we  mean  by  it  ? 
How  do  we  define  it  ?  M.  Guizot  *  tells  us  that  belief  in  it  is 
the  special  difficulty  of  our  time — that  denial  of  it  is  the  form 
taken  by  all  modern  assaults  on  Christian  faith  ;  and  again, 
that  acceptance  of  it  lies  at  the  root,  not  only  of  Christianity, 
but  of  all  positive  religion  whatever.  These  questions,  then, 
concerning  the  Supernatural,  are  questions  of  first  importance. 
Yet  we  find  them  seldom  distinctly  put,  and  still  more  seldom 
distinctly  answered.  This  is  a  capital  error  in  dealing  with 
any  question  of  philosophy.  Half  the  perplexities  of  men  are 
traceable  to  obscurity  of  thought  hiding  and  breeding  under 
obscurity  of  language.  "  The  Supernatural "  is  a  term  em- 
ployed often  in  different,  and  sometimes  in  contradictory,  senses. 
It  is  difficult  to  make  out  whether  M.  Guizot  himself  means  to 
identify  belief  in  the  Supernatural  with  belief  in  the  existence 
of  a  God,  or  with  belief  in  a  particular  mode  of  Divine  action. 
But  these  are  ideas  quite  separable  and  distinct.  There  may 
be  some  men  who  disbelieve  in  the  Supernatural  only  because 
they  are  absolute  atheists;  but  it  is  certain  that  there  are 
others  who  have  great  difficulty  in  believing  in  the  Supernat- 
ural, who  are  not  atheists.  What  they  doubt  or  deny  is,  not 
that  God  exists,  but  that  He  ever  acts,  or  perhaps  can  act, 
unless  in  and  through  what  they  call  the  "  Laws  of  Nature." 
M.  Guizot,  indeed,  tells  us  that  "  God  is  the  Supernatural  in  a 

*  "  L'Eglise  et  la  Societe  Chretienne  en  1861,"  ch.  iv.  p.  19. 


2  THE    REIGN    OF    LAW. 

Person."  But  this  is  a  rhetorical  figure  rather  than  a  defini- 
tion. He  may,  indeed,  contend  that  it  is  inconsistent  to  be- 
lieve in  a  God,  and  yet  to  disbelieve  in  the  Supernatural ;  but 
he  must  admit,  and  indeed  does  admit,  that  such  inconsistency 
is  found  in  fact. 

Theological  and  philosophical  writers  frequently  use  the  Su- 
pernatural as  synonymous  with  the  Superhuman.  But  of  course 
this  is  not  the  sense  in  which  any  one  can  have  any  difficulty 
in  believing  in  it.  The  powers  and  works  of  Nature  are  all 
superhuman — more  than  Man  can  account  for  in  their  origin — 
more  than  he  can  resist  in  their  energy — more  than  he  can  un- 
derstand in  their  effects.  This,  then,  cannot  be  the  sense  in 
which  so  many  minds  find  it  hard  to  accept  the  Supernatural , 
nor  can  it  be  the  sense  in  which  others  cling  to  it  as  of  the 
very  essence  of  their  religious  faith.  What,  then,  is  that  other 
.sense  in  which  the  difficulty  arises  ?  Perhaps  we  shall  best  find 
it  by  seeking  the  idea  which  is  competing  with  it,  and  by  which 
it  has  been  displaced.  It  is  the  Natural  which  has  been  cast- 
ing out  the  Supernatural — the  idea  of  Natural  Law, — the  uni- 
versal reign  of  a  fixed  Order  of  things.  This  idea  is  a  product 
of  that  immense  development  of  the  physical  sciences  which 
is  characteristic  of  our  time.  We  cannot  read  a  periodical,  or 
go  into  a  lecture-room,  without  hearing  it  expressed.  Some- 
times, but  rarely,  it  is  stated  with  accuracy,  and  with  due  recog- 
nition of  the  limits  within  which  Law  can  be  said  to  compre- 
hend the  phenomena  of  the  world.  But  generally  it  is  ex- 
pressed in  language  vague  and  hollow,  covering  inaccurate 
conceptions,  and  confounding  under  common  forms  of  expres- 
sion ideas  which  are  essentially  distinct.  The  mere  ticketing 
and  orderly  assortment  of  external  facts  is  constantly  spoken 
of  as  if  it  were  in  the  nature  of  Explanation,  and  as  if  no  highei 
truth  in  respect  to  natural  phenomena  were  to  be  attained  ot 
desired.*  And  herein  we  see  both  the  result  for  which  Bacor* 
labored,  and  the  danger  against  which  Bacon  prayed.  It  has 

*  Those  wh(?  have  followed  the  course  of  recent  speculation  will  recognize  this 
sentence  as  intended  to  describe  the  characteristic  principle  of  the  Positive  Philosophy. 
I  am  glad  to  observe  that  so  competent  a  judge  as  Mr.  George  H.  Lewes  says  of  it : — 
"  Although  not,  perhaps,  the  most  dignified  or  explicit  statement  of  the  Positive 
point  of  view,  this  may  be  accepted  as  essentially  correct." — Fortnightly  Review , 
July,  1867. 


THE    SUPERNATURAL. 

been  a  glorious  result  of  a  right  method  in  the  study  of  Nature, 
that  with  the  increase  of  knowledge  the  "  human  family  has 
been  endowed  with  new  mercies."  But  every  now  and  then, 
for  a  time  at  least,  from  "the  unlocking  of  the  gates  of  sense, 
and  the  kindling  of  a  greater  natural  light,  incredulity  and  in- 
tellectual night  have  arisen  in  our  minds."* 

But  let  us  observe  exactly  where  and  how  the  difficulty  arises. 
The  Reign  of  Law  in  Nature  is,  indeed,  so  far  as  we  can  ob- 
serve it,  universal.  But  the  common  idea  of  the  Supernatural 
is  that  which  is  at  variance  with  Natural  Law,  above  it,  or  in 
violation  of  it.  Nothing,  however  wonderful,  which  happens 
according  to  Natural  Law,  would  be  considered  by  any  one  as 
Supernatural.  The  law  in  obedience  to  which  a  wonderful 
thing  happens  may  not  be  known  ;  but  this  would  not  give  it  a 
supernatural  character,  so  long  as  we  assuredly  believe  that  it 
did  happen  according  to  some  law.  Hence,  it  would  appear  to 
follow  that  a  man  thoroughly  possessed  of  the  idea  of  Natural 
Law  as  universal,  never  could  admit  anything  to  be  supernat- 
ural ;  because  on  seeing  any  fact,  however  new,  marvellous,  or 
incomprehensible,  he  would  escape  into  the  conclusion  that  it 
was  the  result  of  some  natural  Law  of  which  he  had  before 
been  ignorant.  No  one  will  deny  that,  in  respect  to  the  vast 
majority  of  all  new  and  marvellous  phenomena,  this  would  be 
the  true  and  reasonable  conclusion.  It  is  not  the  conclusion 
of  pride,  but  of  humility  of  mind.  Seeing  the  boundless  ex- 
tent of  our  ignorance  of  the  natural  laws  which  regulate  so 
many  of  the  phenomena  around  us,  and  still  more  of  so  many 
of  the  phenomena  within  us,  nothing  can  be  more  reasonable 
than  to  conclude,  when  we  see  something  which  is  to  us  a  won- 
der, that  somehow,  if  we  only  knew  how,  it  is  "  all  right " — 
all  according  to  the  constitution  and  course  of  Nature.  But 
then,  to  justify  this  conclusion,  we  must  understand  Nature 
in  the  largest  sense, — as  including  all  that  is 

"  In  the  round  ocean,  and  the  living  air 
And  the  blue  sky,  and  in  the  mind  of  man" 

"  Tintern  Abbey." — WORDSWORTH. 

*  "  This  also  we  humbly  beg,  that  human  things  may  not  prejudice  such  as  are 
Divine,  neither  that  from  the  unlocking  of  the  gates  of  sense,  and  the  kindling  of  a 
greater  natural  light,  anything  of  incredulity  or  intellectual  night  may  arise  in  our 
minds  towards  Divine  mysteries." — "  The  Student's  Prayer."  Bacon's  Works. 


4  THE    REIGN    OF    LAW. 

We  must  understand  it  as  including  every  agency  which  we  see 
entering,  or  can  conceive  from  analogy  as  capable  of  entering, 
into  the  causation  of  the  world.  First  and  foremost  among 
these  is  the  agency  of  our  own  Mind  and  Will.  Yet,  strange 
to  say,  all  reference  to  this  agency  is  often  tacitly  excluded 
when  we  speak  of  the  laws  of  Nature.  One  of  our  most  dis- 
tinguished living  teachers  of  physical  science,  Prof.  Tyndall, 
began,  not  long  ago,  a  course  of  lectures  on  the  phenomena  of 
Heat  by  a  rapid  statement  of  the  modern  doctrine  of  the  Cor- 
relation of  Forces — how  the  one  was  convertible  into  the  other 
— how  one  arose  out  of  the  other — how  none  could  be  evolved 
except  from  some  other  as  a  pre-existing  source.  "Thus," 
said  the  lecturer,  "  we  see  there  is  no  such  thing  as  sponta- 
neousness  in  Nature."  What ! — not  in  the  lecturer  himself  ? 
Was  there  no  "  spontaneousness  "  in  his  choice  of  words — 
in  his  selection  of  materials — in  his  orderly  arrangement 
of  experiments  with  a  view  to  the  exhibition  of  particular 
results  ?  It  is  not  probable  that  the  lecturer  was  intending  to 
deny  this ;  it  simply  was  that  he  did  not  think  of  it  as  within 
his  field  of  view.  His  own  Mind  and  Will  were  then  dealing 
with  the  "  laws  of  Nature,"  but  they  did  not  occur  to  him  as 
forming  part  of  those  laws,  or,  in  the  same  sense,  as  subject 
to  them. 

Does  Man,  then,  not  belong  to  Nature  ?  Is  he  above  it — or 
merely  separate  from  it,  or  a  violation  of  it  ?  Is  he  supernat- 
ural ?  If  so,  has  he  any  difficulty  in  believing  in  himself  ?  Of 
course  not.  Self-consciousness  is  the  one  truth,  in  the  light  of 
which  all  other  truths  are  known.  Cogito,  ergo  sum,  or  volo, 
ergo  sum — this  is  the  one  conclusion  which  we  cannot  doubt, 
unless  Reason  disbelieves  herself.  Why,  then,  are  the  facul- 
ties of  the  human  mind  and  body  not  habitually  included 
among  the  "  laws  of  Nature  ?  "  Because  a  fallacy  is  getting 
hold  upon  us  from  a  want  of  definition  in  the  use  of  terms. 
"Nature"  is  being  used  in  the  narrow  sense  of  physical  nature. 
It  is  conceived  as  containing  nothing  beyond  the  properties  of 
Matter.  Thus  the  whole  mental  world  in  which  we  ourselves 
live,  and  move,  and  have  our  being,  is  excluded  from  it.  But 
these  selves  of  ours  do  belong  to  Nature.  At  all  events  if  we 
are  ever  to  understand  the  difficulties  in  the  way  of  believing 


THE    SUPERNATURAL.  5 

in  the  Supernatural,  we  must  first  keep  clearly  in  view  what  we 
intend  to  understand  as  included  in  the  Natural.  Let  us  never 
forget,  then,  that  the  agency  of  Man  is  of  all  others  the  most 
natural — the  one  with  which  we  are  most  familiar — the  only 
one,  in  fact,  which  we  can  be  said,  even  in  any  measure,  to 
understand.  When  any  wonderful  event  can  be  referred  to 
the  contrivance  or  ingenuity  of  Man,  it  is  thereby  at  once  re- 
moved from  the  sphere  of  the  Supernatural,  as  ordinarily  un- 
derstood. 

It  must  be  remembered,  however,  that  we  are  now  only 
seeking  a  clear  definition  of  terms  ?  and  that  provided  this 
other  meaning  be  clearly  agreed  upon,  the  Mind  and  Will  of 
Man  may  be  considered  as  separate  from  "  nature,"  and  be- 
longing to  the  Supernatural.  This  view  is  taken  in  an  able 
treatise  on  "  Nature  and  the  Supernatural,"  by  Dr.  Bushnell, 
an  American  clergyman.*  Dr,  Bushnell  says: — "That  is  su- 
pernatural, whatever  it  be,  that  is  either  not  in  the  chain  of 
natural  cause  and  effect,  or  which  acts  on  the  chain  of  cause 
and  effect  in  nature,  from  without  the  chain,,"  Again  : — "  If 
the  processes,  combinations,  and  results  of  our  system  of 
nature  are  interrupted  or  varied  by  the  action,  whether  of  God, 
or  angels,  or  men,  so  as  to  bring  to  pass  what  would  not  come 
to  pass  in  it  by  its  own  internal  action,  under  the  laws  of  mere 
cause  and  effect,  such  variations  are  in  like  manner  super- 
natural." There  is  no  other  objection  to  this  definition  of  the 
Supernatural,  than  that  it  rests  upon  a  limitation  of  the  terms 
"  Nature  "  and  "  natural,"  which  is  very  much  at  variance  with 
the  sense  in  which  they  are  commonly  understood.  There  is, 
indeed,  a  distinction  which  finds  its  expression  in  common  lan- 
guage between  the  works  of  Man  and  the  works  of  Nature,  A 
honeycomb,  for  example,  would  be  called  a  work  of  Nature, 
but- a  steam-engine  would  not.  This  distinction  is  founded  on 
a  true  perception  of  the  fact  that  the  Mind  and  Will  of  Man 
belong  to  an  order  of  existence  very  different  from  physical 
laws,  and  very  different  also  from  the  fixed  and  narrow  in- 
stincts of  the  lower  animals.  It  is  a  distinction  bearing  wit- 
ness to  the  universal  consciousness  that  the  Mind  of  Man  has 

*  •'  Nature  and  the  Supernatural,  as  together  constituting  the  one  System  of  God." 
By  Horace  Bushnell,  D.D.     Edinburgh,  1860, 


6  THE    REIGN    OF    LAW. 

within  it  something  of  a  truly  creative  energy  and  force — that 
we  are  in  a  sense  "  fellow-workers  with  God,"  and  have  been 
in  a  measure  "  made  partakers  of  the  Divine  nature."  Never- 
theless, it  would  be  using  the  word  in  a  sense  very  different 
from  that  in  which  it  is  generally  accepted,  were  we  to  call  the 
steam-engine  a  supernatural  work.  Yet  it  does  answer  strictly 
to  the  definition  of  Dr.  Bushnell  in  being  "  the  result  of  natural 
Law  varied  by  the  action  of  men/'  It  is  made  by  "  acting  on 
the  chain  of  cause  and  effect  in  nature  from  without  the  chain." 
But  then,  be  it  observed,  that  under  the  same  definition  all  the 
contrivances  of  Nature  become  Supernatural  the  moment  they 
are  conceived  as  the  work  of  a  Mind  using  what  we  call  the 
elements  of  nature  for  the  accomplishment  of  its  designs.  If, 
for  example,  it  is  open  to  us  to  conceive  that  such  a  creature 
as  a  Bee  cannot  have  been  made  out  of  those  elements  "  by 
their  own  internal  action,"  then  we  must  regard  both  this 
creature  and  the  wonderful  products  of  its  instinct  as  belong- 
ing to  the  Supernatural  The  honeycomb  and  the  steam- 
engine  would  thus  come  under  the  same  category — with  this 
only  difference,  that  the  mind  which  made  the  steam-engine, 
being  connected  with  a  Body,  is  visibly  known  to  us,  whereas 
the  Mind  which  made  the  Bee  is  withdrawn  from  sight  But 
both  can  be  equally  regarded  as  the  result  of  Mind  "acting  on 
the  chain  of  cause  and  effect  from  without  the  chain,"  Nor 
can  we  stop  here.  The  same  process  of  analysis  will  carry  us 
farther  in  the  same  direction.  We  often  speak,  as  Dr.  Bush- 
nell does  here,  of  the  elementary  forces  of  Nature  as  "  acting  " 
by  themselves.  But  there  is  no  other  meaning  in  these  words 
than  an  expression  of  the  fact  that  we  neither  see  nor  under- 
stand the  connection  of  those  elementary  forces  and  Mind. 
But  this  ignorance  of  ours  affords  no  manner  of  presumption 
that  such  connection  does  not  exist.  On  the  contrary,  though 
the  manner  of  that  connection  be  unknown,  it  is  much  more 
conceivable  to  us  that  some  connection  does  exist  than  that  it 
does  not  If  therefore  the  distinction  between  the  Natural 
and  the  Supernatural  be  the  distinction  between  that  which  is 
and  that  which  is  not  the  work  of  Mind,  then  it  becomes  a 
purely  arbitrary  distinction.  It  assumes  that  we  can  distin- 
guish between  cases  in  which  the  properties  of  matter  work 


THE    SUPERNATURAL.  J 

under  the  direction  of  Mind,  and  other  cases  in  which  they 
work  "  of  themselves."  But  this  is  a  line  which  we  draw  for 
ourselves.  There  is  no  reason  to  suppose  that  it  has  any 
reality  in  the  constitution  of  things.  It  is  not  in  those  things, 
but  in  the  point  of  view  from  which  we  regard  them,  that  the 
distinction  lies.  We  have  only  to  change  that  point  of  view, 
and  the  distinction  vanishes.  All  Nature  becomes  Super- 
natural, because  all  her  elements,  both  in  themselves  and  in 
their  combinations,  are  only  conceivable  as  first  established, 
and  then  employed  by  the  powers  of  Mind. 

But  if  this  definition  of  the  Supernatural  displeases  us,  as 
tending  to  confound  distinctions  which  we  had  thought  were 
clear,  let  us  take  another  definition.  Let  us  take  the  Natural 
in  that  larger  and  wider  sense,  in  which  it  contains  within  it 
the  whole  phenomena  of  Man's  intellectual  and  spiritual  na- 
ture, as  part,  and  the  most  familiar  of  all  parts  of  the  visible 
system  of  things.  This  is  a  definition  more  consonant  with  com- 
mon language.  In  all  ordinary  senses  of  the  term,  Man  and  his 
doings  belong  to  the  Natural,  as  distinguished  from  the  Super- 
natural. 

We  are  now  from  another  point  of  view  coming  nearer  to 
some  precise  understanding  of  what  the  Supernatural  may  be 
supposed  to  mean.  But  before  we  proceed,  there  is  another 
question  which  must  be  answered — What  is  the  relation  in  which 
the  agency  of  Man  stands  to  the  physical  laws  of  Nature  ?  The 
answer,  in  part  at  least,  is  plain.  His  power  in  respect  to 
those  laws  extends  only,  first  to  their  discovery  and  ascertain- 
ment, and  then  to  their  use.  He  can  establish  none  :  he  can 
suspend  none.  All  he  can  do  is  to  guide,  in  a  limited  degree, 
the  mutual  action  and  reaction  of  the  laws  amongst  each  other.. 
They  are  the  tools  with  which  he  works — they  are  the  instru- 
ments of  his  Will.  In  all  he  does  or  can  do  he  must  employ 
them.  His  ability  to  use  them  is  limited  both  by  his  want  of 
knowledge  and  by  his  want  of  power.  The  more  he  knows  of 
them,  the  more  largely  he  can  employ  them,  and  make  them 
ministers  of  his  purposes.  This,  as  a  general  rule,  is  true  ;  but 
it  is  subject  to  the  second  limitation  just  pointed  out.  Our 
power  over  Nature  does  not  necessarily  keep  pace  with  our 
knowledge  of  her  Laws.  Man  already  knows  far  more  than  he 


8  THE    REIGN    OF    LAW. 

has  power  to  convert  to  use.  It  is  a  true  observation  of  Sir 
George  Lewis,*  that  Astronomy,  for  example,  in  its  higher 
branches,  has  an  interest  almost  purely  scientific.  It  reveals 
to  our  knowledge  perhaps  the  grandest  and  most  sublime  of 
the  physical  laws  of  Nature.  But  a  much  smaller  amount 
of  knowledge  would  suffice  for  the  only  practical  applications 
which  we  have  yet  been  able  to  make  of  these  laws  to  our  own 
use.  Still,  that  knowledge  has  a  reflex  influence  on  our  knowl. 
edge  of  ourselves,  of  our  powers;  and  of  the  relations  which 
subsist  between  the  constitution  of  our  own  minds  and  the  con- 
stitution of  the  universe.  And  in  other  spheres  of  inquiry,  ad- 
vancing knowledge  of  physical  laws  has  been  constantly  accom- 
panied with  advancing  power  over  the  physical  world.  It  has 
enabled  us  to  do  a  thousand  things,  any  one  of  which,  a  few 
generations  ago,  would  have  been  considered  supernatural. 
Nor  can  it  be  said  that  this  judgment  of  their  character  would 
have  been  erroneous,  These  things  would  have  been  superhu- 
man then,  though  they  are  not  superhuman  now.  The  same 
lecturer  who  told  his  audience  that  there  was  nothing  sponta- 
neous in  Nature  proceeded,  by  virtue  of  his  own  knowledge  of 
natural  laws,  and  by  his  selecting  and  combining  power,  to  pre- 
sent a  whole  series  of  phenomena — such  as  ice  frozen  in  contact 
with  red-hot  crucibles — which  certainly  did  not  belong  to  the 
"  ordinary  course  of  Nature."  Such  an  exhibition  a  few  cent- 
uries ago  would,  beyond  all  doubt,  have  subjected  the  lecturer 
on  Heat  to  painful  experience  of  that  condition  of  matter. 
Nevertheless  the  phenomena  so  exhibited  were  natural  phenom- 
ena— in  this  sense,  that  they  were  the  product  of  natural  laws. 
Only  these  laws  were  combined  in  action  under  extraordinary 
conditions,  and  -these  conditions  were  governed  by  the  purpose 
and  design  of  the  lecturer,  which  design  was  "  spontaneous," 
if  there  is  any  meaning  in  the  word.  In  like  manner,  if  the 
progress  of  discovery  is  as  rapid  during  the  next  four  hundred 
years  as  it  has  been  during  the  last  period  of  the  same  extent, 
men  will  be  able  to  do  many  things  which  would  now  appear 
to  be  "  supernatural."  There  is  no  difficulty  in  conceiving  how 
a  complete  knowledge  of  all  natural  laws  would  give,  if  not 
complete  power,  at  least  degrees  of  power,  immensely  greater 

*  "  Astronomy  of  the  Ancients,"  p.  25;. 


THE    SUPERNATURAL.  9 

than  those  which  we  now  possess.  Power  of  this  kind,  then, 
however  great  in  degree,  clearly  does  not  answer  that  idea  of 
the  Supernatural  which  so  many  reject  as  inconceivable.  What, 
then,  is  that  idea  ?  Have  we  not  traced  it  to  its  den  at  last  ? 
By  *'  supernatural "  power,  do  we  not  mean  power  independent 
of  the  use  of  means,  as  distinguished  from  power  depending 
on  knowledge — even  infinite  knowledge — of  the  means  proper 
to  be  employed  ? 

This  is  the  sense — probably  the  only  sense — in  which  the 
Supernatural  is,  to  many  minds,  so  difficult  of  belief.  No  man 
can  have  any  difficulty  in  believing  that  there  are  natural  laws 
of  which  he  is  ignorant ;  nor  in  conceiving  that  there  may  be 
Beings  who  do  know  them,  and  can  use  them,  even  as  he  him- 
self now  uses  the  few  laws  with  which  he  is  acquainted.  The 
real  difficulty  lies  in  the  idea  of  Will  exercised  without  the  use 
of  means — not  in  the  idea  of  Will  exercised  through  means 
which  are  beyond  our  knowledge,  or  beyond  our  reach. 

Now,  have  we  any  right  to  say  that  belief  in  this  is  essential 
to  all  Religion  ?  If  we  have  not,  then,  it  is  only  putting,  as  so 
many  other  hasty  sayings  do  put,  additional  difficulties  in  the 
way  of  Religion.  The  relation  in  which  God  stands  to  those 
rules  of  His  government  which  are  called  "  laws,."  is,  of  course, 
an  inscrutable  mystery  to  us.  But  the  very  idea  of  a  Creator 
involves  the  idea  not  merely  of  a  Being  by  whom  the  proper- 
ties of  Matter  are  employed,  but  of  a  Being  from  whose  Will 
the  properties  of  Matter  are  derived.  This,  indeed,  is  the 
proper  work  of  Creation,  as  nearly  as  we  can  form  a  concep- 
tion of  it.  It  is  true  that  in  forming  this  conception  we  pass 
beyond  the  bounds  of  our  own  experience,  because  "  we  pass 
from  that  in  God  of  which  there  is  an  image  in  Man,  to  that 
which  is  distinctive  of  God  as  God."  But  this  we  must  do  in 
forming  any  idea  of  a  God  at  all.  We  must  conceive  the  Crea- 
tor as  first  giving  existence  to  the  means,  and  then  using  them 
for  the  accomplishment  of  ends.  "  We  cannot  conceive  of  the 
original  relation  of  this  Universe  to  God  as  that  of  an  infinite 
multitude  of  laws  to  an  infinite  Mind,  having  (only)  perfect 
knowledge  of  them,  and  using  this  knowledge  in  turning  them 
to  account,  in  accomplishing  designs  of  infinite  wisdom.  We 
cannot  conceive  of  infinite  wisdom  thus,  as  it  were,  finding  in* 


JO  THE    REIGN    OF    LAW. 

finite  resources  already  existing."  *  All  this  is  true.  But  those 
who  believe  that  God's  Will  does  govern  the  world,  must  be- 
lieve that  ordinarily,  at  least,  He  does  govern  it  by  the  choice 
and  use  of  means, — which  means  were  again  pre-established  by 
Himself.  Nor  have  we  any  certain  reason  to  believe  that  He 
ever  acts  otherwise.  Extraordinary  manifestations  of  His  Will 
— signs  and  wonders — may  be  wrought,  for  aught  we  know,  by 
similar  instrumentality — only  by  the  selection  and  use  of  laws 
of  which  Man  knows  and  can  know  nothing,  and  which,  if  he 
did  know,  he  could  not  employ.t 

Here,  then,  we  come  upon  the  question  of  miracles — how  we 
understand  them  ?  what  we  would  define  them  to  be  ?  The 
common  idea  of  a  miracle  is,  a  suspension  or  violation  of  the  laws 
of  Nature.  This  is  a  definition  which  places  the  essence  of  a 
miracle  in  a  particular  method  of  operation.  But  there  is 
another  definition  which  passes  over  the  question  of  method 
altogether,  and  dwells  only  on  the  agency  by  which,  and  the 
purpose  for  which,  a  wonderful  work  is  wrought.  "  We  would 
confine  the  word  miracle,"  says  Dr.  M'Cosh,$  "to  those  events 
which  were  wrought"  in  our  world  as  a  sign  or  proof  of  God 
making  a  supernatural  interposition,  or  a  revelation  to  Man." 
The  two  most  essential  conditions  in  this  view  of  a  miracle,  are 
that  it  is  a  work  wrought  by  a  Divine  power  for  a  Divine  purpose, 
and  is  of  a  nature  such  as  could  not  be  wrought  by  merely 
human  contrivance.  This  definition  of  a  miracle  does  not  neces- 
sarily exclude  the  idea  of  God  working  by  the  use  of  means,  pro- 
vided they  are  such  means  as  are  out  of  human  reach.  Indeed, 

*  I  am  glad  to  be  able  to  quote  these  passages  from  one  of  my  earliest  and  most 
valued  friends,  the  Rev.  J.  McLeod  Campbell.  They  occur  in  an  Introduction  to  a 
new  edition  of  his  work  on  the  "  Nature  of  the  Atonement "  (Macmillan  and  Co.,  1867) 
—an  Introduction  marked  by  characteristic  depth  of  thought  and  feeling. 

t  This  chapter,  originally  published  as  an  article  in  the  Edinburgh  Review  for  OcU 
1862,  has  been  referred  to  in  the  remarkable  work  of  Mr.  Lecky  on  "  The  Rise  and 
Influence  of  Rationalism  in  Europe"  (vol.  i.  ch.  ii.  p.  195  note),  as  conveying  "  a  no- 
tion of  a  miracle  which  would  not  differ  generically  from  a  human  act,  though  it 
would  still  be  strictly  available  for  evidential  purposes."  I  am  quite  satisfied  with 
this  definition  of  the  result.  Beyond  the  immediate  purposes  of  benevolence,  which 
were  served  by  almost  all  the  miracles  of  the  New  Testament,  the  only  other  purpose 
which  is  ever  assigned  to  them  is  an  "  evidential  purpose  "—that  is,  a  purpose  that 
they  might  serve  as  signs  of  the  presence  of  superhuman  knowledge,  and  of  the  work- 
ing of  superhuman  power.  They  were  performed — in  short — to  assist  faith,  and  not 
to  confound  reason. 

%  "  The  Supernatural  in  Relation  to  the  Natural."  By  the  Rev.  James  M'Cosh,  LL.D. 
Macmillan,  Cambridge,  1861. 


THE    SUPERNATURAL.  II 

in  an  important  note  (p,  149),  Dr.  M'Cosh  explains  that  miracles 
are  not  to  be  considered  ''  as  against  Nature  "  in  any  other  sense 
than  that  in  which  "  one  natural  agent  may  be  against  another 
— as  water  may  counteract  fire."  This  eminent  writer  has  ap- 
proached the  subject  by  the  right  method,  because  he  has  ad- 
dressed himself  first  to  the  solution  of  the  one  question  which 
is  an  essential  preliminary  to  all  subsequent  discussion  : — "  How 
much  is  contained  in  the  Natural  ?  "  Not  until  this  question  is 
answered,  can  the  Supernatural  be  defined.  Yet  the  answer 
given  by  Dr.  M'Cosh  shows  the  inherent  and  the  insuperable 
difficulty  which  attends  the  giving  of  any  answer  at  all.  "  In 
this  world,"  he  says,  "there  is  a  set  of  objects  and  agencies 
which  constitute  a  system  or  Cosmos  which  may  have  relations 
to  regions  beyond,  but  is  all  the  while  a  self-contained  sphere, 
with  a  space  around  it — an  Island  so  far  separated  from  other 
lands.  This  system  we  call  Nature  "  (p.  1 01).  This  definition 
of  the  Natural  is  perhaps  as  accurate  and  as  full  as  any  that  can 
be  given.  It  assumes,  however,  that  the  boundaries  of  the 
Natural  are  known.  But  the  essential  difficulty  of  separating 
between  the  Natural  and  the  Supernatural  is  this — that  the 
boundaries  of  the  Natural  are  not  known — that  we  cannot  trace 
the  shores  of  this  "  island  " — that  even  if  we  could  see  any 
distinct  separation  between  them  and  the  space  around  them, 
we  have  not  explored  the  "  island  "  itself  completely,  and  there- 
fore we  cannot  say  of  any  agency  working  therein,  that  it  comes 
from  beyond  the  Sea.  Mr.  Mansel,  in  his  "  Essay  on  Miracles," 
adopts  the  word  "  superhuman  "  as  the  most  accurate  expression 
of  his  meaning.  He  says,  "  A  superhuman  authority  needs  to 
be  substantiated  by  superhuman  evidence ;  and  what  is  super- 
human is  miraculous"  *  It  is  important  to  observe  that  this 
definition  does  not  necessarily  involve  the  idea  of  a  "  violation 
of  the  laws  of  Nature."  It  does  not  involve  the  idea  of  the 
exercise  of  Will  apart  from  the  use  of  means.  It  does  not 
imply  any  exception  to  the  great  law  of  causation.  It  does  not 
involve,  therefore,  that  idea  which  appears  to  many  so  difficult 
of  conception.  It  simply  supposes,  without  any  attempt  to 

*  "  Aids  to  Faith,"  p.  35.  In  another  passage  (p.  21),  Mr.  Mansel  says,  that  in  re- 
spect to  the  great  majority  of  the  miracles  recorded  in  Scripture,  "  the  supernatural 
element  appears  .  .  .  in  the  exercise  of  a  personal  power  transcending  the  limits  of 
man's  will.  They  are  not  so  much  supermaterial  as  superhuman" 


12  THE    REIGN    OF    LAW. 

fathom  the  relation  in  which  God  stands  to  His  own  "  laws," 
that  out  of  His  infinite  knowledge  of  these  laws,  or  of  His 
infinite  power  of  making  them  the  instruments  of  His  Will,  He 
•  may  and  He  does  use  them  for  extraordinary  indications  of  His 
presence.* 

The  reluctance  to  admit,  as  belonging  to  the  domain  of 
Nature,  any  special  exertion  of  Divine  power  for  special  pur- 
poses, stands  really  in  very  close  relationship  to  the  converse  no- 
tion, that  where  the  operation  of  natural  causes  can  be  clearly 
traced,  there  the  exertion  of  Divine  power  and  Will  is  rendered 
less  certain  and  less  convincing.  This  is  the  idea  which  lies 
at  the  root  of  Gibbon's  famous  chapters  on  the  spread  of 
Christianity.  He  labors  to  prove  that  it  was  due  to  natural 
causes.  In  proving  this,  he  evidently  thinks  he  is  disposing  of 
the  notion  that  Christianity  spread  by  Divine  power  ;  whereas 
he  only  succeeds  in  pointing  out  some  of  the  means  which  were 
employed  to  effect  a  Divine  purpose.  In  like  manner,  the 
preservation  of  the  Jews  as  a  distinct  People  during  so  many 
centuries  of  complete  dispersion,  is  a  fact  standing  nearly,  if  not 
absolutely,  alone  in  the  history  of  the  world.  It  is  at  variance 
with  all  other  experience  of  the  laws  which  govern  the 
amalgamation  with  each  other  of  different  families  of  the  human 
race.  The  case  of  the  Gypsies  has  been  referred  to  as  somewhat 
parallel.  But  the  facts  of  this  case  are  doubtful  and  obscure, 
and  such  of  them  as  we  know  involve  conditions  altogether  dis- 
similar in  kind.  It  is  not  surprising,  therefore,  that  the  pres- 
ervation of  the  Jews,  partly  from  the  relation  in  which  it  stands 
to  the  apparent  fulfilment  of  Prophecy,  and  partly  from  the  ex- 
traordinary nature  of  the  fact  itself,  is  tacitly  assumed  by  many 
persons  to  come  strictly  within  the  category  of  miraculous  events. 
Yet  in  itself  it  is  nothing  more  than  a  striking  illustration  how 
a  departure  from  the  "  ordinary  course  of  nature  "  may  be  ef- 
fected through  the  instrumentality  of  means  which  are  natural 
and  comprehensible.  An  extraordinary  resisting  power  has 

*  I  agree  with  Mr.  J.  M.  Campbell  when  he  says,  in  the  Introduction  already  quoted, 
"  It  appears  to  me  that  we  do  not  know  enough  to  say  as  regards  anything  transcend- 
ing our  knowledge  of  Law,  in  which  way  we  should  view  it — whether  as  belonging  to 
the  system  of  Law,  but  to  a  region  of  it  out  of  our  sight,  or  as  outside  of  that 
system,  and  as  having  the  same  immediate  relation  to  God  which  the  system  of  Law 
ultimately  has." — P.  xxxv. 


THE    SUPERNATURAL.  13 

been  given  to  the  Jewish  People  against  those  dissolving  and 
disintegrating  forces  which  have  caused  the  disappearance  of 
every  other  race  placed  under  similar  conditions.  They  have 
been  torn  from  home  and  country,  and  removed,  not  in  a  body, 
but.  in  scattered  fragments,  over  the  world.  Yet  they  are  as 
distinct  from  every  other  people  now  as  they  were  in  the  days  of 
Solomon.  Nevertheless  this  resisting  power,  wonderful  though 
it  be,  is  the  result  of  special  laws,  overruling  those  in  ordinary 
operation.  It  has  been  effected  by  the  use  of  means.  Those 
means  have  been  superhuman — they  have  been  beyond  human 
contrivance  and  arrangement.  But  they  belong  to  the  region 
of  the  Natural.  They  belong  to  it  not  the  less,  but  all  the 
more,  because  in  their  concatenation  and  arrangement  they 
seem  to  indicate  the  purpose  of  a  living  Will  seeking  and  ef- 
fecting the  fulfilment  of  its  designs.  This  is  the  manner  after 
which  our  own  living  wills  in  their  little  sphere  effect  their 
little  objects.  Is  it  difficult  to  believe  that  after  the  same  man- 
ner also  the  Divine  Will,  of  which  ours  is  the  image  only,  works 
and  effects  its  purposes  ? 

Our  own  experience  shows  that  the  universal  Reign  of  Law 
is  perfectly  consistent  with  a  power  of  making  those  laws  sub- 
servient to  design — even  when  the  knowledge  of  them  is  but 
slight,  and  the  power  over  them  slighter  still.  How  much 
more  easy,  how  much  more  natural,  to  conceive  that  the  same 
universality  is  compatible  with  the  exercise  of  that  Supreme  Will 
before  which  all  are  known,  and  to  which  all  are  servants  1 
What  difficulty  in  this  view  remains  in  the  idea  of  the  Super- 
natural ?  Is  it  any  other  than  the  difficulty  in  believing  in  the 
existence  of  a  Supreme  Will — in  a  living  God  ?  If  this  be  the 
belief  of  which  M.  Guizot  speaks  when  he  says  that  it  is  essen- 
tial to  religion,  then  his  proposition  is  unquestionably  true.  In 
this  sense  the  difficulty  of  believing  in  the  Supernatural,  and 
the  difficulty  of  believing  in  pure  Theism,  is  one  and  the  same. 
But  if  he  means  that  it  is  necessary  to  religion  to  believe  in 
even  the  occasional  "violation  of  law," — if  he  means  that  with- 
out such  belief,  signs  and  wonders  cease  to  be  evidences  of 
Divine  power, — then  he  announces  a  proposition  which  cannot 
be  sustained.  There  is  nothing  in  Religion  incompatible  with 
the  belief  that  all  exercises  of  God's  power,  whether  ordinary 


14  THE    REIGN    OF    LAW. 

or  extraordinary,  are  effected  through  the  instrumentality  of 
means — that  is  to  say,  by  the  instrumentality  of  natural  laws 
brought  out,  as  it  were,  and  used  for  a  Divine  purpose.  To 
believe  in  the  existence  of  miracles,  we  must  indeed  believe 
in  the  Superhuman  and  in  the  Supermaterial.  But  both  these 
are  familiar  facts  in  Nature.  We  must  believe  also  in  a  Supreme 
Will  and  a  Supreme  Intelligence  ;  but  this  our  own  Will  and 
our  own  Intelligence  not  only  enable  us  to  conceive  of,  but 
compel  us  to  recognize  in  the  whole  laws  and  economy  of  Na- 
ture. Her  whole  aspect  "  answers  intelligently  to  our  intelli- 
gence— mind  responding  to  mind  as  in  a  glass."*  Once  admit 
that  there  is  a  Being  who — irrespective  of  any  theory  as 
to  the  relation  in  which  the  laws  of  Nature  stand  to  His  Will- 
has  at  least  an  infinite  knowledge  of  those  laws,  and  an  infinite 
power  of  putting  them  to  use — then  miracles  lose  every  element 
of  inconceivability.  In  respect  to  the  greatest  and  highest 
of  all — that  restoration  of  the  breath  of  life  which  is  not  more 
mysterious  than  its  original  gift — there  is  no  answer  to  the  ques- 
tion which  Paul  asks,  "  Why  should  it  be  thought  a  thing  in- 
credible by  you  that  God  should  raise  the  dead  ?  " 

This  view  of  miracles  is  well  expressed  by  Principal  Tul- 
loch  :— 

"  The  stoutest  advocate  of  interference  can  mean  nothing 
more  than  that  the  Supreme  Will  has  so  moved  the  hidden 
springs  of  nature  that  a  new  issue  arises  on  given  circumstances. 
The  ordinary  issue  is  supplanted  by  a  higher  issue.  The  es- 
sential facts  before  us  are  a  certain  set  of  phenomena,  and  a 
Higher  Will  moving  them.  How  moving  them  ?  is  a  question 
for  human  definition  ;  but  the  answer  to  which  does  not  and 
cannot  affect  the  Divine  meaning  of  the  change.  Yet  when 
we  reflect  that  this  Higher  Will  is  everywhere  reason  and  wis- 
dom, it  seems  a  juster  as  well  as  a  more  comprehensive  view  to 
regard  it  as  operating  by  subordination  and  evolution  rather 
than  by  '  interference  '  or  *  violation.'  According  to  this  view, 
the  idea  of  Law  is  so  far  from  being  contravened  by  the  Chris- 
tian miracles,  that  it  is  taken  up  by  them  and  made  their  very 

*  ''  Beginning  Life  :  Chapters  for  Young  Men  on  Religion,  Study,  and  Business, 
Chap,  iii.,  The  Supernatural  "  By  John  Tulloch,  D.D.,  Principal  of  St.  Mary's  College, 
St.  Andrew's.  Edinburgh,  1860.  P.  29. 


THE    SUPERNATURAL.  1 5 

basis.  They  are  the  expression  of  a  Higher  Law,  working  out 
its  wise  ends  among  the  lower  and  ordinary  sequences  of  life 
and  history.  These  ordinary  sequences  represent  nature — 
nature,  however,  not  as  an  immutable  fate,  but*a  plastic  medi- 
um through  which  a  Higher  Voice  and  Will  are  ever  addressing 
us,  and  which,  therefore,  may  be  wrought  into  new  issues  when 
the  Voice  has  a  new  message,  and  the  Will  a  special  purpose 
for  us."* 

It  is  well  worthy  of  remark,  that  Locke,  who  laid  great  stress 
on  the  Christian  miracles,  as  attesting  the  authority  of  those 
who  wrought  them,  declines,  nevertheless,  to  adopt  the  common 
definition  of  that  in  which  miraculous  agency  consists.  "A 
miracle  then,"  he  says,t  "  I  take  to  be  a  sensible  operation, 
which,  being  above  the  comprehension  of  the  spectator  and,  in 
his  opinion,  contrary  to  the  established  course  of  nature,  is 
taken  by  him  to  be  Divine."  And  in  reply  to  the  objection,  that 
this  makes  a  miracle  depend  on  the  opinions  or  knowledge  of 
the  spectator,  he  points  out  that  this  objection  cannot  be  avoided 
by  any  of  the  definitions  commonly  adopted  ;  because  "  it  be- 
ing agreed  that  a  miracle  must  be  that  which  surpasses  the 
force  of  nature  in  the  established  steady  laws  of  cause  and 
effect,  nothing  can  be  taken  to  be  a  miracle  but  what  is  judged 
to  exceed  those  laws.  Now  every  one  being  able  to  judge  of 
those  laws  only  by  his  own  acquaintance  with  nature,  and  his  own 
notions  of  its  force,  which  are  different  in  different  men,  it  is 
unavoidable  that  that  should  be  a  miracle  to  one  man  which  is 
not  so  to  another."  In  this  passage  Locke  recognizes  the  great 
truth,  that  we  can  never  know  what  is  above  Nature  unless  we 
know  all  that  is  within  Nature.  But  he  misses  another  truth, 
quite  as  important, — that  a  miracle  would  still  be  a  miracle 
even  though  we  did  know  the  laws  through  which  it  was  accom- 
plished, provided  those  laws,  though  not  beyond  human  knowl- 
edge, were  beyond  human  control.  We  might  know  the  con- 
ditions necessary  to  the  performance  of  a  miracle,  although 
utterly  unable  to  bring  those  conditions  about.  Yet  a  work 
performed  by  the  bringing  about  of  conditions  which  are  out  of 

*  "  Beginning  Life,"  etc.,  pp.  85,  86.     By  John  Tulloch,  D.D. 
t  "  A  Discourse  on  Miracles. 


1 6  THE    REIGN    OF    LAW. 

human  reach,  would  certainly  be  a  work  attesting  superhuman 
power. 

Nevertheless  so  deeply  ingrained  in  popular  theology  is  the 
idea  that  miracles,  to  be  miracles  at  all,  must  be  performed  by 
some  violation  or  suspension  of  the  laws  of  Nature,  that  the 
opposite  idea  of  miracles  being  performed  by  the  use  of  means 
is  regarded  by  many  with  jealousy  and  suspicion.  Strange  that 
it  should  be  thought  the  safest  course  to  separate  as  sharply 
and  as  widely  as  we  can  between  what  we  are  called  upon  to 
believe  in  Religion,  and  what  we  are  able  to  trace  or  under- 
stand in  Nature  !  With  what  heart  can  those  who  cherish  this 
frame  of  mind  follow  the  great  argument  of  Butler  ?  All  the 
steps  of  that  argument — the  greatest  in  the  whole  range  of 
Christian  philosophy — are  founded  on  the  opposite  belief,  that 
all  the  truths,  and  not  less  all  the  difficulties  of  Religion,  have 
their  type  and  likeness  in  the  "  constitution  and  course  of  Na- 
ture." As  we  follow  that  reasoning,  so  simple  and  so  profound, 
we  find  our  eyes  ever  opening  to  some  new  interpretation  of 
familiar  facts,  and  recognizing  among  the  curious  things  of 
earth,  one  after  another  of  the  laws  which,  when  told  us  of  the 
spiritual  world,  seem  so  perplexing  and  so  hard  to  accept  or 
understand.  To  ask  how  much  further  this  argument  of  the 
"  Analogy "  is  capable  of  illustration  and  development,  is  to 
ask  how  much  more  we  shall  know  of  Nature.  Like  all  central 
truths,  its  ramifications  are  infinite — as  infinite  as  the  appear- 
ance of  variety,  and  as  pervading  as  the  sense  of  oneness  in  the 
universe  of  God. 

But  what  of  Revelation  ?  Are  its  history  and  doctrines  in- 
compatible with  the  belief  that  God  uniformly  acts  through  the 
use  of  means  ?  The  narrative  of  Creation  is  given  to  us  in  ab- 
stract only,  and  is  told  in  two  different  forms,  both  having  ap- 
parently for  their  main,  perhaps  their  exclusive  object,  the 
presenting  to  our  conception  the  personal  agency  of  a  living 
God.  Yet  this  narrative  indicates,  however  slightly,  that  room 
is  left  for  the  idea  of  a  material  process.  "  Out  of  the  dust  of 
the  ground ; "  that  is,  out  of  the  ordinary  elements  of  Nature, 
was  that  Body  formed  which  is  still  upheld  and  perpetuated  by 
organic  forces  acting  under  the  rules  of  Law.  Nothing  which 
Science  has  discovered,  or  can  discover,  is  capable  of  traversing 


THE    SUPERNATURAL.  17 

that  simple  narrative.  On  this  subject  M.  Guizot  lays  great 
stress,  as  many  others  do,  on  what  he  calls  the  Supernatural  in 
Creation,  as  distinguished  from  the  operations  now  visible  in 
Nature.  "  De  quelle  fagon  et  par  quelle  puissance  le  genre  hu- 
main  a-t-il  commence'  sur  la  terre  ? "  In  reply  to  this  question, 
he  proceeds  to  argue  that  Man  must  have  been  the  result  either 
of  mere  material  forces,  or  of  a  supernatural  power  exterior  to,, 
and  superior  to  Matter.  Spontaneous  generation,  he  argues,, 
supposing  it  to  exist  at  all,  can  give  birth  only  to  infant  beings 
—to  the  first  hours,  and  feeblest  forms  of  nascent  life.  But 
Man — the  human  pair — must  evidently  have  been  complete 
from  the  first ;  created  in  the  full  possession  of  their  powers  and 
faculties.  "  C'est  a  cette  condition  seulement  qu'en  appar- 
aissant  pour  la  premiere  fois  sur  la  terre  1'homme  aurait  pu  y 
vivre — s'y  perpetuer,  et  y  fonder  le  genre  humain.  Evidem- 
ment  1'autre  origine  du  genre  humain  est  seul  admissible,  seul 
possible.  Le  fait  surnaturel  de  la  creation  explique  seul  la 
premiere  apparition  de  1'homme  ici-bas." 

This  is  a  common  but  not  a  very  safe  argument.  If  the  Su- 
pernatural— that  is  to  say,  the  Superhuman  and  the  Super- 
material — cannot  be  found  nearer  to  us  than  this,  it  will  not  be 
Sfecurely  found  at  all.  It  is  very  difficult  to  free  ourselves  from 
this  notion  that  by  going  far  enough  back,  we  can  "  find  out 
God  "  in  some  sense  in  which  we  cannot  find  Him  now.  The 
certainty  not  merely  of  one,  but  of  many  successive  Creations 
in  the  history  of  our  Planet,  and  especially  of  a  time  compara- 
tively recent,  when  Man  did  not  exist,  is  indeed  an  effectual 
answer  to  the  notion,  if  it  be  now  ever  entertained,  of  "  all 
things  having  continued  as  they  are  since  the  Beginning."  But 
those  who  believe  that  the  existing  processes  of  Nature  can  be 
accounted  for  by  "  Law,"  may  believe  that  those  processes  were 
also  commenced  by  the  same  vague  and  mysterious  agency.  To 
accept  the  primeval  narrative  of  the  Jewish  Scriptures  as  com- 
ing from  authority,  and  as  bringing  before  us  the  personal  agency 
of  the  Creator,  but  without  purporting  to  reveal  the  method  of 
His  work, — this  is  one  thing.  To  argue  that  no  other  origin 
for  the  first  parents  of  the  human  race  is  conceivable  than  that 
they  were  moulded  perfect,  without  the  instrumentality  of  any 
means, — this  is  quite  another  thing.  The  various  hypotheses  o£ 


1 8  THE    REIGN    OF    LAW. 

Development,  of  which  Darwin's  theory  is  only  a  new  and 
special  version,  whether  they  are  probable  or  not,  are  at  least 
advanced  as  affording  a  possible  escape  from  the  puzzle  which 
M.  Guizot  puts.  These  hypotheses  are  indeed  destitute  of  proof ; 
and  in  the  form  which  they  have  as  yet  assumed,  it  may  justly 
be  said  that  they  involve  such  violations  of,  or  departures  from, 
all  that  we  know  of  the  existing  order  of  things,  as  to  deprive 
them  of  all  scientific  basis.  But  the  close  and  mysterious  rela- 
tions between  the  mere  animal  frame  of  Man,  and  that  of  the 
lower  animals,  does  render  the  idea  of  a  common  relationship 
by  descent  at  least  conceivable.  Indeed,  in  proportion  as  it 
seems  to  approach  nearer  to  processes  of  which  we  have  some 
knowledge,  it  is,  in  a  degree,  more  conceivable  than  Creation 
without  any  process,  — of  which  we  have  no  knowledge  and  can 
have  no  conception. 

But  whatever  may  have  been  the  method  or  process  of  Crea- 
tion, it  is  Creation  still.  If  it  were  proved  to-morrow  that  the 
first  man  was  "born"  from  some  pre-existing  Form  of  Life,  it 
would  still  be  true  that  such  a  birth  must  have  been,  in  every 
sense  of  the  word,  a  new  Creation.  It  would  still  be  as  true  that 
God  formed  him  "out  of  the  dust  of  the  earth,"  as  it  is  true  that 
He  has  so  formed  every  child  who  is  now  called  to  answer  the  first 
question  of  all  theologies.  And  we  must  remember  that  the 
language  of  Scripture  nowhere  draws,  or  seems  even  conscious 
of,  the  distinction  which  modern  philosophy  draws  so  sharply 
between  the  Natural  and  the  Supernatural.  All  the  operations 
of  Nature  are  spoken  of  as  operations  of  the  Divine  Mind. 
Creation  is  the  outward  embodiment  of  a  Divine  idea.  It  is  in 
this  sense,  apparently,  that  the  narrative  of  Genesis  speaks  of 
ever}'  plant  being  formed  "before  it  grew."  But  the  same 
language  is  held,  not  less  decidedly,  of  every  ordinary  birth. 
"  Thine  eyes  did  see  my  substance,  yet  being  imperfect.  In 
Thy  book  all  my  members  were  written,  which  in  continuance 
were  fashioned,  when  as  yet  there  were  none  of  them."  And 
these  words,  spoken  of  the  individual  birth,  have  been  applied 
not  less  truly  to  the  modern  idea  of  the  Genesis  of  all  Organic 
Life.  Whatever  may  have  been  the  physical  or  material  rela- 
tion between  its  successive  forms,  the  ideal  relation  has  been 
now  clearly  recognized,  and  reduced  to  scientific  definition. 


THE    SUPERNATURAL.  19 

All  the  members  of  that  frame  which  has  received  its  highest  in- 
terpretation in  Man,  had  existed,  with  lower  offices  assigned  to 
them,  in  the  animals  which  flourished  before  Man  was  born.  All 
theories  of  Development  have  been  simply  attempts  to  suggest 
the  manner  in  which,  or  the  physical  process  by  means  of  which 
this  ideal  continuity  of  type  and  pattern  has  been  preserved. 
But  whilst  all  these  suggestions  have  been  in  the  highest  degree 
uncertain,  some  of  them  violently  absurd,  the  one  thing  which 
is  certain  is  the  fact  for  which  they  endeavor  to  account. 
And  what  is  that  fact  ?  It  is  one  which  belongs  to  the  world  of 
Mind,  not  to  the  world  of  Matter.  When  Professor  Owen  tells 
us,  for  example,  that  certain  jointed  bones  in  the  Whale's  pad- 
dle are  the  same  bones  which  in  the  Mole  enable  it  to  burrow, 
which  in  the  Bat  enable  it  to  fly,  and  in  Man  constitute  his  hand 
with  all  its  wealth  of  functions,  he  does  not  mean  that  physically 
and  actually  they  are  the  same  bones,  nor  that  they  have  the 
same  uses,  nor  that  they  ever  have  been,  or  ever  can  be,  transfer- 
able from  one  kind  of  animal  to  another.  He  means  that  in  a 
purely  ideal  or  mental  conception  of  the  plan  of  all  Vertebrate 
skeletons,  these  bones  occupy  the  same  relative  place — relative, 
that  is,  not  to  origin  or  use,  but  to  the  Plan  or  conception  of 
that  skeleton  as  a  whole. 

Here  the  Supermaterial,  and  in  this  sense  the  Supernatural, 
element, — that  is  to  say,  the  ideal  conformity  and  unity  of  con- 
ception, is  the  one  unquestionable  fact,  in  which  -we  recognize 
directly  the  working  of  a  Mind  with  which  our  own  has  very 
near  relations.  Here,  as  elsewhere,  we  see  the  Natural,  in  the 
largest  sense,  including  and  embodying  the  Supernatural ;  the 
Material,  including  the  Supermaterial.  No  possible  theory, 
whether  true  or  false,  in  respect  to  the  physical  means  em- 
ployed to  preserve  the  correspondence  of  parts  which  runs 
through  all  Creation,  can  affect  the  certainty  of  that  mental 
plan  and  purpose  which  alone  makes  such  correspondence  in- 
telligible to  us,  and  in  which  alone  it  may  be  said  to  exist. 

It  must  always  be  remembered  that  the  two  ideas, — that  of 
a  Physical  Cause  and  that  of  a  Mental  Purpose, — are  not 
antagonistic  ;  only  the  one  is  larger  and  more  comprehensive 
than  the  other.  Let  us  take  a  case.  In  many  animal  frames 
there  are  what  have  been  called  "  silent  members  " — members 


20  THE    REIGN    OF    LAW. 

which  have  no  reference  to  the  life  or  use  of  the  animal,  but  only 
to  trie  general  pattern  on  which  all  vertebrate  skeletons  have 
been  formed.  Mr.  Darwin,  when  he  sees  such  a  member  in 
any  animal,  concludes  with  certainty  that  this  animal  is  the 
lineal  decendant  by  ordinary  generation  of  some  other  animal 
in  which  that  member  was  not  silent  but  turned  to  use.  Pro- 
fessor Owen,  taking  a  larger  and  wider  view,  would  say,  with- 
out pretending  to  explain  how  its  presence  is  to  be  accounted 
for  physically,  that  the  silent  member  has  relation  to  a  general 
purpose  or  plan  which  can  be  traced  from  the  dawn  of  Life,  but 
which  did  not  receive  its  full  accomplishment  until  Man  was 
born.  This  is  certain  :  the  other  is  a  theory.  The  assumed 
physical  cause  may  be  true  or  false.  But  in  any  case  the  men- 
tal purpose  and  design — the  conformity  to  an  abstract  idea — 
this  is  certain.  The  relation  in  which  created  Forms  stand  to 
our  own  mind  and  to  our  understanding  of  their  Purpose,  is 
the  one  thing  which  we  can  surely  know,  because  it  belongs  to 
our  own  consciousness.  It  is  entirely  independent  of  any  be- 
lief we  may  entertain,  or  any  knowledge  we  may  acquire,  of 
the  processes  employed  for  the  fulfilment  of  that  Purpose. 

And  yet  scientific  men  sometimes  tell  us  that  "  we  must  be 
very  cautious  how  we  ascribe  intention  to  nature.  Things  do  fit 
into  each  other,  no  doubt,  as  if  they  were  designed ;  but  all  we 
know  about  them  is  that  these  correspondences  exist,  and  that 
they  seem  to  be  the  result  of  physical  laws  of  development  and 
growth."  Very  likely;  but  how  these  correspondences  have 
arisen,  and  are  daily  arising,  is  not  the  question,  and  it  is  im- 
material how  that  question  may  be  answered.  Do  those  cor- 
respondences exist,  or  do  they  not  ?  The  perception  of  them 
by  our  mind  is  as  much  a  fact  as  the  sight  or  touch  of  the 
things  in  which  they  appear.  They  may  have  been  produced 
by  growth — they  may  have  been  the  result  of  a  process  of  de- 
velopment,— but  it  is  not  the  less  the  development  of  a  men- 
tal purpose.  It  is  the  end  subserved  that  we  absolutely  know. 
What  alone  is  doubtful  and  obscure  is  precisely  that  which  We 
are  told  is  the  only  legitimate  object  of  our  research, — viz., 
the  means  by  which  that  end  has  been  attained.  Take  one 
instance  out  of  millions.  The  poison  of  a  deadly  snake — let 
us  for  a  moment  consider  what  this  is.  It  is  a  secretion  of 


THE    SUPERNATURAL.  21 

definite  chemical  properties  which  have  reference,  not  only — 
not  even  mainly — to  the  organism  of  the  animal  in  which  it  is 
developed,  but  specially  to  the  organism  of  another  animal 
which  it  is  intended  to  destroy.  Some  naturalists  have  a 
vague  sort  of  notion  that,  as  regards  merely  mechanical  weap- 
on^, or  organs  of  attack,  they  may  be  developed  by  use, — that 
legs  may  become  longer  by  fast  running,  teeth  sharper  and 
longer  by  much  biting.  Be  it  so  :  this  law  of  growth,  if  it  exist, 
is  but  itself  an  instrument  whereby  purpose  is  fulfilled.  But 
how  will  this  law  of  growth  adjust  a  poison  in  one  animal  with 
such  subtle  knowledge  of  the  organization  of  another  that  the 
deadly  virus  shall  in  a  few  minutes  curdle  the  blood,  benumb 
the  nerves,  and  rush  in  upon  the  citadel  of  life  ?  There  is  but 
one  explanation — a  Mind,  having  minute  and  perfect  knowl- 
edge of  the  structure  of  both,  has  designed  the  one  to  be  capa- 
ble of  inflicting  death  upon  the  other.  This  mental  purpose 
and  resolve  is  the  one  thing  which  our  intelligence  perceives  with 
direct  and  intuitive  recognition.  The  method  of  creation,  by 
means  of  which  this  purpose  has  been  carried  into  effect,  is 
utterly  unknown. 

It  is  no  answer  or  objection  to  this  view  that  poisons  exist 
also  in  plants  and  minerals  where  no  similar  adjustment  to 
function  is  perceived.1*  Even  in  these  cases  there  are  wonder- 
ful relations  between  our  own  human  frame  and  many  poisons 
of  the  mineral  and  vegetable  world  which  render  them  invalu- 
able agents  in  the  mitigation  of  suffering  and  the  prevention 
or  removal  of  disease.  It  is  impossible  to  believe  that  these 
complicated  relations  of  action  and  reaction  between  things 
separated  apparently  from  each  other  by  the  whole  width  of 
being,  have  been  the  result  of  forces  with  which  Mind  and 
Prevision  have  had  no  concern.  But  even  if  the  use  of  such 
poisons  were  absolutely  unknown — even  if  that  use  lay,  which 
it  does  not,  beyond  the  possibility  of  our  conception, — this 
would  not  deduct  by  the  value  of  a  fraction  from  the  certainty 
of  a  conclusion  which  is  founded  on  different  conditions.  The 
relations  of  adjustment  between  a  given  number  of  elements 

*  "  To  what  intention  are  we  to  ascribe  the  poisons  liberally  distributed  through 
plants  and  minerals?  "  asks  Mr.  G.  H.  Lewes  in  his  review  of  this  work.—  Fortnight- 
ly Review,  July  1867,  p.  100. 


22  THE    REIGN    OF    LAW. 

are  none  the  less  a  certain  fact  because  similar  elements  may 
be  found  elsewhere  without  any  such  adjustment  being  visible 
to  us.  It  is  the  very  fact  of  their  not  being  separate  but  com- 
bined in  the  one  case  which  justifies  and  compels  a  conclusion 
different  from  that  which  arises  in  the  other  case.  This  is  the 
law  of  evidence  on  which  we  act  and  judge  in  other  matters 
with  conviction  which  is  both  intuitive  and  capable  of  being 
confirmed  by  the  rules  of  reason.  And  this  reply  is  applicable 
to  all  objections  of  the  same  kind.  Those  portions  of  the  sys- 
tem of  Nature  which  are  wholly  dark  to  us  do  not  necessarily 
cast  any  shadow  on  those  other  portions  of  that  system  which 
are  luminous  with  inherent  light.  Rather  the  other  way.  The 
shining  tracts  which  thus  reflect  the  light  of  Reason  and  of 
Mind  send  abundant  rays  into  all  the  dark  places  round  them. 
The  new  discoveries  which  Science  is  ever  making  of  adjust- 
ments and  combinations,  of  which  we  had  no  previous  concep- 
tion, impress  us  with  an  irresistible  conviction  that  the  same 
relations  to  Mind  prevail  throughout.  It  matters  not  in  what 
department  of  investigation  inquiry  is  conducted,  it  matters  not 
what  may  be  the  Philosophy  or  Theology  of  the  inquirer. 
Every  step  he  takes  he  finds  himself  face  to  face  with  facts 
which  he  cannot  describe  intelligibly  either  to  himself  or 
others,  except  by  referring  them  to  that  function  and  power  of 
Mind  which  we  know  as  Purpose  and  Design. 

Perhaps  no  illustration  more  striking  of  this  principle  was 
ever  presented  than  in  the  curious  volume  published  by  Mr. 
Darwin  on  the  "  Fertilization  of  Orchids."  *  It  appears  that 
the  fertilization  of  almost  all  Orchids  is  dependent  on  the  trans- 
port of  the  pollen  from  one  flower  to  another  by  means  of  in- 
sects. It  appears,  further,  that  the  structure  of  these  flowers 
is  elaborately  contrived,  so  as  to  secure  the  certainty  and  effect- 
iveness of  this  operation.  Mr.  Darwin's  work  is  devoted  to 
tracing  in  detail  what  these  contrivances  are.  To  a  large  ex- 
tent they  are  purely  mechanical,  and  can  be  traced  with  as 
much  clearness  and  certainty  as  the  different  parts  of  which  a 
steam-engine  is  composed.  The  complication  and  ingenuity  of 
these  contrivances  almost  exceed  belief.  "Moth-traps  and 

*  "  On  the  Various  Contrivances  by  which  British  and  Foreign  Orchids  are  Fertil- 
ized by  Insects."     By  Charles  Darwin,  F.R.S,,  London,  1862. 


THE    SUPERNATURAL. 

spring-guns  set  on  these  grounds,"  might  be  the 
Orchids.  There  are  baits  to  tempt  the  nectar-loving  Lepidop- 
tera,  with  rich  odors  exhaled  at  night,  and  lustrous  colors  to 
shine  by  day ;  there  are  channels  of  approach  along  which  they 
are  surely  guided,  so  as  to  compel  them  to  pass  by  certain 
spots  ;  there  are  adhesive  plasters  nicely  adjusted  to  fit  fheir  pro- 
bosces,  or  to  catch  their  brows  ;  there  are  hair  triggers  carefully 
set  in  their  necessary  path,  communicating  with  explosive  shells, 
which  project  the  pollen-stalks  with  unerring  aim  upon  their 
bodies.  There  are,  in  short,  an  infinitude  of  adjustments,  for 
an  idea  of  which  I  must  refer  my  readers  to  Mr.  Darwin's  in» 
imitable  powers  of  observation  and  description — adjustments 
all  contrived  so  as  to  secure  the  accurate  conveyance  of  the 
pollen  of  the  one  flower  to  its  precise  destination  in  the  struct- 
ure of  another. 

Now  there  are  two  questions  which  present  themselves  when 
we  examine  such  a  mechanism  as  this.  The  first  is,  What  is 
the  use  of  the  various  parts,  or  their  relation  to  each  other  with 
reference  to  the  purpose  of  the  whole?  The  second  question 
is,  How  were  those  parts  made,  and  out  of  what  materials  ?  It 
is  the  first  of  these  questions — that  is  to  say,  the  use,  object, 
intention,  or  purpose  of  the  different  parts  of  the  plant — which 
Darwin  sets  himself  instinctively  to  answer  first ;  and  it  is  this 
which  he  does  answer  with  precision  and  success.  The  second 
question, — that  is  to  say,  how  those  parts  came  to  be  developed 
and  out  of  what  "  primordial  elements  "  they  have  been  derived 
in  their  present  shapes,  and  converted  to  their  present  uses — 
this  is  a  question  which  Darwin  does  also  attempt  to  solve,  but 
the  solution  of  which  is  in  the  highest  degree  difficult  and  un- 
certain. It  is  curious  to  observe  the  language  which  this  most 
advanced  disciple  of  pure  naturalism  instinctively  uses  when 
he  has  to  describe  the  complicated  structure  of  this  curious 
order  of  plants.  "  Caution  in  ascribing  intentions  to  nature," 
does  not  seem  to  occur  to  him  as  possible.  Intention  is  the 
one  thing  which  he  does  see,  and  which,  when  he  does  not  see, 
he  seeks  for  diligently  until  he  finds  it.  He  exhausts  every 
form  of  words  and  of  illustration  by  which  intention  or  mental 
purpose  can  be  described.  "  Contrivance  " — "  curious  contriv- 
ance " — "  beautiful  contrivance," — these  are  expressions  which 


^4  THE    REIGN    OF    LAW. 

recur  over  and  over  again.  Here  is  one  sentence  describing 
the  parts  of  a  particular  species  :  "  The  Labellum  is  developed 
into  a  long  nectary,  in  order  to  attract  Lepidoptera,  and  we 
shall  presently  give  reasons  for  suspecting  that  the  nectar  is 
purposely  so  lodged  that  it  can  be  sucked  only  slowly,  in  order 
to  give  time  for  the  curious  chemical  quality  of  the  viscid  matter 
setting  hard  and  dry."  *  Nor  are  these  words  used  in  any  sense 
different  from  that  in  which  they  are  applicable  to  the  works 
of  Man's  contrivance — to  the  instruments  we  use  or  invent  for 
carrying  into  effect  our  own  preconceived  designs.  On  the 
contrary,  human  instruments  are  often  selected  as  the  aptest 
illustrations  both  of  the  object  in  view,  and  of  the  means  taken 
to  effect  it.  Of  one  particular  structure,  Mr.  Darwin  says  : 
"  This  contrivance  of  the  guiding  ridges  may  be  compared  to 
the  little  instrument  sometimes  used  for  guiding  a  thread  into 
the  eye  of  a  needle."  Again,  referring  to  the  precautions  taken 
to  compel  the  insects  to  come  to  the  proper  spot,  in  order  to 
have  the  "  pollinia  "  attached  to  their  bodies,  Mr.  Darwin  says  : 
"  Thus  we  have  the  rostellum  partially  closing  the  mouth  of 
the  nectary,  like  a  trap  placed  in  a  run  for  game, — and  the  trap 
so  complex  and  perfect !  "  f  But  this  is  not  all.  The  idea  of 
special  use,  as  the  controlling  principle  of  construction,  is  so 
impressed  on  Mr.  Darwin's  mind,  that,  in  every  detail  of  struct- 
ure, however  singular  or  obscure,  he  has  absolute  faith  that 
in  this  lies  the  ultimate  explanation.  If  an  organ  is  largely 
developed,  it  is  because  some  special  purpose  is  to  be  fulfilled. 
If  it  is  aborted  or  rudimentary,  it  is  because  that  purpose  is  no 
longer  to  be  subserved.  In  the  case  of  another  species  whose 
structure  is  very  singular,  Mr.  Darwin  had  great  difficulty  in 
discovering  how  the  mechanism  was  meant  to  work,  so  as  to 
effect  the  purpose.  At  last  he  made  it  out,  and  of  the  clue 
which  led  to  the  discovery  he  says :  "  The  strange  position  of 
the  Labellum  perched  on  the  summit  of  the  column,  ought 
to  have  shown  me  that  here  was  the  place  for  experiment. 
I  ought  to  have  scorned  the  notion  that  the  Labellum  was 
thus  placed  for  no  good  purpose.  I  neglected  this  plain  guide, 
and  for  a  long  time  completely  failed  to  understand  the 
flower."$ 
*  P.  29.  t  P.  30.  t  P.  262. 


THE    SUPERNATURAL.  25 

An  attempt  has,  indeed,  been  made  to  explain  away  Mr. 
Darwin's  language  in  such  cases  as  "metaphorical."*  But 
this  explanation  is  powerless  to  expel  from  that  language  the 
inference  it  involves.  Indeed,  it  is  an  explanation  which  only 
repeats  the  same  idea  in  another  form.  The  very  essence  of  a 
metaphor  is  that  it  expresses  the  resemblances  of  things.  But 
it  is  in  seeing  the  resemblances,  and  in  seeing  the  correlative 
differences  of  things,  that  all  knowledge  consists.  This  per- 
ception is  the  raw  material  of  Thought — it  is  the  foundation  of 
all  intellectual  apprehension.  In  proportion  as  resemblances 
are  complete,  the  language  which  expresses  those  resemblances 
is  the  language  of  truth.  Such  language  very  often  carries 
within  it  the  most  certain  conclusions  which  are  accessible  to 
reason.  One  mind  looking  at  the  workings  of  another  mind 
can  see  likeness  of  agency  only  by  recognizing  likeness  in  the 
processes  of  thought.  That  likeness  can  only  be  expressed  in 
words  which  convey  the  idea  of  it  to  other  minds.  But  in  this 
sense  all  language  is  metaphorical.  The  commonest  words  we 
use  to  indicate  ideas  are  essentially  metaphorical,  bringing 
home  into  the  world  of  Mind  images  derived  from  material 
force,  and  carrying  forth  again  into  the  outward  world  concep- 
tions born  of  that  mental  power  which  alone  is  capable  of  con- 
ceiving. In  one  aspect,  all  human  speech  is  what  the  Poet 
calls  it,  "  Matter-moulded  forms  of  speech."  t  In  another 
aspect  it  is  all  spirit-moulded,  since  we  can  only  think  of  Mat- 
ter in  the  light  of  those  impressions  which  it  has  power  to  make 
on  Mind.  All  language  is  thus  but  a  system  of  signs  whereby 
we  express  the  analogies — the  differences  and  resemblances 
perceived  by  us  in  those  two  great  departments  of  Nature  of 
which  the  union  and  the  separation  are  both  imaged  in  our- 
selves— that  is,  in  the  union  and  in  the  difference  of  the  Body 
and  the  Mind.  The  most  absolute  certainties  we  can  ever 
know  are  only  known  by  the  translation  of  ideas  or  conceptions 
from  one  of  these  departments  to  the  other,  and  the  language 
in  which  these  certainties  are  expressed  carries,  and  must  carry, 

*  Quarterly  Journal  of  Science,  Oct.  1867.  *'  Creation  by  Law,"  by  Alfred  Wal- 
/ace.  "  Mr.  Darwin  has  laid  himself  open  to  much  misconception,  and  has  given  to 
his  opponents  a  powerful  weapon  by  his  continual  use  of  metaphor  in  describing  the 
wonderful  coadaptations  of  organic  beings." — P.  473. 

t  "In  Memoriam,"  xciv. 


26  THE    REIGN    OF    LAW. 

signs  of  this  origin  in  itself.  The  question,  therefore,  in  respect 
to  Mr.  Darwin's  language,  is  not  whether  it  is  "  metaphorical " 
—that  is,  whether  it  applies  to  material  phenomena  conceptions 
derived  from  the  world  of  Mind.  This,  of  course,  it  does,  and 
in  the  nature  of  the  case  it  must  do.  But  the  question  is, 
whether  the  correspondence  it  expresses  between  the  order  of 
these  material  phenomena  and  a  known  order  of  Thought  is 
or  is  not  a  real  correspondence,  and  one,  therefore,  indicating 
the  known  effects  of.  a  known  originating  cause. 

And  here  it  is  well  worthy  of  observation,  that  alt-hough  Pur- 
pose and  Intention  are,  of  course,  involved  in  all  mental  opera- 
tions, yet  the  conception  of  contrivance  is  not  the  only  mental 
conception  which,  in  like  manner,  is  recognized  as  constituting 
the  order  of  natural  phenomena.  Other  conceptions  equally 
familiar  to  the  mind  of  Man  are  instinctively  recognized  by  all 
Naturalists  who  bring  high  intellectual  powers  into  that  contact 
with  Nature  which  consists  in  close  and  thoughtful  observation 
of  her  facts.  Other  mental  conceptions,  such  as  those  of  Num- 
ber and  Proportion,  are  then  found  to  emerge,  and  make  an 
ineffaceable  impression  on  the  mind  which  sees  them. 

Thus,  when  we  come  to  the  second  part  of  Mr.  Darwin's 
work,  viz.,  the  Homology  of  the  Orchids,  we  find  that  the  in- 
quiry divides  itself  into  two  separate  questions, — first,  the  ques- 
tion what  all  these  complicated  organs  are  in  their  primitive  re- 
lation to  each  other;  and,  secondly,  how  these  successive  mod- 
ifications have  arisen,  so  as  to  fit  them  for  new  and  changing 
uses.  Now,  it  is  very  remarkable  that  of  these  two  questions, 
that  which  maybe  called  the  most  abstract  and  transcendental — 
the  most  nearly  related  to  the  Supernatural  and  the  Superma- 
terial — is  again  precisely  the  one  which  Darwin  is  able  to  solve 
most  clearly.  We  have  already  seen  how  well  he  solves  the 
first  question — What  is  the  use  and  intention  of  these  various 
parts  ?  The  next  question  is,  What  are  these  parts  in  their 
primal  order  and  conception  ?  The  answer  is,  that  they  are 
members  of  a  numerical  group,  having  a  definite  and  still  trace- 
able order  of  symmetrical  arrangement.  They  are  expressions 
of  a  numerical  idea,  as  so  many  other  things — perhaps  as  all 
things — of  beauty  are.  Mr.  Darwin  gives  a  diagram,  showing 
the  primordial  or  archetypal  arrangement  of  Threes  within 


SUPERNATURAL.  27 

Threes,  out  of  which  all  the  strange  and  marvellous  forms  of 
the  Orchids  have  been  developed,  and  to  which,  by  careful 
counting  and  dissection,  they  can  still  be  ideally  reduced.  But 
when  we  come  to  the  last  question — By  what  process  of  natural 
consequence  have  these  elementary  organs  of  Three  within 
Three  been  developed  into  so  many  various  forms  of  beauty, 
and  made  to  subserve  so  many  curious  and  ingenious  designs  ? 
—we  find  nothing  but  the  vaguest  and  most  unsatisfactory  con- 
jectures. Let  us  take  one  instance  as  an  example.  There  is  a 
Madagascar  Orchis — the  "  Angraecum  sesquipedale  " — with  an 
immensely  long  and  deep  nectary.  How  did  such  an  extraor- 
dinary organ  come  to  be  developed  ?  Mr.  Darwin's  explana- 
tion is  this  :  The  pollen  of  this  flower  can  only  be  removed  by 
the  proboscis  of  some  very  large  Moth  trying  to  get  at  the  nec- 
tar at  the  bottom  of  the  vessel.  The  Moths  with  the  longest 
probosces  would  do  this  most  effectually;  they  would  be  re- 
warded for  their  long  noses  by  getting  the  most  nectar ;  whilst, 
on  the  other  hand,  the  flowers  with  the  deepest  nectaries  would 
be  the  best  fertilized  by  the  largest  Moths  preferring  them. 
Consequently,  the  deepest-nectaried  Orchids,  and  the  longest- 
nosed  Moths,  would  each  confer  on  the  other  a  great  advan- 
tage in  the  "  battle  of  life."  This  would  tend  to  their  respective 
perpetuation,  and  to  the  constant  lengthening  of  nectaries  and 
of  noses.  But  the  passage  is  so  curious  and  characteristic, 
that  it  is  well  to  give  Mr.  Darwin's  own  words : — 

"  As  certain  Moths  of  Madagascar  became  larger,  through 
natural  selection  in  relation  to  their  general  conditions  of  life, 
either  in  the  larval  or  mature  state,  or  as  the  proboscis  alone 
was  lengthened  to  obtain  honey  from  the  Angraecum,  those  in- 
dividual plants  of  the  Angraecum  which  had  the  longest  necta- 
ries, (and  the  nectary  varies  much  in  length  in  some  Orchids,) 
and  which,  consequently,  compelled  the  Moths  to  insert  their 
probosces  up  to  the  very  base,  would  be  the  best  fertilized. 
These  plants  would  yield  most  seed,  and  the  seedlings  would 
generally  inherit  longer  nectaries ;  and  so  it  would  be  in  suc- 
cessive generations  of  the  plant  and  Moth.  Thus  it  would  ap- 
pear that  there  has  been  a  race  in  gaining  length  between  the 
nectary  of  the  Angraecum  and  the  proboscis  of  certain  Moths  ; 
but  the  Angraecum  has  triumphed,  for  it  flourishes  and  abounds 


28  THE    REIGN    OF    LAW 

in  the  forests  of  Madagascar,  and  still  troubles  each  Moth  to 
insert  its  proboscis  as  far  as  possible  in  order  to  drain  the  last 
drop  of  nectar.  .  .  .  We  can  thus,"  says  Mr.  Darwin,  "par- 
tially understand  how  the  astonishing  length  of  the  nectar}7 
may  have  been  acquired  by  successive  modifications." 

It  is  indeed  but  a  "  partial "  understanding.*  How  came 
this  Orchis  to  require  any  exact  adjustment  between  the  length 
of  its  nectary  and  the  proboscis  of  an  insect  ?  This  is  not  a 
general  necessity  even  among  the  Orchids.  "  In  the  British 
species,  such  as  Orchis  Pyramidalis,  it  is  not  necessary  that 
any  such  adjustment  should  exist,  and  thus  a  number  of  insects 
of  various  sizes  are  found  to  carry  away  the  pollinia,  and  aid  in 
the  fertilization. "f  This  would  obviously  be  the  most  favorable 
condition  for  all  Orchids  in  the  battle  of  life.  Does  not  the 
hypothesis,  then,  begin  by  assuming  the  very  condition  of 
things  for  which  it  professes  to  account  ?  We  must  start  with 
this  Madagascar  Orchis  already  in  possession  of  a  larger  nec- 
tary than  other  species,  and  with  a  structure  already  depending 
on  particular  Moths  also  already  existing,  and  already  provided 
with  probosces  of  nicely  adjusted  length.  If  the  nectaries  be- 
gan first  to  lengthen,  how  came  the  Moths  not  to  leave  them 
for  other  flowers  ?  And  if,  on  the  contrary,  they  began  to 
shorten,  how  came  they  not  to  be  favored  and  resorted  to  by 
other  Moths  of  a  smaller  size  ?  Can  we  assume  that  somehow 
there  were  always  ready  some  Moths  still  larger  to  favor  the 
longer  variety,  and  that  somehow  also  there  were  no  smaller 
Moths  to  favor  the  shorter  ?  $  Why  should  the  race  in  this  par- 
ticular species  be  always  in  the  direction  of  nectaries  getting 
longer,  and  not  rather  in  the  direction  of  nectaries  getting 
shorter  ?  Obviously  the  same  hypothesis  might  be  so  turned 
as  to  account  for  either  result  with  equal  ease,  and  therefore  it 
does  not  account  at  all  for  one  of  those  results  as  against  the 

*The  passage  which  follows  I  have  added  to  meet  the  objection  taken  by  Mr. 
Wallace,  that  I  have  "  not  shown  what  point  the  explanation  fails  to  meet."  A  sam- 
ple only  of  such  points  can  be  given  here.  See  also  Note  A. 

t  "  Creation  by  Law."     G.  A.  R.  Wallace.    Journal of  'Science \  October,  1867,  p.  475. 

t  Mr.  Wallace  sees  no  difficulty  whatever  in  making  any  supposition  of  this  kind 
which  the  Theory  may  require.  "  Now  let  us  start,"  he  says,  "  from  the  time  when 
the  nectary  was  only  half  its  present  length,  or  about  six  inches,  and  was  chiefly  fer- 
tilized by  a  species  of  Moth  -which  appeared  at  the  time  of  the  plants  flowering,  and 
•whose  proboscis  was  of  the  same  length." — Ibid.  p.  475. 


THE    SUPERNATURAL.  29 

other.  And  then  there  is  a  larger  question  than  any  of  these 
which  remains  behind.  How  came  Orchids  to  be  dependent  at 
all  upon  insects  for  fertilization  ?  It  cannot  be  argued  that 
this  is  a  necessity  arising  mechanically  from  the  nature  of 
things,  because,  as  we  are  truly  told  by  an  eminent  naturalist 
who  warmly  supports  the  Darwinian  hypothesis,  "exactly  the 
same  end  is  attained  in  ten  thousand  other  flowers  "  which  do 
not  possess  the  same  structure.*  But  what  is  the  bearing  of 
this  fact  upon  the  theory  ?  Is  it  not  this — that  the  origin  of 
such  curious  structures,  and  complicated  relations,  cannot  be 
accounted  for  on  any  principle  of  mere  mechanical  necessity  ? 
Elementary  forces  may  indeed  always  be  detected,  for  they  are 
always  present.  But  the  manner  in  which  they  are  worked  ir- 
resistibly suggests  some  directing  power,  having  as  one  of  its 
aims  mere  increase  and  variety  in  that  ocean  of  enjoyment 
which  constitutes  the  sum  of  Organic  Life.  Some  idea  of  this 
kind,  however  unconsciously,  however  reluctantly  conceded, 
lurks  in  every  form  of  words  in  which  the  facts  of  science  can 
be  generalized  to  the  mind.  Thus  we  find  Mr.  Wallace  him- 
self saying,  in  the  same  paper  in  which  he  regrets  the  language 
of  Mr.  Darwin,  that  the  conception  he  prefers  is,  that  the  "  con- 
trivances "  referred  to  "  are  some  of  the  results  of  those  gen- 
eral laws  which  were  so  co-ordinated  at  the  first  introduction  of 
Life  upon  the  earth,  as  to  result  necessarily  in  the  utmost  pos- 
sible development  of  varied  forms."  Eliminating  the  word 
"  necessarily,"  which,  if  it  has  any  meaning,  does  not  apply,  as 
we  have  seen,  to  the  case  of  the  Orchids,  this  language  pre- 
sents an  intelligible  idea.  It  satisfies  the  mind  precisely  in 
proportion  as  it  brings  into  view,  however  distant,  the  attri- 
butes of  Mind,  and  gives  us  a  glimpse  of  "  the  reason  why." 
The  production  of  variety  in  beauty  and  in  enjoyment  is  the 
purpose  which  those  words  suggest.  In  like  proportion  is  Mr. 
Darwin's  language  the  truest  and  the  best.  His  explanations 
of  the  mechanical  methods  by  which  a  wonderful  Orchis  hate 
come  to  be  are  indeed,  as  he  himself  says,  with  great  candor, 
"  partial  "  and  partial  only.  How  different  from  the  clearness 
and  the  certainty  with  which  Mr.  Darwin  is  able  to  explain  to 
us  the  use  and  intention  of  the  various  organs !  or  the  primal 

*  "  Creation  by  Law,"  p.  474. 


30  THE    REIGN    OF    LAW. 

idea  of  numerical  order  and  arrangement  which  governs  the 
whole  structure  of  the  flower  !  It  is  the  same  through  all  Na- 
ture. Purpose  and  intention,  or  ideas  of  order  based  on  nu- 
merical relations,  are  what  meet  us  at  every  turn,  and  are  more 
or  less  readily  recognized  by  our  own  intelligence  as  corre- 
sponding to  conceptions  familiar  to.  our  own  minds.  We  know, 
too,  that  these  purposes  and  ideas  are  not  our  own,  but  the 
ideas  and  purposes  of  Another- — of  One  whose  manifestations 
are  indeed  superhuman  and  supermaterial,  but  are  not  "  super- 
natural," in  the  sense  of  being  strange  to  Nature,  or  in  viola- 
tion of  it. 

The  truth  is,  that  there  is  no  such  distinction  between  what 
we  find  in  Nature,  and  what  we  are  called  upon  to  believe  in 
Religion,  as  that  which  men  pretend  to  draw  between  the 
Natural  and  the  Supernatural.  It  is  a  distinction  purely 
artificial,  arbitrary,  unreal.  Nature  presents  to  our  intelligence, 
the  more  clearly  the  more  we  search  her,  the  designs,  Ideas, 
and  intentions  of  some 

"  Living  Will  that  shall  endure, 
When  all  that  seems  shall  suffer  shock." 

Religion  presents  to  us  that  same  Will,  not  only  working  equally, 
through  the  use  of  means,  but  using  means  which  are  strictly 
analogous — referable  to  the  same  general  principles — and  which 
are  constantly  appealed  to  as  of  a  sort  which  we  ought  to  be  able 
to  appreciate,  because  we  are  already  familiar  with  the  like.  Re- 
ligion makes  no  call  on  us  to  reject  that  idea,  which  is  the  only 
idea  some  men  can  see  in  Nature — the  idea  of  the  universal  Reign 
of  Law — the  necessity  of  conforming  to  it — the.  limitations  which 
in  one  aspect  it  seems  to  place  on  the  exercise  of  Will, — the  es- 
sential basis,  in  another  aspect,  which  it  supplies  for  all  the 
functions  of  Volition.  On  the  contrary,  the  high  regions  into 
which  this  idea  is  found  extending,  and  the  matters  over  which 
it  is  found  prevailing,  is  one  of  the  deepest  mysteries  both  of 
Religion  and  of  Nature.  We  feel  sometimes  as  if  we  should 
like  to  get  above  this  rule — into  some  secret  Presence  where  its 
bonds  are  broken.  But  no  glimpse  is  ever  given  us  of  any- 
thing, but  "  Freedom  within  the  bounds  of  Law."  The  Will  re- 
vealed to  us  in  Religion  is  not — any  more  than  the  Will  re- 


THE    SUPERNATURAL.  31 

vealed  to  us  in  Nature — a  capricious  Will,  but  one  with  which, 
in  this  respect,  "  there  is  no  variableness,  neither  shadow  of 
turning." 

We  return,  then,  to  the  point  from  which  we  started.  M. 
Guizot's  affirmation  that  belief  in  the  Supernatural  is  essential 
to  all  Religion  is  true  only  when  it  is  understood  in  a  special 
sense.  Belief  in  the  existence  of  a  Living  Will — of  a  Personal 
God — is  indeed  a  requisite  condition.  Conviction  "  that  He 
is  "  must  precede  the  conviction  that  "  He  is  the  rewarder  of 
those  that  diligently  seek  Him."  But  the  intellectual  yoke  in- 
volved in  the  common  idea  of  the  Supernatural  is  a  yoke  which 
men  impose  upon  themselves.  Obscure  thought  and  confused 
language  are  the  main  source  of  difficulty. 

Assuredly,  whatever  may  be  the  difficulties  of  Christianity, 
this  is  not  one  of  them, — that  it  calls  on  us  to  believe  in  any 
exception  to  the  universal  prevalence  and  power  of  Law.  Its 
leading  facts  and  doctrines  are  directly  connected  with  this  be- 
lief, and  directly  suggestive  of  it.  The  Divine  mission  of  Christ 
on  earth — does  not  this  imply  not  only  the  use  of  means  to  an  end, 
but  some  inscrutable  necessity  that  certain  means,  and  these  only, 
should  be  employed  in  resisting  and  overcoming  evil  ?  What 
else  is  the  import  of  so  many  passages  of  Scripture  implying 
that  certain  conditions  were  required  to  bring  the  Saviour  of 
Man  into  a  given  relation  with  the  race  he  was  sent  to  save  ? 
"  It  behoved  Him  ....  to  make  the  Captain  of  our  Sal- 
vation perfect  through  suffering."  "  It  behoved  Him  in  all 
things  to  be  made  like  unto  His  brethren,  that  he  might  be"  etc. — 
with  the  reason  added  :  "  for  in  that  He  Himself  hath  suffered 
being  tempted,  He  is  able  to  succour  them  that  are  tempted." 
Whatever  more  there  may  be  in  such  passages,  they  all  imply  the 
universal  reign  of  Law  in  the  moral  and  spiritual,  as  well  as  in 
the  material  world  :  that  those  laws  had  to  be — behoved  to  be — 
obeyed  ;  and  that  the  results  to  be  obtained  are  brought  about 
by  the  adaptation  of  means  to  an  end,  or,  as  it  were,  by  way 
of  natural  consequences  from  the  -  instrumentality  employed. 
This,  however,  is  an  idea  which  systematic  theology  generally 
regards  with  intense  suspicion,  though,  in  fact,  all  theologies  in- 
volve it,  and  build  upon  it.  But  then  they  are  very  apt  to  give 
explanations  of  that  instrumentality  which  have  no  counterpart 


32  THE    REIGN    OF    LAW. 

in  the  material  or  in  the  moral  world.  Perhaps  it  is  not  too 
much  to  say  that  the  manifest  decay  which  so  many  creeds  and 
confessions  are  now  suffering,  arises  mainly  from  the  degree  in 
which  at  least  the  popular  expositions  of  them  dissociate  the 
doctrines  of  Christianity  from  the  analogy  and  course  of 
Nature.  There  is  no  such  severance  in  Scripture — no  shyness 
of  illustrating  Divine  things  by  reference  to  the  Natural.  On 
the  contrary,  we  are  perpetually  reminded  that  the  laws  of  the 
spiritual  world  are  in  the  highest  sense  laws  of  Nature,  whose 
obligation,  operation,  and  effect  are  all  in  the  constitution  and 
course  of  things.  Hence  it  is  that  so  much  was  capable  of  be- 
ing conveyed  in  the  form  of  parable — the  common  actions  and 
occurrences  of  daily  life  being  often  chosen  as  the  best  vehicle 
and  illustration  of  the  highest  spiritual  truths.  It  is  not  merely, 
as  Jeremy  Taylor  says,  that  "  all  things  are  full  of  such 
resemblances," — it  is  more  than  this — more  than  resemblance. 
It  is  the  perpetual  recurrence,  under  infinite  varieties  of  applica- 
tion, of  the  same  rules  and  principles  of  Divine  government, — 
of  the  same  Divine  thoughts,  Divine  purposes,  Divine  affections. 
Hence  it  is  that  no  verbal  definitions  or  logical  forms  can  con- 
vey religious  truth  with  the  fulness  or  accuracy  which  belongs 
to  narratives  taken  from  Nature — Man's  nature  and  life  being, 
of  course,  included  in  the  term  : 

"  And  so,  the  Word  had  breath,  and  wrought 
With  human  hands  the  Creed  of  creeds." 

" In  Memoriam"  TENNYSON. 

The  same  idea  is  expressed  in  the  passionate  exclamation  of 
Edward  Irving  : — "  We  must  speak  in  parables,  or  we  must 
present  a  wry  and  deceptive  form  of  truth  ;  of  which  choice  the 
first  is  to  be  preferred,  and  our  Lord  adopted  it.  Because 
parable  is  truth  veiled,  not  truth  dismembered  ;  and  as  the  eye 
of  the  understanding  grows  more  piercing,  the  veil  is  seen 
through,  and  the  truth  stands  revealed."  Nature  is  the  great 
Parable  ;  and  the  truths  which  she  holds  within  her  are  veiled, 
but  not  dismembered.  The  pretended  separation  between  that 
which  lies  within  Nature  and  that  which  lies  beyond  Nature  is  a 
dismemberment  of  the  truth.  Let  both  those  who  find  it  difficult 
to  believe  in  anything  which  is  "  above  "  the  Natural,  and  those 


THE    SUPERNATURAL.  33; 

who  insist  on  that  belief,  first  determine  how  far  the  Natural 
extends.  Perhaps  in  going  round  these  marches  they  will  find 
themselves  meeting  upon  common  ground.  For  indeed,  long 
before  we  have  searched  out  all  that  the  Natural  includes,  there 
will  remain  little  in  the  so-called  Supernatural  which  can  seen* 
hard  of  acceptance  or  belief — nothing  which  is  not  rather  es- 
sential to  our  understanding  of  this  otherwise  "  unintelligible 
world." 
3 


CHAPTER  II. 

LAW  ; — ITS   DEFINITIONS. 

THE  Reign  of  Law — is  this,  then,  the  reign  under  which  we 
live  ?  Yes,  mt  a  sense  it  is.  There  is  no  denying  it.  The 
whole  world  around  us,  and  the  whole  world  within  us,  are  ruled 
,by  Law.  Our  very  spirits  are  subject  to  it — those  spirits  which 
yet  seem  so  spiritual,  so  subtle,  so  free.  How  often  in  the 
darkness  do  they  feel  the  restraining  walls — bounds  within 
\vhich  they  move — conditions  out  of  which  they  cannot  think  ! 
The  perception  of  this  is  growing  in  the  consciousness  of  men. 
It  grows  with  the  growth  of  knowledge  ;  it  is  the  delight,  the 
reward,  the  goal  of  Science.  From  Science  it  passes  into  every 
domain  of  thought,  and  invades,  amongst  others,  the  Theology 
of  the  Church.  And  so  we  see  the  men  of  Theology  coming 
-out  to  parley  with  the  men  of  Science, — a  white  flag  in  their 
hands,  and  saying,  "  If  you  will  let  us  alone  we  will  do  the  same 
by  you.  Keep  to  your  own  province,  do  not  enter  ours.  The 
;Reign  of  Law  which  you  proclaim,  we  admit — outside  these 
walls,  but  not  within  them  : — let  there  be  peace  between  us." 
But  this  will  never  do.  There  can  be  no  such  treaty  dividing 
the  domain  of  Truth.  Every  one  Truth  is  connected  with  every 
other  Truth  in  this  great  Universe  of  God.  The  connection 
may  be  one  of  infinite  subtlety,  and  apparent  distance — running, 
as  it  were,  underground  for  a  long  way,  but  always  asserting  it- 
self at  last,  somewhere,  and  at  some  time.  No  bargaining,  no 
fencing  off  the  ground — no  form  of  process,  will  avail  to  bar 
this  right  of  way.  Blessed  right,  enforced  by  blessed  power  ! 
Every  truth,  which  is  truth  indeed,  is  charged  with  its  own  con- 
sequences, its  own  analogies,  its  own  suggestions.  These  will 
not  be  kept  outside  any  artificial  boundary;  they  will  range 
over  the  whole  Field  of  Thought,  nor  is  there  any  corner  of  it 
from  which  they  can  be  warned  away. 

And  therefore  we  must  cast  a  sharp  eye  indeed  on  every  form 


LAW  ; ITS    DEFINITIONS.  35 

of  words  which  professes  to  represent  a  scientific  truth.  If  it 
be  really  true  in  one  department  of  thought,  the  chances  are 
that  it  will  have  its  bearing  on  every  other.  And  if  it  be  not 
true,  but  erroneous,  its  effect  will  be  of  a  corresponding 
character :  for  there  is  a  brotherhood  of  Error  as  close  as  the 
brotherhood  of  Truth.  Therefore,  to  accept  as  a  truth  that 
which  is  not  a  truth,  or  to  fail  in  distinguishing  the  sense  in 
which  a  proposition  may  be  true,  from  other  senses  in  which  it 
is  not  true,  is  an  evil  having  consequences  which  are  indeed 
incalculable.  There  are  subjects  on  which  one  mistake  of  this 
kind  will  poison  all  the  wells  of  truth,  and  affect  with  fatal  error 
the  whole  circle  of  our  thoughts. 

It  is  against  this  danger  that  some  men  would  erect  a  feeble 
barrier  by  defending  the  position,  that  Science  and  Religion 
may  be,  and  ought  to  be,  kept  entirely  separate  ; — that  they 
belong  to  wholly  different  spheres  of  thought,  and  that  the  ideas 
which  prevail  in  the  one  province  have  no  relation  to  those 
which  prevail  in  the  other.  This  is  a  doctrine  offering  many 
temptations  to  many  minds.  It  is  grateful  to  scientific  men  who 
are  afraid  of  being  thought  hostile  to  Religion.  It  is  grateful 
to  religious  men  who  are  afraid  of  being  thought  to  be  afraid  of 
Science.  To  these,  and  to  all  who  are  troubled  to  reconcile 
what  they  have  been  taught  to  believe  with  what  they  have  come 
to  know,  this  doctrine  affords  a  natural  and  convenient  escape. 
There  is  but  one  objection  to  it — but  that  is  the  fatal  objection 
—that  it  is  not  true.  The  spiritual  world  and  the  intellectual 
world  are  not  separated  after  this  fashion  :  and  the  notion  that 
they  are  so  separated  does  but  encourage  men  to  accept  in  each, 
ideas  which  will  at  last  be  found  to  be  false  in  both.  The  truth 
is,  that  there  is  no  branch  of  human  inquiry,  however  purely 
physical,  which  is  more  than  the  word  "  branch  "  implies  ;  none 
which  is  not  connected  through  endless  ramifications  with  every 
other, — and  especially  that  which  is  the  root  and  centre  of  them 
all.  If  He  who  formed  the  mind  be  one  with  Him  who  is  the 
Orderer  of  all  things  concerning  which  that  mind  is  occupied, 
there  can  be  no  end  to  the  points  of  contact  between  our  differ- 
ent conceptions  of  them,  of  Him,  and  of  ourselves. 

The  instinct  which  impels  us  to  seek  for  harmony  in  the  truths 
of  Science  and  the  truths  of  Religion,  is  a  higher  instinct  and  a 


36  THE    REIGN    OF    LAW. 

truer  one  than  the  disposition  which  leads  us  to  evade  the  diffi- 
culty by  pretending  that  there  is  no  relation  between  them. 
For,  after  all,  it  is  a  pretence  and  nothing  more.  No  man  who 
thoroughly  accepts  a  principle  in  the  philosophy  of  Nature 
which  he  feels  to  be  inconsistent  with  a  doctrine  of  Religion, 
can  help  having  his  belief  in  that  doctrine  shaken  and  under- 
mined. We  may  believe,  and  we  must  believe,  both  in  Nature 
and  Religion,  many  things  which  we  cannot  understand  ;  but 
we  cannot  really  believe  two  propositions  which  are  felt  to  be 
contradictory.  It  helps*  us  nothing  in  such  a  difficulty,  to  say 
that  the  one  proposition  belongs  to  Reason  and  the  other  prop- 
osition belongs  to  Faith.  The  endeavor  to  reconcile  them  is 
a  necessity  of  the  mind.  We  are  right  in  thinking  that,  if  they 
are  both  indeed  true,  they  can  be  reconciled,  and  if  they  really 
are  fundamentally  opposed,  they  cannot  both  be  true.  That  is 
to  say,  there  must  be  some  error  in  our  manner  of  conception 
in  one  or  in  the  other,  or  in  both.  At  the  very  best,  each  can 
represent  only  some  partial  and  imperfect  aspect  of  the  truth. 
The  error  may  lie  in  our  Theology,  or  it  may  lie  in  what  we  are 
pleased  to  call  our  Science.  It  may  be  that  some  dogma,  de- 
rived by  tradition  from  our  fathers,  is  having  its  hollowness 
betrayed  by  that  light  which  sometimes  shines  upon  the  ways 
of  God  out  of  a  better  knowledge  of  His  works.  It  may  be  that 
some  proud  and  rash  generalization  of  the  schools  is  haying  its 
falsehood  proved  by  the  violence  it  does  to  the  deepest  instincts 
of  our  spiritual  nature, — to 

"  Truths  which  wake  to  perish  never ; 
Which  neither  man  nor  boy, 
Nor  all  that  is  at  enmity  with  joy, 
Can  utterly  abolish  or  destroy." 

"  Ode  to  Immortality?  WORDSWORTH. 

Such,  for  example,  is  the  conclusion  to  which  the  language  of 
some  scientific  men  is  evidently  pointing,  that  great  general 
Laws  inexorable  in  their  operation,  and  Causes  in  endless 
chain  of  invariable  sequence,  are  the  governing  powers  in 
Nature,  and  that  they  leave  no  room  for  any  special  direction 
or  providential  ordering  of  events.  If  this  be  true,  it  is  vain  to 
deny  its  bearing  on  Religion.  What  then  can  be  the  use  of 


LAW  ; — ITS    DEFINITIONS.  37 

prayer  ?  Can  Laws  hear  us  ?  Can  they  change,  or  can  they 
suspend  themselves  ?  These  questions  cannot  but  arise,  and 
they  require  an  answer.  It  is  said  of  a  late  eminent  Professor 
and  clergyman  of  the  English  Church,  who  was  deeply  imbued 
with  these  opinions  on  the  place  occupied  by  Law.  in  the  econo- 
my of  Nature,  that  he  went  on,  nevertheless,  preaching  high 
doctrinal  sermons  from  the  pulpit  until  his  death.  He  did  so 
on  the  ground  that  propositions  which  were  contrary  to  his  rea- 
son were  not  necessarily  beyond  his  faith.  The  inconsisten- 
cies of  the  human  mind  are  indeed  unfathomable  :  and  there 
are  men  so  constituted  as  honestly  to  suppose  that  they  can 
divide  themselves  into  two  spiritual  beings,  one  of  whom  is 
sceptical,  and  the  other  is  believing.  But  such  men  are  rare — 
happily  for  Religion,  and  not  less  happily  for  Science.  No 
healthy  intellect,  no  earnest  spirit,  can  rest  in  such  self-betrayal. 
Accordingly  we  find  many  men  now  facing  the  consequences  to 
which  they  have  given  their  intellectual  assent,  and  taking 
their  stand  upon  the  ground  that  prayer  to  God  has  no  other 
value  or  effect  than  so  far  as  it  may  be  a  good  way  of  preach- 
ing to  ourselves.  It  is  a  useful  and  helpful  exercise  for  our 
own  spirits,  but  it  is  nothing  more.  But  how  can  they  pray 
who  have  come  to  this  ?  Can  it  ever  be  useful  or  helpful  to 
believe  a  lie  ?  That  which  has  been  threatened  as  the  worst 
of  all  spiritual  evils,  would  then  become  the  conscious  attitude 
of  our  "  religion,"  the  habitual  condition  of  our  worship.  This 
must  be  a  bad  science,  as  it  is  bad  religion.  It  is  in  violation 
of  a  law  the  highest  known  to  Man — the  Law  which  insepara- 
bly connects  earnest  conviction  of  the  truth  in  what  we  do  or 
say,  with  the  very  fountains  of  all  intellectual  and  moral 
strength.  No  accession  of  force  can  come  to  us  from  doing 
anything  in  which  we  disbelieve.  Such  a  doctrine  will  be  in- 
deed 

"  The  little  rift  within  the  lute 

That  by  and  by  will  make  the  music  mute, 
And  ever  widening  slowly  silence  all. " 

"Idyls  of  the  King— Vivien"  TENNYSON. 

If  there  is  any  helpfulness  in  Prayer  even  to  the  Mind  itself, 
that  helpfulness  can  only  be  preserved  by  showing  that  the 


38  THE    REIGN    OF    LAW. 

belief  on  which  this  virtue  depends  is  a  rational  belief.  The 
very  essence  of  that  belief  is  this — that  the  Divine  Mind  is  ac- 
cessible to  supplication,  and  that  the  Divine  Will  is  capable  of 
being  moved  thereby.  No  question  is,  or  indeed  can  be,  raised 
as  to  the  powerful  effect  exerted  by  this  belief  on  Man's  nature. 
That  effect  is  recognized  as  a  fact.  Its  value  is  admitted  ;  and 
in  order  that  it  may  not  be  lost,  the  compromise  now  offered  by 
some  philosophers  is  this — that  although  the  course  of  external 
nature  is  unalterable,  yet  possibly  the  phenomena  of  Mind  and 
character  may  be  changed  by  the  Divine  Agency.  But  will 
this  reasoning  bear  analysis  ?  Can  the  distinction  it  assumes 
be  maintained  ?  Whatever  difficulties  there  may  be  in  recon- 
ciling the  ideas  of  Law  and  of  Volition,  they  are  difficulties 
which  apply  equally  to  the  Worlds  of  Matter  and  of  Mind. 
The  Mind  is  as  much. subject  to  Law  as  the  Body  is.  The 
Reign  of  Law  is  over  all ;  and  if  its  dominion  be  really  incom- 
patible with  the  agency  of  Volition,  Human  or  Divine,  then  the 
Mind  is  as  inaccessible  to  that  agency  as  material  things.  It 
would  indeed  be  absurd  to  affirm  that  all  Prayers  are  equally 
rational  or  equally  legitimate.  Most  true  it  is  that  "  we  know 
not  what  we  should  pray  for  as  we  ought."  Prayer  does  not 
require  us  to  believe  that  anything  can  be  done  without  the  use  of 
means ;  neither  does  it  require  us  to  believe  that  anything  will 
be  done  in  violation  of  the  Universal  Order.  "  If  it  be  possi- 
ble," was  the  qualification  used  in  the  most  solemn  Prayer  ever 
uttered  upon  Earth.  What  are  and  what  are  not  legitimate 
objects  of  supplication,  is  a  question  which  may  well  be  open. 
But  the  question  now  raised  is  a  wider  one  than  this — even  the 
question  whether  the  very  idea  of  Prayer  be  not  in  itself 
absurd — whether  the  Reign  of  Law  does  not  preclude  the  pos- 
sibility of  Will  affecting  the  successive  phenomena  either  of 
Matter  or  of  Mind.  This  is  a  question  lying  at  the  root  of  our 
whole  conceptions  of  the  Universe,  and  of  all  our  own  powers, 
both  of  thinking  and  of  acting.  The  freedom  which  is  denied 
to  God  is  not  likely  to  be  left  to  Man.  We  shall  see,  accord- 
ingly, that  precisely  the  same  denials  are  applied  to  both. 

The  conception  of  Natural  Laws — of  their  place,  of  their  na- 
ture, and  of  their  office — which  involves  us  in  such  questions, 


LAW  ; ITS    DEFINITIONS.  39 

and  which  points  to  such  conclusions,  demands  surely  a  very 
careful  examination  at  our  hands. 

What,  then,  is  this  Reign  of  Law  ?     What  is  Law,  and  in  what 
sense  can  it  be  said  to  reign  ? 

Words,  which  should  be  the  servants  of  Thought,  are  too  often 
its  masters  ;  and  there  are  very  few  words  which  are  used  more 
ambiguously,  and  therefore  more  injuriously,  than  the  \*ord 
"  Law."  It  may  indeed  be  legitimately  used  in  several  different 
senses,  because  in  all  cases  as  applied  in  Science  it  is  a  metaphor, 
and  one  which  has  relation  to  many  different  kinds  and  degrees 
of  likeness  in  the  ideas  which  are  compared.  It  matters  little 
in  which  of  these  senses  it  is  used,  provided  the  distinctions 
between  them  are  kept  clearly  in  view,  and  provided  we  watch 
against  the  fallacies  which  must  arise  when  we  pass  insensibly 
from  one  meaning  to  another.  And  here  it  may  be  observed, 
in  passing,  that  the  metaphors  which  are  employed  in  Language 
are  generally  founded  on  analogies  instinctively,  and  often  un- 
consciously, perceived,  and  which  would  not  be  so  perceived  if 
they  were  not  both  deep  and  true.  In  this  case  the  idea  which 
lies  at  the  root  of  Law  in  all  its  applications  is  evident  enough. 
In  its  primary  signification,  a  "  law  "  is  the  authoritative  expres- 
sion of  human  Will  enforced  by  Power.  The  instincts  of  man- 
kind finding  utterance  in  their  language,  have  not  failed  to  see 
that  the  phenomena  of  Nature  are  only  really  conceivable  to  us- 
as  in  like  manner  the  expressions  of  a  Will  enforcing  itself 
with  Power.  But,  as  in  many  other  cases,  the  secondary  or 
derivative  senses  of  the  word  have  supplanted  the  primary  sig- 
nification ;  and  Law  is  now  habitually  used  by  men  who  deny 
the  analogy  on  which  that  use  is  founded,  and  to  the  truth  of 
which  it  is  an  abiding  witness.  It  becomes  therefore  all  the 
more  necessary  to  define  the  secondary  senses  with  precision. 
There  are  at  least  Five  different  senses  in  which  Law  is  habit- 
ually used,  and  these  must  be  carefully  distinguished : — 

First,  We  have  Law  as  applied  simply  to  an  observed  Order 
of  facts. 

Secondly,  To  that  Order  as   involving  the    action  of  some 
Force  or  Forces  of  which  nothing  more  may  be  known. 

Thirdly,  As  applied  to  individual  Forces  the  measure  of  whose 
operation  has  been  more  or  less  defined  or  ascertained. 


40  THE    REIGN    OF    LAW. 

Fourthly,  As  applied  to  those  combinations  of  Force  which 
have  reference  to  the  fulfilment  of  Purpose,  or  the  discharge  of 
Function. 

Fifthly,  As  applied  to  Abstract  Conceptions  of  the  mind — 
not  corresponding  with  any  actual  phenomena,  but  deduced 
therefrom  as  axioms  of  thought  necessary  to  our  understanding 
of  them.  Law,  in  this  sense,  is  a  reduction  of  the  phenomena 
not  merely  to  an  Order  of  facts,  but  to  an  Order  of  Thought. 

These  great  leading  significations  of  the  word  Law  all  circle 
round  the  three  great  questions  which  Science  asks  of  Nature, 
the  What,  the  How,  and  the  Why : — 

{i)  What  are  the  facts  in  their  established  Order  ? 

(2)  How — that  is,  from  what  physical  causes, — does  that  Order 
come  to  be  ? 

(3)  Why  have  these  causes  been  so  combined  ?     What  rela- 
tion do  they  bear  to  Purpose,  to  the  fulfilment  of  intention,  to 
the  discharge  of  Function  ? 

It  is  so  important  that  these  different  senses  of  the  word  Law 
should  be  clearly  distinguished,  that  each  of  them  must  be 
more  fully  considered  by  itself. 

The  First  and,  so  to  speak,  the  lowest  sense  in  which  Law  is 
applied  to  natural  phenomena  is  that  in  which  it  is  used  to  ex- 
press simply  "  an  observed  Order  of  facts  " — that  is  to  say,  facts 
which  under  the  same  conditions  always  follow  each  other  in 
the  same  order.  In  this  sense  the  laws  of  Nature  are  simply 
those  facts  of  Nature  which  recur  according  to  a  rule.  It  is 
not  necessary  to  the  legitimate  application  of  Law  in  this  sense 
that  the  cause  of  any  observed  Order  of  facts  should  be  at  all 
known,  or  even  guessed  at.  The  Force  or  Forces  to  which  that 
Order  is  due  may  be  hid  in  total  darkness.  It  is  sufficient  that 
the  Order  or  sequence  of  phenomena  be  uniform  and  constant. 
The  neatest  and  simplest  illustration  of  this,  as  well  as  of  the 
other  senses  in  which  Law  is  used,  is  to  be  found  in  the  exact 
sciences,  and  especially  in  the  history  of  Astronomy.  It  is 
nearly  250  years  since  Kepler  discovered,  in  respect  to  the  dis- 
tances, velocities,  and  orbits  of  the  Planets,  three  facts,  or 
rather  three  series  of  facts,  which,  during  many  years  *  of  in- 

*  The  "  Third  Law  "  of  Kepler  was  made  known  to  the  world  in  1619.    Newton's 
M  Principia  "  appeared  in  1687. 


LAW  ; — ITS    DEFINITIONS.  41 

tense  application  to  physical  inquiry,  remained  the  highest 
truths  known  to  Man  on  the  phenomena  of  the  Solar  System. 
They  were  known  as  the  Three  Laws  of  Kepler.  It  is  not  nec- 
essary to  describe  in  detail  here  what  these  laws  were.  Suffice 
it  to  say,  that  the  most  remarkable  among  them  were  facts  of 
constant  numerical  relation  between  the  distances  of  the  dif- 
ferent Planets  from  the  Sun,  and  the  length  of  their  periodic 
times  ;  and  again,  between  the  velocity  of  their  motion  and  the 
space  enclosed  within  certain  corresponding  sections  of  their 
orbit.  These  Laws  were  simply  and  purely  an  "  Order  of 
facts  "  established  by  observation,  and  not  connected  with  any 
known  cause.  The  Force  of  which  that  Order  is  a  necessary 
result  had  not  then  been  ascertained.  A  very  large  proportion 
of  the  laws  of  every  science  are  laws  of  this  kind  and  in  this 
sense.  For  example,  in  Chemistry  the  behavior  of  different 
substances  towards  each  other, ,  in  respect  to  combination  and 
affinity,  is  reduced  to  system  under  laws  of  this  kind,  and  of 
this  kind  only.  Because,  although  there  is  a  probability  that 
Electric  or  Galvanic  Force  is  the  cause  or  one  of  the  causes 
of  the  series  of  facts  exhibited  in  chemical  phenomena,  this  is 
as  yet  no  better  than  a  probability,  and  the  laws  of  Chemistry 
stand  no  higher  than  facts  which  by  observation  and  experiment 
are  found  to  follow  certain  rules. 

But  the  ascertainment  of  a  law  in  this  First  and  lower  sense 
leads  immediately  and  instinctively  to  the  search  after  Law -in 
another  sense  which  is  higher.  An  observed  Order  of  facts, 
to  be  entitled  to  the  rank  of  a  Law,  must  be  an  Order  so  con- 
stant and  uniform  as  to  indicate  necessity,  and  necessity  can 
only  arise  out  of  the  action  of  some  compelling  Force.  Law, 
therefore,  comes  to  indicate  not  merely  an  observed  Order  of 
facts,  but  that  Order  as  involving  the  action  of  some  Force  or 
Forces,  of  which  nothing  more  may  be  known  than  these  visi- 
ble effects.  Every  observed  Order  in  physical  phenomena 
suggests  irresistibly  to  the  mind  the  operation  of  some  physical 
cause.  We  say  of  an  observed  Order  of  facts  that  it  must  be 
due  to  some  "  law,"  meaning  simply  that  all  Order  involves  the 
idea  of  some  arranging  cause,  the  working  of  some  Force  or 
Forces  (whether  they  be  such  as  we  can  further  trace  and  de- 


42  THE   REIGN   OF   LAW. 

fine  or  not)  of  which  that  Order  is  the  index  and  the  result. 
This  is  the  Second  of  the  five  senses  specified  above. 

And  so  we  pass  on,  by  an  easy  and  natural  transition,  to  the 
Third  sense  in  which  the  word  Law  is  used.  This  is  the  most 
exact  and  definite  of  all.  The  mere  general  idea  that  some 
Force  is  at  the  bottom  of  all  phenomena,  which  are  invariably 
consecutive,  is  a  very  different  thing  from  knowing  what  that 
Force  is  in  respect  to  the  rule  or  measure  of  its  operation.  Of 
Law  in  this  sense  the  one  great  example,  before  and  above  all 
others,  is  the  Law  of  Gravitation,  for  this  is  a  Law  in  the  sense 
not  merely  of  a  rule,  but  of  a  cause — that  is,  of  a  Force  accurately 
defined  and  ascertained  according  to  the  measure  of  its  opera- 
tion, from  which  Force  other  phenomena  arise  by  way  of  nec- 
essary consequence.  Force  is  the  root-idea  of  Law  in  its  scien- 
tific sense.  And  so  the  Law  of  Gravitation  is  not  merely  the 
"  observed  order  "  in  which  the  heavenly  bodies  move ;  neither 
is  it  only  the  abstract  idea  of  some  Force  to  which  such  move- 
ments must  be  due,  but  it  is  that  Force  the  exact  measure  of 
whose  operation  was  numerically  ascertained  or  defined  by 
Newton — the  Force  which  compels  those  movements  and  (in  a 
sense)  explains  them.  Now  the  difference  between  Law  in  the 
narrower  and  Law  in  the  larger  sense  cannot  be  better  illus- 
trated than  in  the  difference  between  the  Three  special  Laws  dis- 
covered by  Kepler,  and  the  One  universal  Law  discovered  by 
Newton.  The  Three  Laws  of  Kepler  were,  as  we  have  seen, 
simply  and  purely  an  observed  Order  of  facts.  They  stood  by 
themselves — disconnected, — their  cause  unknown.  The  higher 
Law,  discovered  by  Newton,  revealed  their  connection  and  their 
cause.  The  "  observed  Order  "  which  Kepler  had  discovered, 
was  simply  a  necessary  consequence  of  the  Force  of  Gravita- 
tion. In  the  light  of  this  great  Law  the  "  Three  Laws  of  Kep- 
ler "  have  been  merged  and  lost. 

When  the  operations  of  any  material  Force  can  be  reduced 
to  rules  so  definite  as  those  which  have  been  discovered  in  re- 
spect to  the  Force  of  Gravitation,  and  when  these  rules  are 
capable  of  mathematical  expression  and  of  mathematical  proof, 
they  are,  so  far  as  they  go,  in  the  nature  of  pure  truth.  Mr. 
Lewes,  in  his  very  curious  and  interesting  work  on  the  "  Philos- 
ophy of  Aristotle,"  has  maintained  that  the  knowledge  of  Meas- 


LAW  ; ITS    DEFINITIONS.  43 

ure — or  what  he  calls  the  "  verifiable  element "  in  our  knowl- 
edge— is  the  element  which  determines  whether  any  theory  be- 
longs to  Science,  strictly  so  called,  or  to  Metaphysics;  and 
that  any  theory  may  be  transferred  from  Metaphysics  to  Sci- 
ence, or  from  Science  to  Metaphysics,  simply  by  the  addition 
or  withdrawal  of  its  "verifiable  element."  In  illustration  of 
this,  he  says  that  if  we  withdraw,  from  the  Law  of  Universal 
Attraction,  the  formula,  "inversely  as  the  square  of  the  dis- 
tance, and  directly  as  the  mass,"  it  becomes  pure  Metaphysics. 
If  this  means  that,  apart  from  ascertained  numerical  relations, 
our  conception  of  Law,  or  our  knowledge  of  natural  phenomena, 
loses  all  reality  and  distinctness,  I  do  not  agree  in  the  position4 
The  idea  of  natural  Forces  is  quite  separate  from  any  ascer- 
tained measure  of  their  energy.  The  knowledge,  for  example, 
that  all  the  particles  of  matter  exert  an  attractive  force  upon 
each  other,  is,  so  far  as  it  goes,  true  physical  knowledge,  even 
though  we  did  not  know  the  further  truth,  that  this  force  acts 
according  to  the  numerical  rule  ascertained  by  Newton.  To 
banish  from  physical  Science,  properly  so  called,  and  to  rele- 
gate to  Metaphysics,  all  knowledge  which  cannot  be  reduced 
to  numerical  expression,  is  a  dangerous  abuse  of  language. 

Force,  ascertained  according  to  some  measure  of  its  opera- 
tion—this is  indeed  one  of  the  definitions,  but  only  one,  of  a 
scientific  Law.  The  discovery  of  laws  in  this  sense  is  the 
great  quest  of  Science,  and  the  finding  of  them  is  one  of  her 
great  rewards.  Such  laws  yield  to  the  human  mind  a  peculiar 
delight,  from  the  satisfaction  they  afford  to  those  special  fac- 
ulties whose  function  it  is  to  recognize  the  beauty  of  numerical 
relations.  This  satisfaction  is  so  great,  and  in  its  own  meas- 
ure is  so  complete,  that  the  mind  reposes  on  an  ascertained 
law  of  this  kind  as  on  an  ultimate  truth.  And  ultimate  it  is  as 
regards  the  particular  faculties  which  are  concerned  in  this 
kind  of  search.  When  we  have  observed  our  facts,  and  when 
we  have  summed  up  our  figures,  when  we  have  recognized  the 
constant  numbers, — then  our  eyes,  our  ears,  and  our  calculat- 
ing faculties  have  done  their  work.  But  other  faculties  are 
called  into  simultaneous  operation,  and  these  have  other  work 
to  do.  For  let  it  be  observed  that  laws  in  the  first  three  senses 
we  have  now  examined,  cannot  be  said  to  explain  anything  ex- 


44  THE    REIGN    OF    LAW. 

cept  the  Order  of  subordinate  phenomena.  They  set  forth  that 
order  as  due  to  Force.  They  do  nothing  more.  Least  of  all 
do  laws,  in  any  of  these  three  senses,  explain  themselves. 
They  suggest  a  thousand  questions  much  more  curious  than 
the  questions  which  they  solve.  The  very  beaut)-  and  simplic- 
ity of  some  laws  is  their  deepest  mystery.  What  can  their 
source  be  ?  How  is  their  uniformity  maintained  ?  Every  law 
implies  a  Force,  and  all  that  we  ever  know  is  some  numerical 
rule  or  measure  according  to  which  some  unknown  Forces  oper- 
ate. But  whence  come  those  measures — those  exact  relations 
to  number,  which  never  vary  ?  Or,  if  there  are  variations,  how 
comes  it  that  these  are  always  found  to  follow  some  other  rules 
as  exact  and  as  invariable  as  the  first  ? 

And  as  there  can  be  no  better  example  of  what  Law  is,  so 
also  there  can  be  no  better  example  of  what  it  is  not — than  the 
Law  of  Gravitation.  The  discovery  of  it  was  probably  the 
highest  exercise  of  pure  intellect  through  which  the  human 
mind  has  found  its  way.  It  is  the  most  universal  physical  law 
which  is  known  to  us,  for  it  prevails,  apparently,  through  all 
space.  Yet  of  the  Force  of  Gravitation  all  we  know  is  that  it  is 
a  force  of  attraction  operating  between  all  the  particles  of  mat- 
ter in  the  exact  measure  which  was  ascertained  by  Newton, — 
that  is — "  directly  as  the  mass,  and  inversely  as  the  square  of 
the  distance."  This  is  the  Law.  But  it  affords  no  sort  of  ex- 
planation of  itself.  What  is  the  cause  of  this  Force — what  is 
its  source — what  are  the  media  of  its  operation — how  is  the  exact 
uniformity  of  its  proportions  maintained  ? — these  are  questions 
which  it  is  impossible  not  to  ask,  but  which  it  is  quite  as  im- 
possible to  answer.  Sir  John  Herschel,  in  speaking  of  this 
Force,  has  indicated  in  a  passing  sentence  a  few  questions  out 
of  the  many  which  arise  : — "  No  matter,"  he  says,  "  from  what 
ultimate  causes  the  power  called  gravitation  originates — be  it  a 
virtue  lodged  in  the  sun  as  its  receptacle,  or  be  it  pressure  from 
without,  or  the  resultant  of  many  pressures,  or  solicitations  of 
unknown  kinds,  magnetic  or  electric,  ethers  or  impulses,"  *  etc., 
etc.  How  little  we  have  ascertained  in  this  Law,  after  all !  Yet 
there  is  an  immense  and  an  instinctive  pleasure  in  the  contem- 
plation of  it.  To  analyze  this  pleasure  is  as  difficult  as  to  ana- 

*  Herschel's  "  Outlines  of  Astronomy,"  fifth  edition, p.  323. 


LAW  ; ITS    DEFINITIONS.  45 

lyze  the  pleasure  which  the  eye  takes  in  beauty  of  form,  or  the 
pleasure  which  the  ear  takes  in  the  harmonies  of  sound.  And 
this  pleasure  is  inexhaustible,  for  these  laws  of  number  and 
proportion  pervade  all  Nature,  and  the  intellectual  organs 
which  have  been  fitted  to  the  knowledge  of  them  have  eyes 
which  are  never  satisfied  with  seeing,  and  ears  which  are  never 
full  of  hearing.  The  agitation  which  overpowered  Sir  Isaac 
Newton  as  the  Law  of  Gravitation  was  rising  to  his  view  in  the 
light  of  rigorous  demonstration,  was  the  homage  rendered  by 
the  great  faculties  of  his  nature  to  a  harmony  which  was  as  new 
as  it  was  immense  and  wonderful.  The  same  pleasure  in  its 
own  degree  is  felt  by  every  man  of  science  who,  in  any  branch 
of  physical  inquiry,  traces  and  detects  any  lesser  law.  And  it 
is  perfectly  true  that  such  laws  are  being  detected  everywhere. 
Forces  which  are  in  their  essence  and  their  source  utterly  mys- 
terious, are  always  being  found  to  operate  under  rules  which 
have  strict  reference  to  measures  of  number, — to  relations  of 
Space  and  Time.  The  Forces  which  determine  chemical  com- 
bination all  work  under  rules  as  sharp  and  definite  as  the  Force 
of  Gravitation.  So  do  the  Forces  which  operate  in  Light,  and 
Heat,  and  Sound.  So  do  those  which  exert  their  energies  in 
Magnetism  and  Electricity.  All  the  operations  of  Nature — the 
smallest  and  the  greatest — are  performed  under  similar 
measures  ajid  restraints.  Not  even  a  drop  of  water  can  be 
formed  except  under  rules  which  determine  its  weight,  its  vol- 
ume>  and  its  shape,  with  exact  reference  to  the  density  of  the 
fluid,  to  the  structure  of  the  surface  on  which  it  maybe  formed, 
and  to  the  pressure  of  the  surrounding  atmosphere.  Then  that 
pressure  is  itself  exercised  under  rigorous  rules  again.  Not  one 
of  the  countless  varieties  of  form  which  prevail  in  clouds,  and 
which  give  to  the  face  of  heaven  such  infinite  expression,  not 
one  of  them  but  is  ruled  by  Law, — woven,  or  braided,  or  torn, 
or  scattered,  or  gathered  up  again  and  folded, — by  Forces  which 
are  free  only  "  within  the  bounds  of  Law." 

And  equally  in  those  subjects  of  inquiry  in  which  rules  of 
number  and  of  proportion  are  not  applicable,  rules  are  dis- 
cernible which  belong  to  another  class,  but  which  are  as  certain 
and  as  prevailing.  All  events,  however  casual  or  disconnected 
they  may  at  first  appear  to  be,  are  found  in  the  course  of  time 


46  THE   REIGN   OF    LAW. 

to  arrange  themselves  in  some  certain  Order,  the  index  and 
exponent  of  Forces,  of  which  we  know  nothing  except  their  ex- 
istence as  evidenced  in  these  effects.  It  is  indeed  wonderful 
to  find  that  in  such  a  matter,  for  example,  as  the  develop- 
ment of  our  Human  Speech,  the  unconscious  changes  which 
arise  from  time  to  time  among  the  rudest  utterances  of 
the  rudest  tribes  and  races  of  Mankind,  are  all  found  to  fol- 
low rules  of  progress  as  regular  as  those  which  preside  over 
any  of  the  material  growths  of  Nature.  Yet  so  it  is ;  and  it  is 
upon  this  fact  alone  that  the  science  of  Language  rests — a 
science  in  which  all  the  facts  are  not  yet  observed,  and  many 
of  those  which  have  been  observed  are  not  yet  reduced  to 
order ;  but  in  which  enough  has  been  ascertained  to  show  that 
languages  grow,  and  change  from  generation  to  generation, 
according  to  rules  of  which  the  men  who  speak  them  are 
wholly  unconscious.  It  is  the  same  with  all  other  things. 
And  as  it  is  now,  so  apparently  has  it  been  in  all  past  time  of 
which  we  have  any  record.  Even  the  work  of  Creation  has 
been  and  is  being  carried  on  under  rules  of  adherence  to 
Typical  Forms,  and  under  limits  of  variation  from  them, 
which  can  be  dimly  seen  and  traced,  although  they  cannot 
be  defined  or  understood.  The  universal  prevalence  of  laws 
of  this  kind  cannot  therefore  be  denied.  The  discovery  of 
them  is  one  of  the  first  results  of  all  physical  inquiry.  In  this 
sense  it  is  true  that  we,  and  the  world  around  us,  are  under  the 
Reign  of  Law. 

It  is  true,  but  only  a  bit  and  fragment  of  the  truth.  For 
there  is  another  fact  quite  as  prominent  as  the  universal  pres- 
ence and  prevalence  of  laws — and  that  is,  the  number  of  them 
which  are  concerned  in  each  single  operation  in  Nature.  No 
one  Law — that  is  to  say,  no  one  Force — determines  anything 
that  we  see  happening  or  done  around  us.  It  is  always  the 
result  of  different  and  opposing  Forces  nicely  balanced  against 
each  other.  The  least  disturbance  of  the  proportion  in  which 
any  one  of  them  is  allowed  to  tell,  produces  a  total  change  in 
the  effect.  The  more  we  know  of  Nature,  the  more  intricate 
do  such  combinations  appear  to  be.  They  can  be  traced  very 
near  to  the  fountains  of  Life  itself,  even  close  up  to  the  confines 
of  the  last  secret  of  all — how  the  Will  acts  upon  its  organs  in 


LAW  ; ITS    DEFINITIONS. 

the  Body.  Recent  investigations  in  Physiology  seem 
the  hypothesis  that  our  muscles  are  the  seat  of  two  opposing 
Forces,  each  so  adjusted  as  to  counteract  the  other ;  and  that 
this  antagonism  is  itself  so  arranged  as  to  enable  us  by  acting  on 
one  of  these  Forces,  to  regulate  the  action  of  the  other.  One 
Force — an  elastic  or  contractile  Force — is  supposed  to  be 
inherent  in  the  muscular  fibre  •  another  Force — that  of  Animal 
Electricity  in  statical  condition — holds  the  contractile  Force  in 
check ;  and  the  relaxed,  or  rather  the  restful,  condition  of  the 
muscle  when  not  in  use,  is  due  to  the  balance  so  maintained. 
When,  through  the  motor  nerves  the  Will  orders  the  muscles  into 
action,  that  order  is  enforced  by 'a  discharge  of  the  Electrical. 
Force,  and  upon  this  discharge  the  contractile  Force  is  set  free 
to  act,  and  does  accordingly  produce  the  contraction  which  is 
desired.* 

Such  is,  at  least,  one  suggestion  as  to  the  means  employed 
to  place  human  action  under  the  control  of  human  Will,  in 
that  material  frame  which  is  so  wonderfully  and  fearfully  made. 
And  whether  this  hypothesis  be  accurate  or  not,  it  is  certain 
that  some  such  adjustment  of  Force  to  Mechanism  is  involved 
in  every  bodily  movement  which  is  subject  to  the  Will.  Even 
in  this  high  region,  therefore,  we  see  that  the  existence  of  in- 
dividual laws  is  not  the  end  of  our  physical  knowledge.  What 
we  always  reach  at  last  in  the  course  of  every  physical  inquiry, 
is  the  recognition,  not  of  individual  laws,  but  of  some  definite 
relation  to  each  other,  in  which  different  laws  are  placed,  so  as 
to  bring  about  a  particular  result.  But  this  is,  in  other  words, 
the  principle  of  Adjustment,  and  adjustment  has  no  meaning 
except  as  the  instrument  and  the  result  of  Purpose.  Force  so 
combined  with  Force  as  to  produce  certain  definite  and  orderly 
results, — this  is  the  ultimate  fact  of  all  discovery. 

And  so  we  come  upon  another  sense — the  Fourth  sense,  in 
which  Law  is  habitually  used  in  Science,  and  this  is  perhaps 
the  commonest  and  most  important  of  all.  It  is  used  to 
designate  not  merely  an  observed  Order  of  facts — not  merely 
the  bare  abstract  idea  of  Force — not  merely  individual  Forces 
according  to  ascertained  measures  of  operation — but  a  number 

*  This  theory  of  muscular  and  nervous  action  is  set  forth  with  much  ingenuity  and 
force  of  illustration  in  "  Lectures  on  Epilepsy,"  etc.,  by  Charles  Bland  Radcliffe,  M.D. 


48  THE   REIGN    OF    LAW. 

of  Forces  in  the  condition  of  mutual  adjustment,  that  is  to  say, 
as  combined  with  each  other,  and  fitted  to  each  other  for  the 
attainment  of  special  ends.  The  whole  science  of  Animal 
Mechanics,  for  example,  deals  with  Law  in  this  sense — with 
natural  Forces  as  related  to  Purpose  and  subservient  to  the  dis- 
charge of  Function.  And  this  is  the  highest  sense  of  all — Law 
in  this  sense  being  more  perfectly  intelligible  to  us  than  in  any 
other  ;  because,  although  we  know  nothing  of  the  real  nature 
of  Force,  even  of  that  Force  which  is  resident  in  ourselves,  we 
do  know  for  what  ends  we  exert  it,  and  the  principle  that 
governs  our  devices  for  its  use.  That  principle  is,  Combination 
for  the  accomplishment  of  Purpose. 

Accordingly  it  is,  when  natural  phenomena  can  be  reduced 
to  Law,  in  this  last  sense,  that  we  reach  something  which 
alone  is  really  in  the  nature  of  an  explanation.  For  what  do 
we  mean  by  an  explanation  ?  It  is  an  unfolding  or  a  "  mak- 
ing plain.'*  But  as  the  human  mind  has  many  faculties,  so 
each  of  these  seeks  a  satisfaction  of  its  own.  That  which  is 
made  plain  to  one  faculty  is  not  necessarily  made  plain  to 
another.  That  which  is  a  complete  answer  to  the  question 
What,  or  to  the  question  How,  is  no  answer  at  all  to  the  ques- 
tion Why.  There  are  some  philosophers  who  tell  us  that  this 
last  is  a  question  which  had  better  never  be  asked,  because  it 
is  one  to  which  Nature  gives  no  reply.  If  this  be  so,  it  is 
strange  that  Nature  should  have  given  us  the  faculties  which 
impel  us  to  ask  this  question — ay,  and  to  ask  it  more  eagerly 
than  any  other.  It  is,  indeed,  true  that  there  is  a  point  beyond 
which  we  need  not  ask  it,  because  the  answer  is  inaccessible. 
But  this  is  equally  true  of  the  questions  What,  and  How. 
We  cannot  reach  Final  Causes  any  more  than  Final  Purposes. 
For  every  cause  which  we  can  detect,  there  is  another  cause 
which  lies  behind ;  and  for  every  purpose  which  we  can  see, 
there  are  other  purposes  which  lie  beyond. 

And  so  it  is  true  that  all  things  in  Nature  may  either  be  re- 
garded as  means  or  as  ends — for  they  are  always  both — only 
that  Final  Ends  we  can  never  see.  For.  as  Bishop  Butler 
truly  says  in  his  "Analogy,"  Chapter  IV.,  "We  know  what  we 
ourselves  aim  at  as  final  ends,  and  what  courses  we  take  merely 
as  means  conducing  to  these  ends.  But  we  are  greatly  igno- 


LAW  ; — ITS    DEFINITIONS.  49 

rant  how  far  things  are  considered  by  the  Author  of  Nature 
under  the  simple  notion  of  means  and  ends, — so  as  that  it 
may  be  said  this  is  merely  an  end,  and  that  merely  means,  in 
His  regard.  And  whether  there  be  not  some  peculiar  absurdity 
in  our  very  manner  of  conception  concerning  this  matter,  some- 
what contradictory,  arising  from  an  extremely  imperfect  view  of 
things,  it  is  impossible  to  say."  This  is  indeed  a  wise  caution, 
and  one  which  has  been  much  needed  to  check  the  abuse  of 
that  method  of  reasoning  which  has  been  called  the  doctrine  of 
Final  Causes.  When  Man  makes  an  implement,  he  knows 
the  purpose  for  which  he  makes  it — he  knows  the  function 
assigned  to  it  in  his  own  intention.  But  as  in  making  it  there 
are  a  thousand  chips  and  fragments  of  material  which  he  casts 
aside,  so  in  its  final  use  it  often  produces  consequences  and 
results  which  he  did  not  contemplate  or  foresee.  But  in  Na- 
ture all  this  is  different.  Nature  has  no  chips  or  fragments 
which  she  does  not  put  to  use  ;  and  as  on  the  way  to  her  ap- 
parent ends  there  are  no  incidents  which  she  did  not  foresee, 
so  beyond  those  ends  there  are  no  ulterior  results  which  do 
not  open  out  into  new  firmaments  of  Design.  Of  nothing, 
therefore,  can-  we  say  with  even  the  probability  of  truth  that 
we  see  its  Final  Cause  ;  that  is  to  say,  its  ultimate  purpose. 
All  that  we  can  ever  see  are  the  facts  of  Adjustment  and  of 
Function,  and  these  constitute  not  Final,  but  Immediate  Pur- 
pose. But  a  purpose  is  not  less  a  purpose,  because  other 
purposes  may  lie  beyond  it.  And  not  only  can  we  detect 
Purpose  in  natural  phenomena,  but,  as  we  have  already  seen, 
it  is  very  often  the  only  thing  about  them  which  is  intelligible 
to  us.  The  How  is  very  often  incomprehensible,  where  the 
Why  is  apparent  at  a  glance.  And  be  this  observed,  that 
when  Purpose  is  perceived,  it  is  a  "  making  plain "  to  a 
higher  faculty  of  the  mind  than  the  mere  sense  of  Order.  It 
is  a  making  plain  to  Reason.  It  is  the  reduction  of  phenomena 
to  that  Order  of  Thought  which  is  the  basis  of  all  other  Order 
in  the  works  of  Man,  and  which,  he  instinctively  concludes, 
is  the  basis  also  of  all  Order  in  the  works  of  Nature. 

And  here  it  is  important  to  observe,  that  although  this  gen- 
eral conclusion,  like  all  other  general  conclusions,  belongs  to 
the  category  of  mental  inferences,  and  not  to  the  category  of 


$0  THE    REIGN    OF    LAW. 

physical  facts,  yet  each  particular  instance  of  Purpose  on 
which  the  general  inference  is  founded,  is  not  an  inference 
merely,  but  a  fact.  The  function  of  an  organ,  for  example, 
is  a  matter  of  purely  physical  investigation.  But  the  function 
of  an  organ  is  not  merely  that  which  it  does,  but  it  is  that 
which  some  special  construction  enables  it  to  do.  It  is,  not 
merely  its  work,  but  it  is  the  work  assigned  to  it  as  an  Appa- 
ratus, and  as  fitted  to  other  organs  having  other  functions  re- 
lated to  its  own.  The  nature  of  that  Apparatus,  as  being  in 
itself  an  adjustment  for  a  particular  purpose,  is  not  an  inference 
from  the  facts,  but  it  is  part  of  the  facts  themselves.  The  very 
idea  of  Function  is  inseparable  from  the  idea  of  Purpose.  The 
Function  of  an  organ  is  its  Purpose ;  and  the  relation  of  its 
parts,  and  of  the  whole  to  that  Purpose,  is  as  much  and  as 
definitely  a  scientific  fact  as  the  relation  of  any  other  phenom- 
enon to  Space,  or  Time,  or  Number, 

This  distinction  between  Purpose  as  a  general  inference  and 
Purpose  as  a  particular  fact,  has  not  been  sufficiently  observed. 
The  just  condemnation  pronounced  by  Bacon  on  the  pursuit  of 
Final  Causes  as  distorting  the  true  Method  of  Physical  Investi- 
gation,, has  been  applied  without  discrimination  to  two  very  dif- 
ferent conceptions.  Even  Philosophers  who  believe  in  the  Su- 
premacy of  Purpose  in  Nature  have  been  willing  to  banish  this 
conception  from  the  Domain  of  Science,  and  to  classify  rt  as 
belonging  altogether  to  Metaphysics  or  Theology.  Thus  in  the 
very  able  Harveian  Oration  for  1865  by  Dr.  H.  W.  Acland,  he 
says, — "  Whether  there  be  any  Purpose,  is  the  object  of  Theo- 
logical and  Metaphysical,  but  not  of  Physical  inquiry."  :  And 
again,  "  The  evidence  of  intention  is  metaphysical,  and  de- 
pends on  probabilities.  It  is  not  positive.  It  is  inferential 
from  many  considerations."  f  I  venture  to  dissent  from  these 
conclusions.  They  involve,  I  think,  a  confounding  of  two  sep- 
arate questions.  The  nature  and  character  of  the  intending 
Mind — this  is  indeed  a  question  of  Theology ;  but  not  the  exist- 
ence of  intention.  Neither  in  any  restrictive  sense  of  the  word 
can  it  be  called  Metaphysical.  Even  as  a  general  doctrine,  the 
doctrine  of  Contrivance  and  Adjustment  is  not  so  metaphysical 
as  the  Doctrine  of  Homologies ;  and  when  we  come  to  particular 

*  P.  61. 


LAW  ; ITS    DEFINITIONS.  5  I 

cases  there  can  be  no  question  whatever  that  the  relation  of  a 
given  Structure  to  its  Purpose  and  Function  comes  more  un- 
equivocally under  the  class  of  physical  facts  than  the  relation 
of  that  same  Structure  to  some  corresponding  part  in  another 
animal.  It  is  less  ideal,  for  example, — less  theoretical — less 
metaphysical — to  assert  of  the  little  hooked  claw  which  is  at- 
tached to  the  (apparent)  elbow  of  a  Bat's  wing,  that  it  was 
placed  there  to  enable  the  Bat  to  climb  and  crawl,  than  to  affirm 
of  that  same  claw  that  it  is  the  "  homologue  "  of  the  human 
thumb.  Yet  who  can  deny  that  this  doctrine  of  Homologies 
has  been  established  as  a  strictly  scientific  truth  ?  There  is  a 
sense,  of  course,  in  which  all  Knowledge  and  all  Science  be- 
longs to  Metaphysics.  Mere  classification,  which  is  the  basis 
of  all  Science,  what  is  it  but  the  marshalling  of  physical  facts 
in  an  Ideal  Order — an  arrangement  of  them  according  to  the 
relation  which  they  bear  to  the  laws  of  Thought  ?  But  this  does 
not  constitute  as  a  branch  of  Metaphysics,  the  division  of  ani- 
mals into  Genera,  and  Families,  and  Orders.  And  what  rela- 
tion can  physical  facts  ever  have  to  Thought  so  directly  cogniz- 
able or  so  susceptible  of  Demonstration  as  the  relation  of  an 
animal  organ  to  its  purpose  and  function  in  the  animal  econ- 
omy ?  Whether  Purpose  be  the1  basis  of  all  natural  Order  or 
not  is  a  separate  question.  It  is  at  least  one  of  the  facts  of  that 
Order.  Combination  for  the  accomplishment  of  Purpose  there- 
fore in  particular  cases,  such  as  the  relation  between  the  struct- 
ure of  an  Organ  and  its  function,  is  not  merely  a  safe  conclu- 
sion of  Philosophy,  but  an  ascertained  fact  of  Science.  (See 
note  B.) 

This  question  has  acquired  additional  importance  since  the 
revival  in  our  own  day,  and  with  new  resources,  of  that  old  phi- 
losophy which  assumes  to  banish  from  the  domain  of  Knowl- 
edge no  small  part  of  the  richest  and  surest  acquisitions  of  Rea- 
son. That  Philosophy  must  be  tested  by  a  rigid  analysis  of 
thought  and  language.  This  is  the  weapon  with  which  the  as- 
sault is  made,  and  it  is  by  the  same  weapon  better  handled  that 
it  can  alone  be  met.  An  arbitrary  limitation  of  the  word  "  knowl- 
edge," to  a  particular  kind  of  knowledge,  can  only  be  tolerated 
on  condition  that  the  arbitrary  nature  of  the  limitation  be  con- 
stantly kept  in  view.  In  like  manner  the  word  "  verification  " 


52  THE    REIGN    OF    LAW. 

may  be  confined  to  a  particular  kind  of  proof  applicable  only 
to  a  particular  class  of  truths.  So  again,  in  regard  to  "  Meta- 
physics," it  may  be  considered  with  reference  to  its  subject- 
matter  as  denoting  a  particular  branch  of  inquiry — such  as 
Psychology — or  as  a  method  of  investigation  which  may  be  ap- 
plied equally  to  all  subjects  which  furnish  the  mind  with  the 
materials  of  thought.  But  we  must  watch  against  the  substitu- 
tion of  one  of  these  meanings  for  another  ;  and  against  the  jug- 
glery by  which  men  first  use  Metaphysical  Analysis  to  pull  down 
conceptions  which  they  dislike,  and  then  denounce  Metaphysics 
as  incapable  of  establishing  any  conclusions  on  which  we  can 
rely.  The  fact  to  which  I  have  previously  referred,*  is  a  fact 
of  immense  significance,  that  one  of  the  most  able  supporters 
of  the  Positive  Philosophy  in  England  relegates  to  Metaphysics 
the  great  scientific  fact  of  Physical  Attraction,  when  it  is  con- 
sidered apart  from  its  numerical  relations.  But  if  this  be  con- 
sidered Metaphysics,  then  let  it  be  remembered  that  many  of 
the  most  certain  truths  we  know  belong  to  the  same  category. 
From  a  similar  point  of  view,  it  might  be  argued,  and  it  has 
actually  been  argued,  that  Number  and  all  numerical  relations 
are  purely  abstract  conceptions  of  the  mind,  having  no  other 
reality  than  as  there  conceived.  (See  note  C.)  The  same  rea- 
soning may  be  applied  to  all  our  most  fundamental  conceptions 
— without  which  Science  could  not  even  begin  her  work.  The 
existence  of  Force  under  any  form,  of  which  the  existence  of 
Matter  is  only  a  special  case,  may  be  regarded  as  a  purely 
metaphysical  conception.  It  is  surely  a  comfort  to  find  that,  if 
all  ideas  of  Plan  and  of  Design  in  the  Adjustments  of  Organic 
Life  are  to  be  condemned  as  Metaphysical,  they  stand  at  least 
in  goodly  company  among  the  necessities  of  Thought.  Mr. 
Lewes,  indeed,  himself  confesses  that  "  Science  finds  it  indis- 
pensable to  co-ordinate  all  the  facts  in  a  general  concept,  such 
as  a  Plan."  f  But  he  pronounces  it  one  of  the  "  Infirmities  of 
Thought "  to  "  realize  the  concept."  But  no  accurate  thinker  ever 
"  realized  "  such  an  idea  as  a  "  Plan  " — that  is  to  say,  no  one 
ever  conceived  it  as  existing  by  itself,  separate  from  an  intend- 
ing Mind.  Mr.  Lewes  complains  that  "  Matter  and  Force  are 

*  P.  42.  t  "  History  of  Philosophy,"  Prologue,  p.  IxxxVi. 


LAW  ; — ITS    DEFINITIONS.  53 

mysterious  enough  "  without  a  "  new  mystery  of  Architectural 
Plan,  shaping  Matter  and  directing  Force."  *  But,  substitut- 
ing here  "  Mind "  for  Plan,  it  may  surely  be  argued  that  if 
Science  finds  it  "  indispensable  "  to  co-ordinate  all  the  facts  in 
some  such  general  concept,  this  is  of  itself  a  proof  that  the  ele- 
ment so  introduced  does  not  add  to  the  mystery,  but  helps  to 
remove  it.  Even  if  it  be  an  "  artifice  of  thought,"  it  can  only 
be  resorted  to  as  rendering  the  facts  not  less  but  more  conceiv- 
able. And  this  it  plainly  does  by  appealing  to  an  agency  hav- 
ing known  power  in  the  production  of  analogous  phenomena. 
The  instinctive  wisdom  which  lies  in  this  "  infirmity  "  of  the 
mind  becomes  more  apparent  when  we  turn  to  the  efforts  of  an 
acute  intellect  to  cast  such  infirmities  away.  The  most  abstract 
metaphysical  conceptions  are  substituted  for  those  which  are 
denounced  :  the  only  difference  being  that,  whilst  the  old  con- 
ceptions are  intelligible  as  connecting  the  Phenomena  by  a  link 
of  thought  which  the  mind  can  feel  and  follow,  the  new  concep- 
tions are  unintelligible  because  they  try  to  describe  facts  with- 
out any  reference  to  the  ideas'  they  involve.  No  new  light — 
nothing  but  denser  darkness — is  cast  on  the  phenomena  of 
Organic  Life  by  calling  "  Life  the  connexus  of  the  organic  ac- 
tivities." f  Yet  meaningless  words  are  heaped  on  each  other 
in  the  desperate  effort  to  dispense  with  those  conceptions  which 
can  alone  render  the  order  of  Nature  intelligible  to  us.  Thus 
we  are  told  again,  that  "  The  Organism  is  the  synthesis  of  di- 
verse parts,  and  Life  is  the  synthesis  of  their  properties  ;  "  t — 
and  again,  that  "  Vitality  is  the  abstract  designation  of  certain 
special  properties  manifested  by  Matter  under  certain  special 
conditions."  §  Surely  there  is  more  light  in  the  old  reading  : — 
"  Finding,"  says  Mr.  Lewes,  "  in  an  organism  a  certain  adjust- 
ment of  parts,  which  may  be  reduced  to  a  plan,  we  are  easily 
led  to  conceive  that  this  plan  was  made  before  the  parts,  and  that 
the  adjustment  was  determined  by  the  plan."  No  doubt ! 
This  is  the  easiest  conception,  and  it  is  the  easiest  because  it  is 
most  conformable  to  the  laws  of  Thought ;  and  that  which  is 
the  most  conformable  to  the  laws  of  Thought  is  that  which  makes 
the  nearest  approach  to  absolute  Truth  attainable  by  the  Mind. 

*  "  History  of  Philosophy,"  p.  Ixxxvi. 

t  Ibid.  p.  Ixxx.  \  Ibid.  p.  Ixxxiii.  §  Ibid.  p.  Ixxxiv. 


54  THE    REIGN    OF    LAW. 

The  universal  prevalence  of  this  idea  of  Purpose  in  Nature 
is  indicated  by  the  irresistible  tendency  which  we  observe  in 
the  language  of  Science  to  personify  the  Forces,  and  the  com- 
binations of  Force  by  which  all  natural  phenomena  are  pro- 
duced. It  is  a  great  injustice  to  scientific  men — too  often  com- 
mitted— to  suspect  them  of  unwillingness  to  accept  the  idea  of 
a  Personal  Creator  merely  because  they  try  to  keep  separate 
the  language  of  Science  from  the  language  of  Theology.1*  But 
it  is  curious  to  observe  how  this  endeavor  constantly  breaks 
down — how  impossible  it  is  in  describing  physical  phenomena 
to  avoid  the  phraseology  which  identifies  them  with  the  phe- 
nomena of  Mind,  and  is  moulded  on  our  own  conscious  Person- 
ality and  Will.  It  is  impossible  to  avoid  this  language  simply 
because  no  other  language  conveys  the  impression  which  innu- 
merable structures  leave  upon  the  mind.  Take,  for  example, 
the  word  "  contrivance."  How  could  Science  do  without  it  ? 
How  could  the  great  subject  of  Animal  Mechanics  be  dealt 
with  scientifically  without  continual  reference  to  Law  as  that  by 
which,  and  through  which,  special  organs  are  formed  for  the 
doing  of  special  work  ?  What  is  the  very  definition  of  a  ma- 
chine ?  Machines  do  not  increase  Force,  they  only  adjust  it. 
The  very  idea  and  essence  of  a  machine  is  that  it  is  a  contriv- 
ance for  the  distribution  of  Force  with  a  view  to  its  bearing  on 
special  purposes.  A  man's  arm  is  a  machine  in  which  the  law 
of  leverage  is  supplied  to  the  vital  force  for  the  purposes  of 
prehension.  We  shall  see  presently  that  a  bird's  wing  is  a  ma- 
chine in  which  the  same  law  is  applied,  under  the  most  compli- 
cated conditions,  for  the  purpose  of  flight.  Anatomy  supplies 

*  A  remarkable  instance  of  this  injustice  has  been  lately  brought  to  light.  Professor 
Huxley,  in  an  article  in  the  Fortnightly  Review,  had  used  one  of  those  vague  phrases, 
so  common  with  scientific  men,  about  the  "  unknown  and  the  unknowable  "  being  the 
goal  of  all  scientific  thought,  which  not  unnaturally  suggest  the  notion  that  all  idea  of 
a  God  is  unattainable.  A  writer  in  the  Spectator  accordingly  dealt  with  Professor 
Huxley  as  avowing  Atheism,  and  was  rebuked  by  the  Professor  in  a  letter  published 
in  the  Spectator  of  Feb.  10,  1866.  Professor  Huxley  says  ;  "  I  do  not  know  that  I  care 
very  much  about  popular  odium,  so  that  there  is  no  great  merit  in  saying  that  if  I 
really  saw  fit  to  deny  the  existence  of  a  God,  I  should  certainly  do  so,  for  the  sake  of 
my  own  intellectual  freedom,  and  be  the  honest  Atheist  you  are  pleased  to  say  I  am. 
As  it  happens,  however,  I  cannot  take  this  position  with  honesty,  inasmuch  as  it  is^ 
and  always  has  been,  a  favorite  tenet  of  mine,  that  Atheism  is  as  absurd,  logically 
speaking,  as  Polytheism."  On  the  subject  of  miracles,  in  the  same  letter,  Professor 
Huxley  says,  that  "  denying  the  possibility  of  miracles  seems  to  me  quite  as  unjustifi- 
able as  speculative  Atheism."  The  question  of  miracles  c*»»jns  now  to  be  admitted  on 
all-hands  to  be  simply  a  question  of  evidence 


LAW  ; — ITS    DEFINITIONS.  55 

an  infinite  number  of  similar  examples.  It  is  impossible  to  de- 
scribe or  explain  the  facts  we  meet  with  in  this  or  in  any  other 
branch  of  Science  without  investing  the  "  laws  "  of  Nature  with 
something  of  that  Personality  which  they  do  actually  reflect,  or 
without  conceiving  of  them  as  partaking  of  those  attributes  of 
Mind  which  we  everywhere  recognize  in  their  working  and  re- 
sults. 

We  may,  again,  take  the  Forces  which  determine  the  Plane- 
tary motions  as  the  grandest  and  the  simplest  illustrations  of 
this  truth  of  Science.  Gravitation,  as  already  said,  is  a  Force 
which  prevails  apparently  through  all  space.  But  it  does  not 
prevail  alone.  It  is  a  Force  whose  function  it  is  to  balance 
other  Forces,  of  which  we  know  nothing,  except  this, — that 
these,  again,  are  needed  to  balance  the  Force  of  Gravitation. 
Each  Force,  if  left  to  itself,  would  be  destructive  of  the  Uni- 
verse. Were  it  not  for  the  Force  of  Gravitation,  the  centrifugal 
Forces  which  impel  the  Planets  would  fling  them  off  into  Space. 
Were  it  not  for  these  centrifugal  Forces,  the  Force  of  Gravita- 
tion would  dash  them  against  the  Sun.  The  orbits,  therefore, 
of  the  Planets,  with  all  that  depends  upon  them,  are  determined 
by  the  nice  and  perfect  balance  which  is  maintained  between 
these  two  Forces  ;  and  the  ultimate  fact  of  astronomical  science 
is  not  the  Law  of  Gravitation,  but  the  Adjustment  between  this 
law  and  others  which  are  less  known,  so  as  to  produce  and 
maintain  the  existing  Solar  System. 

This  is  one  example  of  the  principle  of  Adjustment ;  but  no 
one  example,  however  grand  the  scale  may  be  on  which  it  is 
exhibited,  can  give  any  idea  of  the  extent  to  which  the  principle 
of  Adjustment  is  required,  and  is  adopted  in  'the  works  of  Na- 
ture. The  revolution  of  the  seasons,  for  example — seed-time 
and  harvest — depend  on  the  Law  of  Gravitation  in  this  sense, 
that  if  that  law  were  disturbed,  or  if  it  were  inconstant,  they 
would  be  disturbed  and  inconstant  also.  But  the  seasons 
equally  depend  on  a  multitude  of  other  laws, — laws  of  heat, 
laws  of  light,  laws  relating  to  fluids,  and  to  solids,  and  to  gases, 
and  to  magnetic  attractions  and  repulsions,  each  one  of  which 
laws  is  invariable  in  itself,  but  each  of  which  would  produce  ut- 
ter confusion  if  it  were  allowed  to  operate  alone,  or  if  it  were 
not  balanced  against  others  in  the  right  proportion.  It  is  very 


56  THE   REIGN   OF    LAW. 

difficult  to  form  any  adequate  idea  of  the  vast  number  of  laws 
which  are  concerned  in  producing  the  most  ordinary  operations 
of  Nature.  Looking  only  at  the  combinations  with  which  As- 
tronomy is  concerned,  the  adjustments  are  almost  infinite. 
Each  minutest  circumstance  in  the  position,  or  size,  or  shape  of 
the  Earth,  the  direction  of  its  axis,  the  velocity  of  its  motion 
and  of  its  rotation,  has  its  own  definite  effect,  and  the  slightest 
change  in  any  one  of  these  relations  would  wholly  alter  the 
world  we  live  in.  And  then  it  is  to  be  remembered  that  the 
seasons,  as  they  are  now  fitted  to  us,  and  as  we  are  fitted  to 
them,  do  not  depend  only  on  the  facts  or  the  laws  which  As- 
tronomy reveals.  They  depend  quite  as  much  on  other  sets  of 
facts,  and  other  sets  of  laws,  revealed  by  other  sciences,— such, 
for  example,  as  Chemistry,  Electricity,  and  Geology.  The  mo- 
tion of  the  Earth  might  be  exactly  what  it  is,  every  fact  in  re- 
spect to  our  Planetary  position  might  remain  unchanged,  yet 
the  seasons  would  return  in  vain  if  our  own  atmosphere  were 
altered  in  any  one  of  the  elements  of  its  composition,  or  if  any 
one  of  the  laws  regulating  the  action  were  other  than  it  is. 
Under  a  thinner  air  even  the  torrid  zone  might  be  wrapped  in 
eternal  snow.  Under  a  denser  air,  and  one  with  different  re- 
fracting powers,  the  Earth  and  all  that  is  therein  might  be  burnt 
up.  And  so  it  is  through  the  whole  of  Nature :  laws  every- 
where— laws  in  themselves  invariable,  but  so  worked  as  to  pro- 
duce effects  of  inexhaustible  variety  by  being  pitched  against 
each  other,  and  made  to  hold  each  other  in  restraint. 

I  have  already  referred  to  Chemistry*  as  a  science  full  of 
illustrations  of  Law  in  the  First  and  simplest  sense — that  is,  of 
facts  in  observed  orders  of  recurrence.  But  Chemistry  is  a 
science  not  less  rich  in  illustration  of  Law  in  the  Fourth  sense 
— that  is,  of  Forces  in  mutual  adjustment.  Indeed,  in  Chemis- 
try, this  system  of  adjustment  among  the  different  properties 
of  matter  is  especially  intricate  and  observable!  Some  of  the 
laws  which  regulate  Chemical  Combination  were  discovered  in 
our  own  time,  and  are  amongst  the  most  wonderful  and  the 
most  beautiful  which  have  been  revealed  by  any  science. 
They  are  laws  of  great  exactness,  having  invariable  relations  to 
number  and  proportion.  Each  elementary  substance  has  its 
own  combining  proportions  with  other  elements,  so  that,  except 


LAW  ; — ITS   DEFINITIONS.  57 

in  these  proportions,  no  chemical  union  can  take  place  at  all. 
And  when  chemical  union  does  take  place,  the  compounds 
which  result  have  different  and  even  opposite  powers  accord- 
ing to  the  different  proportions  employed.  Then,  the  relations 
in  which  those  inorganic  compounds  stand  to  the  chemistry  of 
Life,  constitute  another  vast  series  in  which  the  principle  of 
adjustment  has  applications,  infinite  in  number,  and  as  infinite 
in  beauty.  How  delicate  these  relations  are,  and  how  tremen- 
dous are  the  issues  depending  on  their  management,  may  be 
conceived  from  this  single  fact, — that  the  same  elements  com- 
bined in  one  proportion  are  sometimes  a  nutritious  food  or  a 
grateful  stimulant,  soothing  and  sustaining  the  powers  of  life  ; 
whilst,  combined  in  another  proportion,  they  may  be  a  deadly 
poison,  paralyzing  the  heart  and  carrying  agony  along  every 
nerve  and  fibre  of  the  animal  frame.  This  is  no  mere  theoreti- 
cal possibility.  It  is  actually  the  relation,  for  example,  in  which 
two  well-known  substances  stand  to  each  other — Tea  and 
Strychnia.  The  active  principles  of  these  two  substances, 
"  Theine "  and  "  Strychnine,"  are  identical  so  far  as  their 
elements  are  concerned,  and  differ  from  each  other  only  in  the 
proportions  in  which  they  are  combined.  Such  is  the  power 
of  numbers  in  the  Laboratory  of  Nature  !  What  havoc  in  this 
world,  so  full  of  Life,  would  be  made  by  blind  chance  gambling 
with  such  powers  as  these !  What  confusion,  unless  they  were 
governed  by  laws  whose  certainty  makes  them  capable  of  fine 
adjustment,  and. therefore  subject  to  accurate  control!  How 
fine  these  adjustments  are,  and  how  absolute  is  that  control,  is 
indicated  in  another  fact — and  that  is  the  few  elements  out  of 
which  all  things  are  made.  The  number  of  substances  deemed 
elementary  has  varied  with  the  advance  of  Science ;  but  as 
compared  with  the  variety  of  their  products,  that  number  may 
be  considered  as  infinitesimally  small ;  whilst  the  progress  of 
analysis,  with  glimpses  of  laws  as  yet  unknown,  renders  it 
almost  certain  that  this  number  will  be  found  to  be  smaller 
still.  Yet  out  of  that  small  number  of  elementary  substances, 
having  fixed  rules,  too,  limiting  their  combination,  all  the  in- 
finite varieties  of  organic  and  inorganic  matter  are  built  up  by 
means  of  nice  adjustment.  As  all  the  faculties  of  a  powerful 
mind  can  utter  their  voice  in  language  whose  elements  are 


58  THE   REIGN    OF    LAW. 

reducible  to  twenty-four  letters,  so  all  the  forms  of  Nature,  with 
all  the  ideas  they  express,  are  worked  out  from  a  few  simple 
elements  having  a  few  simple  properties. 

Simple  !  can  we  call  them  so  ?  Yes,  simple  by  comparison 
with  the  exceeding  complication  of  the  uses  they  are  made  to 
serve :  simple  also,  in  this  sense,  that  they  follow  some  simple 
rule  of  numbers.  But  in  themselves  these  laws,  these  forces 
are  incomprehensible.  That  which  is  most  remarkable  about 
them  is  their  unchangeableness.  The  whole  mind  and  imagi- 
nation of  scientific  men  is  often  so  impressed  with  this  character 
of  material  laws,  that  no  room  is  left  for  the  perception  of  other 
aspects  of  their  nature  and  of  their  work.  We  hear  of  rigid 
and  universal  sequence — necessary — invariable  ; — of  unbroken 
chains  of  cause  and  effect,  no  link  of  which  can,  in  the  nature 
of  things,  be  ever  broken.  And  this  idea  grows  upon  the 
mind,  until  in  some  confused  manner  it  is  held  as  casting  out 
the  idea  of  Purpose  in  creation,  and  inconsistent  with  the 
element  of  Will.  If  it  be  so,  the  difficulty  cannot  be  evaded 
by  denying  the  uniformity,  any  more  than  the  universality,  of 
Law.  It  is  perfectly  true  that  every  law  is,  in  its  own  nature, 
invariable,  producing  always  precisely  and  necessarily  the 
same  effects, — that  is,  provided  it  is  worked  under  the  same 
conditions.  But  then,  if  the  conditions  are  not  the  same,. the 
invariableness  of  effect  gives  place  to  capacities  of  change 
which  are  almost  infinite.  It  is  by  altering  the  conditions 
under  which  any  given  law  is  brought  to  bear,  and  by  bringing 
other  laws  to  operate  upon  the  same  subject,  that  our  own 
Wills  exercise  a  large  and  increasing  power  over  the  material 
world.  And  be  it  observed — to  this  end  the  uniformity  of  laws 
is  no  impediment,  but,  on  the  contrary,  it  is  an  indispensable 
condition.  Laws  are  in  themselves — if  not  unchangeable — at 
least  unchanging,  and  if  they  were  not  unchanging,  they  could 
not  be  used  as  the  instruments  of  Will.  If  they  were  less 
rigorous  they  would  be  less  certain,  and  the  least  uncertainty 
would  render  them  incapable  of  any  service.  No  adjustment, 
however  nice,  could  secure  its  purpose  if  the  implements 
employed  were  of  uncertain  temper. 

The  notion  therefore  that  the  uniformity  or  invariableness  of 
the  Laws  of  Nature  cannot  be  reconciled  with  their  subordina- 


LAW  ; ITS    DEFINITIONS.  59 

tion  to  the  exercise  of  Will,  is  a  notion  contrary  to  our  own  ex- 
perience. It  is  a  confusion  of  thought  arising  very  much  out 
of  the  ambiguity  of  language.  For  let  it  be  observed  that,  of 
all  the  senses  in  which  the  word  Law  is  used,  there  is  only  one 
in  which  it  is  true  that  laws  are  immutable  or  invariable  ,  and 
that  is  the  sense  in  which  Law  is  used  to  designate  an  individ- 
ual Force.  Gravitation,  for  example,  is  immutable  in  this  re- 
spect— that  (so  far  as  we  know)  it  never  operates  according  to 
any  other  measure  than  "  directly  as  the  mass,  and  inversely 
as  the  square  of  the  distance."  But  in  all  the  other  senses  in 
which  the  word  Law  is  used,  laws  are  not  immutable  ,  but,  on 
the  contrary,  they  are  the  great  instruments,  the  unceasing 
agencies,  of  change.  When,  therefore,  scientific  men  speak, 
as  they  often  do,  of  all  phenomena  being  governed  by  invaria- 
ble laws,  they  use  language  which  is  ambiguous,  and  in  most 
cases  they  use  it  in  a  sense  which  covers  an  erroneous  idea  of 
the  facts.  There  are  no  phenomena  visible  to  Man  of  which 
it  is  true  to  say  that  they  are  governed  by  any  invariable  Force. 
That  which  does  govern  them  is  always  some  variable  combi- 
nations of  invariable  forces.  But  this  makes  all  the  difference 
in  reasoning  on  the  relation  of  Will  to  Law, — this  is  the  one 
essential  distinction  to  be  admitted  and  observed.  There  is 
no  observed  Order  of  facts  which  is  not  due  to  a  combination 
of  Forces ;  and  there  is  no  combination  of  Forces  which  is  in- 
variable— none  which  are  not  capable  of  change  in  infinite  de- 
grees. In  these  senses — and  these  are  the  common  senses  in 
which  Law  is  used  to  express  the  phenomena  of  Nature — Law 
is  not  rigid,  it  is  not  immutable,  it  is  not  invariable,  but  it  is, 
on  the  contrary,  pliable,  subtle,  various.  In  the  only  sense  in 
which  laws  are  immutable,  this  immutability  is  the  very  charac- 
teristic which  makes  them  subject  to  guidance  through  endless 
cycles  of  design.  We  know  this  in  our  own  case.  It  is  the 
very  certainty  and  invariableness  of  the  laws  of  Nature  which 
alone  enables  us  to  use  them,  and  to  yoke  them  to  our  service. 
Now,  the  laws  of  Nature  appear  to  be  employed  in  the  sys- 
tem of  Nature  in  a  manner  precisely  analogous  to  that  in  which 
we  ourselves  employ  them.  The  difficulties  and  obstructions 
which  are  presented  by  one  law  in  the  way  of  accomplishing  a 
given  purpose,  are  met  and  overcome  exactly  on  the  same 


60  THE    REIGN    OF    LAW 

principle  on  which  they  are  met  and  overcome  Man — viz., 
by  knowledge  of  other  laws,  and  by  resource  in  applying  them, 
— that  is,  by  ingenuity  in  mechanical  contrivance.  It  cannot 
be  too  much  insisted  on,  that  this  is  a  conclusion  of  pure 
Science.  The  relation  which  an  organic  structure  bears  to  its 
purpose  in  Nature  can  be  recognized  as  certainly  as  the  same 
relation  between  a  machine  and  its  purpose  in  human  art.  It 
is  absurd  to  maintain,  for  example,  that  the  purpose  of  the 
cellular  arrangement  of  material  in  combining  lightness  with 
strength,  is  a  purpose  legitimately  cognizable  by  Science  in  the 
Menai  Bridge,  but  is  not  as  legitimately  cognizable  when  it 
is  seen  in  Nature,  actually  serving  the  same  use.  The  little 
Barnacles  which  crust  the  rocks  at  low  tide,  and  which  to  live 
there  at  all  must  be  able  to  resist  the  surf,  have  the  building  of 
their  shells  constructed  strictly  with  reference  to  this  necessity. 
It  is  a  structure  all  hollowed  and  chambered  on  the  plan  which 
engineers  have  so  lately  discovered  as  an  arrangement  of  ma- 
terial by  which  the  power  of  resisting  strain  or  pressure  is  mul- 
tiplied in  an  extraordinary  degree.  That  shell  is  as  pure  a  bit 
of  mechanics  as  the  bridge,  both  being  structures  in  which  the 
same  arrangement  is  adapted  to  the  same  end. 

"  Small,  but  a  work  divine  ; 
Frail,  but  of  force  to  withstand, 
Year  upon  year,  the  shock 
Of  cataract  seas  that  snap 
The  three-decker's  oaken  spine." 

"  Maud?*  TENNYSON. 

This  is  but  one  instance  out  of  a  number  which  no  man  can 
count.  So  far  as  we  know,  no  Law — that  is,  no  elementary 
Force — of  Nature  is  liable  to  change.  But  every  Law  of  Na- 
ture is  liable  to  counteraction  ;  and  the  rule  is,  that  laws  are 
habitually  made  to  counteract  each  other  in  precisely  the  man- 
ner and  degree  which  some  definite  result  requires. 

Nor  is  it  less  remarkable  that  the  converse  of  this  is  true  : 
no  Purpose  is  ever  obtained  in  Nature,  except  by  the  enlist- 
ment of  Laws  as  the  means  and  instruments  of  attainment. 
When  an  extraordinary  result  is  aimed  at,  it  often  happens 
that  some  common  law  is  yoked  to  extraordinary  conditions, 


LAW  ; ITS    DEFINITIONS.  6 1 

and  its  action  is  intensified  by  some  special  machinery.     For 
example,  the  Forces  of  Electricity  are  in  action,  probably,  in 
all  living  Organisms,  but  certainly  in  the  muscular  and  ner- 
vous system  of  the  higher  animals.     In  a  very  few  (so  far  as 
yet  known,  in   only   a  very  few  animals  among  the   millions 
which  exist,  and  these  all  belonging  to  the  Class  of  Fishes),  the 
electrical  action  has  been  so  stored  and  concentrated  as  to 
render  it  serviceable  as  a  weapon  of  offence.     Creatures  which 
grovel  at  the  bottom  of  the  sea,  or  in  the  slime  of  rivers,  have 
been  gifted  with  the  astonishing  faculty  of  wielding  at  their  will 
the  most  subtle  of  all  the  powers  of  Nature.     They  have  the 
faculty  of  "  shooting  out  lightning  "   against  their  enemies  or 
their  prey.     But  this  gift  has  not  been  given  without  an  exact 
fulfilment  of  all  the  laws  which  govern  Electricity,  and  which 
especially  govern  its  concentration  and  destructive  force.     The 
Electric  Ray,  or  Torpedo,  has  been  provided  with  a  Battery 
closely  resembling,  but  greatly  exceeding  in  the  beauty  and 
compactness  of  its  structure,  the   Batteries  whereby  Man  has 
now  learned  to  make  the  laws  of  Electricity  subservient  to  his 
will.     There  are  no  less  than  940  hexagonal  columns  in  this 
Battery  like  those  of  a  bee's  comb,  and  each  of  these  is  subdi- 
vided by  a  series  of  horizontal  plates,  which  appear  to  be  an- 
alogous to  the  plates  of  the  Voltaic  Pile.     The  whole  is  sup- 
plied with  an  enormous  amount  of  nervous  matter,  four  great 
branches  of  which  are  as  large  as  the  animal's  spinal  cord,  and 
these  spread  out  in  a  multitude  of  thread-like  filaments  round 
the  prismatic   columns,  and   finally  pass   into  all  the   cells.* 
This,  again,  seems  to  suggest  an  analogy  with  the  arrangement 
by  which  an  electric  current,  passing  through  a  coil  and  round 
a  magnet,  is  used  to  intensify  the  magnetic  force.     A  complete 
knowledge  of  all  the  mysteries  which  have  been  gradually  un- 
folded from   the  days  of  Galvani  to  those  of  Faraday,  and  of 
many  others  which  are  still  inscrutable  to  us,  is   exhibited  in 
this  structure.     The  laws  which  are  appealed  to  in  the  accom- 
plishment of  this  purpose  are  many  and  very  complicated  ;  be- 
cause the  conditions  to  be  satisfied  refer  not  merely  to  the 
generation  of  Electric  force  in  the  animal  to  which  it  is  given, 
but  to  its  effect  on  the  nervous  system  of  the  animals  against 

*  Owen's  "  Lectures  on  Comp.  Anat."  vol.  ii.  (Fishes). 


62  THE    REIGN    OF    LAW. 

which  it  is  to  be  employed,  and  to  the  conducting  medium  in 
which  both  are  moving. 

When  we  contemplate  such  a  structure  as  this,  the  idea  is 
borne  in  with  force  upon  the  mind,  that  the  need  of  conform- 
ing to  definite  conditions  seems  as  absolute  a  necessity  in  mak- 
ing an  Electric  Fish  as  in  making  an  Electric  Telegraph.  But 
the  fact  of  these  conditions  existing,  and  requiring  to  be  satis- 
fied,— or,  in  other  words,  the  fact  of  so  many  natural  laws  de- 
manding a  first  obedience, — is  not  the  ultimate  fact,  it  is  not 
even  the  main  fact,  which  Science  apprehends  in  such  phenom- 
ena as  these.  On  the  contrary,  that  which  is  most  observa- 
ble and  most  certain,  is  the  manner  in  which  these  conditions 
are  met,  complied  with,  and,  by  being  complied  with,  are  over- 
come. But  this  is,  in  other  words,  the  subordination  of  many 
laws  to  a  difficult  and  curious  Purpose, — a  subordination  which 
is  effected  through  the  instrumentality  of  a  purely  mechanical 
contrivance. 

It  is  no  objection  to  this  universal  truth,  that  the  machines 
thus  employed  in  Nature  are  themselves  constructed  through 
the  agency  of  Law.  They  grow — or,  in  modern. phraseology, 
they  are  developed.  But  this  makes  no  difference  in  the  case 
— or,  rather,  it  only  carries  us  farther  back  to  other  and  yet 
other  illustrations  of  the  same  truth.  This  is  precisely  one  of 
those  cases  already  referred  to,  in  which  Causes  are  unknown, 
whilst  Purposes  are  clear  and  certain.  The  Battery  of  an  Elec- 
tric Fish  is  both  a  means  and  an  end.  As  respects  the  electric 
laws  which  it  puts  in  motion — that  is,  as  respects  the  Force 
which  it  concentrates — it  must  be  regarded  as  a  means.  As 
respects  the  organic  laws  by  which  it  is  itself  developed  it  is 
an  end. 

What  we  do  know  in  this  case  is  why  the  apparatus  was 
made  ;  that  is  to  say,  what  we  do  know  is  the  Purpose.  What 
we  do  not  know,  and  have  no  idea  of,  is  how  it  was  made  ;  that 
is  to  say,  what  we  do  not  know  is  the  Law,  the  Force  or  Forces, 
which  have  been  used  as  the  instrument  of  that  Purpose. 
When  Man  makes  a  voltaic  Battery,  he  selects  materials  which 
have  properties  and  relations  with  each  other  previously  as- 
certained— metals  worked  out  of  natural  ores,  acids  distilled 
out  of  other  natural  substances ;  and  he  puts  these  together  in 


LAW  ; ITS    DEFINITIONS.  63 

such  fashion  as  he  knows  will  generate  the  mysterious  Force 
which  he  desires  to  evoke  and  to  employ.  But  how  can  such  a 
machine  be  made  out  of  the  tissues  of  a  fish?  Well  may  Mr. 
Darwin  say,  "  It  is  impossible  to  conceive  by  what  steps  these 
wondrous  organs  have  been  produced."  *  We  see  the  Purpose 
— that  a  special  apparatus  should  be  prepared,  and  we  see  that 
it  is  effected  by  the  production  of  the  machine  required ;  but 
we  have  not  the  remotest  notion  of  the  means  employed.  Yet 
we  can  see  so  much  as  this,  that  here  again  other  laws,  belong- 
ing altogether  to  another  department  of  Nature — laws  of  organic 
growth — are  made  subservient  to  a  very  definite  and  very  pecul- 
iar Purpose.  The  paramount  facts  disclosed  by  Science,  how- 
ever, in  this  case,  are  these  : — first,  the  adaptation  of  the  ani- 
mal tissues  to  form  a  battery ;  and,  secondly,  the  Purpose  or 
function  of  the  apparatus,  when  made,  to  discharge  electric 
shocks. 

There  is  indeed  one  objection  to  this  method  of  conception, 
which  would  be  a  fatal  objection  if  it  could  be  consistently 
maintained.  But  all  the  strength  of  this  objection  lies  in  the 
obscure  terrors  which  a  very  long  word  is  sometimes  capable  of 
inspiring.  This  word  is  "  Anthropomorphism."  Purpose  and 
Design,  it  is  said,  is  a  human  conception.  Unquestionably  it 
is,  and  so  is  all  knowledge  in  every  form.  We  can  never  stand 
outside  ourselves.  We  can  never  get  behind  or  above  our  own 
methods  of  conception.  The  human  mind  can  know  noth- 
ing, and  can  think  of  nothing  except  in  terms  of  its  own  ca- 
pacities of  thought.  But  if  this  be  fatal  to  our  knowledge  of 
any  of  the  meanings  in  creation,  it  must  be  equally  fatal  to 
our  having  any  knowledge,  of  the  very  existence  of  a  Crea- 
tor. Once  grant  it  to  be  true,  "  that  if  we  are  to  apply  our 
human  standard  to  the  Creator  in  one  direction,  we  must  apply 
it  in  all,"t — then  it  will  follow  that  we  cannot  conceive  any 
Creator  unless  it  be  one  as  weak,  and  as  corrupt,  and  as  ig- 
norant as  ourselves.  If  this  be  not  bad  logic,  as  on  the  face  of 
it  it  clearly  is,  then  it  is  not  "  Theology  "  alone  which  goes  by 
the  board.  The  purest  and  most  naked  Theism  is  equally 
destroyed.  If  it  can  be  said  with  truth  that  "  the  Universal 

*  "  Origin  of  Species,"  p.  192,  ist  edition. 

t  Mr.  G.  H.  Lewes,  Fortnightly  Review,  July,  1867,  p.  109. 


64  THE   REIGN   OF    LAW. 

Mind  is  essentially  other  than  the  Human  Mind,"  *  so  that  no 
recognizable  relations  can  exist  between  them,  then  that  Uni- 
versal Mind  is  to  us  as  if  it  were  not.  But  those  who  take 
objection  to  Anthropomorphism,  are  not  generally  prepared 
to  follow  it  to  this  extreme  conclusion.  Mr.  Lewes  speaks 
of  the  sceptical  philosophy  he  supports  as  "  rejecting  Athe- 
ism " — of  Atheism  being  "  an  error  which  it  has  not  main- 
tained,"— of  Atheism  being  not  only  rash,  but  "  contradictory."! 
But  every  conception  of  a  "  Mind,"  even  though  it  be  described 
as  "Universal,"  must  be  in  some  degree  Anthropomorphic. 
Our  minds  can  think  of  another  mind  only  as  having  some 
powers  and  properties  which  in  kind  are  common  with  our  own. 
Nor  is  this  objection  avoided  by  any  of  the  other  methods  of 
conception  which  are  devised  to  eliminate  from  the  Order  of 
Nature  one  of  the  most  patent  of  its  facts.  The  idea  of  nat- 
ural forces  working  "  by  themselves  "  is  pre-eminently  Anthro- 
pomorphic. This  is  undoubtedly  the  way  in  which  they  seem 
to  us  to  work  when  we  employ  them.  The  idea  of  those  forces 
having  been  so  co-ordinated  at  the  first  as  to  produce  "neces- 
sarily "  and  "  by  themselves  "  all  the  phenomena  of  Nature — 
this  is  an  idea  essentially  formed  on  those  higher  efforts  of  human 
ingenuity  in  virtue  of  which  "  self-acting  "  machines  are  made. 
It  is  quite  true,  no  doubt,  that  this  is  one  aspect  in  which  the 
adjustments  and  contrivances  in  Nature  present  themselves  to 
us.  But  it  does  not  render  this  idea  more  Anthropomorphic, 
but  rather  less,  when  we  add  to  it  other  conceptions — such  as 
the  idea  of  a  Mind  which  is  the  source  of  all  power,  and  a  Will 
which  is  present  in  all  effects.  There  may  be  other  difficulties 
in  the  way  of  this  conception,  but  not  the  difficulty  of  Anthro- 
pomorphism. From  neither  of  these  conceptions,  however,  can 
we  eliminate  the  idea  of  Purpose  and  Design. 

It  is  very  difficult  to  divest  ourselves  of  the  notion,  that 
whatever  happens  by  way  of  natural  consequence  is  thereby 
removed,  at  least  by  one  degree,  from  being  the  expression  of 
Will  and  the  effect  of  Purpose.  We  forget  that  all  our  own 
works,  not  less  than  the  works  of  Nature,  are  works  done  through 
the  means  and  instrumentality  of  Law.  All  that  we  can  effect 

*Mr.  G.  H.  Lewes,  Fortnightly  Review,  July,  1867,  p.  109. 
tlbid.  p.  107. 


LAW  ; — ITS   DEFINITIONS.  6$ 

is  brought  about  by  way  of  natural  consequence.  All  our  ma- 
chines are  simply  contrivances  for  bringing  natural  Forces  into 
operation ,  and  these  machines  themselves  we  are  able  to  con- 
struct only  out  of  the  materials  and  by  application  of  the  laws; 
of  Nature.  The  Steam-engine  works  by  way  of  natural  conse- 
quence ;  so  does  Mr.  Babbage's  Calculating  Machine  ;  so  does 
the  Electric  Telegraph,  so  does  the  Solar  System.  It  is  true, 
indeed,  that  in  all  human  machinery  we  know  by  the  evidence 
of  sight  the  ultimate  agency  to  which  the  machinery  is  due, 
whereas  in  the  machinery  of  Nature  the  ultimate  agency  is  con- 
cealed from  sight.  But  it  is  the  very  business  and  work  of 
Science  to  rise  from  the  Visible  to  the  Invisible — from  what  we 
observe  by  Sense  to  what  wo  know  by  Reason. 

And  this  brings  us  to  the  Fifth  meaning  in  which  the  word 
Law  is  habitually  used  in  Science, — a  meaning  which  is  indeed 
well  deserving  of  attention.  In  this  sense,  Law  is  used  to  des- 
ignate, not  any  observed  Order  of  facts, — not  any  Force  to 
which  such  Order  may  be  due, — neither  yet  any  combination  of 
Force  adjusted  to  the  discharge  of  function,  but — some  purely 
Abstract  Idea,  which  carries  up  to  a  higher  point  our  concep- 
tion of  what  the  phenomena  are  and  of  what  they  do.  There' 
may  be  no  phenomena  actually  corresponding  to  such  Idea, 
and  yet  a  clear  conception  of  it  may  be  essential  to  a  right 
understanding  of  all  the  phenomena  around  us.  A  good  ex- 
ample of  Law  in  this  sense  is  to  be  found  in  the  law  which,  in 
the  Science  of  Mechanics,  is  called  the  First  Law  of  Motion. 
The  law  is,  that  all  Motion  is  in  itself  (that  is  to  say,  except  as 
affected  by  extraneous  Forces)  uniform  in  velocity,  and  rectilin- 
ear in  direction.  Thus  according  to  this  law  a  body  moving,  and 
not  subject  to  any  extraneous  Force,  would  go  on  moving  forever 
at  the  same  rate  of  velocity,  and  in  an  exactly  straight  line. 

Now,  there  is  no  such  motion  as  this  existing  on  the  earth  or 
in  the  heavens.  It  is  an  Abstract  Idea  of  Motion  which  no 
man  has  ever,  or  can  ever,  see  exemplified.  Yet  a  clear  appre- 
hension of  this  Abstract  Idea  was  necessary  to  a  right  under- 
standing and  to  the  true  explanation  of  all  the  motions  which 
are  actually  seen.  It  was  long  before  this  idea  was  arrived  at  -r 
and  for  want  of  it,  the  efforts  of  Science  to  explain  the  visible 
phenomena  of  Motion  were  always  taking  a  wrong  direction.- 
5 


66  THE   REIGN   OF   LAW. 

There  was  a  real  difficulty  in  conceiving  it,  because  not  only  is 
there  no  such  motion  in  Nature,  but  there  is  no  possibility  by 
artificial  means  of  producing  it.  It  is  impossible  to  release  any 
moving  body  from  the  impulses  of  extraneous  Force.  The 
First  Law  of  Motion  is  therefore  a  purely  Abstract  Idea.  It 
represents  a  Rule  which  never  operates  as  we  conceive  it,  by 
itself,  but  is  always  complicated  with  other  Rules  which  pro- 
duce a  corresponding  complication  in  result.  Like  many  other 
laws  of  the  same  class,  it  was  discovered,  not  by  looking  out- 
wards, but  by  looking  inwards ;  not  by  observing,  but  by  think- 
ing. The  human  mind,  in  the  exercise  of  its  own  faculties  and 
powers,  sometimes  by  careful  reasoning,  sometimes  by  the  intu- 
itions of  genius  unconscious  of  any  process,  is  able,  from  time 
to  time,  to  reach  now  one,  now  another,  of  those  purely  Intel- 
lectual Conceptions  which  are  the  basis  of  all  that  is  intelligi- 
ble to  us  in  the  Order  of  the  Material  World.  We  look  for 
an  ideal  order  or  simplicity  in  material  Law ;  and  the  very 
possibility  of  exact  Science  depends  upon  the  fact  that  such 
ideal  order  does  actually  prevail,  and  is  related  to  the  abstract 
conceptions  of  our  own  intellectual  nature.  It  is  in  this  way 
that  many  of  the  greatest  discoveries  of  Science  have  been  made. 
Especially  have  the  great  pioneers  in  new  paths  of  discovery 
been  led  to  the  opening  of  those  paths  by  that  fine  sense  for 
abstract  truths  which  is  the  noblest  gift  of  genius.  Copernicus, 
Kepler,  and  Galileo  were  all  guided  in  their  profound  interpre- 
tations of  visible  phenomena  by  those  intuitions  which  arise  in 
minds  finely  organized,  brought  into  close  relations  with  the 
-mind  of  Nature,  and  highly  trained  in  the  exercise  of  speculative 
thought.  They  guessed  the  truth  before  they  proved  it  to  be 
true  ;  and  those  guesses  had  their  origin  in  Abstract  Ideas  of 
the  mind  which  turned  out  to  be  ideas  really  embodied  in  the 
Order  of  the  Universe.  So  constantly  has  this  recurred  in  the 
history  of  Science,  that,  as  Dr.  Whewell  says,  it  is  not  to  be 
considered  as  an  exception,  but  as  the  rule.* 

Here  again  it  is  very  instructive  to  observe  how  "  Law  "  in 

*  Whewell's  "  History  of  the  Inductive  Sciences,"  zd  edition,  vol.  i.  page  434.  Speak- 
ing of  Copernicus,  Dr.  Whewell  says,  in  another  place  :  "  It  is  manifest  that  in  this,  as 
in  other  cases  of  discovery,  a  clear  and  steady  possession  of  abstract  Ideas,  and  an 
aptitude  in  comprehending  real  Facts  under  these  general  conceptions,  must  have 
teen  leading  characters  in  the  Discoverer's  mind." — Vol.  i.  p.  389. 


LAW  ; ITS    DEFINITIONS.  67 

this  last  sense  is  dealt  with  by  the  Positive  Philosophy.  Scien- 
tific men  are  accustomed  to  reckon  such  Laws  as  the  First  Law 
of  Motion  among  the  surest  possessions  of  pure  Intellect,  and 
the  faculty  by  which  they  are  conceived  among  the  noblest 
proofs  of  its  energy  and  power.  Positivism,  on  the  contrary, 
regards  such  laws  as  mere  "artifices"  of  thought,  and  the 
Power  by  which  they  are  conceived  not  as  a  Strength,  but  as 
an  "  Infirmity  "  of  Mind.*  I  do  not  deny  that  the  process  by 
which  these  Abstractions  are  attained  is  a  metaphysical  proc- 
ess> — that  is  to  say,  they  are  purely  mental  conceptions.  But 
the  process  which  denies  "  reality  "  to  these  conceptions  is  also 
purely  a  metaphysical  process,  with  this  only  difference,  that  it 
is  bad  metaphysics  instead  of  good.  The  analysis  which 
evolves  these  abstract  Laws  out  of  the  phenomena  of  Nature  is 
an  analysis  which  truly  co-ordinates  the  order  of  those  phe- 
nomena with  an  Order  of  Thought.  The  counter.  Analysis 
which  pronounces  them  to  be  mere  artifices  of  Thought,  and 
"  preliminary  falsifications  of  fact,"  is  an  attempt  to  make  Rea- 
son disbelieve  herself,  and  immerses  us  at  once  in  the  worst 
kind  of  Metaphysics — that  which  has  made  the  name  almost 
opprobrious — even  the  old  Scholastic  subtleties  of  the  Nomi- 
nalistic  and  the  Realistic  controversy. 

And  now  having  traced  the  various  senses  in  which  Law  is 
used,  we  can  form  some  estimate  on  the  value  of  those  con- 
clusions of  which  some  men  are  so  boastful  and  of  which  other 
men  are  so  much  afraid.  We  can  see  how  much  and  how 
little  is  really  meant  when  it  is  said  that  Law  can  t>e  traced  in 
all  things,  and  all  things  can  be  traced  to  Law.  It  is  a  great 
mistake  to  suppose  that,  in  establishing  this  conclusion,  the 
progress  of  modern  investigation  is  in  a  direction  tending  to 
Materialism.  This  may  be  and  always  has  been  the  tendency 
of  individual  minds.  There  are  men  who  would  stare  into  the 
very  Burning  Bush  without  a  thought  that  the  ground  on  which 
they  stand  must  be  Holy  Ground.  It  is  not  now  of  wood  or 
stone  that  men  make  their  Idols,  but  of  their  own  abstract  con- 
ceptions. Before  these,  borrowing  for  them  the  attributes  of 

*  "  Science  is  distinguished  from  common  knowledge  by  its  conscious  employment 
of  artifices  which  our  infirmity  renders  indispensable."  Again,  u  Abstraction  is  one 
of  the  necessary  (from  infirmity)  artifices  of  research." — Lewes's  "  Prologue,"  p. 
Ixxxix. 


68  THE    REIGN    OF    LAW. 

Personality,  they  bow  down  and  worship.  Nothing  is  more 
common  than  to  find  men  who  may  be  trusted  thoroughly  on 
the  facts  of  their  own  Science,  who  cannot  be  trusted  for  a 
moment  on  the  place  which  those  facts  assume  in  the  general 
system  of  truth.  Philosophy  must  include  Science ;  but 
Science  does  not  necessarily  include  Philosophy.  There  are, 
and  there  always  have  been,  some  special  misconceptions  con- 
nected with  the  prosecution  of  physical  research.  It  is,  how- 
ever, on  the  surface  of  things,  rather  than  below  it,  that  the 
suggestions  of  Materialism  lie  thickest  to  the  eye.  They 
abound  among  the  commonest  facts  which  obtrude  themselves 
on  our  attention  in  Nature  and  in  human  life.  When  the  burst- 
ing of  some  small  duct  of  blood  upon  the  Brain  is  seen  to  de- 
stroy in  a  moment  the  Mind  of  Man,  and  to  break  down  all  the 
powers  of  his  Intellect  and  his  Will,  we  are  in  presence  of  a 
fact  whose  significance  cannot  be  increased  by  a  million  of 
other  facts  analogous  in  kind. 

Yet  on  every  fresh  discovery  of  a  few  more  such  facts,  there 
is  generally  some  fresh  outbreak  of  old  delusions  respecting 
the  forms  and  the  Laws  of  Matter  as  the  supreme  realities  of 
the  world.  But  when  the  new  facts  have  been  looked  at  a 
little  longer,  it  is  always  seen  that  they  take  their  place  with 
others  which  have  been  long  familiar,  and  the  eternal  problems 
which  lie  behind  all  natural  phenomena  are  seen  to  be  unaf- 
fected and  unchanged.  Like  the  most  distant  of  the  Fixed 
Stars,  they  have  no  parallax.  The  whole  orbit  of  human 
knowledge  shows  in  them  no  apparent  change  of  place.  No 
amount  of  knowledge  of  the  kind  which  alone  physical  Science 
can  impart  can  do  more  than  widen  the  foundation  of  intelli- 
gent spiritual  beliefs.  We  think  that  Astronomy  and  Geology 
have  given  to  us  in  these  latter  days  ideas  wholly  new  in  re- 
spect to  Space  and  Time.  Yet,  after  all,  can  we  express  those 
ideas,  or  can  we  indicate  the  questions  they  suggest,  in  any 
language  which  approaches  in  power  to  the  majestic  utterances 
of  David  and  of  Job  ?  We  know  more  than  they  knew  of  the 
magnitude  of  the  Heavenly  Bodies ;  but  what  more  can  we  say 
than  they  said  of  the  wonder  of  them, — of  Orion,  of  Arcturus, 
and  the  Pleiades  ?  *  We  know  that  the  earth  moves,  which 

*  Job  ix.  9. 


LAW  ; — ITS    DEFINITIONS.  69 

they  did  not  know ;  and  we  know  that  the  rapid  rotation  of  a 
globe  on  its  own  axis  is  a  means  of  maintaining  the  steadiness 
of  that  axis  in  its  course  through  Space.  But  what  effect,  ex- 
cept that  of  increasing  its  significance,  has  this  knowledge 
upon  the  praise  which  David  ascribes  to  that  ultimate  Agency 
which  has  made  the  round  world  so  sure  "  that  it  cannot  be 
moved  ? "  * 

And  so  of  other  departments  of  Science.  Even  the  modern 
idea  of  Law,  of  the  constancy  and  therefore  the  trustworthi- 
ness of  Natural  Forces,  has  been  known,  not  indeed  scientific- 
ally but  instinctively,  to  Man  since  first  he  made  a  Tool,  and 
used  it  as  the  instrument  of  Purpose.  What  has  Science  added 
to  this  idea,  except  that  the  same  rule  prevails  as  widely  as  the 
Universe,  and  is  made  subservient  in  a  like  manner  to  Knowl- 
edge and  to  Will  ?  In  the  enthusiasm  awakened  by  the  dis- 
covery of  some  new  facts,  or  of  some  new  forces,  and  in  the 
freshness  with  which  they  impress  the  idea  of  such  agencies  on 
)ur  minds,  we  sometimes  very  naturally  exaggerate  the  length 
t?f  way  along  which  they  carry  us  towards  the  great  ultimate 
objects  of  intellectual  desire.  We  forget  altogether  that  the 
;^nowledge  they  convey  is  in  quality  and  in  kind  identical  with 
knowledge  already  long  in  our  possession,  and  places  us  in  no 
new  relation  whatever  to  the  vast  background  of  the  Eternal 
and  the  Unseen.  Thus  it  is  that  the  notions  of  Materialism 
are  perpetually  reviving,  and  are  again  being  perpetually  swept 
away — swept  away  partly  before  the  Intuitions  of  the  Mind, 
partly  before  the  Conclusions  of  the  Reason.  For  there  are 
two  great  enemies  to  Materialism, — one  rooted  in  the  Affec- 
tions, the  other  in  the  Intellect.  One  is  the  power  of  THINGS 
HOPED  FOR — a  power  which  never  dies  :  the  other  is  the  evi- 
dence of  THINGS  NOT  SEEN — and  this  evidence  abounds  in  all 
we  see.  In  re-enforcing  this  evidence,  and  in  adding  to  it, 
Science  is  doing  boundless  work  in  the  present  day.  It  is  not 
the  extent  of  our  knowledge,  but  rather  the  limits  of  it  that 
physical  research  teaches  us  to  see  and  feel  the  most.  Of 
course,  in  so  far  as  its  discoveries  are  really  true,  its  influence 
must  be  for  good.  To  doubt  this  were  to  doubt  that  all  truth 
is  true,  and  that  all  truth  is  God's. 

*  Ps.  xciii.  i. 


70  THE    REIGN    OF    LAW. 

There  are  eddies  in  every  stream — eddies  where  rubbish  will 
collect,  and  circle  for  a  time.  But  the  ultimate  bearing  of 
scientific  truth  cannot  be  mistaken.  Nothing  is  more  remark- 
able in  the  present  state  of  physical  research  than  what  may  be 
called  the  transcendental  character  of  its  results.  And  what  is 
transcendentalism  but  the  tendency  to  trace  up  all  things  to  the 
relation  in  which  they  stand  to  abstract  Ideas  ?  And  what  is 
this  but  to  bring  all  physical  phenomena  nearer  and  nearer 
into  relation  with  the  phenomena  of  Mind  ?  The  old  specula- 
tions of  Philosophy  which  cut  the  ground  from  Materialism  by 
showing  how  little  we  know  of  Matter,  are  now  being  daily 
re-enforced  by  the  subtle  analysis  of  the  Physiologist,  the 
Chemist,  and  the  Electrician.  Under  that  analysis  Matter  dis- 
solves and  disappears,  surviving  only  as  the  phenomena  of 
Force  ;  which  again  is  seen  converging  along  all  its  lines  to 
some  common  centre — "  sloping  through  darkness  up  to  God."* 

Even  the  writers  who  have  incurred  most  reasonable  suspicion 
as  to  the  drift  of  their  teaching,  give  nevertheless  constant  wit- 
ness to  what  may  be  called  the  purely  mental  quality  of  the 
ultimate  results  of  physical  inquiry.  It  has  been  said  with 
perfect  truth  that  "the  fundamental  ideas  of  modern  Science  are 
as  transcendental  as  any  of  the  axioms  in  ancient  philosophy,  f 
We  have  seen  that  one  of  the  senses  in  which  Law  is  habitually 
used  is  to  designate  abstract  ideas  and  doctrines  of  this  kind. 
So  far  from  these  doctrines  and  ideas  having  a  tendency  to 
Materialism,  they  serve  rather  to  bring  inside  the  strict  domain 
of  Science  ideas  which  in  the  earlier  stages  of  human  knowl- 
edge lay  wholly  within  the  region  of  Faith  or  of  Belief.  For 
example,  the  writer  of  the  Epistle  to  the  Hebrews  specially  de- 
clares that  it  is  by  Faith  that  we  understand  "  that  the  things 
which  are  seen  were  not  made  of  the  things  which  do  appear." 
Yet  this  is  now  one  of  the  most  assured  doctrines  of  Science, 
— that  invisible  Forces  are  behind  and  above  all  visible  phe- 
nomena, moulding  them  in  forms  of  infinite  variety,  of  all 
which  forms  the  only  real  knowledge  we  possess  lies  in  our 
perception  of  the  Ideas  they  express— of  their  beauty,  or  of  their 
fitness,— in  short,  of  their  being  all  the  work  of  "  Toil  co- 
operant  to  an  End." 

*  Tennyson's  u  In  Memoriam."  t  Lewes's  "  Philosophy  of  Aristotle,"  p.  66, 


LAW  ; — ITS    DEFINITIONS.  7  I 

Every  natural  Force  which  we  call  a  law  is  itself  invisible — the 
idea  of  it  in  the  mind  arising  by  way  of  necessary  inference  out 
of  an  observed  Order  of  facts.  And  very  often,  if  not  always, 
in  our  conception  of  these  Forces,  we  are  investing  them  with 
the  attributes  of  Intelligence  and  of  Will  at  the  very  moment, 
perhaps,  when  we  are  stumbling  over  the  difficulty  of  seeing  in 
them  the  exponents  of  a  Mind  which  is  intelligent  and  of  a 
Will  which  is  Supreme.  The  deeper  we  go  in  Science,  the 
more  certain  it  becomes  that  all  the  realities  of  Nature  are  in 
the  region  of  the  Invisible,  so  that  the  saying  is  literally,  and 
not  merely  figuratively  true,  that  the  things  which  are  seen  are 
temporal,  and  it  is  only  the  things  which  are  not  seen  that  are 
eternal.  For  example,  we  never  see  the  phenomena  of  Life  dis- 
sociated from  Organization.  Yet  the  profoundest  physiologists' 
have  come  to  the  conclusion  that  Organization  is  not  the  cause 
of  Life,  but,  on  the  contrary,  that  Life  is  the  cause  of  Or- 
ganization,— Life  being  something — a  Force  of  some  kind,  by 
whatever  name  we  may  call  it — which  precedes  Organization,, 
and  fashions  it,  and  builds  it  up.  This  was  the  conclusion  come 
to  by  the  great  anatomist  Hunter,  and  it  is  the  conclusion  en- 
dorsed in  our  own  day  by  such  men  as  Dr.  Carpenter  and  Pro- 
fessor Huxley, — men  neither  of  whom  have  exhibited  in  their 
philosophy  any  undue  bias  towards  either  theological  or 
metaphysical  explanations.  One  illustration  referred  to  by 
these  writers  is  derived  from  the  shells — the  beautiful  shells — 
of  the  animals  called  the  "  Foraminifera."  *  No  Forms  in  Na- 
ture are  more  exquisite.  Yet  they  are  the  work  and  the  abode 
of  animals  which  are  mere  blobs  of  jelly — without  parts,  with- 
out organs — absolutely  without  visible  structure  of  any  kind.  In 
this  jelly,  nevertheless,  there  works  a  "  vital  Force  "  capable 
of  building  up  an  Organism  of  most  complicated  and  perfect 
symmetry. 

But  what  is  a  vital  Force  ?  It  is  something  which  we  cannot 
see,  but  of  whose  existence  we  are  as  certain  as  we  are  of  its 
visible  effects — nay,  which  our  reason  tells  us  precedes  and  is 
superior  to  these.  We  often  speak  of  Material  Forces  as  if  we 
could  identify  any  kind  of  Force  with  Matter.  But  this  is  only 
one  of  the  many  ambiguities  of  language.  All  that  we  mean 

*  "  The  Elements  of  Comparative  Anatomy,"  (Huxley,)  pp.  10,  n. 


*J2  THE    REIGN    OF    LAW. 

by  a  Material  Force  is  a  force  which  acts  upon  Matter,  and 
produces  in  Matter  its  own  appropriate  effects.  We  must  go  a 
step  further  therefore  and  ask  ourselves,  What  is  Force  ?  What 
is  our  conception  of  it  ?  What  idea  can  we  form,  for  example, 
of  the  real  nature  of  that  Force,  the  measure  of  whose  operation 
has  been  so  exactly  ascertained — the  Force  of  Gravitation  ?  It 
is  invisible — imponderable — all  our  words  for  it  are  but  cir- 
cumlocutions to  express  its  phenomena  or  effects. 

There  are  many  kinds  of  .force  in  Nature — which  we  distin- 
guish after  the  same  fashion — according  to  their  effects  or  ac- 
cording to  the  forms  of  Matter  in  which  they  become  cogniz- 
able to  us.     But  if  we  trace  all  our  conceptions  on  the  nature 
of  Force  to  their  fountain-head,  we    shall  find  that  they  are 
formed  on  our  own  consciousness  of  Living  Effort — of  that 
force  which  has  its  seat  in  our  own  vitality,  and  especially  on 
that  kind  of  it  which  can  be  called  forth  at  the  bidding  of  the 
Will.     In  saying  this  I  do  not  mean  to  borrow  from  that  false 
philosophy  which  pretends  by  the  exercise  of  reason  to  get  be- 
hind all  the  intuitive  convictions  on  which  reason  rests.     It  is 
in  this  way  that  men  have  come  to  argue  on  what  they  call  the 
"  reality  of  an  external  world."     Even  if  there  were  no  process 
of  reasoning  capable  of  defending  that  reality,  this  would  not 
lend  a  reasonable  character  to  doubts  regarding  it.     Reason 
must  start  from   some  postulate — some  primary  truths  which 
cannot  be  denied.     But  we  need  not  assume  the  reality  of  an 
external  world  to  be  one  of  these.     Yet  if  it  be  not  a  first  step, 
it  is  a  second  step  hardly  distinguishable  from  the  first.     Self- 
existence  is  of  course  the  truth  which  may  be  regarded  as  the 
first  of  all,  but  in  the  very  idea  of  Self  the  existence  of  that 
which  is  Not-Self  is  necessarily  involved.     In  connecting,  how- 
ever, our  conceptions  of  Force  with  the  consciousness  of  Living 
Effort  in  ourselves,  we  must  guard  against  mistaking  analogy 
for  identity,  and   against  confounding  together  two  items  of 
knowledge  which  are  quite  distinct.     Correlative  with  the  con- 
sciousness of  Living  Effort  in  ourselves,  and  inseparable  from 
it,  there  is  the  consciousness  of  Force  acting  on  us,  as  well  as 
acting  in  us.     And  this  argument  applies  equally  whether  Self 
be  regarded  as  a  perceiving  Mind,  or  as  a  physical  Organism 
through  which  Mind  perceives.     Thus  the  knowledge  of  an  ex- 


LAW  ; ITS    DEFINITIONS.  73 

ternal  world — that  is  to  say,  the  knowledge  of  external  Force — 
stands  side  by  side  with  the  knowledge  of  Self.  Nothing  can 
be  known  except  as  distinguished  from  other  things ;  and  all 
things  which  are  distinguishable  from  each  other,  are,  in  a 
sense,  and  in  the  measure  of  that  distinction,  known.  And  so 
we  know  the  existence  both  of  internal  and  of  external  Force. 
But  if  we  come  to  ask  ourselves  farther  questions,  as  to  the  na- 
ture and  seat  of  Material  Force,  we  can  only  think  of  it  in  the 
terms  of  the  Vital  Force  exerted  by  ourselves.  If  we  can  ever 
know  anything  of  the  nature  of  any  Force,  it  ought  to  be  of  this 
one.  And  yet  the  fact  is  that  we  know  nothing.  If,  then,  we 
know  nothing  of  that  kind  of  Force  which  is  so  near  to  us,  and 
with  which  our  own  Intelligence  is  in  such  close  alliance,  much 
less  can  we  know  the  ultimate  nature  of  Force  in  its  other 
forms. 

It  is  important  to  dwell  on  this,  because  both  the  aversion 
with  which  some  men  regard  the  idea  of  the  Reign  of  Law,  and 
the  triumph  with  which  some  others  hail  it,  are  founded  on  a 
notion  that,  when  we  have  traced  any  given  phenomena  to  what 
are  called  Natural  Forces,  we  have  traced  them  farther  than 
we  really  have.  We  know  nothing  of  the  ultimate  nature,  or 
of  the  ultimate  seat  of  Force.  Science,  in  the  modern  doctrine 
of  the  Conservation  of  Energy,  and  the  Convertibility  of 
Forces,  is  already  getting  something  like  a  firm  hold  of  the  idea 
that  all  kinds  of  Force  are  but  forms  or  manifestations  of  some 
one  Central  Force  issuing  from  some  one  Fountain-head  of 
Power.  Sir  John  Herschel  has  not  hesitated  to  say,  that  "  it  is 
but  reasonable  to  regard  the  Force  of  Gravitation  as  the  direct 
or  indirect  result  of  a  Consciousness  or  a  Will  existing  some- 
where." *  And  even  if  we  cannot  certainly  identify  Force  in 
all  its  forms  with  the  direct  energies  of  One  Omnipresent  and 
all-pervading  Will,  it  is  at  least  in  the  highest  degree  unphilo- 
sophical  to  assume  the  contrary — to  speak  or  to  think  as  if  the 
Forces  of  Nature  were  either  independent  of,  or  even  separate 
from,  the  Creator's  Power. 

It  follows,  then,  from  these  considerations,  that  whatever 
difficulty  there  may  be  in  conceiving  of  a  Will  not  exercised  by 
a  visible  Person,  it  is  a  difficulty  which  cannot  be  evaded  by 

*  "  Outlines  of  Astronomy,"  5th  edition,  p.  291. 


74  THE    REIGN    OF    LAW. 

arresting  our  conceptions  at  the  point  at'which  they  have  ar- 
rived in  forming  the  idea  of  Laws  or  Forces.  That  idea  is- 
itself  made  up  out  of  elements  derived  from  our  own  conscious- 
ness of  Personality.  This  fact  is  seen  by  men  who  do  not  see 
the  interpretation  of  it.  They  denounce  as  a  superstition  the 
idea  of  any  Personal  Will  separable  from  the  Forces  which 
work  in  Nature.  They  say  that  this  idea  is  a  mere  projection 
of  our  own  Personality  into  the  world  beyond — the  shadow  of 
our  own  Form  cast  upon  the  ground  on  which  we  look.  And 
indeed  this,  in  a  sense,  is  true.  It  is  perfectly  true  that  the 
Mind  does  recognize  in  Nature  a  reflection  of  itself.  But  if 
this  be  a  deception,  it  is  a  deception  which  is  not  avoided  by 
transferring  the  idea  of  Personality  to  the  abstract  Idea  of 
Force,  or  by  investing  combinations  of  Force  with  the  attributes 
of  Mind. 

We  need  not  be  jealous,  then,  when  new  domains  are  claimed 
as  under  the  Reign  of  Law — an  agency  through  which  we  see 
working  everywhere  some  Purpose  of  the  Everlasting  Will- 
There  are  many  things  in  Nature  of  which  we  do  not  see  the 
reason  ;  and  many  other  things  of  which  we  cannot  find  out  the 
cause  ;  but  there  are  none  from  which  we  exclude  the  idea  of 
Purpose  by  success  in  discovering  the  cause.  It  has  been  saidr 
with  perfect  truth,  by  a  living  naturalist  who  is  of  all  others  most 
opposed  to  what  he  calls  Theological  explanation^  in  Science, 
that  we  may  just  as  well  speak  of  a  watch  as  the  abode  of  a 
"  watch-force,"  as  speak  of  the  organization  of  an  animal  as  the 
abode  of  a  "  vital  Force."  *  The  analogy  is  precise  and  accurate. 
The  Forces  by  which  a  watch  moves  are  natural  Forces.  It  is 
the  relation  of  interdependence  in  which  those  Forces  are  placed 
to  each  other,  or,  in  other  words,  the  adjustment  of  them  to  a 
particular  Purpose,  which  constitutes  the  "  watch-force ;"  and 
the  seat  of  this  Force — which  is  in  fact  no  one  Force,  but  a 
combination  of  many  Forces — is  in  the  Intelligence  which  con- 
ceived that  combination,  and  in  the  Will  which  gave  it  effect. 
The  mechanisms  devised  by  Man  are  in  this  respect  only  an 
image  of  the  more  perfect  mechanism  of  Nature,  in  which  the 
same  principle  of  Adjustment  is  always  the  highest  result  which 
Science  can  ascertain  or  recognize.  There  is  this  difference, 

*  Lewes's  "  Philosophy  of  Aristotle,"  p.  87. 


LAW; ITS    DEFINITIONS.  75 

-\ 

indeed, — that  in  regard  to  our  works  we  see  that  our  knowledge 
of  natural  laws  is  very  imperfect,  and  our  control  over  them  is 
very  feeble;  whereas  in  the  machinery  of  Nature  there  is  evi- 
dence of  complete  knowledge  and  of  absolute  control.  The 
universal  rule  is,  that  everything  is  brought  about  by  way  of 
Natural  Consequence.  But  another  rule  is,  that  all  natural 
consequences  meet  and  fit  into  each  other  in  endless  circles  of 
Harmony  and  of  Purpose.  And  this  can  only  be  explained  by 
the  fact  that  what  we  call  Natural  Consequence  is  always  the 
conjoint  effect  of  an  infinite  number  of  elementary  Forces, 
whose  action  and  reaction  are  under  direction  of  the  Will  which 
we  see  obeyed,  and  of  the  Purposes  which  we  see  actually  at- 
tained. 

It  is,  indeed,  the  completeness  of  the  analogy  between  our 
own  works  on  a  small  scale,  and  the  works  of  the  Creator  on 
an  infinitely  large  scale,  which  is  the  greatest  mystery  of  all. 
Man  is  under  constraint  to  adopt  the  principle  of  Adjustment, 
because  the  Forces  of  Nature  are  external  to  and  independent 
of  his  Will.  They  may  be  managed,  but  they  cannot  be  dis- 
obeyed.  It  is  impossible  to  suppose  that  they  stand  in  the  same 
relation  to  the  Will  of  the  Supreme  ;  yet  it  seems  as  if  He  took 
the  same  method  of  dealing  with  them — never  violating  them, 
never  breaking  them,  but  always  ruling  them  by  that  which  we 
call  Adjustment  or  Contrivance.  Nothing  gives  us  such  an  idea 
of  the  immutability  of  Laws  as  this  !  nor  does  anything  give  us 
such  an  idea  of  their  pliability  to  use.  How  imperious  they  are, 
yet  how  submissive  !  How  they  reign,  yet  how  they  serve  ! 


THE 

UNIVERSITY 


CHAPTER  III. 

CONTRIVANCE  A  NECESSITY  ARISING  OUT  OF  THE  REIGN  OF  LAW — 
EXAMPLE  IN  THE  MACHINERY  OF  FLIGHT. 

THE  necessity  of  Contrivance  for  the  accomplishment  of 
Purpose  arises  out  of  the  immutability  of  Natural  Forces.  They 
must  be  conformed  to,  and  obeyed.  Therefore,  where  they  do 
not  serve  our  purpose  directly,  they  can  only  be  made  to  serve 
it  by  ingenuity  and  contrivance.  This  necessity,  then,  may  be 
said  to  be  the  index  and  the  measure  of  the  power  of  Law. 
And  so,  on  the  other  hand,  the  certainty  with  which  Purpose 
can  be  accomplished  by  Contrivance,  is  the  index  and  the  meas- 
ure of  mental  knowledge  and  resource.  It  is  by  wisdom  and 
knowledge  that  the  Forces  of  Nature — even  those  which  may 
seem  most  adverse — are  yoked  to  service.  This  idea  of  the  re- 
lation in  which  Law  stands  to  Will,  and  in  which  Will  stands  to 
Law,  is  familiar  to  us  in  the  works  of  Man  :  but  it  is  less  familiar 
to  us  as  equally  holding  good  in  the  works  of  Nature.  We  feel, 
sometimes,  as  if  it  were  an  unworthy  notion  of  the  Will  which 
works  in  Nature,  to  suppose  that  it  should  never  act  except 
through  the  use  of  means.  But  our  notions  of  unworthiness 
are  themselves  often  the  unworthiest  of  all.  They  must  be 
ruled  and  disciplined  by  observation  of  that  which  is, — not 
founded  on  a  priori  conceptions  of  what  ought  to  be.  Nothing 
is  more  certain  than  that  the  whole  Order  of  Nature  is  one  vast 
system  of  Contrivance.  And  what  is  Contrivance  but  that  kind 
of  arrangement  by  which  the  unchangeable  demands  of  Law 
are  met  and  satisfied  ?  It  may  be  that  all  natural  Forces  are 
resolvable  into  some  One  Force ;  and  indeed  in  the  modern 
doctrine  of  the  Correlation  of  Forces,  an  idea  which  is  a  near 
approach  to  this,  has  already  entered  the  domain  of  Science. 
It  may  also  be  that  this  One  Force,  into  which  all  others  return 
again,  is  itself  but  a  mode  of  action  of  the  Divine  Will.  But 
we  have  no  instruments  whereby  to  reach  this  last  analysis. 


CONTRIVANCE   A    NECESSITY.  77 

Whatever  the  ultimate  relation  may  be  between  mental  and 
material  Force,  we  can  at  least  see  clearly  this, — that  in  Nature 
there  is  the  most  elaborate  machinery  to  accomplish  Purpose 
through  the  instrumentality  of  means.  It  seems  as  if  all  that 
is  done  in  Nature  as  well  as  all  that  is  done  in  art,  were  done 
by  knowing  how  to  do  it.  It  is  curious  how  the  language  of  the 
great  Seers  of  the  Old  Testament  corresponds  with  this  idea. 
They  uniformly  ascribe  all  the  operations  of  Nature — the  great- 
est and  the  smallest — to  the  working  of  Divine  Power.  But 
they  never  revolt — as  so  many  do  in  these  weaker  days — from 
the  idea  of  this  Power  working  by  wisdom  and  knowledge  in  the 
use  of  means  ;  nor,  in  this  point  of  view,  do  they  ever  separate 
between  the  work  of  first  Creation,  and  the  work  which  is  going 
on  daily  in  the  existing  world.  Exactly  the  same  language  is 
applied  to  the  rarest  exertions  of  power,  and  to  the  gentlest  and 
most  constant  of  all  natural  operations.  Thus  the  saying  that 
"  The  Lord  by  wisdom  hath  founded  the  Earth ;  by  under- 
standing hath  He  established  the  Heavens," — is  coupled  in  the 
same  breath  with  this  other  saying,  "  By  His  knowledge  the 
depths  are  broken  up,  and  the  clouds  drop  down  the  dew."  * 

Every  instance  of  Contrivance  which  we  can  thoroughly  fol- 
low and  understand,  has  an  intense  interest — as  casting  light 
upon  this  method  of  the  Divine  government,  and  upon  the  anal- 
ogy between  the  operations  of  our  own  minds  and  the  operations 
of  the  Creator.  Some  instances  will  strike  us  more  than  others 
— and  those  will  strike  us  most  which  stand  in  some  near  com- 
parison with  our  own  human  efforts  of  ingenuity  and  contrivance. 
There  is  one  such  instance  which  I  propose  to  consider  in  this 
chapter — the  machinery  by  which  a  great  purpose  has  been  ac- 
complished in  Nature — a  purpose  which  Man  has  never  been 
.able  to  accomplish  in  art,  and  that  is  the  Navigation  of  the  Air. 
No  more  beautiful  example  can  be  found,  even  in  the  wide  and 
rich  domain  of  Animal  Mechanics — none  in  which  we  can  trace 
more  clearly,  too,  the  mode  and  method  in  which  laws  the  most 
rigorous  and  exact  are  used  as  the  supple  instruments  of  Pur- 
pose. 

"  The  way  of  an  Eagle  in  the  air  "  was  one  of  the  things  of 
which  Solomon  said,  that  "  he  knew  it  not."  No  wonder  that 

*  Prov.  iii.  19.  20. 


78  THE   REIGN    OF    LAW. 

•the  Wise  King  reckoned  it  among  the  great  mysteries  of  Nature! 
The  Force  of  Gravitation,  though  its  exact  measure  was  not  as- 
certained till  the  days  of  Newton,  has  been  the  most  familiar  of 
all  Forces  in  all  ages  of  Mankind.  How,  then,  in  violation  of 
its  known  effects,  could  heavy  bodies  be  supported  upon  the 
thin  air — and  be  gifted  with  the  power  of  sustaining  and  direct- 
ing movements  more  easy,  more  rapid,  and  more  certain  than 
the  movements  of  other  animals  upon  the  firm  and  solid,  earth  ? 
No  animal  motion  in  Nature  is  so  striking  or  so  beautiful  as  the 

"  Scythe-like  sweep  of  wings,  that  dare 
The  headlong  plunge  through  eddying  gulfs  of  air." 

"  Wayside  Inn"  LONGFELLOW. 

Nor  will  the  wonder  cease  when,  so  far  as  the  mechanical  prob- 
lem is  concerned,  the  mystery  of  flight  is  solved.  If  we  wish 
to  see  how  material  laws  can  be  bent  to  purpose,  we  shall  study 
this  problem. 

In  the  first  place,  it  is  remarkable  that  the  Force  which  seems 
so  adverse — the  Force  of  Gravitation  drawing  down  all  bodies 
to  the  earth — is  the  very  Force  which  is  the  principal  one  con- 
cerned in  flight,  and  without  which  flight  would  be  impossible. 
It  is  curious  how  completely  this  has  been  forgotten  in  almost 
all  human  attempts  to  navigate  the  air.  Birds  are  not  lighter 
than  the  air,  but  immensely  heavier.  If  they  were  lighter  than 
the  air  they  might  float,  but  they  could  not  fly.  This  is  the 
difference  between  a  Bird  and  a  Balloon.  A  Balloon  rises 
because  it  is  lighter  than  the  air,  and  floats  upon  it.  Conse- 
quently, it  is  incapable  of  being  directed,  because  it  possesses 
in  itself  no  active  Force  enabling  it  to  resist  the  currents  of  the 
air  in  which  it  is  immersed,  and  because,  if  it  had  such  a  force, 
it  would  have  no  fulcrum,  or  resisting  medium  against  which  to 
exert  it.  It  becomes,  as  it  were,  part  of  the  atmosphere,  and 
must  go  with  it  where  it  goes.  No  Bird  is  ever  for  an  instant 
of  time  lighter  than  the  air  in  which  it  flies  ;  but  being,  on  the 
contrary,  always  greatly  heavier,  it  keeps  possession  of  a  Force 
capable  of  supplying  momentum,  and  therefore  capable  of  over- 
coming any  lesser  Force,  such  as  the  ordinary  resistance  of  the 
atmosphere,  and  even  of  heavy  gales  of  wind.  The  Law  of 
Gravitation,  therefore,  is  used  in  the  flight  of  Birds  as  one  of 


CONTRIVANCE   A    NECESSITY.  79 

the  most  essential  of  the  Forces  which  are  available  for  the  ac- 
complishment of  the  end  in  view. 

The  next  law  appealed  to,  and  pressed  into  the  service,  is 
again  a  law  which  would  seem  an  impediment  in  the  way. 
This  is  the  resisting  force  of  the  atmosphere  in  opposing  any 
body  moving  through  it.  In  this  force  an  agent  is  sought  and 
found  for  supplying  the  requisite  balance  to  the  Force  of 
Gravity.  But  in  order  that  the  resisting  force  of  air  should  be 
effectual  for  this  purpose,  it  must  be  used  under  very  peculiar 
conditions.  The  resisting  force  of  fluids,  and  of  airs  or  gases, 
is  a  force  acting  equally  in  all  directions,  unless  special  means 
are  taken  to  give  it  predominant  action  in  some  special  direc- 
tion. If  it  is  a  force  strong  enough  to  prevent  a  body  from  fall- 
ing, it  is  also  a  force  strong  enough  to  prevent  it  from  advanc- 
ing. In  order,  therefore,  to  solve  the  problem  of  flight,  the 
resisting  power  of  the  air  must  be  called  into  action  as  strongly 
as  possible  in  the  direction  opposite  to  the  Force  of  Gravity, 
and  as  little  as  possible  in  any  other.  Consequently  a  body 
capable  of  flight  must  present  its  maximum  of  surface  to  the 
resistance  of  the  air  in  the  perpendicular  direction,  and  its 
minimum  of  surface  in  the  horizontal  direction.  Now,  both 
these  conditions  are  satisfied  (i)  by  the  great  breadth  or 
length  of  surface  presented  to  the  air  perpendicularly 
in  a  Bird's  expanded  wings,  and  by  (2)  the  narrow  lines 
presented  in  its  shape  horizontally,  when  in  the  act  of  forward 
motion  through  the  air.  But  something  more  yet  is  required 
for  flight.  Great  as  the  resisting  force  of  air  is,  it  is  not  strong 
enough  to  balance  the  Force  of  Gravity  by  its  mere  pressure 
on  an  expanded  wing — unless  that  pressure  is  increased  by  an 
appeal  to  yet  other  laws — and  other  properties  of  its  nature. 
Every  sportsman  must  have  seen  cases  in  which  a  flying  Bird 
has  been  so  wounded  as  to  produce  a  rigid  expansion  of  the 
wings.  This  does  not  prevent  the  Bird  from  falling,  although 
it  breaks  the  fall,  and  makes  it  come  more  or  less  gently  to  the 
ground. 

Yet  further,  therefore,  to  accomplish  flight,  another  law  must 
be  appealed  to,  and  that  is  the  immense  elasticity  of  the  air, 
and  the  reacting  force  it  exerts  against  compression.  To  en- 
able an  animal  heavier  than  the  air  to  support  itself  against  the 


So  THE    REIGN    OF    LAW. 

Force  of  Gravity,  it  must  be  enabled  to  strike  the  air  down- 
wards with  such  force  as  to  occasion  a  rebound  upwards  of 
corresponding  power.  *  The  wing  of  a  flying  animal  must,  there- 
fore, do  something  more  than  barely  balance  Gravity.  It  must 
be  able  to  strike  the  air  with  such  violence  as  to  call  forth  a 
reaction  equally  violent,  and  in  the  opposite  direction.  This 
is  the  function  assigned  to  the  powerful  muscles  by  which  the 
wings  of  Birds  are  flapped  with  such  velocity  and  strength. 
We  need  not  follow  this  part  of  the  problem  further,  because 
it  does  not  differ  in  kind  from  the  muscular  action  of  other 
animals.  The  connection,  indeed,  between  the  Wills  of  ani- 
mals and  the  mechanism  of  their  frame,  is  the  last  and  highest 
problem  of  all  in  the  mechanics  of  Nature  ;  but  it  is  merged 
and  hid  forever  in  the  one  great  mystery  of  Life.  But  so  far 
as  this  difficulty  is  concerned,  the  action  of  an  Eagle's  wing  4is 
not  more  mysterious  than  the  action  of  a  Man's  arm.  There 
is  a  greater  concentration  of  muscular  poWer  in  the  organism  of 
Birds  than  in  most  other  animal  frames  ;  because  it  is  an  es- 
sential part  of  the  problem  to  be  solved  in  flight,  that  the 
engine  which  works  the  wings  should  be  very  strong,  very  com- 
•pact,  of  a  special  form,  and  that;  though  heavier  than  the  air,  it 
should  not  have  an  excessive  weight.  These  conditions  are 
all  met  in  the  power,  in  the  outline,  and  in  the  bulk  of  the 
pectoral  muscles  which  move  the  wings  of  Birds.  Few  persons 
have  any  idea  of  the  force  expended  in  the  action  of  ordi- 
nary flight.  The  pulsations  of  the  wing  in  most  Birds  are  so 
rapid  that  they  cannot  be  counted.  Even  the  Heron  seldom 
flaps  its  wings  at  a  rate  of  less  than  from  120  to  150  strokes  in 
a  minute.  This  is  counting  only  the  downward  strokes,  pre- 
paratory to  each  one  of  which  there  must  be  an  upward  stroke 
also ;  so  that  there  are  from  240  to  300  separate  movements 
per  minute.  Yet  the  Heron  is  remarkable  for  its  slow  and 
heavy  flight,  and  it  is  difficult  to  believe,  until  one  has  timed 
the  pulsations  with  a  watch,  that  they  have  a  rapidity  approach- 
ing to  two  in  a  second.  But  this  difficulty  is  an  index  to  the 
enormous  comparative  rapidity  of  the  faster-flying  Birds.  Let 
any  one  try  to  count  the  pulsations  of  the  wing  in  ordinary 
flight  of  a  Pigeon,  or  of  a  Blackcock,  or  of  a  Partridge,  or,  still 
more,  of  any  of  the  diving  sea-fowl.  He  will  find  that  though, 


CONTRIVANCE   A    NECESSITY.  8'l 

in  the  case  of  most  of  these  Birds,  the  quickness  of  sight  ena- 
bles him  to  see  the  strokes  separate  from  each  other,  it  is  ut- 
terly impossible  to  count  them ;  whilst  in  some  Birds,  especially 
in  the  Divers,  as  well  as  in  the  Pheasant  and  Partridge  tribe, 
the  velocity  is  so  great  that  the  eye  cannot  follow  it  at  all,  and 
the  vibration  of  the  wings  leaves  only  a  blurred  impression  on 
the  eye. 

Our  subject  here,  however,  is  not  so  much  the  amount  of 
vital  force  bestowed  on  Birds,  as  the  mechanical  laws  which 
are  appealed  to  in  order  to  make  that  force  effective  in  the 
accomplishment  of  flight.  The  elasticity  of  the  air  is  the  law 
which  offers  itself  for  the  counteraction  of  gravity.  But,  in 
order  to  make  it  available  for  this  purpose,  there  must  be  some 
great  force  of  downward  blow  in  order  to  evoke  a  correspond- 
ing rebound  in  the  opposite,  or  upward  direction.  Now,  what 
is  the  nature  of  the  implement  required  for  striking  this  down- 
ward blow  ?  There  are  many  conditions  it  must  fulfil.  First, 
it  must  be  large  enough  in  area  to  compress  an  adequate  vol- 
ume of  air ;  next,  it  must  be  light  enough  in  substance  not  to 
add  an  excess  of  weight  to  the  already  heavy  body  of  the  Bird  ; 
next,  it  must  be  strong  enough  in  frame  to  withstand  the  press- 
ure which  its  own  action  on  the  air  creates.  The  first  of 
these  conditions  is  met  by  an  exact  adjustment  of  the  size  or 
area  of  the  wing  to  the  size  and  weight  of  the  Bird  which  it  is- 
to  lift.  The  second  and  the  third  conditions  are  both  met  by 
the  provision  of  a  peculiar  substance,  feathers,  which  are  very 
light  and  very  strong ;  whilst  the  only  heavy  parts  of  the 
framework,  namely,  the  bones  in  which  the  feathers  are  in- 
serted, are  limited  to  a  very  small  part  of  the  area  required. 

But  there  is  another  difficulty  to  be  overcome — a  difficulty 
opposed  by  natural  laws,  and  which  can  only  be  met  by  another 
adjustment,  if  possible  more  ingenious  and  beautiful  than  the 
rest.  It  is  obvious  that  if  a  Bird  is  to  support  itself  by  the 
downward  blow  of  its  wings  upon  the  air,  it  must  at  the  end  of 
each  downward  stroke  lift  the  wing  upwards  again,  so  as  to  be 
ready  for  the  next.  But  each  upward  stroke  is  in  danger  of 
neutralizing  the  effect  of  the  downward  stroke.  It  must  be 
made  with  equal  velocity,  and  if  it  required  equal  force  it  must 
produce  equal  resistance, — an  equal  rebound  from  the  elas- 
6 


82  THE    REIGN    OF    LAW. 

ticity  of  the  air.  If  this  difficulty  were  not  evaded  somehow, 
flight  would  be  impossible.  But  it  is  evaded  by  two  mechan- 
ical contrivances,  which,  as  it  were,  triumph  over  the  laws  of 
aerial  resistance  by  conforming  to  them.  One  of  these  contriv- 
ances is,  that  the  upper  surface  of  the  wing  is  made  convex, 
whilst  the  under  surface  is  concave. ,  The  enormous  difference 
which  this  makes  in  atmospheric  resistance  is  familiarly  known 
to  us  by  the  difference  between  the  effect  of  the  wind  on  an  um- 
brella which  is  exposed  to  it  on  the  under  or  the  upper  side. 
The  air  which  is  struck  by  a  concave  or  hollow  surface  is  gath- 
ered up,  and  prevented  from  escaping :  whereas  the  air  struck 
by  a  convex  or  bulging  surface  escapes  readily  on  all  sides, 
and  comparatively  little  pressure  or  resistance  is  produced. 
And  so,  from  the  convexity  of  the  upper  surface  of  a  Bird's  wing, 
the  upward  stroke  may  be  made  with  comparatively  trifling  in- 
jury to  the  force  gained  in  the  downward  blow. 

But  this  is  only  half  of  the  provision  made  against  a  conse- 
quence which  would  be  so  fatal  to  the  end  in  view.  The  other 
half  consists  in  this — that  the  feathers  of  a  Bird's  wing  are 
made  to  underlap  each  other,  so  that  in  the  downward  stroke  the 
pressure  of  the  air  closes  them  upwards  against  each  other,  and 
converts  the  whole  series  of  them  into  one  connected  mem- 
brane, through  which  there  is  no  escape  ;  whilst  in  the  upward 
stroke  the  same  pressure  has  precisely  the  reverse  effect — it 
opens  the  feathers,  separates  them  from  each  other,  and  con- 
verts each  pair  of  feathers  into  a  self-acting  valve,  through 
which  the  air  rushes  at  every  point.  Thus  the  same  imple-. 
ment  is  changed  in  the  fraction  of  a  second  from  a  close  and 
continuous  membrane  which  is  impervious  to  the  air,  into  a  se- 
ries of  disconnected  joints  through  which  the  air  passes  without 
the  least  resistance — the  machine  being  so  adjusted  that  when 
pressure  is  required  the  maximum  of  pressure  is  produced,  and, 
when  pressure  is  to  be  avoided,  it  is  avoided  in  spite  of  rapid 
and  violent  action. 

This,  however,  exhausts  but  a  small  part  of  the  means  by  which 
Law  is  made  to  do  the  work  of  Will  in  the  machinery  of  flight. 
It  might  easily  be  that  violent  and  rapid  blows,  struck  down- 
wards against  the  elastic  air,  might  enable  animals  possessed  of 
such  power  to  lift  themselves  from  the  ground  and  nothing 


CONTRIVANCE   A   NECESSITY.  83 

more.  There  is  a  common  toy  which  lifts  itcelf  in  this  manner 
from  the  force  exerted  by  the  air  in  resisting,  and  reacting  upon 
little  vanes  which  are  set  spinning  by  the  hand.  But  the  toy 
mounts  straight  up,  and  is  incapable  of  horizontal  motion.  So, 
there  are  many  structures  of  wing  which  might  enable  animals 
to  mount  into  the  air,  but  which  would  not  enable  them  to  ad- 
vance or  to  direct  their  flight.  How,  then,  is  this  essential 
purpose  gained?  Again  we  find  an  appeal  made  to  natural 
laws,  and  advantage  taken  of  their  certainty  and  unchangeable- 
ness. 

The  power  of  forward  motion  is  given  to  Birds,  first  oy  the 
direction  in  which  the  whole  wing  feathers  are  set,  and  next  by 
the  structure  given  to  each  feather  in  itself.  The  wing  feath- 
ers are  all  set  backwards, — that  is,  in  the  direction  opposite  to 
that  in  which  the  Bird  moves ;  whilst  each  feather  is  at  the 
same  time  so  constructed  as  to  be  strong  and  rigid  toward  its 
base,  and  extremely  flexible  and  elastic  towards  its  end.  On 
the  other  hand,  the  front  of  the  wing,  along  the  greater  part  of 
its  length,  is  a  stiff  hard  edge,  wholly  unelastic  and  unyielding 
to  the  air.  The  anterior  and  posterior  webs  of  each  feather  are 
adjusted  on  the  same  principle.  The  consequence  of  this  dis- 
position of  the  parts  as  a  whole,  and  of  this  construction  of  each 
of  the  parts,  is,  that  the  air  which  is  struck  and  compressed  in 
the  hollow  of  the  wing,  being  unable  to  escape  through  the 
wing,  owing  to  the  closing  upwards  of  the  feathers  against  each 
other,  and  being  also 'unable  to  escape  forwards  owing  to  the 
rigidity  of  the  bones  and  of  the  quills  in  that  direction,  finds  its 
easiest  escape  backwards.  In  passing  backwards  it  lifts  by  its 
force  the  elastic  ends  of  the  feathers  ;  and  thus  whilst  effect- 
ing this  escape,  in  obedience  to  the  law  of  action  and  reaction, 
it  communicates,  in  its  passage  along  the  whole  line  of  both 
wings,  a  corresponding  push  forwards  to  the  body  of  the  Bird. 
By  this  elaborate  mechanical  contrivance  the  same  volume  of 
air  is  made  to  perform  the  double  duty  of  yielding  pressure 
enough  to  sustain  the  Bird's  weight  against  the  Force  of  Grav- 
ity, and  also  of  communicating  to  it  a  forward  impulse.  The 
Bird,  therefore,  has  nothing  to  do  but  to  repeat  with  the  requi- 
site velocity  and  strength  its  perpendicular  blows  upon  the  air, 


84  THE    REIGN    OF    LAW. 

and  by  virtue  of  the  structure  of  its  wings  the  same  blow  both 
sustains  and  propels  it.* 

The  truth  of  this  explanation  of  the  mechanical  theory  of 
flight  may  be  tested  in  various  ways.  In  the  first  place  it  is 
quite  visible  to  the  eye.  In  many  birds  flying  straight  to  us, 
or  straight  from  us,  the  effect  of  aerial  resistance  in  bending 
upwards  the  ends  of  the  quill  feathers  is  very  conspicuous. 
The  flight  of  the  common  Rook  affords  an  excellent  example — 
where  the  Bird  is  seen  foreshortened.  In  Eagles  the  same  effect 
is  very  marked — the  wing  tips  forming  a  sharp  upward  curve. 
I  have  seen  it  equally  obvious  in  that  splendid  Bird  the  Gan- 
net,  or  Solan  Goose ;  and  when  we  recollect  the  great  weight 
which  those  few  quill  feathers  are  thus  seen  sustaining,  we  be- 
gin to  appreciate  the  degree  in  which  lightness,  strength,  and 
imperviousness  to  the  passage  of  air  are  combined  in  this  won- 
derful implement  of  flight. 

But  perhaps  the  simplest  test  of  the  action  and  reaction  of 
the  air  and  the  wing  feathers  in  producing  forward  motion  is 
an  actual  experiment.  If  we  take  in  the  hand  the  stretched 
wing  of  a  Heron,  which  has  been  dried  in  that  position,  and 
strike  it  quickly  downwards  in  the  air,  we  shall  find  that  it  is 
very  difficult  indeed  to  maintain  the  perpendicular  direction  of 
the  stroke,  requiring,  in  fact,  much  force  to  do  so  ,  and  that  if 
we  do  not  apply  this  force,  the  hand  is  carried  irresistibly  for- 
ward, from  the  impetus  in  that  direction  which  the  air  com- 
municates to  the  wing  in  its  escape  backwards  from  the  blow 

Another  test  is  one  of  reasoning  and  observation.  If  the  ex- 
planation now  given  be  correct,  it  must  follow  that  since  no 
Bird  can  flap  its  wings  in  any  other  direction  than  the  vertical — 
i.e.,  perpendicular  to  its  own  axis  (which  is  ordinarily  horizon- 
tal)— and  as  this  motion  has  been  shown  to  produce  necessa- 
rily a  forward  motion,  no  Bird  can  ever  fly  backwards.  Accord- 
ingly no  Bird  ever  does  so — no  man  ever  saw  a  Bird,  even  for 
an  instant,  fly  tail  foremost.  A  Bird  can,  of  course,  allow  it- 
self to  fall  backwards  by  merely  slowing  the  action  of  its  wings 

*  The  upward  stroke  has  no  sustaining  power,  but  has  considerable  propelling 
power  ;  because  some  air,  failing  to  escape  between  the  feathers,  must  always  pass 
along  the  convex  surface  of  the  wing,  and,  escaping  backwards,  must  exert  upon  the 
ends  of  the  quills  a  similar  reactive  force  to  that  which  is  exerted  in  the  downward 
stroke. 


CONTRIVANCE   A    NECESSITY.  85 

so  as  to  allow  its  weight  to  overcome  their  sustaining  power; 
and  this  motion  may  sometimes  give  the  appearance  of  flying 
backwards, — as  when  a  Swift  drops  backwards  from  the  eaves 
of  a  house,  or  when  a  Humming  Bird  allows  itself  to  drop  in 
like  manner  from  out  of  the  large  tubular  petals  of  a  flower. 
But  this  backward  motion  is  due  to  the  action  of  gravity,  and 
not  to  the  action  of  the  Bird's  wing.  In  short,  it  is  falling 
downwards,  not  flying  backwards.  Nay,  more,  if  the  theory  of 
flight  here  given  be  correct,  it  must  equally  follow  that  even 
standing  still,  which  is  the  easiest  of  all  things  to  other  ani- 
mals, must  be  very  difficult,  if  not  altogether  impossible,  to  a 
Bird  when  flying.  This  also  is  true  in  fact.  To  stand  still  in 
the  air  is  not  indeed  impossible  to  a  flying  Bird,  for  reasons  to 
be  presently  explained,  but  it  is  one  of  the  most  difficult  feats 
of  wingmanship, — a  feat  which  many  Birds,  not  otherwise 
clumsy,  can  never  perform  at  all,  and  which  is  performed  only 
by  special  exertion,  and  generally  for  a  very  short  time,  by 
those  Birds  whose  structure  enables  them  to  be  adepts  in  their 
glorious  art. 

It  cannot  be  too  often  repeated — because  misconception  on 
this  point  has  been  the  cardinal  error  in  human  attempts  to 
navigate  the  air — that  in  all  the  beautiful  evolutions  of  birds 
upon  the  wing,  it  is  weight,  and  not  buoyancy,  which  makes 
those  evolutions  possible.  It  supplies  them,  so  to  speak,  with 
a  store  of  Force  which  is  constant,  inexhaustible,  inherent  in 
the  very  substance  of  themselves,  and  entirely  independent  of 
any  muscular  exertion.  All  they  have  to  do  is  to  give  direc- 
tion to  that  internal  Force,  by  acting  on  the  external  Force  of 
aerial  currents,  through  the  contraction  and  expansion  of  the 
implements  which  have  been  given  them  for  that  purpose. 
Those  who  have  watched  the  flight  of  Birds  with  any  care,  must 
have  observed  that  when  once  they  have  attained  a  certain  ini- 
tial velocity  and  a  certain  elevation,  by  rapid  and  repeated 
strokes  upon  the  air,  they  are  then  able  to  fly  with  compar- 
atively little  exertion,  and  very  often  to  pursue  their  course  for 
long  distances  without  any  flapping  whatever  of  the  wings. 
The  contrast  between  the  violent  efforts  required  for  the  first 
acquisition  of  the  initial  velocity,  and  the  perfect  ease  with  which 


86  THE    REIGN    OF    LAW. 

flight  is  performed  after  it  has  been  acquired,  is  a  contrast  de- 
scribed by  Virgil  in  lines  of  incomparable  beauty  : — 

"  Qualis  spelunca  subito  commota  columba, 
Cui  domus  et  dulces  latebroso  in  pumice  nidi, 
Fertur  in  arva  volans,  plausumque  exterrita  pennis 
Dat  tecto  ingentem  ;  mox,  acre  lapsa  quieto, 
Radit  iter  liquidum,  celeres  neque  commovet  alas." 

ALH.  lib.  v.  213-17. 

Still  more  remarkable,  as  showing  the  power  and  the  value  of 
weight  in  flight,  is  the  fact  that  Birds  are  able  to  resume  rapid 
and  easy  motion  not  only  as  the  result  of  a  previously-acquired 
momentum,  but  after  "soaring"  in  an  almost  perfectly  station- 
ary position.  Nothing,  for  example,  is  more  common  than  to 
see  Sea  Gulls,  and  some  large  species  of  Hawks,  "  soaring " 
one  moment  (that  is,  all  the  forces  bearing  on  the  Bird  brought 
to  an  equilibrium,  and  all  motion  brought  consequently  to 
nearly  a  perfect  standstill),  and  the  next  moment  sailing  on- 
wards in  rapid  and  apparently  effortless  progression.  Now, 
how  is  this  effect  produced  ?  If  we  only  think  of  it,  the  question 
ought  rather  to  be,  How  is  it  ever  prevented  ?  The  soaring  is 
a  much  more  difficult  thing  to  do  than  the  going  onwards.  It 
cannot  be  done  at  all  in  a  perfectly  still  atmosphere.  It  can 
only  be  done  when  there  is  a  breeze  of  sufficient  strength.  Grav- 
ity is  ceaselessly  acting  on  the  Bird  to  pull  it  downwards  :  and 
downwards  it  must  go,  unless  there  is  a  countervailing  Force  to 
keep  it  up.  This  force  is  the  force  of  the  breeze  striking  against 
the  vanes  of  the  wings.  But  in  order  to  bring  these  two  forces  to 
nearly  a  perfect  balance,  and  so  to  "  soar,"  the  Bird  must  expand 
or  contract  its  wings  exactly  to  the  right  size,  and  hold  them 
exactly  at  the  right  angle.  The  slightest  alteration  in  either  of 
these  adjustments  produces  instantly  an  upsetting  of  the 
balance,  and  of  course  a  resulting  motion.  The  exact  direc- 
tion of  that  motion  will  depend  on  the  degree  in  which  the 
wing  is  contracted,  and  the  degree  in  which  its  angle  to  the 
wind  is  changed.  If  the  wing  is  very  much  contracted,  and  at 
the  same  time  held  off  from  the  wind,  that  motion  will  be 
steeply  downwards.  Accordingly  this  is  the  action  of  a  Hawk 
when  it  swoops  upon  its  prey  from  a  great  height  above  it.  I 


CONTRIVANCE    A    NECESSITY.  87 

have  seen  a  Merlin  dash  down  from  a  great  distance  with  its- 
wings  so  closed  as  to  seem  almost  wholly  folded.  The  Gannet 
in  diving  for  fish  does  not  close  its  wings  at  all,  but  turning 
them  and  the  whole  axis  of  its  body  into  the  perpendicular,  and 
thus  allowing  its  great  weight  to  act  without  any  counteraction, 
dashes  itself  into  the  sea  with  foam.  But  every  variety  of 
forward  motion  is  attained  by  different  degrees  of  contraction 
and  exposure,  according  to  the  strength  of  the  breeze  with 
which  the  Bird  has  to  deal.  The  limit  of  its  velocity  is  the 
limit  of  its  momentum,  and  the  limit  of  its  momentum  is  the 
limit  of  its  weight.  The  lightness  of  a  Bird  is  therefore  a 
limit  to  its  velocity.  The  heavier  a  Bird  is,  the  greater  is  its 
possible  velocity  of  flight — because  the  greater  is  the  store  of 
Force — or  to  use  the  language  of  modern  physics,  the  greater 
is  the  quantity  of  "  potential  energy  "  which,  with  proper  imple- 
ments to  act  upon  aerial  resistance,  it  can  always  convert  into 
upward,  or  horizontal,  or  downward  motion,  according  to  its 
own  management  and  desires. 

It  will  be  at  once  seen  from  this  view  of  the  forces  concerned 
in  flight,  that  the  common  explanation  of  Birds  being  assisted 
by  air-cells  for  the  inhalation  and  storage  of  heated  air,  must 
not  only  be  erroneous,  but  founded  on  wholly  false  conceptions 
of  the  fundamental  mechanical  principles  on  which  flight 
depends.  If  a  Bird  could  inhale  enough  warm  air  to  make  it 
buoyant,  its  power  of  flight  would  be  effectually  destroyed.  It 
would  become  as  light  as  a  Balloon,  and  consequently  as  help- 
less. If,  on  the  other  hand,  it  were  merely  to  inflate  itself  with 
a  small  quantity  of  hot  air  insufficient  to  produce  buoyancy, 
but  sufficient  to  increase  its  bulk,  the  only  effect  would  be  to 
expose  it  to  increased  resistance  in  cleaving  the  air.  It  is 
true,  indeed,  that  the  bones  of  Birds  are  made  more  hollow  and 
lighter  than  the  bones  of  Mammals,  because  Birds,  though 
requiring  weight,  must  not  have  too  much  of  it.  It  is  true, 
also,  that  the  air  must  have  access  to  these  hollows,  else  they 
would  be  unable  to  resist  atmospheric  pressure.  But  it  is  no 
part  whatever  of  the  plan  or  intention  of  the  structure  of  Birds, 
or  of  any  part  of  that  structure,  to  afford  balloon-space  for 
heated  air  with  a  view  to  buoyancy.  , 

And  here,  indeed,  we  open  up  a  new  branch  of  the  same 


'88  THE    REIGN    OF    LAW. 

inquiry,  showing,  in  new  aspects,  how  the  universality  and 
unchangeableness  of  all  natural  laws  are  essential  to  the  use  of 
them  as  the  instruments  of  Will,  and  how  by  being  played  off 
against  each  other  they  are  made  to  express  every  shade  of 
thought,  and  the  nicest  change  of  purpose.  The  movement  of 
all  flying  animals  in  the  air  is  governed  and  determined  by 
Forces  of  muscular  power,  and  of  aerial  resistance  and  elastic- 
ity, being  brought  to  bear  upon  the  Force  of  Gravity,  whereby, 
according  to  the  universal  laws  of  motion,  a  direction  is  given 
.to  the  animal  which  is  the  resultant,  or  compromise,  between 
.all  the  Forces  so  employed.  Weight,  as  we  have  seen,  is  one 
•of  these  Forces — absolutely  essential  to  that  result,  and  no  fly- 
ing animal  can  ever  for  a  moment  of  time  be  buoyant,  or  lighter 
than  the  air  in  which  it  is  designed  to  move.  But  it  is  obvious 
that,  within  certain  limits,  the  proportion  in  which  these  differ- 
ent Forces  are  balanced  against  each  other  admits  of  immense 
variety.  The  limits  of  variation  can  easily  be  specified. 
Every  flying  animal  must  have  muscular  power  great  enough 
to  work  its  own  size  of  wing :  that  size  of  wing  must  be  large 
enough  to  act  upon  a  volume  of  air  sufficient  to  lift  the  animal's 
whole  weight :  lastly,  and  consequently,  the  weight  must  not 
be  too  great,  or  dispersed  over  too  large  a  bulk.  But  within 
these  limits  there  is  room  for  great  varieties  of  adjustments, 
having  reference  to  corresponding  varieties  of  purpose.  To 
some  Birds  the  air  is  almost  their  perpetual  home — the  only 
region  in  which  they  find  their  food — a  region  which  they  never 
leave,  whether  in  storm  or  sunshine,  except  during  the  hours  of 
darkness,  and  the  yearly  days  which  are  devoted  to  their  nests. 
Other  Birds  are  mainly  terrestrial,  and  never  betake  themselves 
to  flight  except  to  escape  an  enemy,  or  to  follow  the  seasons 
and  the  sun.  Between  these  extremes  there  is  every  possible 
variety  of  habit.  And  all  these  have  corresponding  varieties 
of  structure.  The  Birds  which  seek  their  food  in  the  air  have 
long  and  powerful  wings,  and  so  nice  an  adjustment  of  their 
weight  to  that  power  and  to  that  length,  that  the  faculty  of 
self-command  in  them  is  perfect,  and  their  power  of  direction 
so  accurate  that  they  can  pick  up  a  flying  gnat  whilst  they  are 
passing  through  the  air  at  the  rate  of  more  than  a  hundred 
miles  an  hour.  Such  especially  are  the  powers  of  some  species 


"i 


CONTRIVANCE   A    NECESSITY.  89 

of  the  Swallow  tribe,  one  of  which,  the  common  Swift,  is  a 
creature  whose  wonderful  and  unceasing  evolutions  seem  part 
of  the  happiness  of  summer  and  of  serene  and  lofty  skies.* 

There  are  other  Birds  in  which  the  wing  has  to  be  adapted 
to  the  double  purpose  of  swimming,  or  rather  of  diving,  and  of 
flight.  In  this  case,  a  large  area  of  wing  must  be  dispensed 
with,  because  it  would  be  incapable  of  being  worked  under 
water.  Consequently  in  all  diving  Birds  the  wings  are  reduced 
to  the  smallest  possible  size  which  is  consistent  with  retaining 
the  power  of  flight  at  all ;  and  in  a  few  extreme  Forms,  the 
power  of  flight  is  sacrificed  altogether,  and  the  wing  is  reduced 
to  the  size,  and  adapted  to  the  function,  of  a  powerful  fin. 
This  is  the  condition  of  the  Penguins.  But  in  most  genera  of 
swimming  Birds,  both  purposes  are  combined,  and  the  wing  is 
just  so  far  reduced  in  size  and  stiffened  in  texture  as  to  make 
it  workable  as  a  fin  under  water,  whilst  it  is  still  just  large 
enough  to  sustain  the  weight  of  the  Bird  in  flight.  And  here 
again  we  have  a  wonderful  example  of  the  skill  with  which  in- 
exorable mechanical  laws  are  subordinated  to  special  purpose. 
It  is  a  necessary  consequence  of  the  area  of  the  wing  being  so 
reduced,  in  proportion  to  the  size  of  the  Bird,  that  great  muscu- 
lar power  must  be  used  in  working  it,  otherwise  the  Force  of 
Gravity  could  not  be  overcome  at  all.  It  is  a  farther  conse- 
quence of  this  proportion  of  weight  to  working  power,  that  there 
must  be  great  momentum  and  therefore  great  velocity  of  flight. 
Accordingly  this  is  the  fact  with  all  the  oceanic  diving  Birds. 
They  have  vast  distances  to  go,  following  shoals  of  fish,  and 
moving  from  their  summer  to  their  winter  haunts.  They  all  fly 
with  immense  velocity,  and  the  wing-strokes  are  extremely 
rapid.  But  there  is  one  quality  which  their  flight  does  not  pos- 
sess— because  it  is  incompatible  with  their  structure,  and  be- 
cause it  is  not  required  by  their  habits — they  have  no  facility 
in  evolutions,  no  delicate  power  of  steering ;  they  cannot  stop 
with  ease,  nor  can  they  resume  their  onward  motion  in  a  mo- 
ment. They  do  not  want  it :  the  trackless  fields  of  ocean  over 
which  they  roam  are  broad,  and  there  are  no  obstructions  in 
the  way.  They  fly  in  straight  lines,  changing  their  direction 

*  For  the  form  of  the  wing  m  this  remarkable  bird,  see  the  beautiful  drawing  here 
engraved  from  the  pencil  of  Mr. Wolf. 


go  THE    REIGN    OF    LAW. 

only  in  long  curves,  and  lighting  in  the  sea  almost  with  a  tum- 
ble and  a  splash.  Their  rising  again  is  a  work  of  great  effort, 
and  generally  they  have  to  eke  out  the  resisting  power  of  their 
small  wings,  not  only  by  the  most  violent  exertion,  but  by  rising 
against  the  wind,  so  as  to  collect  its  force  as  a  help  and  addi- 
tion to  their  own. 

And  now,  again,  we  may  see  all  these  conditions  changed 
where  there  is  a  change  in  the  purpose  to  be  served.  There  is 
another  large  class  of  oceanic  Birds  whose  feeding  ground  is 
not  under  water,  but  on  the  surface  of  the  sea.  In  this  class 
all  those  powers  of  flight  which  would  be  useless  to  the  Divers 
are  absolutely  required,  and  are  given  in  the  highest  perfection, 
by  the  enlistment  of  the  same  mechanical  laws  under  different 
conditions.  In  the  Gulls,  the  Terns,  the  Petrels,  and  in  the 
Fulmars,  with  the  Albatross  as  their  typical  Form,  the  mechan- 
ism of  flight  is  carried  through  an  ascending  scale,  to  the  high- 
est degrees  of  power,  both  as  respects  endurance  and  facility  of 
evolution. 

The  mechanical  laws  which  are  appealed  to  in  all  these  mod- 
ifications of  structure  require  adjustments  of  the  finest  kind , 
and  some  of  them  are  so  curious  and  so  beautiful  that  it  is  well 
worth  following  them  a  little  further  in  detail. 

There  are  two  facts  observable  in  all  Birds  of  great  and  long- 
sustained  powers  of  flight : — the  first  is,  that  they  are  always 
provided  with  wings  which  are  rather  long  than  broad,  some- 
times extremely  narrow  in  proportion  to  their  length  ;  the  sec- 
ond is,  that  the  wings  are  always  sharply  pointed  at  the  ends. 
Let  us  look  at  the  mechanical  laws  which  absolutely  require 
this  structure  for  the  purpose  of  powerful  flight,  and  to  meet 
which  it  has  accordingly  been  devised  and  provided. 

One  law  appealed  to  in  making  wings  rather  long  than  broad 
is  simply  the  law  of  leverage.  But  this  law  has  to  be  applied 
under  conditions  of  difficulty  and  complexity,  which  are  not  ap- 
parent at  first  sight.  The  body  to  be  lifted  is  the  very  body 
that  must  exert  the  lifting  power.  The  Force  of  Gravity,  which 
has  to  be  resisted,  may  be  said  to  be  sitting  side  by  side,  occu- 
pying the  same  particles  of  matter,  with  the  Vital  Force  which 
is  to  give  it  battle.  Nay,  more,  the  one  is  connected  with  the 
other  in  some  mysterious  manner  which  we  cannot  trace  or  un- 


CONTRIVANCE   A    NECESSITY.  9! 

derstand.  A  dead  Bird  weighs  as  much  as  a  living  one.  Noth- 
ing which  our  scales  can  measure  is  lost  when  the  Vital  Force 
is  gone.  It  is  The  Great  Imponderable.  Nevertheless,  vital 
forces  of  unusual  power  are  always  coupled  with  unusual  mass 
and  volume  in  the  matter  through  which  they  work.  And  so  it 
is  that  a  powerful  Bird  must  always  also  be  comparatively  a 
heavy  Bird.  And  then  it  is  to  be  remembered  that  the  action 
of  gravity  is  constant  and  untiring.  The  Vital  Force,  on  the 
contrary,  however  intense  it  may  be,  is  intermitting  and  capa- 
ble of  exhaustion.  If,  then,  this  Force  is  to  be  set  against  the 
Force  of  Gravity,  it  has  much  need  of  some  implement  through 
which  it  may  exert  itself  with  mechanical  advantage  as  regards 
the  particular  purpose  to  be  attained.  Such  an  implement  is 
the  lever — and  a  long  wing  is  nothing  but  a  long  lever.  The 
mechanical  principle,  or  law,  as  is  well  known,  is  this, — that  a 
very  small  amount  of  motion,  or  motion  through  a  very  small 
space,  at  the  short  end  of  a  lever,  produces  a  great  amount  of 
motion,  or  motion  through  a  long  space,  at  the  opposite  or 
longer  end.  This  action  requires  indeed  a  very  intense  force 
to  be  applied  at  the  shorter  end,  but  it  applies  that  force  with 
immense  advantage  for  the  purpose  in  view :  because  the  mo- 
tion which  is  transmitted  to  the  end  of  a  long  wing  is  a  motion 
acting  at  that  point  through  a  long  space,  and  is  therefore  equiv- 
alent to  a  very  heavy  weight  lifted  through  a  stiort  space  at  the 
end  which  is  attached  to  the  body  of  the  Bird.  Now  this  is 
precisely  what  is  required  for  the  purpose  of  flight.  The  body 
of  a  Bird  does  not  require  to  be  much  lifted  by  each  stroke  of 
the  wing.  It  only  requires  to  be  sustained ;  and  when  more 
than  this  is  needed — as  when  a  Bird  first  rises  from  the  ground 
or  from  the  sea,  or  when  it  ascends  rapidly  in  the  air — greatly 
increased  exertion — in  many  cases,  very  violent  exertion — is  re- 
quired.* And  then  it  is  to  be  remembered  that  long  wings 
economize  the  vital  force  in  another  way.  When  a  strong  cur- 
rent of  air  strikes  against  the  wings  of  a  Bird,  the  same  sustain- 

*  The  Albatross,  when  rising  from  the  sea,  is  described  ("  Ibis,"  July,  1865)  as l%  stretch- 
ing out  his  neck,  and  with  great  exertion  of  his  wings,  running  along  the  top  of  the 
'water  for  seventy  or  eighty  yards,  until  at  last  having  got  sufficient  impetus,  he  tucks 
up  his  legs,  and  is  once  more  fairly  launched  into  the  air ."  The  contrast  here  described 
between  the  violent  exertion  required  in  first  rising,  and  the  perfect  ease  of  flight  after 
this  first  momentum  has  been  acquired,  is  a  striking  illustration  of  the  true  mechani- 
cal principles  of  flight. 


92  THE    REIGN    OF    LAW. 

ing  effect  is  produced  as  when  the  wing  strikes  against  the  air. 
Consequently  Birds  with  very  long  wings  have  this  great  advan- 
tage, that  with  pre-acquired  momentum,  they  can  often  for  a 
long  time  fly  without  flapping  their  wings  at  all.  Under  these 
circumstances,  a  Bird  is  sustained  very  much  as  a  boy's  kite  is 
sustained  in  the  air.  The  string  which  the  boy  holds,  and  by 
which  he  pulls  the  kite  downwards  with  a  certain  force,  per- 
forms for  the  kite  the  same  offices  which  its  own  weight  and 
balance  and  momentum  perform  for  the  Bird.  The  great  long- 
winged  oceanic  Birds  often  appear  to  float  rather  than  to  fly. 
The  stronger  is  the  gale,  their  flight,  though  less  rapid,  is  all  the 
more  easy — so  easy  indeed  as  to  appear  buoyant ,  because  the 
blasts  which  strike  against  their  wings  are  enough  to  sustain  the 
bird  with  comparatively  little  exertion  of  its  own,  except  that  of 
holding  the  wing  vanes  stretched  and  exposed  at  proper  angles 
to  the  wind.  And  whenever  the  onward  force  previously  ac- 
quired by  flapping  becomes  at  length  exhausted,  and  the  cease- 
less inexorable  Force  of  Gravity  is  beginning  to  overcome  it, 
the  Bird  again  rises  by  a  few  easy  and  gentle  half-strokes  of  the 
wing.  Very  often  the  same  effect  is  produced  by  allowing  the 
Force  of  Gravity  to  act,  and  when  the  downward  momentum 
has  brought  the  Bird  close  to  the  ground  or  to  the  sea,  that 
force  is  again  converted  into  an  ascending  impetus  by  a  change 
in  the  angle  at  which  the  wing  is  exposed  to  the  wind.  This  Is 
a  constant  action  with  all  the  oceanic  Birds.  Those  who  have 
seen  the  Albatross  have  described  themselves  as  never  tired  of 
watching  its  glorious  and  triumphant  motion  : — 

"  Tranquil  its  spirit  seemed,  and  floated  slow ; 
Even  in  its  very  motion  there  was  rest." 

"  A  Cloud?  PROF.  WILSON. 

Rest — where  there  is  nothing  else  at  rest  in  the  tremendous 
turmoil  of  its  own  stormy  seas  !  Sometimes  for  a  whole  hour 
together  this  splendid  Bird  will  sail  or  wheel  round  a  ship  in 
every  possible  variety  of  direction  without  requiring  to  give  a 
single  stroke  to  its  pinions.  Now,  the  Albatross  has  the  ex- 
treme form  of  this  kind  of  wing.  Its  wings  are  immensely  long 
— about  fourteen  or  fifteen  feet  from  tip  to  tip — and  almost  as 


UNIVERSITY 


CONTRIVANCE   A    NECESSITY.  93 

narrow  in  proportion  as  a  ribbon.*  Our  common  Gannet  is  an 
excellent,  though  a  more  modified,  example  of  the  same  kind  of 
structure.  On  the  other  hand,  Birds  of  short  wings,  though 
their  flight  is  sometimes  very  fast,  are  never  able  to  sustain  it 
very  long.  The  muscular  exertion  they  require  is  greater,  be- 
cause it  does  not  work  to  the  same  advantage.  Most  of  the 
Gallinaceous  Birds  (such  as  the  common  Fowl,  Pheasants,  Par- 
tridges, etc.)  have  wings  of  this  kind  ;  and  some  of  them  never 
fly  except  to  escape  an  enemy,  or  to  change  their  feeding- 
ground. 

The  second  fact  observable  in  reference  to  Birds  of  easy  and 
powerful  flight — namely,  that  their  wings  are  all  sharply  pointed 
at  the  end — will  lead  us  still  further  into  the  niceties  of  adjust- 
ment which  are  so  signally  displayed  in  the  machinery  of  flight. 

The  feathers  of  a  Bird's  wing  have  a  natural  threefold  divi- 
sion, according  to  the  different  wing-bones  to  which  they  are  at- 
tached. The  quills  which  form  the  end  of  the  wing  are  called 
the  Primaries ;  those  which  form  the  middle  of  the  vane  are 
called  the  Secondaries  ;  and  those  which  are  next  the  body  of 
the  Bird  are  called  the  Tertiaries.  The  motion  of  a  Bird's 
wing  increases  from  its  minimum  at  the  shoulder-joint  to  its 
maximum  at  the  tip.  The  primary  quills  which  form  the  ter- 
mination of  the  wing  are  those  on  which  the  chief  burden  of 
flight  is  cast.  Each  feather  has  less  and  less  weight  to  bear,  and 
less  and  less  force  to  exert,  in  proportion  as  it  lies  nearer  the  body 
of  the  bird  ;  and  there  is  nothing  more  beautiful  in  the  struct- 
ure of  a  wing  than  the  perfect  gradation  in  strength  and  stiff- 
ness, as  well  as  in  modification  of  form,  which  marks  the  series 
from  the  first  of  the  Primary  quills  to  the  last  and  feeblest  of 
the  Tertiaries.f  Now,  the  sharpness  or  roundness  of  a  wing 

*  The  mechanical  principle  involved  in  the  sufficiency  of  very  narrow  wings  has,  I 
believe,  been  adequately  explained  in  a  very  ingenious  pape*  read  before  the  Aeron- 
autical Society,  by  Mr.  F.  H.  Wenham,  C.E.  It  is  .the  same  mechanical  principle 
which  accounts  for  the  narrow  blades  of  a  Screw  Propeller  having  a  resisting  force 
as  great  as  would  be  exerted  upon  the  whole  area  of  rotation  by  a  solid  Disc.  In  the 
case  of  a  flat  body,  such  as  the  wing  of  a  bird,  being  propelled  edgeways  through  the 
air,  nearly  the  whole  resisting  and  sustaining  force  is  exerted  upon  the  first  few  inches 
of  the  advancing  surface. 

1 1  owe  to  the  accurate  pencil  of  Mr.  J.  Wolf  the  accompanying  engraving  of  the 
wing  of  the  Golden  Plover,  a  Bird  of  powerful  flight.  In  this  wing  the  gradation  of 
the  feathers  is  very  perfect.  It  will  be  observed  that  the  first  of  the  Secondaries, 
the  eleventh  feather  from  the  tip  of  the  wing,  is  marked  by  a  slight  variation  in  the 
form  of  the  margin. 


94  THE    REIGN    OF    LAW. 

at  the  tip  depends  on  the  position  which  is  given  to  the  longest 
Primary  quill.  If  the  first,  or  even  the  second,  primary  is  the 
longest,  and  all  that  follow  are  considerably  shorter,  the  wing 
is  necessarily  a  pointed  wing,  because  the  tip  of  a  single  quill 
forms  the  end ;  but  if  the  third  or  fourth  Primary  quills  are  the 
longest,  and  the  next  again  on  both  sides  are  only  a  little  shorter, 
the  wing  becomes  a  round-ended  wing.  Round-ended  wings 
are  also  almost  always  open-ended — that  is  to  say,  the  tips  of 
the  quills  do  not  touch  each  other,  but  leave  interspaces  at  the 
end  of  the  wing,  through  which,  of  course,  a  good  deal  of  air 
escapes.  Since  each  single  quill  is  formed  on  the  same  princi- 
ple as  the  whole  wing — that  is,  with  the  anterior  margin  stiff 
and  the  posterior  margin  yielding — this  escape  is  not  useless 
for  progression  ;  but  the  air  acts  less  favorably  for  this  purpose 
than  when  struck  by  a  more  compact  set  of  feathers.  The  com- 
mon Rook  and  all  the  Crows  are  examples  of  this.  The  Per- 
egrine Falcon,  the  common  Swallow,  and  all  Birds  of  very  pow- 
erful flight,  have  been  provided  with  the  sharp-pointed  struct- 
ure.* 

The  object  of  this  structure,  and  the  mechanical  laws  to  which 
it  appeals,  will  be  apparent  when  we  recollect  what  it  is  on 
which  the  propelling  power,  as  distinct  from  the  sustaining 
power,  of  a  Bird's  wing  depends.  It  depends  on  the  reaction 
of  the  air  escaping  backwards — that  is,  in  the  direction  exactly 
opposite  to  that  of  the  intended  motion  of  the  Bird.  Any  air 
which  escapes  from  under  the  wing,  in  any  other  direction,  will 
of  course  react  with  less  advantage  upon  that  motion.  But 
from  under  a  round  wing  a  good  deal  of  air  must  necessarily 
escape  along  the  rounded  end — that  is,  in  a  direction  at  right 
angles  to  the  line  of  intended  flight.  All  the  reaction  produced 
by  this  escape  is  a  reaction  which  is  useless  for  propulsion. 
Accordingly,  in  all  Birds  to  which  great  velocity  of  flight  is 
essential,  this  structure,  which  is  common  in  other  Birds,  is  care- 
fully avoided. 

The  Hawks  have  been  classified  as  "  noble  "  or  "  ignoble," 
according  to  the  length  and  sharpness  of  their  wings  :  those 
which  catch  their  prey  by  velocity  of  flight  having  been  uni- 

*  The  illustrations  of  Mr.  Wolf  will  here  again  be  the  best  explanation  to  the  reader 
of  the  difference  between  the  sharp  and  the  round  structure,  p.  93. 


CONTRIVANCE    A    NECESSITY.  95 

formly  provided  with  the  long-pointed  structure.  The  Sparrow- 
Hawk  and  the  Merlin  are  excellent  examples  of  the  difference. 
The  Sparrow-Hawk,  with  its  comparatively  short  and  blunt 
wings,  steals  along  the  hedgerows  and  pounces  on  its  prey  by 
surprise  ;  seldom  chasing  it,  except  for  a  short  distance,  and 
when  the  victim  is  at  a  disadvantage.  And  well  do  the  smaller 
Birds  know  this  habit,  and  the  limit  of  his  powers.  Many  of 
them  chase  and  "  chaff  "  the  Sparrow-Hawk,  when  he  is  seen 
flying  in  the  open,  perfectly  aware  that  he  cannot  catch  them 
by  fast  flying.  But  they  never  play  these  tricks  with  the  Merlin. 
This  beautiful  little  Falcon  hunts  the  open  ground,  giving  fair 
chase  to  its  quarry  by  power  and  speed  of  flight.  The  Merlin 
delights  in  flying  at  some  of  the  fastest  Birds,  such  as  the  Snipe. 
The  longest  and  most  beautiful  trial  of  wingmanship  I  have  ever 
seen  was  the  chase  of  a  Merlin  after  a  Snipe  in  one  of  the  Heb- 
rides. It  lasted  as  far  as  the  eye  could  reach,  and  seemed  to 
continue  far  out  to  sea.  In  the  Merlin,  as  in  all  the  fastest 
Falcons,  the  second  quill  feather  is  the  longest  in  the  wing; 
the  others  rapidly  diminish  ;  and  the  point  of  the  wing  looks  as 
sharp  as  a  needle  in  the  air. 

There  is  yet  one  other  power  which  it  is  absolutely  necessary 
to  some  Birds  that  their  wings  should  enable  them  to  exert : 
and  that  is,  the  power  of  standing  still,  or  remaining  suspended 
in  the  air  without  any  forward  motion.  One  familiar  example 
of  this  is  the  common  Kestrel,  which,  from  the  frequent  exer- 
cise of  this  power,  is  called  in  some  counties  the  "  Windhover." 
The  mechanical  principles  on  which  the  machinery  of  flight  is 
adapted  to  this  purpose,  are  very  simple.  No  Bird  can  exercise 
this  power  which  is  not  provided  with  wings  large  enough,  long 
enough,  and  powerful  enough  to  sustain  its  weight  with  ease, 
and  without  violent  exertion.  Large  wings  can  always  be  di- 
minished at  the  pleasure  of  the  Bird,  by  being  partially  folded 
inwards  ;  and  this  contraction  of  the  area  is  constantly  resorted 
to.  But  a  Bird  which  has  wings  so  small  and  scanty  as  to  com- 
pel it  to  strike  them  always  at  full  stretch,  and  with  great  veloc- 
ity in  order  to  fly  at  all,  is  incapable  of  standing  still  in  the  air. 
No  man  ever  saw  a  Diver  or  a  Duck  performing  the  evolution 
which  the  Kestrel  may  be  seen  performing  every  hour  over 
so  many  English  fields.  The  cause  of  this  is  obvious,  if  we  re- 


96  THE    REIGN    OF    LAW. 

fer  to  the  principles  which  have  already  been  explained.  We 
have  seen  that  the  perpendicular  stroke  of  a  Bird's  wing  has 
the  double  effect  of  both  propelling  and  sustaining.  The  reac- 
tion from  such  a  stroke  brings  two  different  forces  to  bear  upon 
the  Bird — one  whose  direction  is  upwards,  and  another  whose 
direction  is  forwards.  How  can  these  two  effects  be  separated 
from  each  other  ?  How  can  the  wing  be  so  moved  as  to  keep 
up  just  enough  of  the  sustaining  force  without  allowing  the  pro- 
pelling force  to  come  into  play  ?  The  answer  to  this,  although 
it  involves  some  very  complicated  laws  connected  with  what 
mechanicians  call  the  "  parallelogram  of  forces,"  is  practically 
a  simple  one.  It  can  only  be  done  by  shortening  the  stroke 
and  altering  the  perpendicularity  of  its  direction.  Of  course, 
if  a  Bird,  by  altering  the  axis  of  its  own  body,  can  direct  its 
wing-stroke  in  some  degree  forwards,  it  will  have  the  effect  of 
stopping  instead  of  promoting  progression.  But  in  order  to  do 
this,  it  must  have  a  superabundance  of  sustaining  force,  because 
some  of  this  force  is  sacrificed  when  the  stroke  is  off  the  perpen- 
dicular. Hence  it  follows  that  Birds  so  heavy  as  to  require  the 
whole  action  of  their  wings  to  sustain  them  at  all,  can  never 
afford  this  sacrifice  of  the  sustaining  force,  and,  except  for  the 
purpose  of  arresting  their  flight,  can  never  strike  except  directly 
downwards, — that  is,  directly  against  the  opposing  force  of 
gravity.  But  Birds  with  superabundant  sustaining  power,  and 
long  sharp  wings,  have  nothing  to  do  but  to  diminish  the  length 
of  stroke,  and  direct  it  off  the  perpendicular  at  such  an  angle 
as  will  bring  all  the  forces  bearing  upon  their  body  to  an  exact 
balance,  and  they  will  then  remain  stationary  at  a  fixed  point 
in  the  air.* 

They  are  greatly  assisted  in  this  beautiful  evolution  by  an 
adverse  current  of  air ;  and  it  will  always  be  observed  that  the 
Kestrel,  when  hovering,  turns  his  head  to  wind,  and  hangs  his 
whole  body  at  a  greater  or  less  angle  to  the  plane  of  the  hori- 
zon. When  there  is  no  wind,  or  very  little,  the  sustaining  force 
is  kept  up  by  a  short  rapid  action  of  the  pinions,  and  the  long 
tail  is  spread  out  like  a  fan  to  assist  in  stopping  any  tendency 
to  pnward  motion.  When  there  is  a  strong  breeze,  no  flapping 

*  Mr.  Wolf's  illustration  of  a  Kestrel  hovering  shows  accurately  the  position  of  the 
bird  when  the  action  is  performed  in  still  air. 


C,  SPARROW  HAWK— ROVXD  WING. 


A,  KESTREL  HOVERING. 


CONTRIVANCE   A    NECESSITY.  97 

is  required  at  all — the  force  of  the  wind  supplying  the  whole 
force  necessary  to  counteract  the  force  of  gravity ;  and  in  pro- 
portion to  the  increasing  strength  of  the  wind,  the  amount  of 
vane  which  must  be  exposed  to  it  becomes  less  and  less.  I 
have  seen  a  Kestrel  stand  suspended  in  a  half  gale  with  the 
wings  folded  close  to  the  body,  and  with  no  visible  muscular 
motion  whatever.  And  so  nice  is  the  adjustment  of  position 
which  is  requisite  to  produce  this  exact  balance  of  all  the  forces 
bearing  on  the  Bird,  that  the  change  in  that  position  which 
again  instantly  results  in  a  forward  motion  is  very  often  almost 
insensible  to  the  eye.  It  is  generally  a  slight  expansion  of  the 
wings,  and  a  very  slight  change  in  the  axis  of  the  body. 

And  here  it  may  be  observed  that  the  tails  of  Birds  have  notr 
as  is  often  supposed,  any  function  analogous  to  the  rudder  of  a 
ship.  Birds  which  have  lost  the  tail  are  not  thereby  rendered 
incapable  of  turning.  If  the  steering  function  had  been  as- 
signed to  Birds'  tails,  the  vane  of  the  tail  must  have  been  set, 
not,  as  it  is,  horizontally,  but  perpendicularly  to  the  line  of 
flight.  But  a  Bird's  tail  has  in  flight  no  lateral  motion  what- 
ever. It  does,  indeed,  materially  assist  the  Bird  in  turning,  be- 
cause it  serves  to  stop  the  way  of  a  Bird  when  it  rises  or  turns 
in  the  air  to  take  a  new  direction.  The  feathers  of  the  tail  are 
also  capable  of  being  depressed  unequally, — that  is,  more  at 
one  side  than  at  the  other ;  and  when  the  whole  are  spread  out 
like  the  leaves  of  a  fan,  this  depression  at  one  side  is  a  means 
whereby  the  Bird  can  exert  against  the  air  which  is  passing  un- 
der it  greater  muscular  pressure  upon  one  side  than  upon  the 
other,  and  can  thus  help  the  turning  action  of  the  wings.  With 
a  telescope  I  have  seen  this  action  of  the  tail  very  marked  in 
the  soaring  flight  of  the  Buzzard,  when  the  Bird  is  wheeling 
round  in  spiral  circles.  The  tail  contributes  also  largely  to  the 
general  balance  of  the  body,  which  in  itself  is  an  important 
element  in  the  facility  of  flight.  Accordingly,  almost  all  Birds 
which  depend  on  great  ease  of  evolution  in  flight — or  on  the 
power  of  stopping  suddenly,  have  largely  developed  tails. 
This  is  the  case  with  all  the  Birds  of  prey — with  the  Kestrel  in 
a  conspicuous  degree.  But  there  are  some  exceptions  which 
show  that  great  powers  of  flight  are  not  always  dependent  ort 
the  possession  of  a  large  tail — as,  for  example,  the  Swift. 
7 


9^  THE    REIGN    OF    LAW. 

Another  explanation  has  been  given  of  the  means  by  which 
Birds  are  able  to  turn  in  flight,  which  is  a  curious  example 
how  preconceived  theories  founded  on  false  analogies  will 
vitiate  our  observation  of  the  commonest  facts  in  nature.  I  do 
not  know  of  any  modern  work  that  gives  any  account  of  the 
theory  of  flight,  which  is  even  tolerably  correct.  But  in  most 
points  an  admirable  account  is  to  be  found  in  the  celebrated 
work  of  Borelli,  "  De  Motu  Animalium."  On  the  question, 
however,  of  steerage  in  flight,  he  gives  a  solution  which  the 
most  ordinary  observation  is  sufficient  to  contradict.  Borelli  is 
quite  aware  that  the  tail  in  Birds  has  no  such  function  as  that 
which  is  usually  assigned  to  it,  and  he  points  out  the  true  theo- 
retical objection  to  the  possibility  of  its  having  any  guiding 
power — viz.,  its  horizontal  position,  and  its  immobility  in  the 
lateral  direction.  But  the  theory  which  he  himself  propounds 
is  equally  erroneous.  It  is  this, — that  Birds  deflect  their 
course  to  the  right  or  to  the  left,  as  rowers  turn  a  row-boat — by 
striking  more  quickly  and  more  strongly  with  one  wing  than 
with  the  other.*  To  this  theory  there  are  two  objections — 
first,  that  as  matter  of  fact  Birds  can  turn,  and  do  turn?  even  to 
the  extent  of  describing  complete  circles  in  the  air,  without  any 
flapping  either  of  one  wing  or  the  other :  and  secondly,  that 
when  Birds  do  flap  and  turn  at  the  same  time,  not  the  slight- 
est difference  in  time  between  the  two  wing-strokes  can  ever 
be  detected.  The  beats  of  a  Bird's  two  wings  are  always  ex- 
actly synchronous.  But  the  first  of  these  two  objections  is  of 
itself  quite  sufficient  to  disprove  the  theory.  No  man  can  have 
watched  even  for  a  moment  the  flight  of  the  common  Swallow, 
and  especially  the  flight  of  the  Swift,  without  seeing  it  perform 
complete  gyrations  in  the  air  without  any  strokes  of  either  wing. 
The  only  change  which  can  ever  be  detected  by  the  eye  is  a 
slight  elevation  on  one  side  of  the  whole  body,  and  a  slight  de- 
pression of  the  other.  The  depression  is  always  on  that  side 

*  Referring  to  a  boat,  he  says:—"  Si  remi  dexteri  lateris  celerius  quam  sinistri  aquam 
retrorsum  impellant— semper  prora  revolvetur  versus  sinistrum  latus  ;  ergo  eodem 
modo  dum  avis  in  medio  fluido  aeris  innatat,  volando  aequilibrata  in  centre  gravitatis 
ejus,  si  sola  dextra  ala  deorsum  sed  oblique  flactatur,  aer<jm  subjectum  impellando 
versus  caudam  necessario  ad  instar  navis  mox  memoratae,  permovetur  latus  ejus  dex- 
trum,  quiescente  aut  tardius  moto  sinistro  latera.  Ex  quo  fit,  ut  avis  pars  anterior 
circa  centrum  gravitatis  ejus  revoluta,  flectatur  versum  sinistrum  latus."— Borellus, 
**  De  Motu  Animalium,"  Pars  Prima.  Propositio  cxcix. 


CONTRIVANCE    A    NECESSITY.  99 

towards  which  the  Bird  is  turning.  On  the  opposite  side,  that 
from  which  the  Bird  is  turning,  there  is  of  course  a  correspond- 
ing elevation.  Sometimes  this  is  very  obvious  ;  but  in  general 
it  is  so  slight  as  to  require  close  observation  to  detect  it.  In 
the  Albatross,  when  sweeping  round,  the  wings  are  often 
pointed  in  a  direction  nearly  perpendicular  to  the  sea.*  The 
effect  of  this,  of  course,  is  to  expose  the  two  vanes  at  different 
angles  to  the  aerial  currents — and  it  must  be  remembered  that 
in  flight  the  balance  of  all  the  forces  employed  is  so  extremely 
fine  that  the  most  minute  alteration  in  the  degree  in  which 
they  bear  upon  each  other  will  produce  an  immense  change  in 
the  result.  It  is  not  surprising,  therefore,  that  the  muscular 
movements  which  serve  to  turn  the  axis  of  a  flying  Bird  from 
one  direction  to  another,  are  very  often  so  extremely  minute  as 
generally  altogether  to  elude  the  sight.  But  in  general  terms, 
it  may  be  said  that  a  Bird  turns  in  flying  essentially  on  the 
same  principle  as  that  on  which  a  Man  turns  in  walking.  It  is 
done  in  both  cases  by  change  in  the  direction  of  muscular  press- 
ure upon  a  resisting  medium.  By  an  exquisite  combination 
of  different  laws,  and  by  mechanical  contrivance  in  the  adjust- 
ment of  them,  it  has  been  given  to  a  Bird  to  find  in  the  thin 
and  yielding  air  a  medium  of  resistance  against  which  its  own 
muscular  force  may  act,  as  firm  and  as  effective  as  that  which 
Man  finds  in  the  solid  earth. 

The  Humming  Birds  are  perhaps  the  most  remarkable  exam- 
ples in  the  world  of  the  machinery  of  flight.  The  power  of 
poising  themselves  in  the  air, — remaining  absolutely  stationary 
whilst  they  search  the  blossoms  for  insects, — is  a  power  essen- 
tial to  their  life.  It  is  a  power  accordingly  which  is  enjoyed 
by  them  in  the  highest  perfection.  When  they  intend  progres- 
sive flight,  it  is  effected  with  such  velocity  as  to  elude  the  eye. 
The  action  of  the  wing  in  all  these  cases  is  far  too  rapid  to  en- 
able the  observer  to  detect  the  exact  difference  between  that 

*  See  a  very  interesting  account  of  the  flight  of  the  Albatross  by  Captain  T.  W. 
Hutton,  in  the  "  Ibis  "  for  July,  1864.  Captain  Hutton  says  :  u  If  he  wishes  to  turn  to 
the  right,  he  bends  his  head  and  tail  slightly  upwards,  at  the  same  time  raising  his 
left  side  and  lowering  the  right  in  proportion  to  the  sharpness  of  the  curve  he  wishes 
to  make,  the  wings  being  kept  rigid  the  whole  time."  This  is  the  only  paper  I  have 
seen  on  the  flight  of  birds  in  which  observation  of  the  facts  is  not  vitiated  by  some 
false  preconceived  theory  on  their  cause.  Captain  Hutton  has  thoroughly  seized  the 
true  mechanical  principles  of  flight. 


TOO  THE    REIGN    OF    LAW. 

kind  of  motion  which  keeps  the  Bird  at  absolute  rest  in  the  air, 
and  that  which  carries  it  along  with  such  immense  velocity. 
But  there  can  be  no  doubt  that  the  change  is  one  from  a  short 
quick  stroke  delivered  obliquely  forward,  to  a  full  stroke,  more 
slow,  but  delivered  perpendicularly.  This  corresponds  with 
the  account  given  by  that  most  accurate  ornithological  ob- 
server, Mr.  Gould.  He  says :  "  When  poised  before  any  ob- 
ject, this  action  of  the  wing  is  so  rapidly  performed  that  it  is 
impossible  for  the  eye  to  follow  each  stroke,  and  a  hazy  semi- 
circle of  indistinctness  on  each  side  of  the  Bird  is  all  that  is 
perceptible."  There  is  another  fact  mentioned  by  those  who 
have  watched  their  movements  most  closely  which  corresponds 
with  the  explanation  already  given — viz.,  the  fact  that  the  axis 
of  the  Humming  Bird's  body  when  hovering  is  always  highly 
inclined,  so  much  so  as  to  appear  almost  perpendicular  in  the 
air.  In  other  words  the  wing-stroke,  instead  of  being  delivered 
perpendicularly  downwards,  which  would  infallibly  carry  the 
body  onwards,  is  delivered  at  such  an  angle  forwards  as  to 
bring  to  an  exact  balance  the  upward,  the  downward,  and  the 
forward  forces  which  bear  upon  the  body  of  {he  Bird.  Mr. 
Darwin  says,  "  When  hovering  by  a  flower,  the  tail  is  constantly 
shut  and  expanded  like  a  fan,  the  body  being  kept  in  a  nearly 
vertical  position"  Mr.  Wallace,  another  accurate  observer,  de- 
scribes the  Humming  Birds  as  "  balancing  themselves  vertically 
in  the  air." 

These  are  a  few,  and  a  few  only,  of  the  adjustments  required 
in  order  to  the  giving  of  the  power  of  flight ; — adjustments  of 
organic  growth  to  intensity  of  vital  force — of  external  structure 
to  external  work — of  shape  in  each  separate  feather  to  definite 
shape  in  the  series  as  a  whole — of  material  to  resistance — of 
mass  and  form  to  required  velocities ;  adjustments,  in  short,  of 
law  to  law,  of  force  to  force,  and  of  all  to  Purpose.  So  many 
are  these  contrivances,  so  various,  so  fine,  so  intricate,  that  a 
volume  might  be  written  without  exhausting  the  beauty  of  the 
method  in  which  this  one  mechanical  problem  has  been  solved. 
It  is  by  knowledge  of  unchanging  laws  that  these  victories  over 
them  seem  to  be  achieved  ;  yet  not  by  knowledge  only,  except 
as  the  guide  of  Power.  For  here  as  everywhere  else  in  Nature, 
we  see  the  same  mysterious  need  of  conforming  to  imperative 


CONTRIVANCE    A    NECESSITY.  IOI 

conditions,  side  by  side  with  absolute  control  over  the  forces 
through  which  this  conformity  is  secured.  When  any  given 
purpose  cannot  be  attained  without  the  violation  of  some  law, 
unless  by  some  new  power,  and  some  new  machinery — the  req- 
uisite power  and  mechanism  are  evolved  generally  out  of  old 
materials,  and  by  modifications  of  pre-existing  forms.  There 
can  be  no  better  example  of  this  than  a  wing-feather.  It  is  a 
production  wholly  unlike  any  other  animal  growth — an  imple- 
ment specially  formed  to  combine  strength  with  lightness,  elas- 
ticity, and  imperviousness  to  air.  Again,  the  bones  of  a  Bird's 
wing  are  the  bones  of  the  Mammalian  arm  and  hand,  specially 
modified  to  support  the  feathers.  The  same  purpose  is  effected 
by  other  means  in  connection  with  precisely  the  same  bones  in 
the  flying  Mammalia — the  Bats.  In  these  animals  the  finger- 
bones  instead  of  being  compressed  or  soldered  together  to  sup- 
port feathers,  are  separated,  attenuated,  and  greatly  lengthened 
to  afford  attachment  to  a  web  or  flying  membrane  which  is 
stretched  between  them.  In  other  ages  of  the  world  there 
were  also  flying  Lizards.  But  in  all  these  cases  the  mechanical 
principle  is  the  same,  and  there  has  been  the  same  ingenious 
adaptation  of  material  and  of  force  to  the  universal  laws  of 
motion. 

On  the  earth  and  on  the  sea  Man  has  attained  to  powers  of 
locomotion  with  which,  in  strength,  endurance,  and  in  velocity, 
no  animal  movement  can  compare.  But  the  air  is  an  element 
on  which  he  cannot  travel — an  ocean  which  he  cannot  navigate. 
The  Birds  of  heaven  are  still  his  envy,  and  on  the  paths  they 
tread  he  cannot  follow.  As  yet !  for  it  is  not  certain  that  this 
exclusion  is  to  be  perpetual.  His  failure  has  resulted  quite  as 
much  from  his  ignorance  of  natural  laws,  as  from  his  inability 
to  meet  the  conditions  which  they  demand.  All  attempts  to 
guide  bodies  buoyant  in  the  air  must  be  fruitless.  Balloons 
are  mere  toys.  No  flying  animal  has  ever  been  formed  on  the 
principle  of  buoyancy.  Birds  and  Bats,  and  Dragons,  have 
been  all  immensely  heavier  than  the  air,  and  their  weight  is  one 
of  the  forces  most  essential  to  their  flight.  Yet  there  is  a  real 
impediment  in  the  way  of  Man  navigating  the  air — and  that  is 
the  excessive  weight  of  the  only  great  mechanical  moving  pow- 
ers hitherto  placed  at  his  disposal.  When  Science  shall  have 


102  THE    REIGN    OF    LAW. 

discovered  some  moving  power  greatly  lighter  than  any  we  yet 
know,  in  all  probability  the  problem  will  be  solved.*  But  of 
one  thing  we  maybe  sure — that  if  Man  is  ever  destined  to  nav- 
igate the  air,  it  will  be  in  machines  formed  in  strict  obedience 
to  the  mechanical  laws  which  have  been  employed  by  the  Cre- 
ator for  the  same  purpose  in  flying  animals.t 

*  The  men  of  Science  in  France  are  ahead  of  the  men  of  Science  in  England  upon 
this  subject.  There  is  a  society  established  in  Paris  which  announces  in  its  very  title 
the  true  fundamental  principle  of  flight—"  Socie'te  d, Encouragement  pour  la  Locomo- 
tion aeVienne  au  moyen  d'Appareils  PLUS  LOURDS  que  1'Air."  The  false  principle  of 
Buoyancy  is  thus  eliminated  and  banished  from  the  question. 

t  I  owe  to  my  father  (John,  7th  Duke  of  Argyll)  my  knowledge  of  the  Theory  of 
Flight  which  is  expounded  in  this  chapter.  The  retired  life  he  led,  and  the  dislike  he 
had  of  the  work  of  literary  composition,  confined  the  knowledge  of  his  views  within 
a  comparatively  narrow  circle.  But  his  love  of  mechanical  science,  and  his  study  of 
the  problem  during  many  years  of  investigation  and  experiment,  made  him  thoroughly 
master  of  the  subject.  In  his  devices  for  testing  and  illustrating  the  truth  of  his 
Theory,  he  was  chiefly  assisted  by  two  very  ingenious  men,  the  late  Mr.  John  Hart, 
of  Glasgow,  and  the  late  Mr.  Robert  Bryson,  of  Edinburgh.  The  result  of  his  inves- 
tigations led  him  to  the  opinion  that  until  a  lighter  moving  power  than  steam  is  dis- 
covered, it  will  be  impossible  to  construct  successfully  machines  for  the  navigation 
of  the  air.  I  shall  only  add,  that  having  made  ornithology  a  favorite  pursuit,  I  have 
been  led  during  many  years  to  test  this  theory  by  close  observation  of  the  flight  of 
Birds  ;  and  that  from  the  manner  in  which  it  fits  into,  and  explains  all  the  facts,  I 
have  been  always  more  and  more  satisfied  of  its  truth. 


CHAPTER  IV. 

APPARENT  EXCEPTIONS  TO  THE  SUPREMACY  OF  PURPOSE. 

YET,  as  we  look  at  Nature,  the  fact  will  force  itself  upon  us 
that  there  are  structures  in  which  we  cannot  recognize  any  use  ; 
that  there  are  contrivances  which  often  fail  of  their  effect ;  and 
that  there  are  others  which  appear  to  be  separated  from  the 
conditions  they  were  intended  to  meet,  and  under  which  alone 
their  usefulness  could  arise.  Such  instances  occur  in  many 
branches  of  inquiry;  and  although  in  the  great  mass  of  nat- 
ural phenomena  the  supremacy  of  Purpose  is  evident  enough, 
such  cases  do  frequently  come  across  our  path  as  cases  of 
exception — cases  in  which  Law  does  not  seem  to  be  subser- 
vient to  Will,  but  to  be  asserting  a  power  and  an  endurance  of 
its  own. 

The  degree  of  importance  which  may  be  attached  to  such 
cases  as  a  source  of  real  difficulty,  will  vary  with  the  character 
of  the  individual  mind,  and  its  capacity  of  holding  by  the  great 
lines  of  evidence  which  run  through  the  whole  Order  of  Nature. 
It  is  with  these  cases  as  with  the  local  currents  which  some- 
times obscure  the  rising  and  falling  of  the  tides.  When 
watched  from  hour  to  hour,  the  greater  law  is  clearly  discernible 
by  well-marked  effects ;  but  when  watched  from  minute  to 
minute,  that  law  is  not  distinct,  and  there  are  waves  which 
seem  like  a  rebellion  of  the  sea  against  the  force  which  is 
dragging  it  from  the  land.  The  Order  of  Nature  is  very  com- 
plicated, and  very  partially  understood.  It  is  to  be  expected 
therefore  that  there  should  be  a  vast  variety  of  subordinate 
facts,  whose  relation  to  each  other  and  to  the  whole  must  be  a 
matter  of  perplexity  to  us.  It  is  so  with  the  relation  in  which 
different  known  laws  of  Nature  stand  to  each  other ;  much  more 
must  it  be  so  with  the  far  deeper  subject  of  the  relation  which 
these  laws  bear  to  the  Will  and  the  intentions  of  the  Supreme. 


104  THE    REIGN    OF    LAW. 

But  as  cases  of  intention  frustrated,  of  structure  without  ap- 
parent purpose,  of  organs  dissociated  from  function  and  from 
the  opportunities  of  use,  are  sometimes  sources  of  difficulty,  it 
may  be  well  to  consider  this  subject  a  little  nearer.  Let  us 
look  at  it  both  in  the  light  of  abstract  reasoning,  and  also  in 
the  light  of  particular  illustration. 

In  the  first  place,  then,  we  must  remember  that  results  which 
may  appear  as  exceptions  to  the  attainment  of  one  Purpose 
may  be  nothing  more  than  fulfilments  of  another.  This  follows 
from  the  truth  which  has  been  dealt  with  in  a  former  page,* 
;that  we  are  "  greatly  ignorant,"  as  Bishop  Butler  says,  how  far 
anything  in  Nature  is  to  be  regarded  as  a  means  or  as  an  end, 
and  that  ultimate  or  final  purposes  we  can  never  see.  The 
•difficulty  hence  arising  has  often  been  represented  as  a  funda- 
mental objection  to  the  whole  doctrine  of  Intention.  But  this 
view  is  founded  on  a  very  great,  although  a  very  natural  con- 
fusion of  thought.  The  perception  of  Purpose  and  Intention 
is  inseparable  from  the  perception  of  Adjustment  and  Function 
.as  these  are  exhibited  in  Nature.  As  such  it  belongs  to 
Knowledge.  It  is  the  perception  of  a  relation  between  those 
phenomena  and  certain  well  known  phenomena  of  Mind.  But 
to  perceive  a  relation  is  not  necessarily  to  perceive  all  that  this 
relation  involves.  To  perceive  intention  is  a  very  different 
thing  from  perceiving  all  that  is  intended.  Our  own  human 
experience  should  make  this  distinction  familiar  to  us.  Many 
things  we  do  and  many  things  we  contrive  are  done  and  con- 
trived with  more  than  one  intention.  In  the  light  of  this  ex- 
perjence  it  is  altogether  irrational  to  regard  as  an  exception  to 
the  attainment  of  Purpose  in  Nature  the  fact,  for  example, 
"  that  of  fifty  seeds  she  often  brings  but  one  to  bear."  It 
throws  no  doubt  or  difficulty  in  the  way  of  our  conviction,  for 
example,  that  one  purpose  of  seed-bearing  in  Plants  is  the  re- 
production of  their  kind,  because  it  appears  that  another  pur- 
pose to  which  that  seed-bearing  is  applied  is  the  support  of 
animal  life.  The  intention  with  which  a  grain  of  wheat  is  so 
constituted  as  to  be  capable  of  producing  another  wheat  plant, 
is  not  the  less  in  the  nature  of  Purpose  because  it  co-exists 
with  another  intention,  that  the  same  grain  should  be  capable 

*  A  nte^  p.  48. 


APPARENT  EXCEPTIONS  TO  THE  SUPREMACY  OF  PURPOSE.     105 

of  sustaining  the  powers  and  the  enjoyments  of  Life  in  the 
Body  and  in  the  Mind  of  Man.  On  the  contrary,  the  power 
possessed  by  most  plants,  and  by  this  plant  especially,  of  pro' 
ducing  seed  in  a  ratio  far  beyond  that  which  would  be  required 
for  one  purpose,  is  the  sure  indication  and  the  proof  that  an- 
other purpose  larger  and  wider  was  in  view.  Yet  the  seeds  of 
corn  which,  as  seeds,  are  destroyed  when  they  are  converted 
into  bread,  may  in  that  aspect  be  represented  and  regarded  as 
"  failures."  In  reference  to  this  kind  of  failure,  it  has  been 
actually  argued  that  in  Nature  "  the  prodigality  of  waste  is  far 
more  conspicuous  than  the  wise  economy  of  which  so  much  is 
said."*  When  applied  to  the  case  of  the  wheat  plant  the 
fallacy  is  apparent,  and  would  probably  be  admitted.  But  this 
is  only  one  example  of  a  class  to  which  an  infinite  number  of 
other  examples  in  Nature  may  be  referred.  There  may  be, 
indeed,  and  there  are,  innumerable  examples  where  the  mean- 
ing of  like  "  failures  "  is  not  equally  evident  to  us — some  which 
may  be  involved  in  utter  and  hopeless  darkness — some  which 
may  run  up  into  the  great  master  difficulty — that  which  we  are 
accustomed  to  call  the  "  Origin  of  Evil."  But  the  same  argu- 
ment applies  to  all.  It  is  not  that  Purpose  and  Intention  solve 
all  difficulties.  But  it  is  that  no  difficulty  in  perceiving  what 
may  be  the  purpose  and  intention  of  a  particular  fact  can  affect 
the.  reality  and  truth  of  that  perception  in  other  cases  where  no 
such  difficulty  exists.  Let  us  now  look  at  the  same  subject  in 
the  light  of  particular  examples. 

There  is  one  explanation  which,  it  cannot  be  doubted,  applies 
to  many  cases ;  and  this  is,  the  simple  explanation  that  we 
often  mistake  the  purpose  of  particular  structures  in  Nature, 
and  connect  them  with  intentions  which  are  not,  and  never 
were,  the  intentions  really  in  view.  The  best  naturalists  are 
liable  to  such  mistakes.  A  very  curious  illustration  is  afforded 
by  an  observation  of  Mr.  Darwin,  in  his  "  Origin  of  Species." 
He  says  that  "  if  green  Woodpeckers  alone  had  existed,  and 
we  did  not  know  that  there  were  any  black  and  pied  kinds,  I 
daresay  we  should  have  thought  that  the  green  color  was  a 
beautiful  adaptation  to  hide  this  tree-frequenting  bird  from  its 
enemies."  Now,  this  introduces  us  to  a  very  curious  subject, 

*  Mr.  G.  H.  Lewes,  Fortnightly  Review,  July,  1867,  p.  100. 


IO6  THE    REIGN    OF    LAW. 

and  one  as  well  adapted  as  any  other  to  illustrate  the  relation 
in  which  Law  stands  to  Purpose  in  the  economy  of  Nature. 

There  can  be  no  doubt  that  the  principle  of  adapted  coloring 
with  the  effect  and  for  the  purpose  of  concealment,  prevails 
extensively  in  various  branches  of  the  Animal  Kingdom.  It 
arises,  probably,  like  all  other  phenomena,  by  way  of  Natural 
Consequence,  out  of  some  combination  of  forces  which  are  the 
instruments  employed.  We  have  no  knowledge  what  these 
forces  are ;  but  we  can  imagine  them  to  be  worked  into  a  law 
of  assimilation,  founded  on  some  such  principle  as  that  which 
photography  has  revealed.  It  is  true  that  Man  has  not  yet  dis- 
covered any  process  by  which  the  tints  of  Nature  can  be  trans- 
ferred,  as  the  most  delicate  shades  of  light  can  be  transferred, 
to  surfaces  artificially  prepared  to  receive  them.  Such  a  proc- 
ess is,  however,  very  probably  within  the  reach  even  of  human 
chemistry,  and  it  is  one  which  is  certainly  known  in  the  labora- 
tory of  Nature.  The  Chameleon  is  the  extreme  case  in  which 
the  effect  of  such  a  process  is  proverbially  known.  Many  Fish 
exhibit  it  in  a  remarkable  degree,  changing  color  rapidly  in 
harmony  with  the  color  of  the  water  in  which  they  swim,  or  of 
the  bottom  on  which  they  lie.  The  law  on  which  such  changes 
depend  is  very  obscure  :  but  it  appears  to  be  a  natural  process, 
as  constant  as  all  other  laws  are — that  is,  constant  whenever 
given  conditions  are  brought  together.  It  is  possible  that  the 
effect  may  be  due  to  a  cause  which  is  well  known  to  be  capable 
of  producing  somewhat  analogous  results.  Even  before  the 
days  of  Jacob  and  of  Laban,  it  seems  to  have  been  known  that 
through  the  eyes  of  the  female  parent  color  can  be  determined 
in  her  young ;  and  although  this  is  certainly  not  the  law  which 
commonly  determines  color — operating  as  it  does,  so  far  as  we 
know,  seldom,  and  only  in  a  small  degree — it  is  quite  conceiv- 
able that,  under  special  conditions,  it  is  capable  of  being 
worked  as  a  great  power  in  Nature.  But,  then,  these  condi- 
tions are  not  brought  together  except  with  a  view  to  purpose. 
For  now  let  us  see  how  this  law,  whatever  it  may  be,  is  regulat- 
ed and  applied. 

One  thing  is  certain  :  assimilated  coloring  is  not  applied  uni- 
versally ;  on  the  contrary,  it  is  applied  very  partially.  Is  it, 
therefore,  applied  arbitrarily — at  hap-hazard,  or  without  refer- 


APPARENT  EXCEPTIONS  TO  THE  SUPREMACY  OF  PURPOSE.     107 

ence  to  conditions  in  which  we  can  trace  a  reason  and  a  rule  ? 
Far  from  it.  The  rule  appears  to  be  this : — adaptive  coloring, 
as  a  means  of  concealment,  is  never  applied  (i)  to  any  animal 
whose  habits  do  not  expose  it  to  special  danger,  or  (2)  to  any 
animal  which  is  sufficiently  endowed  with  other  more  effective 
means  of  escape. 

This  is  the  higher  Law  of  Purpose  which  governs  the  lesser 
law,  whatever  it  may  be,  by  which  assimilative  coloring  is  pro- 
duced. Now,  no  man  who  had  observed  this  higher  law  could 
ever  fall  into  the  error  of  supposing  that  the  color  of  the  Green 
Woodpecker  was  given  to  it  as  a  means  of  concealment.  Few 
Birds  are  so  invisible  as  Woodpeckers,  because  their  structure 
and  habits  give  them  other  methods  of  escaping  observation, 
which  are  most  curious  and  effective.  They  have  few  natural 
enemies  but  Man  ;  and  when  in  danger  of  being  seen  by  him, 
they  slip  and  glide  round  the  bole  of  a  tree  or  bough  on  which 
they  may  be  climbing,  with  a  swift,  silent,  and  cunning  motion, 
and  from  behind  that  shelter,  with  nothing  visible  but  their 
head,  they  keep  a  close  watch  upon  the  movements  of  the  en- 
emy. With  such  sleight  of  feet,  there  is  no  need  of  lazier 
methods  of  concealment. 

Accordingly,  in  this  family  of  Birds,  the  law  of  assimilation 
is  withheld  from  application,  and  the  most  violent  and  strongly 
contrasted  coloring  prevails.  Jet  black,  side  by  side  with  pure 
white,  and  the  most  brilliant  crimsons,  are  common  in  the  plu- 
mage of  the  Woodpeckers.  No  birds  are  more  conspicuous  in 
coloring,  yet  none  are  more  seldom  seen.  The  Green  Wood- 
pecker itself,  with  its  yellow  tints  and  crimson  hood,  contrasts 
strongly  with  the  bark  on  which  it  climbs.  The  purpose  of  con- 
cealment being  effected  by  other  means,  gives  way  to  the  pur- 
pose of  beauty  or  of  adornment  in  the  disposition  of  colors. 
And  in  general  the  same  rule  applies  to  all  Birds  whose  life  is 
led  among  woods  and  forests.  Comparatively  inaccessible  to 
Birds  of  prey,  they  exhibit  every  variety  of  tint,  and  the  princi- 
ple of  invisibility  from  assimilated  coloring  is  almost  unknown. 

It  must  always  be  remembered,  that  animals  of  prey  are  as 
much  intended  to  capture  their  food,  as  their  victims  are  in- 
tended to  have  some  chances  and  facilities  of  escape.  The 
purpose  here  is  a  double  purpose — a  purpose  not  in  all  cases 


108  THE    REIGN    OF    LAW. 

to  preserve  life,  but  to  maintain  its  balance  and  due  proportion. 
In  order  to  effect  this  purpose,  the  means  of  aggression,  and  of 
defence,  or  of  escape,  must  bear  a  definite  relation  to  each 
other  both  in  kind  and  in  degree.  When  arboreal  Birds  leave 
their  sheltering  trees,  they  are  exposed  to  the  attacks  of  Hawks, 
but  they  have  fair  opportunities  of  retreating  to  their  coverts 
again  ;  and  the  upward  spring  of  the  disappointed  Falcon  in 
the  air,  when  his  quarry  reaches  the  shelter  of  trees,  tells  how 
effective  such  a  retreat  is,  and  how  completely  it  ends  the  chase. 
On  the  other  hand,  there  is  a  great  variety  of  Birds  whose 
habitat  is  the  open  plain — the  desert — the  unprotected  shore — 
the  treeless  moor — the  stony  mountain-top.  These  are  the 
favorite  hunting-grounds  of  the  Eagles,  and  the  Falcons,  and 
the  Hawks.  There  they  have  free  scope  for  their  great  powers 
of  wing,  and  uninterrupted  range  for  their  piercing  powers  of 
sight.  And  it  must  be  remembered,  that  even  the  slowest  of 
the  Hawks  can  on  such  ground  capture  with  ease  Birds  which, 
when  once  on  the  wing,  could  distance  their  pursuer  by  superior 
speed,  because  the  Hawk,  sweeping  over  the  ground,  takes  the 
prey  at  a  disadvantage,  pouncing  on  it  before  it  can  get  fairly 
into  the  air.  Birds  whose  habitat  is  thus  exposed  could  not 
maintain  their  existence  at  all  without  special  means  of  conceal- 
ment or  escape.  Accordingly  it  is  among  such  Birds  almost 
exclusively  that  the  law  of  assimilative  coloring  prevails.  And 
among  them  it  is  carried  to  a  perfection  which  is  wonderful  in- 
deed. Every  ornithologist  will  recognize  the  truth  of  the  ob- 
servation, that  this  law  prevails  chiefly  among  the  Grouse,  the 
Partridges,  the  Plovers,  the  Snipes,  Woodcocks,  Sandpipers, 
and  other  kindred  families,  all  of  which  inhabit  open  ground. 
There  can  be  no  better  examples  than  the  Grouse  and  the 
Ptarmigan  of  our  Scottish  mountains.  The  close  imitation  in 
the  plumage  of  these  Birds  of  the  general  tinting  and  mottling 
of  the  ground  on  which  they  lie  and  feed  is  apparent  at  a  glance 
and  is  best  known  to  those  who  have  tried  to  see  Grouse  or 
Ptarmigan  when  sitting,  and  when  their  position  is  indicated 
within  a  few  feet  or  a  few  inches  by  the  trembling  nostrils  and 
dilated  eyeballs  of  a  steady  Pointer-Dog.  In  the  case  of  the 
common  Grouse,  as  the  ground  is  nearly  uniform  int  color 
throughout  the  year,  the  coloring  of  the  Bird  is  constant  also.. 


APPARENT  EXCEPTIONS  TO  THE  SUPREMACY  OF  PURPOSE.  109 

But  in  the  case  of  the  Ptarmigan,  it  changes  with  the  changing 
seasons.  The  pearly  grays  which  in  summer  match  so  exactly 
with  the  lichens  of  the  mountain  peaks,  give  place  in  winter  to 
the  pure  white  which  matches  not  less  perfectly  with  the  wreaths 
of  snow. 

This  is  indeed  a  change  which  requires  for  its  production  the 
agency  of  other  laws  than  those  merely  of  reflected  light,  be- 
cause the  substitution  of  one  entire  set  of  feathers,  for  another 
of  a  different  color,  twice  in  every  year,  implies  arrangements 
which  lie  deep  in  the  organic  chemistry  of  the  Bird.  The 
various  genera  of  Sand-Grouse  and  Sand-Partridges  which  fre- 
quent the  deserts  and  naked  plains  of  the  Asiatic  continent, 
are  colored  in  exquisite  harmony  with  the  ground.  Our  com- 
mon Woodcock  is  another  excellent  example,  and  is  all  the 
more  remarkable  as  there  is  one  very  peculiar  color  introduced 
into  the  plumage  of  this  Bird  which  exactly  corresponds  with  a 
particular  stage  in  the  decay  of  fallen  leaves — I  mean  that  in 
which  the  browns  and  yellows  of  the  Autumn  rot  away  into 
the  pale  ashy  skeletons  which  lie  in  thousands  under'  every 
wood  in  winter.  This  color  is  exactly  reproduced  in  the 
feathers  of  the  Woodcock,  and  so  mingled  with  the  dark 
browns  and  warm  yellows  of  fresher  leaves,  that  the  general 
imitation  of  effect  is  perfect.  And  so  curiously  is  the  purpose 
of  concealment  worked  out  in  the  plumage  of  the  Woodcock, 
that  one  conspicuous  ornament  of  the  bird  is  covered  by  a 
special  provision  from  the  too  curious  gaze  of  those  for  whose 
admiration  it  was  not  intended.  The  tail-feathers  of  the  Wood- 
cock can  be  erected  and  spread  out  at  pleasure  like  a  fan,  and, 
being  tipped  on  their  under  surface  with  white  of  a  brilliant 
and  silvery  lustre,  set  off  by  contrast  with  an  adjacent  patch  of 
velvety  black,  they  then  produce  a  most  conspicuous  effect. 
But  the  same  web  which  on  its  under  surface  bears  this  beau- 
tiful but  dangerous  ornament,  is  on  its  upper  surface  dulled 
down  to  a  sombre  ashy-gray,  and  becomes  as  invisible  as  the 
rest  of  the  plumage.  These  are  all  provisions  of  Nature, 
which  stand  in  clear  and  intelligible  relation  to  the  habits  of 
the  Bird.  It  rests  all  day  upon  the  ground,  under  trees.;  and 
were  it  not  for  its  ingeniously  adapted  coloring,  it  would  be  pe- 
culiarly exposed  to  destruction.  Man  is  an  enemy  whose  cun- 


IIO  THE   REIGN    OF    LAW. 

ning  inventions  overcome  all  such  methods  of  protection,  and 
the  Woodcock,  when  in  his  most  rapid  flight,  is  now  an  easier 
prey  than  in  older  times  when  sitting  on  the  ground.  But  be- 
fore fire-arms  had  reached  the  perfection  which  has  enabled  us 
to  shoot  flying  Birds,  the  coloring  of  the  Woodcock  served  it 
in  good  stead,  even  against  the  Lords  of  the  Creation.  In  old 
times  it  required  special  skill  and  practice  to  see  Woodcocks  on 
the  ground,  and  the  large  lustrous  black  eye  which  is  adapted 
for  night-vision  was  the  one  spot  of  color  which  enabled  the 
fowler  of  a  century  and  a  half  ago  to  detect  the  bird.  Thus 
Hudibras  has  it : — 

"  For  fools  are  known  by  looking  wise, 
As  men  find  woodcocks  by  their  eyes." 

"  Hudibras  to  Sidrophel,"  79,  80. 

In  Snipes,  again,  there  is  are  markable  series  of  straw-col- 
ored feathers  introduced  along  the  back  and  shoulders,  which 
perfectly  imitate  the  general  effect  of  the  bleached  vegetable 
stalks  common  on  the  ground  which  the  Bird  frequents. 

There  are  other  animals  in  which  the  principle  of  imitation 
with  a  view  to  concealment  is  carried  very  much  farther  than 
the  mere  imitation  of  color,  and  extends  also  to  form  and 
structure.  There  are  some  examples  of  this  in  the  Class  of 
Insects,  so  remarkable  that  it  is  impossible  to  look  at  them 
without  ever  fresh  astonishment.  I  refer  to  some  families  of 
the  Orthopterous  order,  and  especially  to  some  genera  of  the 
MantidcE  and  Phasmidce.  Many  species^  of  the  genus  Mantis 
are  wholly  modelled  in  the  form  of  vegetable  growths.  The 
legs  are  made  to  imitate  leaf-stalks,  the  body  is  elongated  and 
notched  so  as  to  simulate  a  twig;  the  segment  of  the  shoul- 
ders is  spread  out  and  flattened  in  the  likeness  of  a  seed-vessel ; 
and  the  large  wings  are  exact  imitations  of  a  full-blown  leaf, 
with  all  its  veins  and  skeleton  complete,  and  all  its  color  and 
apparent  texture.  There  is  something  startling  and  almost 
horrible  in  the  completeness  of  the  deception — very  horrible  it 
must  be  to  its  hapless  victims.  For  in  this  case  the  purpose  of 
the  imitation  is  a  purpose  of  destruction,  the  Mantis  being  a 
predacious  insect,  armed  with  the  most  terrible  weapons,  hid 
under  the  peaceful  forms  of  the  vegetable  world.  It  is  the 


APPARENT  EXCEPTIONS  TO  THE  SUPREMACY  OF  PURPOSE.     Ill 

habit  of  these  creatures  to  sit  upon  the  leaves  which  they  so 
closely  resemble,  apparently  motionless,  but  really  advancing 
on  their  prey  with  a  slow  and  insensible  approach.  Their 
structure  disarms  suspicion.  Wonderful  as  this  structure  is, 
it  would  be  none  the  less,  but  all  the  more  wonderful,  if  it  should 
arise  by  way  of  Natural  Consequence  from  some  law  of  de- 
velopment or  of  growth.  It  must  be  a  law  of  which  at  present 
we  have  no  knowledge,  and  can  hardly  form  any  conception. 
But  certain  it  is  that  here,  as  in  all  other  cases,  the  purpose 
which  is  actually  attained,  is  attained  by  a  special  adaptation 
of  ordinary  structure  to  a  special  and  extraordinary  purpose. 
No  new  members  are  given  to  the  Mantis ;  there  is  no  depart- 
ure from  the  plan  on  which  all  other  Insects  of  the  same  Order 
are  designed.  The  body  has  the  same  number  of  segments, 
the  legs  are  the  same  in  number,  and  are  composed  of  the 
same  joints ;  every  part  of  this  strange  creature  which  seems 
like  a  bit  of  foliage  animated  with  insect  life,  can  be  referred 
to  its  corresponding  part  in  the  ordinary  anatomy  of  its  Class. 
The  whole  effect  is  produced  by  a  little  elongation  here,  a  little 
swelling  there,  a  little  dwarfing  of  one  part,  a  little  develop- 
ment of  another.  The  most  striking  part  of  the  whole  imita- 
tion— that  of  the  "  nervation  "  of  the  leaf — is  produced  by  a 
modification,  not  very  violent,  of  a  structure  which  belongs  to 
all  flying  Insects.  Their  wings  are  constructed  of  a  thin  filmy 
material  stretched  upon  a  framework  of  stronger  substance,  as 
the  sails  of  -a  windmill  are  stretched  upon  a  trellis-work  of 
spars.  This  framework  is  designed  in  a  great  variety  of  pat- 
terns— more  elaborate  and  more  beautiful  than  the  tracery 
of  Gothic  windows.  In  the  Mantis  this  tracery,  instead  of 
being  drawn  in  a  mere  pattern,  is  drawn  in  imitation  of  the 
nervature  of  a  leaf.  And  imitative  coloring  is  added  to  imita- 
tive structure — so  that  nothing  should  be  wanting  to  its  com- 
pleteness and  success. 

It  must  always  be  remembered,  however,  that  Contrivance 
in  Nature  can  never  be  reduced  to  a  single  purpose,  and  to 
that  alone.  Almost  every  example  of  it  is  connected  with  a 
number  of  effects  which  fit  into  each  other  in  endless  ramifica- 
tions of  adjustment.  For  example,  this  imitative  structure  of 
the  Mantidce  serves  as  well  for  their  own  protection  from  in- 


112  THE    REIGN    OF    LAW. 

sectivorous  birds  as  for  the  procuring  of  their  food  in  the  cap- 
ture of  other  Insects.  And  this,  which  is  perhaps  the  subordi- 
nate purpose  in  the  case  of  the  Mantidce,  emerges  as  the  main 
purpose  in  another  family  of  imitative  Insects,  the  Phasmida. 
These  last  are  vegetable  feeders,  and  their  imitative  structure 
is,  if  possible,  even  more  wonderful,  as  it  certainly  is  more 
beautiful.  In  some  species  the  wings  are  not  only  made  like 
leaves  in  form,  in  structure,  and  in  general  color,  but  they 
are  tinted  at  different  seasons  of  the  year  with  the  varying 
colors  of  spring,  of  summer,  or  of  autumn.  The  fundamental 
green  is  shaded  off  into  browns,  and  reds,  and  yellows,  with 
a  few  of  those  crimson  touches  which  are  so  common  in  the 
"  Pageant  of  the  year."  There  is  one  specimen  in  the  British 
Museum  where  the  imitative  effect  is  pursued,  as  it  were,  into 
a  region  of  still  more  minute  and  curious  observation.  The 
general  aspect  of  summer  vegetation  is  much  affected  by  the 
ravages  of  insect  life.  Minute  larvae  eat  into  the  cuticle  of 
leaves,  and  mark  them  with  various  spots  of  bleached  or  faded 
color.  Now  the  specimen  of  Phasma  I  refer  to  has  its  wing 
covered  with  spots  which  exactly  imitate  this  appearance  of  a 
larva-eaten  leaf.  Can  it  be  that  this  effect  is  itself  produced 
by  a  really  similar  cause — the  eating  of  some  larval  parasite 
into  the  tissue  of  the  wing  ?  If  so,  the  combination  of  means 
to  the  production  of  so  wonderful  an  effect  becomes  only  the 
more  bewildering  in  the  endless  vistas  of  adjustment  which  are 
opened  out.  And  there  is  another  fact  connected  with  these 
Insects  which  is  as  astonishing  as  any  other.  It  is  this — that 
the  idea  and  purpose  of  imitation  is  carried  into  effect  consist- 
ently and  perseveringly  through  all  the  stages  of  the  creature's 
metamorphoses.  The  eggs  are  as  perfect  imitation's  of  vegeta- 
ble seeds  as  the  adult  insect  is  of.  the  expanded  leaf.  In  the 
larval  form  they  are  like  bits  of  stalk,  or  chips  or  cuttings  of 
leaves. 

But  although  the  laws  which  determine  both  form  and  col- 
oring are  here  seen  to  be  subservient  to  use,  we  shall  never 
understand  the  phenomena  of  Nature  unless  we  admit  that 
mere  ornament  or  beauty  is  in  itself  a  purpose,  an  object,  and 
an  end.  Mr.  Darwin  denies  this  ;  but  he  denies  it  under  the 
strange  impression,  that  to  admit  it  would  be  absolutely  fatal  to 


APPARENT  EXCEPTIONS  TO  THE  SUPREMACY  OF  PURPOSE.     113 

his  own  theory  on  the  Origin  of  Species.  So  much  the  worse 
for  his  theory,  if  this  incompatibility  be  true.  There  is  indeed 
a  difference,  at  least  in  words,  between  the  doctrine  now  asserted 
and  the  doctrine  which  Mr.  Darwin  denies.  What  he  denies 
as  a  purpose  in  nature  is  beauty  "  in  the  eyes  of  Man."  But 
this  evades  the  real  point  at  issue.  The  relation  in  which 
natural  beauty  stands  to  Man's  appreciation  of  it,  is  quite  a 
separate  question.  It  is  -certain  enough  that  the  gift  of  orna- 
ment in  natural  things  has  not  been  lavished,  as  it  is  lavished, 
for  the  mere  admiration  of  mankind.  Ornament  was  as  uni- 
versal— applied  upon  a  scale  at  once  as  grand  and  as  minute  as 
now — during  the  long  ages  before  Man  was  born.  Some  of 
the  most  beautiful  forms  in  Nature  are  the  shells  of  the  marine 
Mollusca,  and  many  of  them  are  the  richest,  too,  in  surface 
ornament.  But,  prodigal  of  beauty  as  the  Ocean  now  is  in  the 
creatures  which  it  holds,  its  wealth  was  even  greater  and  more 
abounding  in  times  when  there  was  no  man  to  gather  them. 
The  shells  and  corals  of  the  old  Silurian  Sea  were  as  elaborate 
and  as  richly  carved  as  those  which  we  now  admire :  and  the 
noble  Ammonites  of  the  Secondary  ages  must  have  been  glo- 
rious things  indeed.  Even  now  there  is  abundant  evidence- 
that  although  Man  was  intended  to  admire  beauty,  beauty  was> 
not  intended  only  for  Man's  admiration.  Nowhere  is  orna- 
ment more  richly  given,  nowhere  is  it  seen  more  separate  from 
use,  than  in  those  organisms  of  whose  countless  millions  the 
microscope  alone  enables  a  few  men  for  a  few  moments  to  see 
a  few  examples.  There  is  no  better  illustration  of  this  than 
a  class  of  forms  belonging  to  the  border-land  of  animal  and 
vegetable  life  called  the  Diatomacece,  which,  though  invisible  to 
the  naked  eye,  play  an  important  part  in  the  economy  of  Na- 
ture. They  exist  almost  everywhere,  and  of  their  remains 
whole  strata,  and  even  mountains,  are  in  great  part  composed. 
They  have  shells  of  pure  silex.  and  these,  each  after  its  own 
kind,  are  all  covered  with  the  most  elaborate  ornament — 
striated,  or  fluted,  or  punctured,  or  dotted  in  patterns  which 
are  mere  patterns,  but  patterns  of  perfect,  and  sometimes  of 
most  complex,  beauty.  No  graving  done  with  the  graver's- 
tool  can  equal  that  work  in  gracefulness  of  design,  or  in 
delicacy  and  strength  of  touch.  Yet  it  is  impossible  to  look  at 
8 


114  THE    REIGN    OF    LAW. 

these  forms — in  all  the  variety  which  is  often  crowded  under  a 
single  lens — without  recognizing  instinctively  that  the  work  of  the 
graver  is  work  strictly  analogous, — addressed  to  the  same  percep- 
tions,— founded  on  the  same  idea, — having  for  its  object  the  same 
end  and  aim.  And  as  the  work  of  the  graver  varies  for  the  mere 
sake  of  varying,  so  does  the  work  on  these  microscopic  shells. 
In  the  same  drop  of  moisture  there  may  be  some  dozen  or 
twenty  forms,  each  with  its  own  distinctive  pattern,  all  as  con- 
stant as  they  are  distinctive,  yet  having  all  apparently  the  same 
habits,  and  without  any  perceptible  difference  of  function. 

It  would  beto  doubt  the  evidence  of  our  senses  and  of  our 
reason,  or  else  to  assume  hypotheses  of  which  there  is  no  proof 
whatever,  if  we  were  to  doubt  that  mere  ornament,  mere  vari- 
ety, are  as  much  an  end  and  aim  in  the  workshop  of  Nature  as 
they  are  known  to  be  in  the  workshop  of  the  goldsmith  and  the 
jeweller.  Why  should  they  not  ?  The  love  and  desire  of  these 
is  universal  in  the  mind  of  Man.  It  is  seen  not  more  distinctly 
in  the  highest  forms  of  civilized  art  than  in  the  habits  of  the 
rudest  savage,  who  covers  with  elaborate  carving  the  handle  of 
his  war-club,  or  the  prow  of  his  canoe.  Is  it  likely  that  this 
universal  aim  and  purpose  of  the  mind  of  Man  should  be 
wholly  without  relation  to  the  aims  and  purposes  of  his  Creator  ? 
He  that  formed  the  eye  to  see  beauty,  shall  He  not  see  it  ? 
He  that  gave  the  human  hand  its  cunning  to  work  for  beauty, 
shall  His  hand  never  work  for  it  ?  How  then,  shall  we  account 
for  all  the  beauty  of  the  world — for  the  careful  provision  made 
for  it  where  it  is  only  the  secondary  object,  not  the  first  ?  Even 
in  those  cases,  for  example,  where  concealment  is  the  main  ob- 
ject in  view,  ornament  is  never  forgotten,  but  lies  as  it  were  un- 
derneath, carried  into  effect  under  the  conditions  and  limita- 
tions imposed  by  the  higher  law  and  the  more  special  purpose. 
Thus  the  feathers  of  the  Ptarmigan,  though  confined  by  the  law 
of  assimilative  coloring  to  a  mixture  of  black  and  white  or 
gray,  have  those  simple  colors  disposed  in  crescent  bars  and 
mottlings  of  beautiful  form,  even  as  the  lichens  which  they  im- 
itate spread  in  radiating  lines  and  semi-circular  ripples  over  the 
weather-beaten  stones.  It  is  the  same  with  all  other  Birds 
whose  color  is  the  color  of  their  home.  For  the  purpose  of 
concealment,  their  coloring  would  be  equally  effective  if  it 


APPARENT  EXCEPTIONS  TO  THE  SUPREMACY  OF  PURPOSE.     115 

were  laid  on  without  order  or  regularity  of  form.  But  this  is 
never  done.  The  required  tints  are  always  disposed  in  pat- 
terns, each  varying  with  the  genus  and  the  species  ;  varying  for 
the  mere  sake  of  variation,  and  for  the  beauty  which  belongs 
to  ornament.  And  where  this  purpose  is  not  under  the  re- 
straint of  any  other  purpose  controlling  it  and  keeping  it  down 
as  it  were  within  comparatively  narrow  limits,  how  gorgeous 
are  the  results  attained  I  What  shall  we  say  of  flowers — those 
banners  of  the  vegetable  world,  which  march  in  such  various 
and  splendid  triumph  before  the  coming  of  its  fruits  ?  What 
shall  we  say  of  the  Humming  Birds — whose  feathers  are  made 
to  return  the  light  which  falls  upon  them,  as  if  rekindled  from 
intenser  fires,  and  colored  with  more  than  all  the  colors  of  all 
the  gems  ? 

There  is  one  instance  in  Nature  (and,  as  far  as  I  know,  only 
one)  in  which  ornament  takes  the  form  of  pictorial  representa- 
tion. The  secondary  feathers  in  the  wing  of  the  Argus  Pheas- 
ant are  developed  into  long  plumes,  which  the  bird  can  erect 
and  spread  out  like  a  fan,  as  a  Peacock  spreads  his  train. 
These  feathers  are  decorated  with  a  series  of  conspicuous  spots 
or  "  eyes,"  which  are  so  colored  as  to  imitate  the  effect  of 
balls.  The  shadows  and  the  "  high  light  "  are  placed  exactly 
where  an  artist  would  place  them  in  order  to  represent  a  sphere.* 
The  "  eyes  "  of  the  Peacock's  train  are  wonderful  examples  of 
ornament ;  but  they  do  not  represent  anything  except  their  own 
harmonies  of  color.  The  "  eyes  "  of  the  Argus  Pheasant  are 
like  the  "  ball  and  socket  "  ornament  which  is  common  in  the 
decorations  of  human  art.  It  i&  no  answer  to  this  argument  in 
respect  to  beauty,  that  we  are  constantly  discovering  the  use  of 
beautiful  structures  in  which  the  beauty  only,  and  not  the  use- 
fulness, had  been  hitherto  perceived.  The  harmonies  on  which 
all  beauty  probably  depends  are  so  minutely  connected  in  Na- 
ture that  "  use  "  and  ornament  may  often  both  arise  out  of  the 
same  conditions.  Thus,  some  of  the  most  beautiful  lines  on 
the  surface  of  shells  are  simply  the  lines  of  their  annual  growth, 
which  growth  has  followed  definite  curves,  and  it  is  the  "  law  " 
of  these  curves  that  is  beautiful  in  our  eyes.  Again,  the  forms 

*  I  owe  the  observation  of  this  curious  fact  to  my  friend  Mr.  James  Nasmyth,  so 
well  known  as  the  inventor  of  the  Steam  Hammer,  and  as  a  distinguished  astronomer. 


Il6  THE    REIGN    OF    LAW. 

of  many  Fish  which  are  so  beautiful,  are  also  forms  founded  on 
the  lines  of  least  resistance.  The  same  observation  applies  to 
the  form  of  the  bodies  and  of  the  wings  of  Birds.  Throughout 
Nature,  ornament  is  perpetually  the  result  of  conditions  and 
arrangements  fitted  to  use  and  contrived  for  the  discharge  of 
function.  But  the  same  principle  applies  to  human  art,  and 
few  persons  are  probably  aware  how  many  of  the  mere  orna- 
ments of  architecture  are  the  traditional  representation  of  parts 
which  had  their  origin  in  essential  structure.  Yet  who  would 
argue  from  this  fact  that  ornament  is  not  a  special  aim  in  the 
works  of  Man  ?  When  the  savage  carves  the  handle  of  his 
war-club,  the  immediate  purpose  of  his  carving  is  to  give  his 
own  hand  a  firmer  hold.  But  any  shapeless  scratches  would  be 
enough  for  this.  When  he  carves  it  in  an  elaborate  pattern, 
he  does  so  for  the  love  of  ornament,  and  to  satisfy  the  sense  of 
beauty. 

There  is,  however,  another  department  of  natural  phenomena 
which,  much  more  than  the  one  we  have  been  now  considering, 
does  at  first  sight  suggest  to  the  mind  the  subordination  of 
Purpose  and  the  supremacy  of  Law.  Is  is  the  department  of 
Comparative  Anatomy.  It  is  a  fact  now  well  known  and  uni- 
versally accepted,  that  in  many  animal  structures,  perhaps  in 
all  except  one,  there  are  parts  the  presence  of  which  cannot  be 
explained,  from  their  serving  any  immediate  use,  or  discharging 
any  actual  function.  For  example,  the  limbs  of  all  the  Mam- 
malia, and  even  of  all  the  Lizards,  terminate  in  five  jointed 
bones  or  fingers.  But  in  many  animals  the  whole  five  are  not 
needed,  but  only  some  one,  or  two,  or  three.  In  such  cases 
the  remainder  are  indeed  dwarfed,  sometimes  almost  extin- 
guished ;  but  the  curious  fact  is  that  rudimentally  the  whole 
number  are  always  to  be  traced.  Even  in  the  Horse,  where 
one  only  of  the  five  is  directly  used,  and  where  this  one  is  en- 
larged and  developed  into  a  hoof,  parts  corresponding  to  the 
remaining  four  fingers  can  be  detected  in  the  anatomy  of  the 
limb.  Other  examples  of  the  same  principle  might  be  given 
without  number.  Thus  there  are  Monkeys  which  have  no 
thumbs  for  use,  but  only  thumb-bones  hid  beneath  the  skin  : 
the  wingless  Bird  of  New  Zealand,  the  "  Apteryx,"  has  useless 
wing-bones  similarly  placed ;  snakes  destined  always  to  creep 


APPARENT  EXCEPTIONS  TO  THE  SUPREMACY  OF  PURPOSE.     117 

"  upon  their  belly  "  have  nevertheless  rudiments  of  legs,  and  the 
common  "  Slowworm  "  has  even  the  "  blade  bone  "  and  "  collar 
bone  "  of  rudimentary  or  aborted  limbs  :  the  Narwhal  has  only 
one  tusk,  on  the  left  side,  developed  for  use,  like  the  horn  of 
an  heraldic  Unicorn,  but  the  other  tusk,  on  the  right  side,  is 
present  as  a  useless  germ  :  the  female  Narwhal  has  both  tusks 
reduced  to  the  same  unserviceable. condition  :  young  whalebone 
Whales  are  born  with  teeth  which  never  cut  the  gum,  and 
which  are  afterwards  absorbed  as  entirely  useless  to  the  crea- 
ture's life. 

At  first  sight  it  may  appear  as  if  these  were  facts  not  to  be 
reconciled  with  the  supremacy  of  Purpose  : — at  first  sight,  but 
at  first  sight  only.  For  as  we  look  at  them  and  wonder  at 
them,  and  set  ourselves  to  discover  how  many  of  a  like  nature 
can  be  found,  our  eye  catches  sight  of  an  Order  which  had  not 
been  at  first  perceived.  Exceptions  to  one  narrow  rule  such  as 
we  might  have  laid  down  and  followed  for  ourselves,  they  are  now 
seen  to  be  in  strict  subordination  to  a  larger  rule  which  it  would 
never  have  entered  into  our  imagination  to  conceive.  These 
useless  members,  these  rudimentary  or  aborted  limbs  which 
puzzled  us  so  much,  are  parts  of  an  universal  Plan.  On  this 
plan  the  bony  skeletons  of  all  living  animals  have  been  put 
together.  The  forces  which  have  been  combined  for  the  mould- 
ing of  Organic  Forms  have  been  so  combined  as  to  mould  them 
after  certain  types  or  patterns.  And  when  Comparative  Anat- 
omy has  revealed  this  fact  as  affecting  all  the  animals  of  the 
existing  world,  another  branch  of  the  same  science  comes  in 
to  conform  the  generalization,  and  extend  it  over  the  innumer- 
able creatures  which  have  existed  and  have  passed  away.  This 
one  Plan  of  Organic  Life  has  never  been  departed  from  since 
Time  began.  , 

When  we  have  grasped  this  great  fact,  all  the  lesser  facts 
which  are  subordinate  to  it  assume  a  new  significance.  In  the 
first  place  a  Plan  of  this  kind  is  in  itself  a  Purpose.  An  Order 
so  vast  as  this,  including  within  itself  such  variety  of  detail,  and 
maintained  through  such  periods  of  Time,  implies  combination 
and  adjustment  founded  upon,  and  carrying  into  effect,  one 
vast  conception.  It  is  only  as  an  Order  of  Thought  that  the 
doctrine  of  Animal  Homologies  is  intelligible  at  all.  It  is  a 


Il8  THE   REIGN   OF   LAW. 

Mental  Order,  and  can  only  be  mentally  perceived.  For  what 
do  we  mean  when  we  say  that  this  bone  in  one  kind  of  animal 
corresponds  to  such  another  bone  in  another  kind  of  animal  ? 
Corresponds — in  what  sense  ?  Not  in  the  method  of  using  it 
— for  very  often  limbs  which  are  homologically  the  same  are  put 
to  the  most  diverse  and  opposite  uses.  To  what  standard,  then, 
are  we  referring  when  we  say  that  such  and  such  two  limbs  are 
homologically  the  same  ?  It  is  to  the  standard  of  an  Ideal  Order 
— a  Plan — a  Type — a  Pattern  mentally  conceived.  This  sounds 
very  recondite  and  metaphysical ;  and  yet  the  habit  of  referring 
physical  facts  to  some  ideal  standard  and  order  of  thought  is  a 
universal  instinct  in  the  human  mind.  It  is  one  of  the  earliest 
of  our  efforts  in  endeavoring  to  understand  the  phenomena 
around  us.  The  science  of  Homologies,  as  developed  by  Cu- 
vier  and  Hunter  and  Owen  and  Huxley,  is  indeed  an  intricate, 
almost  a  transcendental  science.  Yet  Dr.  Livingstone  found  the 
natives  of  Africa  debating  a  question  which  belongs  essentially 
to  that  science  and  involves  the  whole  principle  of  the  mental 
process  by  which  it  is  pursued.  The  debate  was  on  the  question 
"  whether  the  two  toes  of  the  Ostrich  represent  the  thumb  and 
forefinger  in  Man,  or  the  little  and  ring-finger."1*  This  is 
purely  a  question  of  Comparative  Anatomy.  It  is  founded 
on  the  instinctive  perception  that  even  between  two  frames 
so  widely  separated  as  those  of  an  Ostrich  and  a  Man,  there  is 
a  common  Plan  of  structure,  with  reference  to  which  plan, 
parts  wholly  dissimilar  in  appearance  and  in  use  can  never- 
theless be  identified  as  "  representative  "  of  each  other  : — 
that  is,  as  holding  the  same  relative  place  in  one  Ideal  Order 
of  arrangement. 

The  recognition  of  this  idea  in  minds  so  rude  is  not  the  less 
remarkable  from  the  fact  that  both  sides  in  this  African  debate 
were  wrong  in  their  practical  application  of  the  idea  to  the 
particular  case  before  them.  Unity  of  design  amidst  variety 
of  form  is  so  conspicuous  and  universal  in  the  works  of  Nature 
that  the  perception  of  it  'could  not  possibly  escape  recognition 
even  by  the  rudest  human  mind,  formed  as  that  Mind  is  to  see 
Order,  and  to  work  for  it,  and  to  admire  it.  But  though  instinct 
is  enough  to  give  us  the  general  idea,  and  to  trace  it  in  a  thou- 

*  "  The  Zambesi  and  its  Tributaries,"  p.  424. 


APPARENT  EXCEPTIONS  TO  THE  SUPREMACY  OF  PURPOSE.     119 

sand  instances  where  it  can  hardly  be  overlooked,  yet  it  needs 
close  and  laborious  study,  and  high  powers  of  analysis  and  of 
thought,  to  trace  correctly  the  true  Order  and  Plan  through  the 
fine  and  subtle  passages  of  Nature.  It  would  have  astonished 
those  poor  natives  of  Africa  to  be  told,  as  is  the  truth,  that  if 
they  wished  to  find  in  the  Ostrich  the  parts  corresponding  to 
their  own  middle  finger,  or  ring-finger,  or  any  other  finger, 
they  must  look,  not  to  the  toes  of  the  Ostrich,  but  to  her  little 
aborted  wings,  which,  though  useless  for  trfe  purposes  of  flight, 
are  still  retained  as  representing  the  wings  of  other  Birds,  and 
the  forearms  of  all  the  Mammals. 

For  here  we  come  upon  the  interchange  and  crossing  as  it 
were  of  two  distinct  ideas,  which  seem  to  stand  the  one  as  the 
warp  and  the  other  as  the  woof  in  the  fabrics  of  Organic  Life. 
There  is  the  idea  of  Homology  in  Structure  and  the  idea  of 
Analogy  in  Use.  The  one  represents  the  Unity  of  Design,  the 
other  represents  Variety  of  Function.  It  might  have  been  sup- 
posed that  these  could  not  easily  be  reconciled — that  where 
great  differences  in  use  and  application  are  essential,  rigid  ad- 
herence to  one  pattern  of  structure  would  be  an  impediment  in 
the  way.  But  it  is  not  so.  The  same  bones  in  different  ani- 
mals are  made  subservient  to  the  widest  possible  diversity  of 
function.  The  same  limbs  are  converted  into  paddlest  and 
wings,  and  legs,  and  arms.  And  so  it  is  with  every  other  part 
of  the  skeleton  and  every  other  organ  of  the  body.  Indeed  it 
is  difficult  to  say  whether  the  law  of  unity  in  design,  or  the  law 
of  variety  in  adaptation,  is  pushed  to  the  greatest  length.  There 
are  some  cases  in  which  the  adaptation  of  form  to  special  func- 
tion is  carried  so  far  that  all  appearance  of  common  structure 
is  entirely  lost.  It  is  very  difficult,  for  example,  to  persuade 
persons  ignorant  of  the  principles  of  anatomy  that  the  Whale 
and  the  Porpoise  are  not  Fish,  that  they  breathe  with  lungs  as 
Man  breathes,  that  they  would  be  drowned  if  kept  long  under 
water,  and  that,  as  they  suckle  their  young,  they  belong  to  the 
same  great  Class,  Mammalia.  Living  in  the  same  element  as 
Fish,  and  feeding  very  much  as  fishes  feed,  a  similar  outward 
form  has  been  given  to  them,  because  that  form  is  the  best 
adapted  for  progression  through  the  water.  *  But  that  form  has 
been,  so  to  speak,  put  on  round  the  Mammalian  skeleton,  and 


120  THE   REIGN    OF 

covers  all  the  organs  proper  to  the  Mammalian  Class.  Whales 
and  Porpoises,  notwithstanding  their  form,  and  their  habitat, 
and  their  food,  are  as  separate  from  Fishes  as  the  Elephant,  or 
the  Hippopotamus,  or  the  Giraffe. 

And  when  we  remember  that  the  immense  variety  of  Organic 
Forms  in  the  existing  world  does  not  exhaust  the  adaptability 
of  their  Plan,  but  that  the  still  vaster  varieties  of  all  the  extinct 
creations  have  circled  round  the  same  central  Types,  it  be- 
comes evident  that  Ihese  Types  have  had  from  the  first  a  Pur- 
pose which  has  been  well  and  wonderfully  fulfilled.  As  a  mat- 
ter of  fact,  we  see  that  the  original  conception  of  the  framework 
of  Organic  Life  has  included  in  itself  provisions  for  applying 
the  principle  of  adaptation  in  infinite  degrees.  Its  last  devel- 
opment is  in  Man.  In  his  frame  there  is  no  abortive  member. 
Fvery  part  is  put  to  .its  highest  use  : — highest,  that  is,  in  refer- 
ence to  the  supremacy  of  mind.*  There  are  stronger  arms, 
there  are  swifter  limbs,  there  are  more  powerful  teeth,  there  are 
finer  ears,  there  are  sharper  eyes.  There  are  creatures  which 
go  where  he  cannot  go,  and  can  live  where  he  would  die.  But 
all  his  members  are  co-ordinated  with  one  power — the  power  of 
Thought.  Through  this  he  has  the  dominion  over  all  other 
created  things — whilst  yet  as  regards  the  type  and  pattern  of 
his  frame  he  has  not  a  single  bone  or  joint  or  organ  which  he 
does  not  share  with  some  one  or  other  of  the  Beasts  that  perish. 
It  is  not  in  any  of  the  parts  of  his  structure,  but  in  their  combi- 
nation and  adjustment,  that  he  stands  alone. 

All  these  facts  must  convince  us  that  we  must  enlarge  our 
ideas  as  to  what  is  meant  by  Use  in  the  Economy  of  Nature. 
In  the  first  place,  it  must  be  so  interpreted  as  to  include  orna- 
ment ;  and  in  the  second  place,  it  must  include  also  not  merely 
Actual  Use,  but  Potential  Use,  or  the  capacity  of  being  turned 
to  use  in  new  creations.  Of  course  this  is  one  of  the  ideas 
which  Philosophers  of  the  Positive  School  denounce  as  "  Meta- 
physical." But  here  again  their  opposition  is  itself  based  upon 
metaphysics,  only  upon  metaphysics  which  are  bad.  "  Poten- 
tial existence,"  says  Mr.  Lewes,f  "  is  ideal,  not  real."  "  A 

*  "  Quid  reliqua  descriptione  omnium  corporis  partium,  in  qua  nihil  inane,  nihil  sine 
causa,  nihil  supervacaneum est  ?  " — Cicero,  "  De  Nat.  Deor.,"  lib.  i.  cap.  33. 
t  u  History  of  Philosophy,"  Prologue,  p.  Ixxxviii. 


APPARENT  EXCEPTIONS  TO  THE  SUPREMACY  OF  PURPOSE.     I  2  I 

fact  is  not  a  fact  until  it  is  accomplished.  Nothing  exists  be- 
fore it  exists.  This  truism  is  disregarded  by  those  who  talk  of 
potential  existence."  So  it  is,  and  it  ought  to  be  disregarded, 
because  it  has  no  bearing  on  the  question.  May  not  the  forma- 
tion of  a  plan  or  conspiracy  to  murder  be  "  a  fact  "  although  the 
murder  is  not  "  accomplished  ? "  Is  not  the  capacity  in  the 
different  pieces  of  a  puzzle  of  being  fitted  together,  a  fact — 
even  when  the  pieces  are  all  huddled  confusedly  in  a  box  ?  Is 
there  no  potential  use  in  the  udder  of  a  cow-calf  before  it  can 
have  had  any  calves  of  its  own  ?  Is  the  idea  of  Potential  use 
in  all  these  cases  an  idea  which  has  no  "  reality  ?  "  Are  they 
mere  "artifices  of  thought,"  or  "preliminary  falsifications  of 
fact  ? "  If  the  metaphysics  of  Positivism  are  available  to  estab- 
lish this  conclusion,  they  must  be  equally  available  to  condemn 
knowledge  in  all  its  forms  as  "  Ideal  "  and  not  "  real."  Bad  met- 
aphysics of  this  kind  are  indeed,  what  Dr.  Newman  dreads  the 
human  mind  may  be,  a  "  universal  solvent,"  casting  doubt  on 
the  most  certain  of  its  own  conclusions,  and  landing  itself  in 
universal  scepticism. 

We  have  not  far  to  go  to  find  the  same  kind  of  reasoning, 
and  the  same  methods  of  analysis,  employed  to  establish  the 
converse  proposition,  that  so  far  from  Potentiality  having  no 
existence,  it  is  the  only  form  under  which  the  existence  of  any- 
thing beyond  ourselves  can  be  known  to  us.  No  less  eminent 
a  thinker  than  Mr.  J.  S.  Mill  reduces  Matter  itself,  and  the  very 
idea  of  the  existence  of  an  external  world,  to  a  "  Permanent 
Possibility  of  Sensation."  *  Nay,  he  is  not  sure — he  only  sees 
some  "  intrinsic  difficulties  "  in  the  way — whether  our  knowledge 
of  Self-existence  may  not  be  brought  under  the  same  "  Poten- 
tial "  category — as  a  mere  "  Possibility  of  Sensation."  f  In  re- 
gard to  Matter,  Mr.  Mill  distinctly  says  that  so  far  from  a  mere 
Possibility  having  no  real  existence,  it  is  the  only  reality — the 
one  thing  which  is  constant  and  abiding  behind  the  flux  and 
uncertainty  of  actual  sensations.  My  own  opinion  is  that  the 
metaphysical  process  by  which  these  opposite  paradoxes  are  ar- 
rived at  is  nearly  as  worthless  in  the  one  case  as  in  the  other. 
Of  the  two  I  prefer  the  paradox  of  Mr.  Mill  to  the  paradox  of 
Mr.  Lewes — so  far  at  least  as  the  reality  of  Potential  Existences 

*u  Mill  on  Hamilton,"  chap.  xi.  t  Ibid.  chap.  xii. 


122  THE    REIGN    OF    LAW. 

is  concerned.  But  I  prefer  it  only  in  the  very  case  to  which 
Mr.  Mill  shrinks  from  applying  it.  I  can  think  of  my  own  mind 
or  existence  as  a  "  Possibility  of  Sensation  "  (whether  "  perma- 
nent" or  not).  It  is  a  method  of  conception  indeed  which 
casts  no  light  on  anything,  and  it  is  highly  artificial ;  but  at 
least  it  is  not  false.  It  involves  no  confounding  of  two  differ- 
ent elements  of  thought.  But  I  cannot  transfer  the  word  or 
the  idea  of  sensation  from  myself  to  the  external  things  which 
cause  sensation  in  me.  This  transfer  involves  a  fundamental 
confusion  of  thought  and  of  language  as  the  instrument  of 
thought.  (See  note  D.)  But  such  paradoxes  are  the  natural 
result  of  one  great  error — the  endeavor  to  get  rid  of,  or  to  ex- 
plain away,  or  to  dissolve  by  analysis,  such  simple  and  element- 
ary conceptions  of  the  Mind  as  the  idea  of  External  Force  and 
of  Causation,  or  the  idea  of  Purpose  and  Intention.  Matter 
may  very  well  be  conceived  as  "  That  which  produces,  or  has  a 
Possibility  of  producing,  Sensation  in  Sentient  beings."  But 
this  is  a  definition  which  involves  the  idea  of  Causation.  And 
if  this  be  rejected  as  an  elementary  conception,  (or  as  a  distinct 
conception,  whether  elementary  or  not,)  then  the  paradox  of 
Mr.  Mill  is  the  natural  result.  In  like  manner,  if  the  idea  of 
Purpose  and  Intention  be  repudiated,  as  representing  no  "  n  - 
ality  "  in  Nature,  then  the  opposite  paradox  of  Mr.  Lewes  is 
reached  along  the  same  slippery  and  deceptive  ways.  We  know 
at  least,  as  a  matter  of  experience,  that  we  are  .capable  of  form- 
ing plans  which  exist  as  such  before  they  are  carried  into  ef- 
fect. We  know  too  that  one  plan  may  be  large  enough  to  in- 
clude another,  and  that  even  within  the  fractional  limits  of  our 
foresight  we  can  provide  for  contingent  as  well  as  for  actual 
use.  We  can  therefore  easily  conceive  the  existence  of  the 
same  kind  of  prevision  in  the  Mind  which  works  in  Nature,  and 
we  can  easily  understand  how  the  apparent  difference  between 
actual  and  contingent  use  should  be  greater  in  proportion  as 
the  Plan  is  larger,  and  is  designed  to  operate  during  vaster  pe- 
riods of  Time. 

In  this  point  of  view  rudimentary  or  aborted  organs  need  no 
longer  puzzle  us,  for  in  respect  to  Purpose  they  may  be  read 
either  in  the  light  of  History,  or  in  the  light  of  Prophecy. 
They  may  be  regarded  as  indicating  always  either  what  had 


APPARENT  EXCEPTIONS  TO  THE  SUPREMACY  OF  PURPOSE.     123 

already  been,  or  what  was  yet  to  be.  Why  new  creations 
should  never  have  been  made  wholly  new ; — why  they  should 
have  been  always  moulded  on  some  pre-existing  Forms  ; — why 
one  fundamental  ground-plan  should  have  been  adhered  to  for 
all  Vertebrate  Animals,  we  cannot  understand.  But  as  a  mat- 
ter of  fact  it  is  so.  For  it  appears  that  Creative  Purpose  has 
been  effected  through  the  instrumentality  of  Forces  so  com- 
bined as  to  arrange  the  particles  of  organic  matter  in  definite 
forms  :  which  forms  include  many  separate  parts  having  a  con- 
stant relation  to  each  other  and  to  the  whole,  but  capable  of 
arrestment  or  development  according  as  special  organs  are 
required  for  the  discharge  of  special  functions.  Each  new 
creation  seems  to  have  been  a  new  application  of  these  old 
materials.  Each  new  House  of  Life  has  been  built  on  these 
old  foundations.  Among  the  many  wonders  of  Nature  there 
is  nothing  more  wonderful  than  this — the  adaptability  of  the 
one  Vertebrate  Type  to  the  infinite  variety  of  Life  to  which  it 
serves  as  an  organ  and  a  home.  Its  basement  has  been  so 
laid  that  every  possible  change  or  addition  of  superstructure 
could  be  built  upon  it.  Creatures  destined  to  live  on  the  earth 
or  in  the  earth,  on  the  sea  or  in  the  sea,  under  every  variety  of 
condition  of  existence,  have  all  been  made  after  that  one  pat- 
tern ;  and  each  of  them  with  as  close  an  adaptation  to  special 
function  as  if  the  pattern  had  been  designed  for  itself  alone. 
It  is  true  that  there  are  particular  parts  of  it  which  are  of  no 
use  to  particular  animals.  But  there  is  no  part  of  it  which  is 
not  of  indispensable  use  to  some  member  of  the  group  ;  and 
there  is  one  Supreme  Form  in  which  all  its  elements  receive 
their  highest  interpretation  and  fulfilment.  It  is  indeed  won- 
derful to  think  that  the  feeble  and  sprawling  paddles  on  a  Newt, 
the  ungainly  flippers  of  a  Seal,  and  the  long  leathery  wings  of 
a  Bat,  have  all  the  same  elements,  bone  for  bone,  with  that  hu- 
man hand  which  is  the  supple  instrument  of  Man's  contrivance, 
and  is  alive,  even  to  the  finger-tips,  with  the  power  of  express- 
ing his  Intellect  and  his  Will.  Here  again  the  Laws  of  Nature 
are  seen  to  be  nothing  but  combinations  of  Force  with  a  view 
to  Purpose  :  combinations  which  indicate  complete  knowledge, 
not  only  of  what  is,  but  of  what  is  to  be,  and  which  foresees 
the  End  from  the  Beginning. 


UHI7BHSITT 


CHAPTER  V. 

CREATION     BY    LAW. 

WE  see,  then,  how  the  existence  of  Organs  separated  from 
Function,  and  of  structures  without  immediate  use,  find  their 
natural  place  among  all  the  other  phenomena  of  the  world. 
They  do  not  show  that  "  Law  "  is  ever  superior  to  Will,  or  can 
ever  assert,  even  for  a  moment,  an  independence  of  its  own. 
On  the  contrary,  they  show,  as  nothing  else  can  show,  the  pa- 
tient movements,  and  the  incalculable  years,  through  which 
material  laws  have  been  made  to  follow  the  steps  of  Purpose. 

But,  then,  let  us  remember  this  :  these  discoveries  in  Phys- 
iology, though  they  are  helpless  to  prove  that  Law  has  ever 
been  present  as  a  Master,  are  eminently  suggestive  of  the  idea 
that  Law  has  never  been  absent  as  a  Servant , — that  as,  in 
governing  the  world,  so  in  forming  it,  Material  Forces  have 
been  always  used  as  the  instruments  of  Will. 

It  is  no  mere  theory,  but  a  fact  as  certain  as  any  other  fact 
of  Science,  that  Creation  has  had  a  History.  It  has  not  been  a 
single  act,  done  and  finished  once  for  all,  but  a  long  series  of 
acts — a  work  continuously  pursued  through  an  inconceivable 
lapse  of  time.  It  is  another  fact,  equally  certain,  respecting 
this  work,  that  as  it  has  been  pursued  in  Time,  so  also  it  has 
been  pursued  by  Method.  There  is  an  "  observed  Order  of 
facts  "  in  the  history  of  Creation,  both  in  the  organic  and  in  the 
inorganic  world.  I  speak  here,  however,  of  the  organic  world 
alone,  and  chiefly  of  those  higher  Forms  which  are  the  seat  of 
Animal  Life.  In  these,  there  is  an  observed  Order  in  the  most 
rigid  scientific  sense — that  is,  phenomena  in  uniform  connection, 
and  mutual  relations  which  can  be  made,  and  are  made,  the  basis 
of  systematic  classification.  These  classifications  are  imperfect, 
not  because  they  are  founded  on  ideal  connections  where  none 
exist,  but  only  because  they  fail  in  representing  adequately  the 
subtle  and  pervading  Order  which  binds  together  all  living  things. 


CREATION    BY    LAW.  125 

But  the  Order  which  prevails  in  the  existing  world  is  not  the 
only  Order  which  has  been  recognized  by  science.  A  like 
Order  has  prevailed  through  all  the  past  history  of  Creation. 
Nay,  more  ;  it  has,  I  think,  been  clearly  ascertained,  not  only 
that  relations  similar  to  those  which  now  exist  have  existed 
always  among  all  the  animals  of  each  contemporary  Creation, 
but  that  Order  of  a  like  kind  has  connected  with  each  other  all 
the  different  Creations  which  were  successively  introduced.  In 
almost  all  the  leading  Types  of  Life  which  have  existed  in  the 
different  geological  ages,  there  is  an  orderly  gradation  connect- 
ing the  Forms  which  were  becoming  extinct  with  the  Forms 
which  were  for  the  first  time  appearing  in  the  world.  It  is  still 
disputed  by  some  geologists,  whether  we  have  certain  evidence 
that  this  gradation  has  been  the  gradation  of  a  rising  scale — of 
progressive  Creations  from  lower  to  higher  Types.  But  this 
dispute  is  maintained  only  on  the  ground  that  we  cannot  safely 
trust  to  negative  evidence.  It  is  an  unquestionable  fact,  that 
so  far  as  this  kind  of  evidence  can  go,  it  does  testify  to  the 
successive  introduction  of  higher  and  higher  Forms  of  Life. 
Very  recently  a  discovery  has  been  made,  to  which  Mr.  Darwin 
only  a  few  years  ago  referred  as  "  a  discovery  of  which  the 
chance  is  very  small  " — viz.  of  fossil  Organisms  in  beds  far  be- 
neath the  lowest  Silurian  strata.  This  discovery  has  been 
made  in  Canada — in  beds  far  down,  near  the  bottom  even,  of 
the  rocks  hitherto  termed  "  Azoic."  But  what  are  the  Forms 
of  Life  which  have  been  found  here  ?  They  belong  to  the  very 
lowest  of  living  types — to  the  "  Rhizopods."  So  far  as  this  dis~ 
covery  goes,  therefore,  it  is  in  strict  accordance  with  all  the 
facts  previously  known — that,  as  we  go  back  in  time,  we  lose, 
one  after  another,  the  higher  and  more  complex  organisms  : 
first,  the  Mammalia ;  then  the  Vertebrata ;  and  now,  lastly, 
even  the  Mollusca.  It  is  in  accordance,  too,  with  another  fact 
which  has  been  observed  before,  viz.  that  particular  Forms  of 
Life  have  attained,  at  particular  epochs,  a  maximum  develop- 
ment, both  in  respect  to  size  and  distribution — the  favorites, 
as  it  were,  of  Creation  for  a  time.  These  earliest  Rhizopods 
seem  to  have  been  of  enormous  size,  and  developed  on  an  enor- 
mous scale  ;  since  there  is  good  reason  to  believe  that  beds  of 
immense  thickness  are  composed  of  their  remains.  All  that  is 


126  THE    REIGN    OF    LAW. 

new  in  this  discovery  is  the  vast  extension  which  it  gives  in 
Time  to  the  same  rules  which  had  been  already  traced  through 
ages  which  we  cannot  number. 

Then,  there  is  another  observed  Order.  For  each  Class  of 
animal  some  definite  Type  or  pattern  has  been  adhered  to; 
and  the  modifications  of  that  Type  have  been  gradual  and 
successive.  In  many  cases  the  science  of  fossil  remains  ena- 
ble us  to  trace  the  intermediate  Forms  through  which  existing 
animals  can  be  connected  with  animals  long  since  extinct.  It 
must  be  remembered  that  the  fact  of  this  connection  is  quite  a 
separate  thing  from  any  theory  as  to  its  physical  cause.  Pro- 
fessor Owen  pointed  out  some  years  before  the  publication  of 
Mr.  Darwin's  theory,  the  existence  of  fossil  animals  which 
showed  an  increasing  approximation  to  the  forms  of  the  Horse 
and  of  the  Ox  ;  and  he  showed  that  this  approximation  was 
related  in  Time,  as  it  seemed  to  be  in  Purpose,  with  the  com- 
ing need  of  them  for  the  service  and  use  of  Man.  These  are 
the  facts  on  which  the  idea  of  "  Creation  by  Law  '  is  founded. 
Let  us  look  a  little  nearer  what  this  idea  is,  and  what  it  in- 
volves. It  is  an  idea  much'vaunted  by  some  men,  much  feared 
by  others.  Perhaps  it  may  be  found,  on  closer  investigation, 
that  they  are  fearing  or  worshipping,  as  the  case  may  be,  an 
idol  of  the  imagination. 

It  being  certain  that  Creation  exhibits  an  Order  of  facts 
which  can  be  so  clearly  defined  and  traced,  it  follows,  that  at 
least  in  this  first  sense  of  the  word,  Creation  has  been  "by  Law. 
We  are,  therefore,  led  on  to  the  farther  question,  whether  Law 
in  any  other  sense  can  be  traced  or  detected  in  the  work  of 
Creation  ?  Is  the  observed  Order  which  prevails  in  the  organic 
world  an  Order  of  which  we  can  even  guess  the  physical  cause  ? 
Is  it  an  Order  which  contains  within  itself  any  indications  of 
the  Force  or  combination  of  Forces  which  have  been  con- 
cerned in  producing  it  ? 

In  considering  this  question,  there  is  one  thing  to  be  ob- 
served at  the  outset.  It  is  certain  that  nothing  is  known,  or 
has  been  even  guessed  at,  in  respect  to  the  history  and  Origin 
of  Life,  which  corresponds  with  Law  in  its  strictest  and  most 
definite  sense.  We  have  no  knowledge  of  any  one  or  more 
Forces — such  as  the  Force  of  Gravitation,  or  of  magnetic  at- 


CREATION    BY    LAW.  127 

traction  and  repulsion — to  which  any  one  of  the  phenomena 
of  Life  can  be  traced.  Far  less  have  we  any  knowledge  of  any 
laws  of  the  like  kind  which  can  be  connected  with  the  succes- 
sive creation  or  development  of  new  Organisms.  Professor 
Huxley,  in  a  recent  work,*  has  indeed  spoken  of  "  that  combi- 
nation of  natural  forces  which  we  term  Life."  But  this  lan- 
guage is  purely  rhetorical.  I  do  not  mean  to  say  that  Life  may 
not  be  defined  to  be  a  kind  of  Force,  or  a  combination  of 
Forces.  All  I  mean  is,  that  we  know  nothing  of  any  of  these 
Forces  in  the  same  sense  in  which  we  do  know  something  of  the 
Force  of  Gravity,  or  of  Magnetism,  or  of  Electricity,  or  of 
Chemical  Affinity.  These  are  all  more  or  less  known,  not,  in- 
deed, in  respect  to  their  ultimate  nature,  but  in  respect  to  cer- 
tain methods  and  measures  of  their  operation.  No  such 
knowledge  exists  in  respect  to  any  of  the  Forces  which  have 
been  concerned  in  the  development  of  Life.  No  man  has  ever 
pretended  to  get  such  a  view  of  any  of  these  as  to  enable  him 
10  apply  to  them  the  instruments  of  his  analysis,  or  to  trace  in 
their  working  any  definite  relations  to  Space,  or  Time,  or  Num- 
ber. 

Since,  then,  laws,  in  this  most  definite  sense  of  the  word, 
have  not  been  discovered  in  the  existing  phenomena,  or  in  the 
past  history  of  Organic  Life,  let  us  look  a  little  closer  at  the 
ideas  which  these  phenomena  have  suggested  to  the  mind  of 
those  who  have  speculated  on  the  Origin  and  Development  of 
Species. 

There  is  one  idea  which  has  been  common  to  all  theories  of 
Development,  and  that  is,  the  idea  that  ordinary  generation 
has  somehow  been  producing,  from  time  to  time,  extraordinary 
effects,  and  that  a  new  Species  is,  in  fact,  simply  an  unusual 
birth.  It  is  worthy  of  observation,  that  the  earlier  forms  in 
which  the  theory  of  Development  appeared,  did  suggest  some- 
thing more  nearly  approaching  to  a  Law  of  Creacion  than  is 
contained  in  the  later  form  which  that  theory  has  assumed  in 
the  hands  of  Mr.  Darwin.  The  essential  idea  of  the  theory  of 
Development,  in  its  earlier  forms,  was,  that  modifications  of 
structure  arose  somehow  by  way  of  natural  consequence  from 
the  outward  circumstances  or  physical  conditions  which  re- 

*  "  Elements  of  Comparative  Anatomy,"  p.  2. 


128  THE    REIGN    OF    LAW. 

quired  them,  and  from  the  living  effort  of  Organism  sensible  in 
some  degree  of  that  requirement.  Now,  inadequate  and  even 
grotesque  though  this  idea  may  be  as  explaining  the  Origin  of 
new  Species  it  cannot  be  denied,  that  it  makes  its  appeal  to  a 
process  which,  at  least  to  a  limited  extent,  does  operate  in 
producing  modifications  of  organic  structure.  For  example, 
the  same  species  of  Mollusc  has  often  a  shell  comparatively  weak 
and  thin,  or  a  shell  comparatively  robust  and  strong,  accord- 
ing as  it  lies  in  tranquil  or  in  stormy  water.  The  shell  which 
is  much  exposed  needs  to  be  stronger  than  the  shell  which  is 
less  exposed.  But  it  is  obvious  that  the  mere  fact  of  the  need 
cannot  supply  the  thing  needed,  unless  by  the  adjustment  of 
some  machinery  for  the  purpose.  How  the  vital  forces  of  the 
Mollusc  can  thus  be  made  to  work  to  order,  under  a  change 
of  external  conditions,  we  do  not  know.  But  we  do  know,  as  a 
matter  of  fact,  that  the  shell  is  thickened  and  strengthened, 
according  as  it  needs  resisting  power.  This  result  does  not 
appear  to  arise  from  any  difference  in  the  amount  of  lime  held 
in  solution  in  the  water,  but  from  some  power  in  the  secreting 
organs  of  the  animal  to  appropriate  more  or  less  of  it  accord- 
ing to  its  own  need.  The  effects  of  this  power  are  seen  where 
there  is  no  difference  of  condition  except  difference  of  ex- 
posure. It  is  said  that  they  are  observable,  for  example,  in 
the  shells  which  lie  on  the  different  sides  of  Plymouth  Break- 
water,— the  sheltered  side  and  the  exposed  side.  The  same 
power  of  adaptation  is  seen  in  many  other  forms.  Trees  which 
are  most  exposed  to  the  blast  are  the  most  strongly  anchored 
in  the  soil.  Limbs  which  are  the  most  used  are  the  most  de- 
veloped. Organs  which  are  in  constant  use,  are  strengthened, 
whilst  organs  in  habitual  disuse  have  a  tendency  to  become 
weaker. 

All  these  results  arise  by  way  of  natural  consequence.  How 
shall  we  describe  them  ?  Shall  we  say  that  they  are  the  result 
of  Law  ?  We  may  safely  do  so,  remembering  only  that  by 
Law,  in  this  sense,  we  mean  nothing  but  the  co-operation  of 
different  natural  Forces,  which,  under  certain  conditions,  work 
together  for  the  fulfilment  of  an  obvious  intention.  Of  the 
nature  of  those  Forces  we  know  nothing ;  nor  is  it  easy  to 
conceive  how  they  have  been  so  co-ordinated  as  to  produce 


CREATION    BY    LAW.  1 29 

effects  fitting  with  such  exactness  into  the  conditions  requisite 
for  the  preservation  of  Organic  Life.  If  there  were  any  evidence 
that  by  the  same  means  new  Forms  of  Life  could  be  developed 
from  the  old,  I  cannot  see  why  there  should  be  any  reluctance 
to  admit  the  fact.  It  would  be  different  from  anything  that  we 
see ;  but  I  do  not  know  that  it  would  be  at  all  less  wonderful, 
or  that  it  would  bring  us  much  nearer  than  we  now  stand  to 
the  great  mystery  of  Creation.  The  adaptation  and  arrange- 
ment of  natural  forces,  which  can  compass  these  modifications 
of  animal  structure,  in  exact  proportion  to  the  need  of  them,  is 
an  adaptation  and  arrangement  which  is  in  the  nature  of  Crea- 
tion. It  can  only  be  due  to  the  working  of  a  power  which  is 
in  the  nature  of  Creative  power. 

We  are  so  accustomed  to  these  and  other  similar  phenomena, 
and  so  apt  to  hide  our  own  ignorance  of  their  cause,  by  de- 
scribing them  as  the  result  of  "  Law,"  that  we  forget  what  a 
multitude  of  natural  Forces  must  be  concerned  in  their  produc- 
tion, and  what  complicated  adjustmemts  of  these  amongst 
each  other  for  the  accomplishment  of  Purpose.  It  is  purely, 
therefore,  in  my  view  a  question  of  evidence,  whether  this  par- 
ticular law  of  adaptation  has  or  has  not  been  the  means  of 
introducing  new  Forms  of  Life.  There  is  no  evidence  that  it 
has.  So  far  as  we  know,  this  power  of  self-adaptation,  wonderful 
as  it  is,  has  a  comparatively  limited  application ;  when  that 
limit  is  outrun  by  changes  in  outward  conditions,  which  are  too 
great  or  too  rapid,  whole  Species  die  and  disappear.  Never- 
theless, the  introduction  of  new  Species  to  take  the  place  of 
those  which  have  passed  away,  is  a  work  which  has  been  not 
only  so  often  but  so  continuously  repeated,  that  it  does  suggest 
the  idea  of  having  been  brought  about  through  the  instrumen- 
tality of  some  natural  process.  But  we  may  say  with  confidence, 
that  it  must  have  been  a  process  different  from  any  that  we  yet 
know — a  process  not  the  same  as  that  (obscure  as  that  is)  which 
produces  the  lesser  modifications  of  Organic  Forms. 

It  has  not,  I  think,  been  sufficiently  observed,  that  the  theory 
of  Mr.  Darwin  does  not  address  itself  to  the  same  question,  and 
does  not  even  profess  to  trace  the  Origin  of  new  Forms  to  any 
definite  law.  His  theory  gives  an  explanation,  not  of  the  proc- 
esses by  which  new  Forms  first  appear,  but  only  of  the  proc- 
9 


130  THE   REIGN   OF   LAW. 

esses  by  which,  when  they  have  appeared,  they  acquire  a  pref- 
erence over  others,  and  thus  become  established  in  the  world. 
A  new  Species  is,  indeed,  according  to  his  theory,  as  well  as 
with  the  older  theories  of  Development,  simply  an  unusual 
birth.  The  bond  of  connection  between  allied  specific  and 
generic  Forms,  is  in  his  view  simply  the  bond  of  Inheritance. 
But  Mr.  Darwin  does  not  pretend  to  have  discovered  any  law 
or  rule  according  to  which  new  Forms'  have  been  born  from 
old  Forms.  He  does  not  hold  that  outward  conditions,  how- 
ever changed,  are  sufficient  to  account  for  them.  Still  less 
does  he  connect  them  with  the  effort  or  aspirations  of  any  Or- 
ganism after  new  faculties  and  powers.  He  frankly  confesses 
that  "  our  ignorance  of  the  laws  of  variation  is  profound ; "  and 
says,  that  in  speaking  of  them  as  due  to  chance,  he  means  only 
"  to  acknowledge  plainly  our  ignorance  of  the  cause  of  each 
particular  variation."  *  Again  he  says — "  I  believe  in  no  law 
of  necessary  development."  t 

This  distinction  between  Mr.  Darwin's  theory  and  other  the- 
ories of  Development,  has  not,  I  think,  been  sufficiently  ob- 
served. His  theory  seems  to  be  far  better  than  a  mere  theory 
— to  be  an  established  scientific  truth — in  so  far  as  it  accounts, 
in  part  at  least,  for  the  success  and  establishment  and  spread 
of  new  Forms  when  they  have  arisen.  But  it  does  not  even 
suggest  the  law  under  which,  or  by  which,  or  according  to 
which,  such  new  Forms  are  introduced.  Natural  Selection 
can  do  nothing  except  with  the  materials  presented  to  its 
hands.  It  cannot  select  except  among  the  things  open  to  se- 
lection. Natural  Selection  can  originate  nothing;  it  can  only 
pick  out  and  choose  among  the  things  which  are  originated  by 
some  other  law.  Strictly  speaking,  therefore,  Mr.  Darwin's 
theory  is  not  a  theory  on  the  Origin  of  Species  at  all,  but  only 
a  theory  on  the  causes  which  lead  to  the  relative  success  or 
failure  of  such  new  Forms  as  may  be  born  into  the  world.  It 
is  the  more  important  to  remember  this  distinction,  because  it 
seems  to  me  that  Mr.  Darwin  himself  frequently  forgets  it. 
Not  only  does  he  speak  of  Natural  Selection  "  producing  "  this 
and  that  modification  of  structure,  but  he  undertakes  to  affirm 


*  "  Origin  of  Species,"  p.  131  (first  edition), 
i  Ibid.  p.  351. 


CREATION    BY    LAW.  131 

of  one  class  of  changes  that  they  can  be  produced,  and  of  an- 
other class  of  changes  that  they  cannot  be  produced  by  this 
process.* 

Now,  what  are  the  changes  for  the  preservation  of  which 
Natural  Selection  does,  in  some  sense,  account  ?  They  are 
such  changes,  and  these  only,  as  are  of  some  direct  use  to  the 
Organism  in  the  "  struggle  for  existence."  Any  change  which 
has  not  this  direct  value,  is  not  provided  for  in  the  theory.  All 
structures,  therefore,  are  unaccounted  for — not  only  as  respects 
their  origin,  but  even  as  respects  their  preservation — in  which 
the  variations  have  no  other  value  than  mere  beauty  or  variety. 
Accordingly,  Mr.  Darwin  is  tempted,  as  I  have  already  had  oc- 
casion to  observe,  to  deny  that  any  such  structures  exist  in  Na- 
ture. Any  theory  of  which  this  denial  is  really  a  necessary 
part,  is  self-condemned.  Yet  a  theory  may  be  good  as  account- 
ing for  the  preservation  of  some  structures,  although  it  fails  to 
account  for  the  preservation  of  others.  And  so  the  fact  that 
Natural  Selection  cannot  have  operated  on  structures  of  mere 
beauty  and  variety  is  no  proof  that  the  theory  of  Natural  Selec- 
tion is  false,  but  only  that  it  is  incomplete.  It  does  not  ac- 
count for  the  origin  of  any  structure  ;  and  it  accounts  for  the 
preservation  of  only  a  certain  number.  Surely,  then,  Mr. 
Darwin  assigns  to  his  "  law  "  of  Natural  Selection  a  range  far 
wider  than  really  belongs  to  it,  when,  on  the  strength  of  it,  he 
denies  that  beauty  for  its  own  sake  can  be  an  end  or  object  in 
Organic  Forms.  He  says — "  This  doctrine,  if  true,  would  be 
absolutely  fatal  to  my  theory."  Why  should  this  be  fatal  to  his 
theory,  except  on  the  supposition  that  Natural  Selection  gives 
a  complete  account  both  of  the  Origin  of  new  Forms,  (of  which, 
in  reality,  it  gives  no  account  at  all,)  and  of  their  preservation, 
of  which  it  does  give  some  account,  but  one  which  is  only  par- 
tial ?  I  dwell  on  this,  because  it  lies  at  the  very  root  of  the 
question,  how  far  Mr.  Darwin's  theory  can  be  said  to  suggest 
anything  in  the  nature  of  a  Creative  Law  of  a  kind  to  explain 
the  Method  which  has  been  followed  in  the  introduction  of 
new  Forms. 

We  may  test  this  question  by  bringing  to  bear  upon  it  some 
particular  example  of  specific  variation.  I  select  for  this  pur- 

% 

*  "  Origin  of  Species,"  p.  200  (first  edition). 


132  THE    REIGN    OF    LAW. 

pose  one  example,,  which  will  illustrate  the  subject  better  than 
any  abstract  discussion.  It  is  the  case  of  the  Humming  Birds. 

This  groerp  of  Birds  seems  to  exhibit,  in  the  most  striking 
form,  not  a  few  of  those  mysteries  of  Creation  which  at  once 
tempt  us  to  speculate  on  the  Origin  of  Species,  and  at  the  same 
time  confound  every  endeavor  to  bring  it  into  relation  with  any 
process  which  we  know  or  can  conceive.  In  the  first  place,  they 
are  sharply  defined  from  all  other  forms  in  that  Class  of  the 
animal  kingdom  to  which  they  belong.  It  is  most  difficult  to 
say  what  is  their  nearest  affinity,  and  the  nearest,  when  it  is 
found,  is  very  distant.  Secondly,  they  are  absolutely  confined 
to  one  Continent  of  the  Globe.  In  the  third  place,  the  various 
Species  as  amongst  themselves  are  very  closely  united,  ranging, 
indeed,  over  a  great  variety  of  forms,  but  for  the  most  part  con- 
nected with  each  other  by  very  nice  gradations.  In  the  fourth 
place,  there  are,  so  to  speak,  some  gaps  in  the  scale,  which  sug- 
gest that  some  Species  have  either  been  lost,  or  have  not  yet 
been  discovered.  In  the  fifth  place,  each  of  these  Species,  how- 
ever nearly  allied  to  some  other,  appears  to  be  absolutely  fixed 
and  constant,  there  being  not  the  slightest  indication  of  any 
mixture — of  any  hybrid  forms.  In  the  sixth  place,  there  is  the 
most  wonderful  adaptation  of  special  organs  for  the  performance 
of  special  functions,  and  for  the  relation  of  these  organs  to 
particular  structures  in  the  vegetable  kingdom.  In  the  seventh 
place,  there  is  a  development,  for  which,  in  extent  and  variety, 
there  is  no  parallel  in  the  world,  of  structures  designed  appar- 
ently for  mere  ornament,  and  entirely  separate  from  any  other 
known»  or  conceivable  use. 

A  few  words  on  some  of  these  characters  will  show  their 
separate  and  joint  bearing  on  the  idea  of  Creation  by  Law. 

In  the  first  place,  then,  the  absolute  distinctiveness  from  all 
others  of  this  Family  of  Birds,  coupled  with  its  immense  extent 
gives  the  idea  of  some  common  bond,  some  physical  cause,  to 
which  such  an  identity  in  physical  characters  must  be  due. 
This  identity  prevails  not  only  in  such  essential  matters  as  the 
structure  of  the  bill  and  tongue,  in  the  form  of  the  feet  and  of 
the  wings,  in  the  habits  of  flight,  and  in  the  nature  of  the  food, 
but  runs  also  into  some  very  curious  details,  as,  for  example, 
in  the  number  of  feathers  in  the  tail  and  in  the  wings,  which 


[TIN 

CREATION    BY    LAW.  133 

are  constant  numbers — adhered  to  even  when  some  of  the 
feathers,  not  being  used  even  for  ornament,  are  reduced  almost 
to  rudiments.  But  under  degrees  of  development  which  are 
very  variable,  the  number  is  invariable.  This  identity  of 
structure  is  the  more  remarkable  from  the  immense  extent  of 
the  group  which  it  characterizes.  There  are  now  known  to 
science  no  less  than  about  430  different  species  of  Humming 
Bird ;  and  it  cannot  be  doubted  that  many  more  remain  to  be 
discovered  among  the  immense  forests  and  mountain  ranges  of 
Central  America. 

Now,  what  is  the  bond  that  unites  so  closely,  in  a  common 
structure,  all  the  forms  of  this  great  Family  of  birds?  We 
think  it  a  sufficient  explanation  sometimes  of  the  likeness  of 
things,  that  they  are  made  for  a  common  purpose.  And  so  it  is 
an  explanation  in  one  sense,  but  not  in  another.  It  gives  the 
reason  why  likeness  should  be  aimed  at,  but  not  the  cause  or 
the  means  through  which  it  has  been  brought  about.  Sameness 
in  the  purpose  for  which  things  are  intended,  is  a  reason  why 
those  things  should  be  made  alike  ;  but  it  is  no  explanation  of 
the  process  to  which  the  common  aspect  is  due.  It  is  an  expla- 
nation of  the  "why;"  but -it  is  no  explanation  of  the  "how." 
Purpose  is  attained  in  Nature  through  the  instrumentality  of 
means  ;  and  community  of  aspect  in  created  things  suggests 
the  idea  of  some  common  process  in  the  creative  work.  Thus, 
the  likeness  which  is  due  to  common  parentage  serves  the  most 
important  purposes ;  but  it  is  not  the  less  the  result  of  a  physi- 
cal cause  out  of  which  it  arises  by  way  of  natural  consequence. 
The  likeness  of  the  Humming  Birds  to  each  other  suggests  this 
kind  of  cause.  It  is  true  that  the  organs  which  it  principally 
affects  are  specially  adapted  for  a  special  habit  of  life.  They 
are  fitted  to  enable  the  Bird  to  feed  on  the  nectar,  and  the 
insects  which  frequent  the  nectar  of  flowers,  or  the  leaves  or 
bark  of  trees.  But  there  are  flowers  and  insects  in  abundance 
in  other  quarters  of  the  globe  where  there  are  no  Humming 
Birds. 

And  here  we  come  on  the  curious  facts  of  geographical  dis- 
tribution,— a  class  of  facts  which,  as  much  as  any  other,  suggest 
some  specific  methods  as  having  been  followed  in  the  work  of 
Creation.  Humming  Birds  are  absolutely  confined  to  the  great 


134  THE   REIGN    OF    LAW. 

Continent  of  America  with  its  adjacent  islands.  Within  those 
limits  there  is  every  range  of  climate,  and  there  are  particular 
species  of  Humming  Bird  adapted  to  every  region  where  a 
flowering  vegetation  can  subsist.  It  is  therefore  neither  climate 
nor  food  which  confines  the  Humming  Birds  to  the  New  World. 
What  is  it,  then?  The  idea  of  "centres  of  Creation"  is  at 
once  suggested  to  the  mind.  It  seems  as  if  the  Humming  Birds 
were  introduced  at  one  spot,  and  as  if  they  had  spread  over 
the  whole  Continent  which  was  accessible  to  them  from  that 
spot.  They  are  absent  elsewhere,  simply  because  from  that 
spot  the  other  Continents  of  the  world  were  inaccessible  to  them. 
But  if  these  ideas  are  suggested  to  the  mind  by  the  general  as- 
pect of  this  family  as  a  whole,  they  are  strengthened  by  some 
of  the  facts  which  we  discover  when  we  examine  and  compare 
with  each  other  the  genera  and  species  of  which  it  is  composed. 
There  is  a  beautiful  gradation  between  the  different  genera  and 
the  different  species, — so  much  so,  that  it  has  been  found  im- 
possible to  divide  the  Humming  Birds  into  more  than  two  sub- 
families, from  the  absence  of  sufficiently  well-marked  divisions. 
And  yet  on  the  other  hand,  they  cannot  be  arranged  in  anything 
like  a  continuous  series,  because  some  links  appear  to  be 
missing  in  the  chain. 

But  these  general  facts  terminate  in  nothing  more  definite 
than  a  vague  surmise.  When  we  enter  farther  into  details,  we 
feel  at  once  how  little  they  agree  with  any  physical  law  which  is 
known  or  even  conceivable  by  us.  If  the  likeness  which  pre- 
vails in  the  whole  group  reminds  us  of  the  likeness  which  is  due 
to  community  of  blood,  it  is  equally  true  that  the  differences  be- 
tween the  species  are  totally  distinct,  both  in  kind  and  degree, 
from  the  variation  which  we  ever  see  arising  among  the  off- 
spring of  the  same  parents.  Let  us  look  at  what  these  differ- 
ences are.  The  generic  and  specific  distinctions  between  the 
Humming  Birds  are  mainly  of  two  kinds, — ist,  Differences  in 
the  form  of  essential  organs,  such  as  the  bill  and  the  wings ;  20?, 
Differences  in  those  parts  of  the  plumage  which  are  purely  or- 
namental. Now,  of  these  two  kinds  of  variation,  the  only  one 
on  which  the  law  of  Natural  Selection  has  any  bearing  at  all  is 
the  first.  And  on  that  kind  of  variation,  the  only  bearing  which 
Natural  Selection  has  is  this — that  if  any  Humming  Bird  were 


CREATION    BY   LAW.  135 

born  with  a  new  form  of  bill,  or  a  new  form  of  wing,  which  en- 
abled it  to  feed  better  and  to  range  farther,  then  that  improved 
bill  and  wing  would  naturally  tend  to  be  perpetuated  by  ordi- 
nary generation.  This  is  unquestionably  true ;  but  it  really 
does  not  touch  the  facts  of  the  case.  The  bills  and  wings  of 
the  different  genera  do  not  differ  from  each  other  in  respect  of 
any  comparative  advantage  of  this  kind,  but  simply  in  respect 
to  variety  corresponding  with  the  variety  of  certain  vegetable 
Forms.  One  form  of  bill  is  as  good  as  another,  but  some  forms 
are  adapted  to  some  special  class  of  flower.  Some  bills,  for  ex- 
ample, are  formed  of  enormous  length,  specially  adapted  to  ob- 
tain access  to  the  nectar  chambers  of  long  tubular  flowers,  such 
as  the  Brugmansia.  Some,  on  the  other  hand,  as  if  to  show 
that  the  same  end  may  be  attained  by  different  means,  obtain 
access  to  the  same  flowers  by  a  shorter  process,  and  pierce  the 
bases  of  the  corolla  instead  of  seeking  access  by  the  mouth. 
Some  have  bills  bent  downwards  like  a  sickle,  adapted  to 
searching  the  bark  of  Palm-trees  for  the  insects  hid  under  the 
scaly  covering  ;  others  have  bills  curved  in  the  opposite  direc- 
tion, fitted,  apparently,  to  the  curious  construction  of  some  of 
the  great  family  of  Orchids  so  immensely  developed  in  the  for- 
ests of  Central  America.  Some  have  bills  equally  well  adapted 
for  searching  a  vast  variety  of  flowers  and  blossoms,  and 
these,  accordingly,  migrate  with  the  flowering  season,  and,  is- 
suing from  the  great  stronghold  of  the  family  in  tropical 
America,  spread  like  our  own  summer  Birds  of  passage,  north- 
wards to  Canada,  and  southwards  to  Cape  Horn,  in  the  corre- 
sponding seasons  of  the  year.  In  contrast  with  these  species 
of  extended  range,  there  are  many  species  whose  habitat  is  con- 
fined, perhaps  to  a  single  mountain,  and  there  are  a  few  which 
never  have  been  seen  beyond  the  edges  of  some  extinct  volcano, 
whose  crater  is  now  filled  with  a  special  flora.  Many  of  the 
great  mountains  of  the  Andes  have  each  of  them  species  pecul- 
iar to  themselves.  On  Chimborazo  and  Cotopaxi,  and  other 
summits,  special  forms  of  Humming  Birds  are  found  in  special 
zones  of  vegetation  even  close  up  to  the  limits  of  perpetual 
snow.  Again,  many  of  the  Islands  have  species  peculiar  to 
themselves.  The  little  island  of  Juan  Fernandez,  300  miles 
from  the  mainland,  has  three  species  peculiar  to  itself,  of  which 


136  THE    REIGN    OF    LAW. 

two  are  so  distinct  from  all  others  known,  that  they  cannot  for 
a  moment  be  confounded  with  any  of  them.* 

It  is  impossible  not  to  see,  in  such  complicated  facts  as  these, 
that  the  creation  of  new  Species  has  followed  some  plan  in 
which  mere  variety  has  been  in  itself  an  object  and  an  aim. 
The  divergence  of  form  is  not  a  divergence  which  can  have 
arisen  by  way  of  natural  consequence,  merely  from  comparative 
advantage  and  disadvantage  in  the  struggle  for  existence. 
Bills  highly  specialized  in  form  are  certainly  not  those  which 
would  give  the  greatest  advantage  to  birds  which  have  equal 
access  to  the  abundant  Flora  of  an  immense  Continent.  Some 
form  of  bill  adapted  to  the  probing  or  piercing  of  all  flowers 
'with  almost  equal  ease,  would  seem  to  be  the  form  most  favor- 
able to  the  multiplication  and  spread  of  Humming  Birds.  Con- 
tinued approximation  to  some  common  type  would  seem  to  be 
quite  as  natural  a  change,  and  a  much  more  advantageous  kind 
of  change  as  regards  advantage  in  the  struggle  for  existence, 
than  endless  divergence  and  special  adaptation  to  limited 
spheres  of  enjoyment.  At  all  events,  we  may  safely  say  that 
mere  advantage,  in  Mr.  Darwin's  sense,  is  not  the  rule  which 
has  chiefly  guided  Creative  Power  in  the  Origin  of  these  new 
Species.  It  seems  rather  to  have  been  a  rule  having  for  its  ob- 
ject the  mere  multiplying  of  Life,  and  the  fitting  of  new  Forms 
for  new  spheres  of  enjoyment,  according  as  these  might  arise 
out  of  corresponding  changes  in  other  departments  of  the  or- 
ganic world. 

If,  now,  we  turn  to  the  other  kind  of  specific  distinction  be- 
tween Humming  Birds,  viz.,  that  which  consists  in  differences 
in  the  mere  coloring  and  disposition  of  the  plumage,  we  shall 
find  the  same  phenomena  still  more  remarkable.  In  the  first 
place,  it  is  to  be  observed  of  the  whole  group  that  there  is  no 
connection  which  can  be  traced  or  conceived  between  the 
splendor  of  the  Humming  Birds  and  any  function  essential  to 
their  life.  If  there  were  any  such  connection,  that  splendor 
could  not  be  confined,  as  it  almost  exclusively  is,  to  one  sex. 
The  female  Birds  are  of  course  not  placed  at  any  disadvantage 
in  the  struggle  for  existence  by  their  more  sombre  coloring. 
Mere  utility  in  this  sense,  therefore,  can  have  had  no  share  in 

*  Gould's  "  Trochilidae." 


CREATION    BY    LAW.  137 

determining  one  of  the  most  remarkable  of  all  the  characteris- 
tics of  this  family  of  Birds.  It  is  obviously  beside  the  question 
to  account,  as  Mr.  Wallace  and  Mr.  Darwin  do,  for  the  beauty 
of  the  Humming  Birds  upon  the  ground  that  the  males  are 
thus  rendered  more  attractive  to  the  females.  This  attractive- 
ness can  only  operate  as  between  different  individuals  of  the 
same  species,  since  no  one  ever  heard  of  the  females  of  a  dull- 
colored  species  wandering  in  their  affection  from  their  rightful 
lords  to  the  more  brilliant  males  of  some  other  species.  Every 
animal,  however  little  beautiful  it  may  be  in  our  eyes,  has 
sufficient  attractiveness  as  between  the  sexes  to  secure  the 
great  object  of  the  continuation  of  its  race.  Utility,  indeed, 
in  a  different  sense,  can  be  quoted  with  probability,  as  account- 
ing for  the  comparative  plain  coloring  of  females  in  this  and  in 
almost  all  other  genera  of  Birds.  But  then  it  is  Utility  con- 
ceived as  operating  by  way  of  motive  in  a  Creative  Mind,  and 
not  operating  as  a  physical  cause  in  the  production  of  a  me- 
chanical result.  And  here  we  find  Mr.  Wallace  instinctively 
testifying  to  this  great  distinction,  and  employing  language 
whidi  indicates  the  passage  from  one  order  of  ideas  to  another. 
He  says,  "The  REASON  WHY  female  birds  are  not  adorned 
with  equally  brilliant  plumes  is  sufficiently  clear ;  they  would 
be  injurious  by  rendering  their  possessors  too  conspicuous 
during  incubation."  *  This  is,  no  doubt,  the  true  explanation 
of  the  purpose  which  the  plain  coloring  of  female  Birds  is  in- 
tended to  serve  ;  but  it  is  no  explanation  at  all  of  the  physical 
causes  by  which  this  special  protection  is  secured. 

Those  who,  by  special  study,  have  laid  their  minds  alongside 
the  Mind  of  Nature  in  any  of  her  Provinces,  have  generally 
imparted  to  them  a  true  sense,  so  far  as  it  goes,  in  the  interpre- 
tation of  her  mysteries.  Let  us  then  hear  what  Mr.  Gould  says 
on  the  beauty  of  the  Humming  Birds  : — "  The  members  of  most 
of  the  genera  have  certain  parts  of  their  plumage  fantastically 
decorated ;  and  in  many  instances  most  resplendent  in  color. 
My  own  opinion  is,  that  this  gorgeous  coloring  of  the  Humming 
Birds  has  been  given  for  the  mere  purpose  of  ornament,  and 
for  no  other  purpose  of  special  adaptation  in  their  mode  of 
life;  in  other  words,  that  ornament  and  beauty,  merely  as 

*  Quarterly  Journal  of  Science,  Oct.,  1867,  p.  481. 


138  THE    REIGN    OF    LAW. 

such,  was  the  end  proposed."  *  Different  parts  of  the  plumage 
have  been  selected  in  different  genera  as  the  principal  subject 
of  ornament.  In  some,  it  is  the  feathers  of  the  crown  worked 
into  different  forms  of  crest ;  in  some,  it  is  the  feathers  of  the 
throat,  forming  gorgets  and  beards  of  many  shapes  and  hues ,. 
in  some,  it  is  a  special  development  of  neck  plumes,  elongated 
into  frills  and  tippets  of  extraordinary  form  and  beauty.  In  a 
great  number  of  genera  the  feathers  of  the  tail  are  the  special 
subjects  of  decoration,  and  this  on  every  variety  of  plan  and 
principle  of  ornament.  In  some,  the  two  central  feathers  are 
most  elongated,  the  others  decreasing  in  length  on  either  side, 
so  as  to  give  the  whole  the  wedge  form.  In  others,  the  con- 
verse plan  is  pursued,  the  two  lateral  feathers  being  most  de- 
veloped, so  that  the  whole  is  forked  after  the  manner  of  the 
common  Swallow.  In  others,  again,  they  are  radiated  or  pointed 
and  sharpened  like  thorns.  In  some  genera  there  is  an  ex- 
traordinary development  of  one  or  two  feathers  into  plumes  of 
enormous  length,  with  flat  or  spatulose  terminations.  Mere 
ornament  and  variety  of  form,  and  these  for  their  own  sake,  is- 
the  only  principle  or  rule  with  reference  to  which  Creative 
Power  seems  to  have  worked  in  these  wonderful  and  beautiful 
Birds.  And  if  we  cannot  account  for  the  differences  in  the 
general  style  and  plan  of  ornament  followed  in  the  whole  groupr 
by  referring  them  to  any  sort  of  use  in  the  struggle  for  exist- 
ence, still  less  is  it  possible  to  account,  on  this  principle,  for 
the  kind  of  difference  which  separates  from  each  other  the 
different  species  in  each  of  the  genera.  These  differences  are 
often  little  more  than  a  mere  difference  of  color.  The  radiance 
of  the  ruby  or  topaz  in  one  species,  is  replaced  perhaps  by  the 
radiance  of  the  emerald  or  the  sapphire  in  another.  In  all 
other  respects  the  different  species  are  sometimes  almost  exact 
counterparts  of  each  other.  As  an  example,  let  me  refer  to 
the  two  species  figured  by  Mr.  Gould  as  the  Blue-tailed  and  the 
Green-tailed  Sylphs  ;  and  also  to  two  species  of  the  "  Comets," 
in  which  two  different  kinds  of  luminous  reds  or  crimsons  are 
nearly  all  that  serve  to  distinguish  the  species. 

A  similar  principle  of  variation  applies  in  other  genera,  where 
the  amount  of  difference  is  greater.      For  example,  one  of  the 

*  Gould's  "Trochilidae,"  Introduction. 


CREATION    BY    LAW.  139 

most  singular  and  beautiful  of  all  the  tribe  is  comprised  within 
the  genus  Lophornis,  or  the  "  Coquettes."  The  principle  of 
ornament  in  this  genus  is,  that  the  different  species  are  all  pro- 
vided both  with  brilliant  crests,  and  with  frills  or  tippets  on  the 
neck.  The  feathers  of  these  parts  are  generally  of  one  color, 
ending  in  spots  or  spangles  of  another ;  the  spangles  being 
generally  of  metallic  lustre.  There  seems  to  be  a  rule  of  inverse 
proportion  between  the  two  kinds  of  ornament.  The  species 
which  have  the  neck  plumes  longest  have  the  shortest  crests 
and  vice  versa.  In  the  shape  and  structure  of  all  essential 
organs  there  is  hardly  any  difference  between  the  species. 

One  very  curious  example  of  variety  for  the  sake  of  ornament 
may  be  mentioned  in  connection  with  this  wonderful  family  of 
Birds.  It  is  a  law — in  the  sense  of  an  observed  order  of  facts 
— regulating  the  ornament  of  Humming  Birds,  that  where  white 
is  introduced  into  the  coloring  of  the  tail  feathers,  it  is  not 
applied  to  the  central  feathers,  but  is  confined  to  the  marginal 
feathers  on  either  side.  There  is,  however,  one  species  (Uros- 
ticte  Bengamini),  recently  discovered,  which  affords  the  only  ex- 
ample yet  known  of  a  departure  from  this  rule.  It  is  a  species 
in  which  white  is  one  of  the  principal  ornaments  of  the  Bird,  and 
is  used  in  places  where  it  can  be  placed  in  conspicuous  contrast 
with  the  darkest  tints.  Tufts  and  lines  of  purest  white  shine 
among  the  greens  and  violets  of  the  neck  and  head ;  whilst,  in 
exquisite  harmony  with  this,  the  four  central  feathers  of  the  tail 
are  alone  dipped,  as  it  were,  in  a  solid  glaze  of  the  same  white, 
and  the  marginal  feathers  on  either  side  are  kept  wholly  dark. 
Then,  as  if  to  mark  with  emphasis  the  meaning  of  this  departure 
from  the  ordinary  rule,  it  is  a  departure  confined  to  the  or- 
namented sex  :  and  the  Female  Form  of  the  same  species  fol- 
lows the  ordinary  law — white  being  introduced  in  the  marginal 
feathers,  and  in  these  alone. 

Now,  what  explanation  does  the  law  of  Natural  Selection  give 
— I  will  not  say  of  the  origin,  but  even  of  the  continuance  and 
preservation — of  such  specific  varieties  as  these  ?  None  what- 
ever. A  crest  of  topaz  is  no  better  in  the  struggle  for  existence 
than  a  crest  of  sapphire.  A  frill  ending  in  spangles  of  the 
emerald  is  no  better  in  the  battle  of  life  than  a  frill  ending  in 
the  spangles  of  the  ruby.  A  tail  is  not  affected  for  the  purposes 


140  THE   REIGN   OF   LAW. 

of  flight,  whether  its  marginal  or  its  central  feathers  are  dec- 
orated with  white.  It  is  impossible  to  bring  such  varieties  into 
relation  with  any  physical  law  known  to  us.  It  has  relation, 
however,  to  a  Purpose,  which  stands  in  close  analogy  with  our 
own  knowledge  of  Purpose  in  the  works  of  Man.  Mere  beauty 
and  mere  variety,  for  their  own  sake,  are  objects  which  we 
ourselves  seek  when  we  can  make  the  Forces  of  Nature  subor- 
dinate to  the  attainment  of  them.  There  seems  to  be  no  con- 
ceivable reason  why  we  should  doubt  or  question,  that  these 
are  ends  and  aims  also  in  the  Forms  given  to  living  Organisms, 
when  the  facts  correspond  with  this  view,  and  with  no  other. 
In  this  sense,  we  can  trace  a  creative  law, — that  is,  we  can  see 
that  these  Forms  of  Life  do  fulfil  a  purpose  and  intention,  which 
we  can  appreciate  and  understand. 

But  then  it  may  be  asked,  has  this  purpose  and  intention  been 
attained  without  the  use  of  means  ?  Have  no  physical  laws 
been  used,  whereby  these  new  forms  of  beauty  have  been  evolved, 
the  one  from  the  other,  in  a  series  so  wonderful  for  its  variety 
in  unity,  and  its  unity  in  variety  ?  I  am  not  now  seeking  to 
answer  this  question  in  the  negative.  All  I  say  is,  that  the 
physical  laws  which  are  made  subservient  to  this  purpose  are 
entirely  unknown  to  us.  That  particular  combination  of  a  great 
many  natural  laws,  which  Mr.  Darwin  groups  under  the  name 
of  Natural  Selection,  does  not  in  the  least  answer  the  conditions 
which  we  seek  in  a  law  to  account  for  either  the  origin  or  the 
spread  of  such  creatures  as  the  various  kinds  of  Humming  Birds. 
On  the  other  hand,  if  I  am  asked  whether  I  believe  that  every 
separate  Species  has  been  a  separate  creation — not  born,  but 
separately  made — I  must  answer,  that  I  do  not  believe  it.  I 
think  the  facts  do  suggest  to  the  mind  the  idea  of  the  working 
of  some  creative  Law,  almost  as  certainly  as  they  convince  us 
that  we  know  nothing  of  its  nature,  or  of  the  conditions  under 
which  it  does  its  glorious  work.  Our  experience  of  the  existing 
Order  of  Nature  is,  that  the  young  of  each  species  repeat  the 
form  and  the  colors  .of  their  parent,  and  that  even  where 
variations  occur,  they  are  inconstant,  and  tend  to  disappear. 
We  have  no  knowledge,  for  example,  that  from  the  eggs  of  the 
Blue-tailed  Sylph  a  pair  of  Green-tailed  Sylphs  can  ever  be  pro- 
duced. We  have  no  reason  to  believe  that  a  species  of  Lophornis 


CREATION    BY    LAW.  141 

with  a  tippet  of  emerald  spangles,  can  ever  hatch  out  a  pair  of 
young  adorned  with  spangles  of  some  other  gem.  And  yet  we 
cannot  assert  that  such  phenomena  are  impossible,  nor  can  it  be 
denied  that,  as  a  matter  of  speculation,  this  process  is  natural 
and  easy  of  conception,  as  compared  with  the  idea  of  each 
Species  being  separately  called  into  existence,  out  of  the  in- 
organic elements  of  which  its  body  is  composed. 

Such  new  births— if  they  do  take  place — would  perfectly  ful- 
fil, I  think,  the  only  idea  we  can  ever  form  of  new  creations. 
For  example,  it  would  appear  that  every  variety  which  is  to 
take  its  place  as  a  new  Species  must  be  born  male  and  female; 
because  it  is  one  of  the  facts  of  specific  variation  in  the  Hum- 
ming Birds,  that  although  the  male  and  female  plumage  is  gen- 
erally entirely  different,  yet  the  female  of  each  species  is  as 
distinct  from  the  female  of  every  other,  as  the  male  is  from  the 
male  of  every  other.  If,  therefore,  each  new  variety  were  not 
born  in  couples,  and  if  the  divergence  of  Form  were  not  thus 
secured  in  the  organization  of  both  the  sexes,  it  would  fail  to 
be  established,  or  would  exhibit  for  a  time  the  phenomena  of 
mixture,  and  terminate  in  reversion  to  the  original  type.  Now 
here  again  we  have  the  emphatic  declaration  of  Mr.  Gould,  that 
among  the  thousands  of  specimens  which  have  passed  through 
his  hands,  from  all  the  genera  of  this  great  family,  he  has  never 
seen  one  case  of  mixture  or  hybridism  between  any  two  Spe- 
cies, however  nearly  allied.  But  this  passage  is  so  important, 
that  I  quote  it  entire.  "  It  might  be  thought  by  some  persons 
that  four  hundred  species  of  birds  so  diminutive  in  size,  and  of 
one  family,  could  scarcely  be  distinguished  from  each  other ; 
but  any  one  who  studies  the  subject,  will  soon  perceive  that 
such  is  not  the  case.  Even  the  females,  which  assimilate  more 
closely  to  each  other  than  the  males,  can  be  separated  with  per- 
fect certainty  ;  nay,  even  a  tail-feather  will  be  sufficient  for  a 
person  well  versed  in  the  subject  to  say  to  what  genus  and  spe- 
cies the  Bird  from  which  it  has  been  taken  belongs.  I  mention 
this  fact  to  show  that  what  we  designate  a  Species  has  really 
distinctive  and  constant  characters ;  and  in  the  whole  of  my 
experience,  with  many  thousands  of  Humming  Birds  passing 
through  my  hands,  I  have  never  observed  an  instance  of  any 
variation  which  would  lead  me  to  suppose  that  it  was  the  result 


142  THE    REIGN    OF    LAW. 

of  a  union  of  two  species.  I  write  this  without  bias,  one  way 
or  the  other,  as  to  the  question  of  the  Origin  of  Species.  I  am 
desirous  of  representing  Nature  in  her  wonderful  ways  as  she 
presents  herself  to  my  attention  at  the  close  of  my  work,  after 
a  period  of  twelve  years  of  incessant  labor,  and  not  less  than 
twenty  years  of  interesting  study."  * 

If,  therefore,  new  Species  are  born  from  the  old,  it  is  not  by 
accidental  mixture  ;  it  is  not  by  the  mere  nursing  of  changes 
advantageous  in  the  battle  of  life ;  it  must  be  from  the  birth  of 
some  one  couple,  male  and  female,  whose  organization  is  sub- 
jected to  new  conditions  corresponding  with  each  other,  and 
having  such  force  of  self-continuance  as  to  secure  it  against  re- 
version. It  matters  not  how  small  the  difference  may  be  from 
the  parent  Form ;  if  that  difference  be  constant,  and  if  it  be 
associated  with  some  difference  equally  constant  in  the  female 
Form,  it  becomes  at  once  a  new  Species.  There  are  some  cases 
mentioned  by  Mr.  Gould  which  may  possibly  be  examples  of 
the  first  founding  of  a  new  Species.  In  the  beautiful  genus 
Cynanthus,  he  tells  us  that  there  are  some  local  varieties  near 
Bogota,  in  which  the  ornament  is  partially  changing  from  blue 
to  green  •  and  it  is  a  curious  fact  that  this  variation  appears  to 
be  taking  effect  under  the  direction  of  some  definite  rule  or 
"law," — inasmuch  as  it  is  only  the  eight  central  feathers  of 
the  tail  which  are  tipped  with  the  new  color.  Mr.  Gould 
expressly  says  of  one  such  variety  from  Ecuador,  that  it  pos- 
sesses characters  so  distinctive  as  to  entitle  it,  in  his  opinion, 
to  the  rank  of  a  separate  Species.  The  very  discussion  of 
such  a  question  shows  the  possibility  of  new  births  being  the 
means  of  introducing  new  Species.  But  my  object  here  is  sim- 
ply to  point  out  that  Mr.  Darwin's  theory  offers  no  explanation 
of  such  births,  either  as  respects  their  origin  or  their  preserva- 
tion, neither  does  it  even  approach  to  tracing  these  births  to 
any  physical  law  whatever.  It  fails  also  to  recognize,  even  if 
it  does  not  exclude,  the  relation  which  the  birth  of  new  Species 
has  to  the  mental  purpose  of  producing  mere  beauty  and  mere 
variety.  Nevertheless  it  may  be  true  that  ordinary  generation 
has  been  the  instrument  employed ;  but  if  so,  it  must  be  em- 

*  Gould's11  Trochilidae,"  Introduction. 


CREATION    BY   LAW.  143 

ployed  under  extraordinary  conditions,  and  directed  to  extraor- 
dinary results. 

It  will  be  seen,  then,  that  the  principle  of  Natural  Selection 
has  no  bearing  whatever  on  the  Origin  of  Species,  but  only  on 
the  preservation  and  distribution  of  Species  when  they  have 
arisen.  I  have  already  pointed  out  that  Mr.  Darwin  does  not 
always  keep  this  distinction  clearly  in  view,  because  he  speaks 
of  Natural  Selection  "  producing  "  organs,  or  "  adapting  "  them. 
It  cannot  be  too  often  repeated  that  Natural  Selection  can  pro- 
duce nothing  whatever,  except  the  conservation  or  preservation 
of  some  variation  otherwise  originated.  The  true  Origin  of 
Species  does  not  consist  in  the  adjustments  which  help  varieties 
to  live  and  to  prevail,  but  in  those  previous  adjustments  which 
cause  those  varieties  to  be  born  at  all.  Now  what  are  these  ? 
Can  they  be  traced  or  even  guessed  at  ?  Mr.  Darwin  has  a 
whole  chapter  on  the  Laws  of  Variation  ,  *  and  it  is  here,  if 
anywhere,  that  we  look  for  any  suggestion  as  to  the  physical 
causes  which  account  for  the  Origin  as  distinguished  from  the 
mere  preservation  of  Species.  He  candidly  admits  that  his  doc- 
trine of  Natural  Selection  takes  cognizance  of  variations  only 
after  they  have  arisen,  and  that  it  regards  those  variations  as 
purely  accidental  in  their  origin,  or,  in  other  words,  as  due  to 
chance.  This,  of  course,  he  adds,  is  a  supposition  wholly  in- 
correct, and  only  serves  "  to  indicate  plainly  our  ignorance  of 
the  cause  of  each  particular  variation."  Accordingly,  the  Laws 
of  Variation  which  he  proceeds  to  indicate  are  merely,  for  the 
most  part,  certain  observed  facts  in  respect  to  Variation,  and  do 
not  at  all  come  under  the  category  of  Laws,  in  that  higher  sense 
in  which  the  word  Law  indicates  a  discovered  method  under 
which  Natural  Forces  are  made  to  work.  There  is,  however,  in 
this  chapter,  one  Law  which  approaches  to  a  Law  in  the  higher 
sense.  Mr.  Darwin,  whilst  candidly  confessing  our  profound 
ignorance  of  the  cause  or  origin  of  varieties,  yet  groups  together 
a  great  class  of  facts  as  connected  by  a  tie  which  he  calls  the 
"  Correlation  of  Growth."  Now  what  is  this  law — this  observed 
Order  of  facts  ?  It  is,  that  variation  in  one  part  of  an  organism 
is,  as  a  rule,  accompanied  with  corresponding  variations  in  other 
parts,  and  especially  in  those  parts  which  are  "  homologous," 

*  "  Origin  of  Species,"  chap.  v. 


144  THE    REIGN    OF    LAW. 

that  is  to  say,  which  occupy  the  same  relative  place  in  the  geiv 
eral  Plan. 

This,  however,  is  but  a  very  imperfect  definition  of  the  vast 
Order  of  mysterious  facts  which  are  covered  by  the  words, 
"  Correlation  of  Growth."  The  fundamental  idea  which  these 
words  express  is  an  Idea  of  wider  and  deeper  significance  in 
Nature,  than  Mr.  Darwin  seems  to  have  perceived.  There  is  a 
correlation  between  all  natural  organic  growths  ;  that  is  to  say, 
that  any  variation  of  form  in  a  single  part  has  a  constant  rela- 
tion to  other  variations  of  form  in  some  other  part  or  parts  of 
the  same  organism.  But  "  relation  "  is  a  vague  word.  There 
are  many  kinds  of  "  relation  " — there  are  indeed  an  infinite  vari- 
ety of  kinds.  What  is  the  kind  of  relation  that  we  detect  in 
Correlated  Growths  ?  It  is  not  until  we  ask  ourselves  this 
question  that  we  discover  what  a  deep  question  it  is — how  end- 
less are  the  avenues  of  thought  and  of  inquiry  which  it  opens 
up.  ^ 

First,  one  relation  which  we  detect  in  all  variations  of  organic 
growth,  is  simply  the  relation  of  symmetry.  This  kind  and 
degree  of  Correlation  of  Growth  prevails  even  in  the  world  which 
we  call  Inorganic.  The  corresponding  sides  and  angles  of  a 
crystal,  for  example,  may  be  said  to  be  correlated  together. 
The  nature  of  this  relation  is  geometrical  and  numerical.  It  is 
a  relation  having  reference  to  invariable  rules  of  number.  As 
regards  its  physical  cause,  all  we  can  say  is,  that  it  is  the  result 
of  forces  whose  property  it  is  to  aggregate  the  particles  of  mat- 
ter in  definite  forms,  which  forms  are  symmetrical — that  is  to 
say,  they  are  forms  having  an  axis  with  equal  developments  on 
either  side.  Correlation  of  Growth,  therefore,  in  this  sense 
points  to  the  work  of  Forces,  one  of  whose  essential  properties 
is  Polarity — that  is,  equal  and  similar  action  in  opposite  direc- 
tions. Now,  this  kind  of  Correlation  of  Growth  may  be  traced 
upwards  from  simple  Minerals  through  all  the  infinite  compli- 
cations of  the  organic  world.  It  is  unquestionably  the  basis  of 
many  of  the  Correlations  of  Growth  prevailing  in  Plants  and 
Animals.  It  is  seen  in  the  symmetrical  arrangement  of  all  veg- 
etable and  of  all  animal  Forms.  A  central  axis  is  traceable  in 
them  all ;  and  the  Bilateral  or  Radiated  arrangement  of  their 


CREATION    BY    LAW.  14$ 

subordinate  parts  is  one  of  the  most  fundamental  and  uthiver- 
sal  of  all  the  Correlations  of  Growth. 

This  is  one,  but  it  is  one  only,  of  the  Correlations  of  Growth 
which  are  constantly  observed.  It  would  lead  us  to  expect 
that  any  change  of  form  on  one  side  of  an  animal  would  be  ac- 
companied by  an  exactly  corresponding  change  on  the  other 
side  :  so  that  limbs  on  one  side  of  the  central  axis,  if  changed  at 
all,  would  change  in  exact  and  symmetrical  accordance  with  the 
limbs  on  the  opposite  and  corresponding  side.  This,  accord- 
ingly, is  one  of  the  Correlations  of  Growth  most  constantly  ob- 
served. 

Now,  it  will  be  seen  that  Correlation  of  Growth,  in  this  first 
and  simplest  sense,  runs  alongside,  as  it  were,  of  Correlation  in 
another  and  higher  sense.  The  relation  between  two  equal  and 
opposite  growths,  which  is  a  relation,  in  the  first  place,  of  sim- 
ple symmetry  as  between  themselves,  is  always  accompanied  by 
another  relation,  in  the  second  place,  of  correspondence  or  fit- 
ness as  between  these  growths  and  external,  conditions.  An 
organism  which  is  developed  unsymmetrically,  unequally,  would 
be  not  only  ugly  in  its  form,  but  it  would  be  maimed  and  im- 
perfect in  its  functions.  Here,  then,  we  see  one  kind  and  one 
idea  of  Correlation  rising  above  another.  Two  growths  might 
be  correlated  as  regards  each  other,  and  might  yet  be  wanting 
in  any  corresponding  correlation  of  fitness  and  of  function  to- 
wards outward  things.  But  the  first  of  these  two  kinds  of  corre- 
lation would  be  useless  without  the  last.  And  this  last  is  obvi- 
ously the  higher  and  more  complex  Correlation  of  the  two.  It 
is  higher,  not  only  in  the  sense  of  being  more  complex,  but  as 
involving  an  idea  which  lifts  us  at  once  from  a  lower  to  a  higher 
region  of  thought.  Growths  correlated  as  between  each  other 
according  to  mere  symmetry  of  arrangement  suggest  nothing, 
except  the  work  of  Forces  with  inherent  Polarity  of  action.. 
But  growths  correlated  with  things  outside  the  organism  in- 
which  those  growths  occur, — and  which  can  exert  no  physical 
effect  upon  it, — suggest  at  once  the  operation  of  Forces  work- 
ing under  Adjustment  with  a  view  to  Purpose. 

When  we  see  a  Mineral  salt  crystallizing  under  the  power  of 
a  Voltaic  Current,  we  see  Correlation  of  Growth  in  its  simplest 
form,  and  in  visible  connection  with  its  immediate  cause.  The- 

10 


146  THE    REIGN    OF    LAW. 

particles  of  salt  are  marshalled  in  a  constant  Order — an  Order 
the  principle  of  which  is  some  central  axis,  with  branches  and 
branchlets  grouped  around  it  in  equal  and  exquisite  arrangement. 
Wonderful  as  this  arrangement  is,  it  suggests  no  other  question 
to  the  mind  than  that  which  may  be  asked  in  respect  to  the  ulti- 
mate nature  and  source  of  Polarity  in  Magnetic  Force.  But 
when  we  see  two  growths  in  an  organism  which  not  only  are 
correlated  to  each  other  with  reference  to  a  centre,  but  are  cor. 
related  also  to  external  things  with  reference  to  Function,  we 
see  something  which  raises  questions  altogether  different  in 
kind.  We  have  passed  at  once  from  the  region  of  the  What, 
and  the  How,  into  the  region  of  the  Why.  The  one  kind  of 
Correlation  has  reference  to  Physical  Causes,  the  other  kind  of 
correlation  has  reference  to  those  Mental  Purposes  which 
Physical  Causes  are  made  to  serve.  These  two  kinds  of  Cor. 
relation  are  perfectly  distinct.  They  are  as  distinct  as  the  cor- 
relation of  equal  pressures  which  a  given  volume  of  steam  ex- 
erts upon  the  opposite  sides  of  a  boiler  is  distinct  from  the  cor- 
relation between  that  pressure  and  its  conversion  into  the  driv- 
ing-force of  cranks  and  wheels,  with  all  their  adaptations  for 
running  on  the  rails,  or  for  paddling  in  the  sea.  They  are  as 
distinct  as  the  correlations  of  force  developed  in  a  Voltaic  Bat- 
tery are  distinct  from  the  adjustments  which  convert  those 
forces  into  the  means  of  communicating  Thought. 

Mr.  Darwin  has  not  pointed  out  this  distinction  clearly.  In- 
deed, he  does  not  seem  to  have  had  it  in  his  view.  He  groups 
under  one  name, — the  Correlation  of  Growth, — two  classes  of 
Phenomena,  which  are  indeed  always  combined  in  fact,  but 
which  are  entirely  separate  in  idea.  Correlation  of  Growth, 
in  one  sense,  is  that  law  of  vital  force  which  secures  that 
any  change  in  the  shape  of  one  limb  in  an  animal  shall  be  ac- 
companied by  a  corresponding  change  in  all  the  other  limbs. 
Correlation  of  Growth  in  the  other  sense,  is  that  adjustment  of 
vital  forces  to  the  contingencies  of  external  circumstance,  which 
secures  that  all  the  changes  which  do  take  place  shall  be 
changes  adapted  to  the  discharge  of  new  functions — to  the  ful- 
filment of  new  conditions  of  life — to  command  over  new  sources 
of  enjoyment. 

Keeping,  then,  clearly  in  our  view  the  distinction  between 


CREATION    BY   LAW.  147 

these  two  different  kinds  of  Correlation  of  Growth,  let  us  look 
at  the  phenomena  actually  presented  in  the  aspect  and  history 
of  Organic  Forms,  as  respects  both  these  kinds  of  Correlation. 
As  regards  the  first  kind  of  Correlation,  I  have  referred  to 
the  law  of  Bilateral  Symmetry  as  the  simplest  and  most  obvious 
illustration.  It  is  a  law  which  at  once  connects  itself  with  the 
idea  of  Polarity  of  Force.  But  though  this  be  one  kind  of  Cor- 
relation, almost  universal,  and  may  very  probably  be  the  foun- 
dation of  every  other,  there  are  many  Correlations  of  Growth 
between  which  and  mere  Polarity  there  is  no  visible  connection. 
The  truth  is  that  all  the  parts  of  an  organism  are  bound  to- 
gether as  one  whole  by  a  pervading  system  of  correlations  as 
intricate  as  they  are  obscure.  When  the  organism  is  in  health, 
and  all  its  parts  are  working  in  harmony,  the  wonder  of  these 
correlations  is  not  perceived.  But  they  are  brought  out  in  a 
marked  degree  by  the  phenomena  of  disease,  and  also  by  the 
phenomena  of  monstrosity  or  malformation.  The  "  sympathy  " 
which  the  most  distant  and  apparently  unconnected  parts  of  an 
organism  show  with  each  other,  when  one  of  them  is  affected 
by  disease,  is  the  index  of  correlations  whose  nature  is  utterly 
beyond  the  reach  of  our  anatomy,  It  is  the  same  with  malfor- 
mations. Mr.  Darwin  mentions  one  case  of  curious  unintelli- 
gible correlation — viz.,  that  a  blue  iris  is  associated  in  Cats 
with  deafness ;  and,  again,  that  the  tortoise-shell  color  of  the 
fur  is  associated  with  the  female  sex  in  the  same  animal.  In 
like  manner  the  bright  colors,  and  the  more  conspicuous  orna- 
ments of  plumage  in  Birds,  are  correlated  with  the  male  sex. 
So  likewise  are  vocal  organs  with  the  wonderful  gift  of  song. 
In  many  insects  the  differences  of  form  which  are  correlated 
with  the  differences  of  sex,  are  far  greater  than  the  differences 
which  separate  species  and  even  genera.  There  are  insects  of 
which  the  male  is  a  fly,  whilst  the  female  is  a  worm.  There 
are  many  other  cases  of  corfelation  between  different  growths 
in  respect  to  which  the  nature  and  source  of  the  connection  is 
equally  unknown.  For  example,  the  complex  stomachs  of  the 
Ruminant  Order  are  uniformly  associated  with  a  particular 
form  of  hoof.  Sometimes  correlations  the  most  constant  and 
invariable  are  at  the  same  time  the  most  subtle  and  the  most 
secret,  because  they  are  hid  under  other  growths  which  are  not 


148  THE    REIGN    O7    LAW. 

so  correlated,  and  which  produce  total  diversities  of  outward 
aspect.  One  very  curious  class  of  correlations  is  the  correla- 
tion between  the  internal  structure  of  the  teeth  in  animals,  and 
the  structure  of  other  very  distant  portions  of  their  frame. 
There  lately  was,  for  example,  in  the  Zoological  Gardens,  a  lit- 
tle animal,  the  Hyrax,  not  unlike  a  Rabbit  in  general  appear- 
ance, and  very  like  it  in  habit.  It  is  the  "  Cony  "  of  Scripture. 
Now  this  little  animal  will  be  found  on  examination  to  have 
limbs  which  do  not  terminate  in  a  foot  like  a  Rabbit,  but  in  a 
divided  hoof  of  peculiar  form.  This  hoof  is  in  miniature  like 
the  hoof  of  a  Rhinoceros.  If  next  we  examine  the  teeth  of  the 
Hyrax  we  shall  find  that  the  materials  of  these  teeth  are  also 
combined  in  the  same  manner,  and  after  the  same  pattern  as 
the  teeth  of  the  Rhinoceros.  So  it  is  with  other  parts  of  the 
same  two  animals.  Along  with  the  teeth  and  the  hoofs  there 
are  certain  other  shapes  of  bones  which  seem  to  be  under  the 
same  bond  of  likeness.  Now  these  are  Correlations  of  Growth 
between  different  parts  of  the  same  animal,  and  between  the 
corresponding  parts  in  two  different  species. 

The  conception,  then,  which  we  are  led  to  form  by  this  kind 
of  Correlation  between  organic  growths,  is  more  complex  than 
we  had  at  first  supposed.  Mere  Polarity  of  Force,  leading  to 
equal  and  opposite  arrangement  of  subordinate  parts,  is  not 
enough  to  satisfy  the  facts.  This,  indeed,  may  continue  to  be 
the  type  to  which  our  thoughts  refer,  and  by  which  we  are 
helped  to  some  more  adequate  idea  of  the  facts.  But  the 
general  impression  left  on  the  mind  is  this — that  some 
One  Force  directs  the  form  and  structure  of  every  organism, 
so  that  any  change  in  one  part  of  it  is  but  the  index  of 
changes  which  run  visibly  or  invisibly  throughout  the  whole. 
The  growths  between  which  we  detect  a  correlation,  are  not 
really  separate  things  connected  only  by  the  few  correspond- 
ences which  we  may  be  able  to  detect,  but  are  part  and  parcel 
of  one  operation,  the  result  of  one  Force,  exerting  its  energies 
through  channels  which  we  cannot  see,  and  according  to  laws 
of  which  we  can  form  but  a  distant  and  faint  conception.  The 
truth  is  that  Correlation  in  this  sense  is  involved  in  the  very 
word  "  Growth."  Each  part  of  every  structure  which  is  the 
result  of  growth  must  be  correlated  to  every  other  part.  This 


CREATION    BY    LAW.  149 

is  essential  to  the  very  idea  of  growth,  and  to  the  very  idea  of 
an  organism  due  to  growth.  When,  therefore,  Mr.  Darwin  says 
that  one  of  the  laws  on  which  variation  of  form  depends  is 
Correlation  ©f  Growth,  he  simply  says  that  variations  of 
Growth  depend  on  growth — for  all  growths  must  be  correlated. 

But  Correlation  in  this  sense  helps  but  a  little  way  indeed  in 
conceiving  the  origin  of  a  new  Species.  There  might  be  the 
most  minute  and  perfect  harmony  between  the  changes  effected 
in  an  animal  newly  born  without  those  changes  tending  even  in 
the  most  remote  degree  towards  the  establishment  of  a  new 
Form  of  Life.  In  order  to  that  establishment  there  must  be  an- 
other correlation,  and  a  correlation  of  a  higher  kind.  There  must 
be  a  correlation  between  those  changes  and  all  the  outward  con- 
ditions amidst  which  the  new  Form  is  to  be  placed  and  live. 
If  this  correlation  fails  the  new  Form  will  die.  Yet,  so  far  as 
we  can  see,  this  kind  of  correlation  is  without  any  physical 
cause.  It  is  not  necessarily  involved,  as  the  other  kind  of  cor- 
relation is,  in  the  very  idea  of  Growth.  On  the  contrary,  it  is 
not  only  entirely  separable  in  thought,  but,  as  we  see  in  mon- 
strosities, it  is  sometimes  separated  in  fact.  We  have  no  con- 
ception of  any  Force  emanating  from  external  things  which 
shall  mould  the  structure  of  an  organism  in  hatmony  with  them- 
selves. Mr.  Darwin  freely  confesses  this,  and  says  that  many 
considerations  "  incline  him  to  lay  very  little  weight  on  the  di- 
rect action  of  the  conditions  of  life  "  in  producing  variety  of 
Form.  We  can  conceive,  dimly  indeed,  but  still  we  can  con- 
ceive, how  in  the  Humming  Birds  a  special  form  of  Wing  shall 
be  correlated  with  a  special  form  of  Bill.  But  we  have  no  con- 
ception whatever  how  a  special  form  of  Bill  should  be  correlated 
with  a  special  form  of  Flower  from  which  the  Bill  is  to  extract 
its  food.  Mr.  Darwin  has  shown  how  an  improved  Bill,  when 
once  produced,  will  be  preserved  by  finding  external  conditions 
to  which  it  is  adapted.  But  he  has  not  shown,  and  he  frankly 
confesses  he  has  no  idea,  how  the  adapted  variation  of  Bill 
comes  to  be  born  at  all. 

Yet  it  is  this  higher  and  more  complex  Correlation  which  is 
the  most  constant  and  the  most  obvious  of 'all  the  facts  of  Na- 
ture. In  these  facts  we  see  that  the  forces  of  Organic  Growth 
are  worked  under  rules  of  close  adjustment  to  external  con- 


150  THE    REIGN    OF    LAW. 

ditions  ;  and  that  particular  shapes  which  might  seem  insepara- 
bly associated,  if  we  looked  at  one  Genus  or  one  Family  alone, 
are  at  once  disjoined  where  different  adaptations  to  Function 
are  required.  Let  us  take  another  example  from  the  great 
Class  of  Birds.  If  we  were  to  look  only  to  the  family  of  the 
A/iatida  (Ducks  and  Geese),  we  might  suppose  that  there  is 
a  constant  Correlation  of  Growth  between  webbed  feet  and 
spoon-shaped  bills.  But  the  real  and  efficient  Correlation  of 
Growth  in  this  case  is  not  between  the  spoon-bill  and  the  web- 
foot,  but  between  both  of  these  and  certain  external  conditions 
of  life.  The  web-foot  is  correlated  to  an  aquatic  habitat :  and 
the  spoon-bill  is  correlated  to  spoon-food.  And  accordingly 
this  association  of  form  in  foot  and  bill  is  at  once  dissolved 
where  different  external  functions  require  a  separation.  In  the 
Gulls,  the  Fulmars,  and  the  Petrels,  the  web-foot  is  retained, 
because  action  upon  the  element  of  water  is  still  required ;  but 
the  correlated  form  of  bill  vanishes,  and  shapes  altogether  dif- 
ferent are  given, — shapes  adapted,  that  is  correlated,  to  different 
kinds  of  food,  and  to  different  methods  of  capture. 

Again,  there  is  another  great  family  of  Birds  where  some  of 
the  same  forms  are  correlated  with  other  forms  entirely  differ- 
ent, because  of  the  different  external  Correlations  which  are  re- 
quired by  Function.  In  the  Divers  the  web-foot  is  mounted 
upon  a  flattened  leg-bone,  with  the  sharp  edge  set  "  fore  and 
aft."  Now  what  is  this  Correlation  of  Growth  ?  It  is,  first,  the 
Internal  Correlation  of  those  parts  to  each  other,  but  secondly 
and  principally,  it  is  the  External  Correlation  of  both  to  their 
function  of  propelling  under  water.  The  form  of  the  foot  is 
correlated  to  the  function  of  opposing  the  largest  possible  area 
of  resistance  to  that  medium,  exactly  where,  for  the  purpose  of 
swimming,  the  maximum  of  resistance  is  required ;  the  knife- 
shaped  leg-bone  is  correlated  to  the  function  of  opposing  the 
least  possible  resistance,  precisely  where,  for  the  same  purpose, 
the  minimum  of  resistance  is  required.  In  Australia  we  have, 
in  the  Ornithorynchus  paradoxus,  the  webbed  feet  correlated 
with  the  Duck-shaped  Bill  in  an  animal  which  does  not  belong 
to  the  Class  of  Birds  at  all. 

There  is  another  case  of  what  may  be  called  Correlated 
Correlations,  which  brings  out  very  clearly  the  distinction  which 


CREATION    BY   LAW.  151 

is  so  important  in  the  philosophy  of  this  great  subject.    Feathers 
are  a  kind  of  covering  peculiar  to  the  Class  of  Birds.     Under 
every  variety  of  modification  they  have  one  fundamental  plan — 
a  central  shaft  or  quill  to  which  lateral  filaments  are  attached. 
Now  there  is  a  vast  range  of  correlations  between  the  different 
kinds  of  feather  and  the  different  Families  or  Species,  and  be- 
tween different  parts  of  the  body  in  the  same  Species.     But 
there  are  two  Correlations  of  Growth  in  respect   to   feathers 
which  are  constant.     In  all  cases,  (excepting,    of  course,    the 
Wingless  Birds,)  the  feathers  which  grow  from  the  fore-arm  and 
finger-bones,  constituting  the  Wings,  are  comparatively  long, 
strong,  tapering,  elastic,  and  with  thin  lateral  filaments,  which 
filaments  are  closely  hooked  together  by  means  of  minute  teeth 
fitting  into  each  other,  so  that  the  whole  shall  form  one  con- 
tinuous surface  or  web.     This  is  a  Correlation  of  Growth  be- 
tween one  particular  kind  of  feather,  and  one  particular  member 
of  the  body,  which,  in  all  Birds  capable  of  flight,  is  constant,  and 
amounts  to  a  universal  Law.     Now  let  us  contrast  this  with 
another  Correlation  of  Growth  which  is  equally  constant.     On 
the  side  of  the  head  of  all  Birds,  there  is  a  patch  of  feathers  of 
peculiar  structure,  with  fine  and  slender  shafts,  and  with  the 
lateral  filaments  not  hooked  together  as  in  the  other  case,  but, 
on  the  contrary,  always  separated  from  each  other — the  whole 
series  forming  a  fine  and  open  network  spread  over  the  surface 
which  they  cover  and  protect.     These  feathers  cover  the  orifice 
of  the  ear,  and  are  called  the  auriculars.     They  are  correlated 
with  the  curious  passages,  the  finely  hung  clapper-bones,  and 
all  the   elaborate   mechanism   of   that  organ.     Such    are    the 
Internal  Correlations.     But  they  are  intelligible  only  when  con- 
sidered in  the  light  shed  by  other  correlations  which  are  external. 
The  wing  feathers  with  close  continuous  webs  are  correlated  to 
the  laws  by  which  the  passage  of  air  may  be  prevented — the 
auricular  feathers,  with  open  unconnected  webs,  are  correlated 
to  the  laws  by  which  the  passage  of  sound  maybe  rendered  easy. 
The  one  set  of  feathers  are  adapted  to  the  active  function  of 
evoking  and  resisting  atmospheric  pressure  by  striking  strong, 
yet  light  and  elastic  blows,    upon  the  air — the   other  set  of 
feathers  are  adapted  to  the  passive  function  of  allowing  the  free 
access  of  thf  waves  of  sound  into  the  passages   of  the   ear. 


152  THE    REIGN    OF   LAW. 

These  are  but  a  few  examples  out  of  millions.  Throughout  the 
whole  range  of  Nature  the  system  of  Internal  Correlation  is 
.entirely  subordinate  to  the  system  of  External  Correlation. 
Forms  or  growths  which  are  inseparably  joined  with  each  other 
in  one  group  of  animals,  are  wholly  divorced  from  each  other 
in  another  group;  whereas  Forms  which  have  correlations 
adapted  to  external  conditions,  are  repeated  over  and  over  again 
across  the  widest  gaps  in  the  scale  of  Natural  affinity. 

If,  then,  it  be  true  that  New  Species,  are  created  out  of 
small  variations  in  the  form  of  Old  Species,  and  this  by 
way  of  Natural  Generation,  there  must  be  some  bond  of  con- 
nection with  determines  those  variations  in  a  definite  direction, 
and  keeps  up  the  External  Correlations  part  pas su  with  the 
Internal  Correlations.  Natural  Selection  can  have  no  part  in 
this.  Natural  Selection  seizes  on  these  External  Correlations 
when  they  have  come  to  be.  But  Natural  Selection  cannot 
Center  the  secret  chambers  of  the  womb,  and  there  shape  the 
•new  Form  in  harmony  with  modified  conditions  of  external  life. 
How,  then,  are  these  external  correlations  provided  for  before- 
,hand  ?  There  can  be  but  one  reply.  It  is  by  Utility,  not  act- 
ing as  a  Physical  Cause  upon  organs  already  in  existence,  but 
acting  through  Motive  as  a  Mental  Purpose  in  contriving  organs 
before  they  have  begun  to  be.  And  where  obvious  utility  does 
result,  the  only  connecting  Bond  which  can  be  conceived  as 
capable  of  maintaining  the  Internal  Correlations,  in  harmony 
with  the  External  Correlations,  is  the  bond  of  Creative  Will  giv- 
ing to  Organic  Forces  a  foreseen  direction.  It  is,  in  short, 
precisely  the  same  bond  which  in  all  mechanism  produces 
Structure  in  harmony  with  intended  Function. 

Hence  it  is  that  scientific  men,  in  seeking  expression  for  the 
ultimate  ideas  arrived  at  in  the  course  of  Physical  research,  find 
themselves  compelled  to  borrow  the  language  of  Mechanical 
Invention.  There  is  no  other  language  which  conveys  an 
impression  of  the  facts,  or  of  the  tie  by  which  the  facts  are  con- 
nected with  each  other.  In  the  first  chapter  of  this  work  I  have 
had  occasion  to  point  out  how  true  this  is  of  Mr.  Darwin's  de- 
scription of  the  Orchids,  and  of  the  curious  functions  of  their 
structure.  The  correlations  there  are  all  external.  But  the 
same  result  appears  in  every  other  department  of  Science.  In  a 


CREATION    BY    LAW.  153 

remarkable  paper  on  the  "  Constitution  of  the  Universe,"  Pro- 
fessor Tyndall  has  occasion  to  speak  of  the  non-luminous  rays 
of  heat  emitted  by  all  incandescent  bodies, — rays  which,  though 
intensely  hot,  are  altogether  insensible  to  the  eye.  Now  the 
Retina  of  the  eye  is  a  piece  of  mechanism  whose  Correlations 
are  essentially  External.  It  is  the  expansion  of  a  special  nerve 
whose  function  it  is  to  be  sensitive  to  certain  particular  vibra- 
tions, and  to  no  other  vibrations  whatever.  Light  itself,  there- 
fore, is  discovered  to  be  merely  a  relative  term — a  word,  in 
short,  denoting  nothing  but  an  external  Correlation  between  the 
Retina  and  vibrations  of  a  certain  kind  and  quality.  Now  what 
is  the  language  which  Professor  Tyndall  is  constrained  to  use 
in  explanation  of  facts  so  difficult  of  conception  ?  It  is  the 
language  of  Mechanism,  of  mental  Purpose  and  Design.  "  It 
is  not,"  he  says,  "  the  size  of  a  wave  which  determines  its  power 
of  producing  light ;  it  is,  broadly  speaking,  the  fitness  of  the 
wave  to  the  Retina.  The  ethereal  pulses  must  follow  each  other 
with  a  certain  rapidity  of  succession  before  they  can  produce 
light,  and  if  their  rapidity  exceed  a  certain  limit,  they  also  fail 
to  produce  light.  The  Retina  is  attuned,  if  I  may  use  the  term, 
to  a  certain  range  of  vibrations,  beyond  which,  in  both  directions, 
it  ceases  to  be  of  use."  These  are  indeed  wonderful  Correla- 
tions which  reveal  to  us  fittings  and  adjustments  of  which  we  had 
no  previous  conception  :  but  they  give  us  no  glimmering,  even, 
of  knowledge  as  to  the  physical  causes  which  have  "  attuned  " 
a  material  organ  so  as  to  catch  certain  ethereal  pulsations  in 
the  external  world,  and  to  make  these  the  means  of  conveying 
to  Man's  Intelligence  the  enjoyment  and  the  power  of  sight. 

It  will  be  seen,  then,  that  when  Mr.  Darwin  speaks  of  the 
Law  of  Correlation  of  Growth  as  a  Law  which  determines  va- 
riation in  organic  growths,  he  is  really  presenting  to  us  under 
one  phase  two  separate  ideas  which  are  radically  distinct. 
One  is  the  idea  of  different  growths  in  the  same  organism,  cor- 
responding with  each  other  in  respect  to  arrangement, — or  in 
respect  to  texture,  or  in  respect  to  form, — or  to  some  other 
point  of  comparison.  The  other  idea  is  that  these  growths 
(each  and  all)  correspond  with  the  conditions  of  external  na- 
ture in  such  a  way  as  to  fit  them  for  the  discharge  of  Func- 
tion with  some  new  adaptation,  and  consequently  with  some 


I$4  THE   REIGN   OF   LAW. 

new  advantage.  In  one  aspeet  the  Law  of  Correlation  of 
Growth  is  (or  at  least  may  probably  be)  a  Law  in  the  strictest 
sense  of  the  word  ;  that  is  to  say,  the  result  of  a  Force  acting 
according  to  its  own  definite  modes  and  measures  of  operation. 
But  the  Law  of  Correlation  of  Growth  in  the  other  aspect,  is  a 
law  only  in  the  sense  (i)  of  an  observed  order  of  facts  ;  and  (2) 
of  that  Order  depending  on  Adjustment  with  a  view  to  Pur- 
pose. 

Many  naturalists  have  spoken  of  the  facts  of  organic  like- 
ness as  sufficiently  accounted  for  by  referring  them  to  Adher- 
ence to  Type.  Mr.  Darwin  complains  that  this  phrase,  as  an 
explanation  of  organic  likeness,  is  no  explanation  at  all,  but 
amounts  only  to  a  re-statement  of  the  facts  in  another  form  of 
language.  This  is  true ,  but  it  is  equally  true  of  his  own 
phrase  of  Correlation  of  Growth.*  "  Adherence  to  Type  "  is 
not  in  the  nature  of  a  Physical  Cause,  but  in  the  nature  of  a 
Mental  Purpose.  It  is  no  explanation,  therefore,  to  those  fac- 
ulties, of  the  mind  which  seek  for  Methods  of  operation.  In 
like  manner  "  Correlation  of  Growth,"  in  the  only  sense  in 
which  it  is  possible  to  connect  it  with  the  Origin  of  Species,  is 
not  a  Physical  Cause,  but  a  Mental  Purpose.  The  physical 
means  by  which  that  purpose  is  secured  remain  as  dark  as  ever  ; 
and  such  of  them  as  are  conceivable  by  us,  are  seen,  like  all 
other  physical  forces,  working  to  order,  subject  to  direction, 
and  having  that  direction  determined  by  foresight,  forethought, 
and  contrivance. 

Correlation  of  Growth,  in  the  sense  of  external  adaptations, 
may  be  said  to  be  the  most  universal  of  all  the  Laws  of  Nature. 
But  it  accounts  for  the  Origin  of  Organic  Forms  only  in  the 
same  sense  in  which  it  accounts  for  the  origin  of  all  other 
phenomena,  which  in  their  result  exhibit  adaptations,  or  fittings 
into  use  and  service.  Let  us  take,  as  an  example,  the  origin, 
nature,  and  capacities  of  Coal.  That  substance  is  correlated 
in  a  truly  wonderful  manner  with  the  needs,  the  powers,  and  the 
capacities  of  Man.  It  contains  within  itself,  in  a  form  con- 
densed and  portable,  a  store  of  physical  Force  of  incredible 

*  Mr.  Wallace  traces  the  whole  Darwinian  theory  to  six  "  general  laws  of  the  sim 
plest  kind— laws  which,"  he  emphatically  adds,  "  are  in  most  cases  mere  statements 
of  admitted  facts.'1'1  Again  he  says,  "  This  series  of  facts  or  laws  are  mere  state- 
ments ofiuha*Js  the  condition  of  nature."— Journal  of  Science,  No.  XVI.  p.  472. 


CREATION    BY    LAW.  155 

amount.  The  particles  of  one  pound  weight  of  it  are  held 
together  by  a  Force  which,  when  liberated  and  applied  in  the 
form  of  heat,  is  capable  of  lifting  one  million  times  its  own 
weight  to  the  height  of  one  foot.*  No  other  substance  known 
to  Man  is  to  be  compared  with  this  as  a  furnisher  of  Force. 
This  is  its  function  in  the  world.  It  is  a  function  relating  to 
Man's  mechanical  and  inventive  powers,  and  coal  has  been 
rendered  capable  of  discharging  this  function  by  processes  of 
preparation  which  began  millions  of  ages  before  Man  was 
born.  But  these  External  Correlations  are  a  result  arising  by 
way  of  natural  consequence  out  of  certain  physical  causes  work- 
ing to  order,  that  is  to  say,  out  of  Internal  Correlations  of 
Growth  between  Solar  Heat  and  Vegetable  Structure,  and 
again  between  these  and  the  causes  which  occasion  interchange 
between  sea  and  land.  No  explanation  so  definite  as  this  can 
be  given  of  the  method  in  which  Vital  Forces  are  made  to 
evolve  a  new  Form  of  Life.  But  even  if  such  explanation 
could  be  given,  it  would  render  no  account  at  all  of  the  fittings 
of  that  Form  into  the  outward  requirements"  of  its  life.  These 
are  Correlations  which  in  their  very  nature  belong  to  Mind, 
are  the  work  of  Mind,  and  are  intelligible  only  in  the  light  of 
Mind. 

I  do  not  represent  this  conclusion  as  one  necessarily  adverse 
to  Mr.  Darwin's  Theory  on  the  Origin  of  Species.  It  is  a  con- 
clusion which  he  would  probably  be  willing  to  accept.  I  only 
desire  to  point  out  in  how  very  limited  a  sense  that  Theory  can 
be  said  to  trace  Creation  to  a  "  Law  "  at  all;  and  how  entirely 
inadequate  that  Theory  is  to  account  by  any  physical  cause  for 
the  Origin  of  Species. 

The  only  senses,  therefore,  in  which  we  get  any  glimpse  of 
Creation  by  Law  are  these — ist,  That  the  close  physical  con- 
nection between  different  Specific  Forms  is  probably  due  to  the 
operation  of  some  Force  or  Forces  common  to  them  all ;  2d, 
That  these  Forces  have  been  employed  and  worked,  with  others 
equally  unknown,  for  the  attainment  of  such  ends  as  the  multi- 
plication of  Life,  in  Forms  fitted  for  new  spheres  of  enjoyment, 
and  for  the  display  of  new  kinds  of  beauty. 

Is  there  anything  in  this  conclusion  to  conflict  with  such 

*  "  The  Coal  Question."    W.  S.  Jevons,  1865. 


156  THE   REIGN    OF    LAW. 

knowledge  as  we  have  from  other  sources  of  the  nature  and 
working  of  Creative  Power  ?  I  do  not  know  on  what  authority 
it  is  that  we  so  often  speak  as  if  Creation  were  not  Creation  un- 
less it  work  from  nothing  as  its  material,  and  by  nothing  as  its 
means.  We  know  that  out  of  the  "dust  of  the  ground  " — that 
is,  out  of  the  ordinary  elements  of  Nature — are  our  own  bodies 
formed,  and  the  bodies  of  all  living  things.  Nor  is  there  any- 
thing which  should  shock  us  in  the  idea  that  the  creation  of 
new  Forms,  any  more  than  their  propagation,  has  been  brought 
about  by  the  use  and  instrumentality  of  means.  In  a  theologi- 
cal point  of  view  it  matters  nothing  what  those  means  have 
been.  I  agree  with  M.  Guizot,  when  he  says  that  "  Those  only 
would  be  serious  adversaries  of  the  doctrine  of  Creation  who 
could  affirm  that  the  universe — the  earth,  and.  Man  upon  it — 
have  been  from  all  eternity,  and  in  all  respects,  just  what  they  are 
now."  *  But  this  cannot  be  affirmed  except  in  the  teeth  of  facts 
which  Science  has  clearly  ascertained.  There  has  been  a 
continual  coming-to-be  of  new  Forms  of  Life.f  This  is  Crea- 
tion, no  matter  what  have  been  the  laws  or  forces  employed  by 
Creative  Power. 

The  truth  is,  that  the  theory  which  fixes  upon  Inheritance  as 
the  cause  of  organic  likeness,  startles  us  only  when  it  is  applied 
to  Forms  in  which  unlikeness  is  more  prominent  than  resem- 
blance. The  idea,  for  example,  that  the  different  kinds  of 
Pigeon,  or  of  Humming  Birds,  have  all  descended  through  suc- 
cessive variation  from  some  one  ancestral  pair,  whether  it  be 
true  or  not,  would  not  startle  any  one.  Yet,  if  this  be  true,  we 
must  be  prepared  for  the  same  surmise  extending  farther.  The 
advocates  of  Development  urge  that  Time  is  a  powerful  factor. 
They  say  that  if  changes  small,  but  constant  enough,  and  defi- 
nite enough,  to  constitute  new  Species,  can  and  do  arise  out  of 
born  varieties,  it  is  impossible  to  fix  the  limits  of  divergence 
which  may  be  reached  in  the  course  of  ages.  It  does  not  follow, 
on  the  other  hand,  that  there  is  no  such  limit  because  we  cannot 
fix  it.  It  does  not  necessarily  follow  that  because  we  admit 
the  idea  of  the  Rock-dove,  and  the  Turtle-dove,  and  the  Ring- 

*  "  Meditations  sur  I'Essenqe  de  la  Religion  Chretienne,"  p.  49. 

t  u  We  discern  no  evidence  of  a  pause  or  intromission  in  the  creation  of  coming-to- 
be  of  new  plants  and  animals." — Instances  of  the  Power  of  God  as  manifested  in  His 
Animal  Creation,  by  Professor  Owen. 


CREATION    BY    LAW.  157 

dove  being  all  descended  from  one  ancestral  Pigeon,  we  are 
bound  to  accept  the  idea  of  the  Whale,  and  the  Antelope,  and 
the  Monkey  being  all  descended  from  some  one  primeval  Mam- 
mal. Mr.  Darwin  says,  truly  enough,  that  Inheritance  "  is  that 
cause  which  alone,  as  far  as  we  positively  know,  produces  or- 
gar\isms  quite  like,  or  nearly  like,  each  other."  But  this  is  no 
reason  why  we  should  conclude  that  Inheritance  is  the  only 
cause  which  can  produce  Organisms  quite  unlike,  or  only  very 
partially  like  each  other.  We  are  surely  not  entitled  to  assume 
that  all  degrees  and  kinds  of  likeness  can  arise  only  from  this 
single  cause.  Yet  until  this  extreme  proposition  be  proved,  or 
rendered  probable,  we  have  a  sound  scientific  basis  for  doubting 
the  application  of  the  theory,  precisely  in  proportion  to  the  un- 
likeness  of  the  animals  to  which  it  is  applied. 

And  this  is  the  ground  of  reasoning,  besides  the  ground  of 
feeling,  on  which  we  revolt  from  the  doctrine  as  applied  to 
Man.  We  do  so  because  we  are  conscious  of  an  amount  and 
of  a  kind  of  difference  between  ourselves  and  the  lower  animals, 
which  is,  in  sober  truth,  immeasurable,  in  spite  of  the  close 
affinities  of  bodily  structure.  Yet  the  closeness  of  these  affin- 
ities is  a  fact ;  and  it  may  with  truth  be  said  that  in  contrast 
with  the  gulf  of  separation  in  all  resulting  characters,  these 
affinities  are  among  the  profoundest  mysteries  of  Nature. 
Professor  Huxley,  in  his  work  on  "  Man's  Place  in  Nature," 
has  endeavored  to  prove  that,  so  far  as  mere  physical  structure 
is  concerned,  "  the  differences  which  separate  him  from  the 
Gorilla  and  the  Chimpanzee  are  not  so  great  as  those  which 
separate  the  Gorilla  from  the  lower  Apes."  On  the  frontispiece 
of  this  work  he  exhibits  in  series  the  skeletons  of  the  Anthropoid 
Apes  and  of  Man.  It  is  a  grim  and  grotesque  procession. 
The  Form  which  leads  it,  however  like  the  others  in  general 
structural  plan,  is  wonderfully  different  in  those  lines  and 
shapes  of  Matter  which  have  such  mysterious  power  of  ex- 
pressing the  characters  of  Mind.  And  significant  as  those 
differences  are  in  the  skeleton,  they  are  as  nothing  to  the  dif- 
ferences which  emerge  in  the  living  creatures.  Huxley  himself 
admits  that  these  differences  amount  to  "  an  enormous  gulf," — 
to  a  "  divergence  immeasurable — practically  infinite."  What 
more  striking  proof  could  we  have  than  this,  that  Organic  Forms 


158  THE    REIGN    OF    LAW. 

are  but  as  clay  in  the  hands  of  the  Potter,  and  that  the  "  Law  " 
of  Structure  is  entirely  subordinate  to  the  "  Law  "  of  Purpose 
and  Intention  under  which  the  various  parts  of  that  structure 
are  combined  for  use  ? 

But  Science  will  continue  to  ask,  even  if  she  never  gets  an 
answer,  What  is  the  community  of  physical  cause  which  pro- 
duces this  community  of  resulting  structure  ?  The  fact  which 
it  is  most  difficult  to  disengage  from  the  theory  of  Development, 
or,  in  other  words,  from  the  theory  of  Creation  by  Birth,  is  the 
existence  of  rudimentary  or  aborted  organs ;  the  existence  of 
teeth,  for  example,  in  the  jaws  of  the  Whale — teeth  which  never 
cut  the  gum,  and  which  are  entirely  useless  to  the  animal.  We 
have  an  inherent  conviction  that  this  must  have  some  use  in  the 
future, — that  is,  in  some  organism  to  be  born  from  this  one, — 
or  else  it  must  have  had  some  use  in  the  past, — that  is,  in  some 
organism  from  which  this  one  has  descended.  In  either  case 
the  power  of  Inheritance  is  suggested  to  the  mind.  We  think 
instinctively  of  the  existence  of  some  Derivative  Form  in  which 
these  teeth  have  been,  or  are  to  be  turned  to  use.  It  is  only 
fair  towards  the  Theory  of  Creation  by  Birth,  to  admit  that  it 
does  explain  the  existence  of  useless  organs  in  a  sense  in  which 
no  other  Theory  explains  them.  It  would  be  almost  a  neces- 
sary consequence  of  Creation  by  Birth,  that  there  must  be 
stages  in  which  the  ultimate  use  of  new  Forms  could  not  be  yet 
apparent.  And  if  mere  beauty  or  variety  were  in  themselves 
objects  which  Creative  Power  sets  before  itself,  then,  also,  we 
might  expect  to  meet  with  modifications  of  structure  having  no 
other  apparent  use.  Both  these  explanations,  however,  exclude 
Mr.  Darwin's  idea  of  Natural  Selection  ;  because  this  is  a  proc- 
ess which  can  never  operate,  except  through  the  agency  of  act- 
ual use  and  disuse,  upon  organs  already  existing  and  capable 
of  discharging  function.  The  only  theory  of  Creation  by  Birth 
which  really  does  afford  some  explanation  of  the  facts,  is  a  the- 
ory which  assumes  modifications  of  structure  to  be  entirely  in- 
dependent of  the  effect  of  actual  use  or  disuse.  Mr.  Darwin 
himself  candidly  admits  that  'in  flowers,  at  least,  the  forces  of 
Correlated  Growth  do  "  modify  important  structures  independ- 
ent of  Utility,  and  therefore  of  Natural  Selection."  This  ad- 
mission must  be  extended  to  all  organic  growths.  There  must 


CREATION    BY    LAW.  159 

have  been  a  time  with  all  of  them  when  they  began  to  be  ;  and, 
therefore,  a  time  before  Natural  Selection  had  room  to  play. 
These  considerations,  however,  only  serve  to  put  a  higher  inter- 
pretation on  the  Theory  of  Creation  by  Birth.  They  do  not 
condemn  it. 

One  suggestion,  indeed,  has  been  made  on  this  subject  which 
I  think  it  is  impossible  to  accept.  When  men  were  yet  unwill- 
ing to  admit  the  existence  of  life  and  death  upon  the  globe  so 
long  before  the  creation  of  Man,  it  used  to  be  said  that  fossils 
were  only  "  sports  of  nature."  So  in  our  own  day,  I  have 
heard  it  said  that  rudimentary  organs  are  merely  intended  to 
satisfy  that  condition  of  our  finite  minds  in  virtue  of  which  we 
are  unable  to  conceive  Cr&ation,  except  in  connection  with  some 
History  and  Method  of  growth.  And  so,  as  a  condescension  to 
this  weakness,  aborted  members  are  given  to  suggest  a  History 
which  was  never  true,  and  a  Method  which  was  never  followed ! 
Now  of  one  thing  we  may  be  sure,  that  there  are  no  fictions  of 
this  kind  in  Nature,  and  no  bad  jokes.  Whatever  natural 
things  really  point  to,  they  point  to  faithfully  ;  and  the  conclu- 
sions really  indicated  are  never  false.  Abortive  organs  mean 
something,  and  they  mean  it  truly. 

Still,  there  is  no  proof  that  Inheritance  is  the  only  cause  from 
which  such  structures  can  arise.  In  the  inorganic  world  we  know 
that  not  mere  similarity,  but  absolute  identity  of  form,  as  in 
crystals,  is  the  result  of  laws  which  have  nothing  to  do  with  In- 
heritance, but  of  forces  whose  nature  it  is  to  aggregate  the  par- 
ticles of  matter  in  identic  shapes.  It  is  impossible  to  say  how 
far  a  similar  unity  of  effect  may  have  been  impressed  on  the 
forces  through  which  vital  Organisms  are  first  started  on  their 
way.  There  are  some  essential  resemblances  between  all 
Forms  of  Life  which  it  is  impossible  even  in  imagination  to  con- 
nect with  community  of  blood  by  descent.  For  example,  the 
Bilateral  arrangement  is  common  to  all  Organisms,  down  at 
least  to  the  Radiata,  and  in  this  great  class  we  have  the  same 
principle  of  Polarity  developed  in  a  circle.  Again,  the  general 
mechanism  of  the  digestive  organs  by  which  food  is  in  part  as- 
similated and  part  rejected,  is  also  common  through  a  range  of 
equal  extent.  Indeed,  it  may  be  said  with  truth,  that  never  in 
all  the  changes  of  Time  has  there  been  any  alteration  through- 


l6o  THE   REIGN    OF    LAW. 

out  the  whole  scale  of  Organic  Life,  in  the  fundamental  princi- 
ples of  chemical  and  mechanical  adjustment,  on  which  the  great 
animal  functions  of  Respiration,  Circulation,  and  Reproduction, 
have  been  provided  for.*  These  are  fundamental  similarities 
of  plan,  depending  probably  on  the  very  nature  of  Forces  which 
necessitate  these  adjustments  in  order  to  the  production  of  the 
phenomena  of  Life — Forces  of  which  we  know  nothing,  but 
which  we  have  not  the  slightest  reason  to  suppose  to  be  due  to 
Inheritance.  Other  similarities  of  plan  may  depend  on  the 
same  laws,  equally  unconnected  with  Inheritance  by  descent. 

Inheritance,  indeed,  has  been  suggested  as  the  cause  of  or- 
ganic likeness,  mainly  because  there  is  a  difficulty  in  conceiv- 
ing any  other.  But  there  is  at  least  an  equal  difficulty  in  con- 
ceiving the  applicability  of  this  cause  to  Man.  We  have 
already  seen  f  that  M.  Guizot  lays  it  down  as  a  physical  im- 
possibility that  Man — the  human  pair — can  have  been  intro- 
duced into  the  world  except  in  complete  stature — :in  the  full 
possession  of  all  his  faculties  and  powers.  He  holds  it  as  cer- 
tain that  on  no  other  condition  could  Man,  on  his  first  appear- 
ance, have  been  able  to  survive  and  to  found  the  human  family. 
Even  those  who  question  whether  this  argument  is  entitled  to 
the  rank  of  a  self-evident  physical  truth,  must  admit  that  it  is 
at  least  quite  as  good  as  the  opposite  assertion  that  any  origin 
except  the  origin  of  natural  birth  is  inconceivable.  Where  our 
ignorance  is  so  profound,  no  reasoning  of  this  kind  is  of  much 
value.  There  is  undoubtedly  much  to  be  said  in  support  of  M. 
Guizot's  position.  Certainly,  Man  as  a  mere  animal  is  the 
most  helpless  of  all  animals.  His  whole  frame  has  relation  to 
his  mind,  and  apart  from  that  relation,  it  is  feebler  than  the 
frame  of  any  of  the  brutes.  All  its  members  are  Correlated 
amongst  each  other  with  the  functions  of  his  Brain,  so  that 
action  may  follow  upon  Knowledge — so  that  embodiment  may 
be  possible  to  Thought.  Yet  in  its  plan  and  structure  his 
frame  is  homologically,  that  is  ideally,  the  same  as  the  frame  of 
the  brutes — organ  answering  to  organ,  and  bone  to  bone. 

The  words  "  Adherence  to  Type  "  are  words  expressive  of  an 
Idea,  of  a  Purpose,  which  we  see  fulfilled  in  Organic  Forms. 

*  Agassiz'  "  Geological  Sketches,"  p.  41.    London,  1860. 
t  Ante,  page  28. 


CREATION    BY   LAW.  l6l 

But  this  purpose  must  have  sought  its  own  accomplishment  by 
the  use  of  means,  and  the  question  of  Science  always  is,  what 
were  these  means  ?  Love  of  beauty  is  equally  a  Purpose  which 
we  see  fulfilled  in  Nature,  but  in  the  case  of  the  Humming 
Birds  this  has  been  accomplished  by  giving  to  their  plumes  the 
structure  of  "  Thin  Plates," — a  structure  which  decomposes 
light  and  flings  back  its  prismatic  colors  to  the  eye.  Fitness 
and  special  adaptation  is  another  of  the  purposes  of  Creation, 
but  this  also  is  attained  through  the  careful  arrangement,  and 
pliability  to  use,  of  physical  laws.  In  like  manner,  "  Adher- 
ence to  Type  "  is  the  expression  of  a  fact,  or  the  statement  of  a 
Purpose,  which,  like  all  the  other  purposes  fulfilled  in  Nature, 
invites  to  an  investigation  of  the  instrumentality  employed. 
We  see  the  Purpose,  but  we  do  not  see  the  Method.  We  see 
the  purpose,  for  example,  in  the  wonderful  adaptability  of  the 
Vertebrate  Type  to  the  infinite  varieties  of  Life  to  which  it 
serves  as  an  organ  and  a  home.  Science  should  be  allowed 
without  suspicion  or  remonstrance  to  pursue  her  proper  object, 
which  is  to  detect,  if  she  can,  what  the  method  of  this  work  has 
been.  There  is  no  point,  short  of  the  last  and  highest,  at 
which  Science  can  be  satisfied.  Her  curiosity  is  insatiable.  It 
is  a  curiosity  representing  man's  desire  of  knowledge.  But 
that  desire  extends  into  regions  where  the  means  of  investiga- 
tion cease,  and  in  which  the  processes  of  Verification  are  of  no 
avail.  Above  and  behind  every  Detected  Method  in  Nature 
there  lies  the  same  ultimate  question  as  before — What  is  it  by 
which  this  is  done  ? 

It  is  the  great  mystery  of  our  Being  that  we  have  powers  im- 
pelling us  to  ask  such  questions  on  the  history  of  Creation, 
when  we  have  no  powers  enabling  us  to  solve  them.  Ideas 
and  faint  suggestions  of  reply  are  ever  passing  across  the  outer 
limits  of  the  Mind,  as  meteors  pass  across  the  margin  of  the 
atmosphere,  but  we  endeavor  in  vain,  to  grasp  or  understand 
them.  The  faculties  both  of  reason  and  of  imagination  fall 
back  with  a  sense  of  impotence  upon  some  favorite  phrase — 
some  form  of  words  built  up  out  of  the  materials  of  analogy, 
and  out  of  the  experience  of  a  Mind,  which,  being  finite,  is  not 
creative.  We  beat  against  the  bars  in  vain.  The  only  real 
rest  is  in  the  confession  of  ignorance,  and  the  confession,  tooy 


1 62  THE   REIGN    OF    LAW. 

that  all  ultimate  physical  Truth  is  beyond  the  reach  of  Science  * 
It  is  probable  that  even  the  nearest  methods  of  Creation, 
though  far  short  of  ultimate  truths,  lie  behind  a  veil  too  thick 
for  us  to  penetrate.  It  is  here  surely,  if  it  is  anywhere  in  the 
sphere  of  natural  investigation,  that  the  Man  of  Science  may 
lay  down  the  weapons  of  his  analysis,  and  say,  "  I  do  not  exer- 
cise myself  in  great  matters,  or  in  things  which  are  too  high  for 
me."t 

There  is  at  least  one  conclusion  which  is  certain,  namely,  this 
— that  no  theory  in  respect  to  the  means  and  method  employed 
in  the  work  of  Creation — provided  such  theory  takes  in  all  the 
facts — can  have  the  slightest  effect  in  removing  that  work  from 
the  relation  in  which  it  stands  to  the  attributes  of  Will.  All 
such  theories  are,  and  can  only  be  "  simply  questions  of  how 
the  Creator  has  worked."  This  is  the  confession  made  in  re- 
spect to  Mr.  Darwin's  theory  by  one  of  the  most  competent  of 
its  supporters. $  Creation  by  Law — Evolution  by  Law — De- 
velopment by  Law,  or,  as  including  all  those  kindred  ideas,  the 
Reign  of  Law,  is  nothing  but  the  reign  of  Creative  Force 
directed  by  Creative  Knowledge,  worked  under  the  control  of 
Creative  Power,  and  in  fulfilment  of  Creative  Purpose. 

*  I  have  slightly  altered  this  passage  as  it  stood  in  the  earlier  editions,  because, 
although  the  c  ntext  clearly  indicates  its  reference  to  Physical  truth,  it  has  been 
quoted  by  Mr.  Lewes  as  granting  all  that  the  Positive  Philosophy  demands.  There 
is  a  sense  of  course,  in  -a'hich  it  may  be  said  that  no  Truth  knowable  by  man  can  be 
"ultimate."  That  is  to  say,  there  is  m  Trath  even  conceivable,  respecting  which  we 
might  not  ask,  or  desire  t  ask,  farther  questions.  But  there  is  no  use  in  appearing  to 
agree  with  those  from  whom  in  reality  I  so  widely  differ.  The  definition  of  Truth 
which  Mr.  Lewes  would  consider  u  ultimate,"  and  therefore  unattainable,  is  very 
different  from  the  definition  which  I  should  give,  and  have  given. 

t  Psalm  cxxxi. 

$  Mr.  Wallace.— Journal  of  Science,  No.  XVI,  p.  473, 


CHAPTER  VI. 

THE   REIGN    OF    LAW    IN   THE    REALM    OF    MIND. 

WHEN  we  pass  from  the  phenomena  of  Matter  to  the  phe- 
nomena of  Mind,  we  do  not  pass  from  under  the  Reign  of  Law. 
Here,  too,  facts  do  range  themselves  in  an  observed  Order: 
here,  too,  there  is  a  chain  of  cause  and  effect  running  through- 
out all  events  :  here,  too,  we  see  around  us,  and  feel  within  us, 
the  work  of  Forces  which  have  always  a  certain  definite  ten- 
dency to  produce  certain  definite  results :  here,  too,  it  is  by 
combination  and  adjustment  among  these  Forces  that  they  are 
mutually  held  in  check :  here,  too,  accordingly,  special  ends 
can  only  be  accomplished  by  the  use  of  special  means. 

But  then  the  question  immediately  occurs  to  us — can  we 
speak  of  Law,  or  of  Force,  or  of  "  cause  and  effect,"  as  applied 
to  the  phenomena  of  Mind,  in  the  same  sense  in  which  we 
speak  of  them  as  applied  to  the  phenomena  of  Matter?  Is  it 
only  by  distant  analogy,  or  as  expressing  ideas  really  the  same, 
that  we  use  the  same  terms  of  both  ? 

Undoubtedly  the  first  thought  which  suggests  itself  to  the 
mind  is,  that  a  material  Force  and  a  moral  or  intellectual 
Force  are  essentially  different  in  kind, — not  subject  to  condi- 
tions the  same,  or  even  similar.  But  are  we  sure  of  this  ?  Are 
we  sure  that  the  Forces  which  we  call  Material  are  not,  after 
all,  but  manifestations  of  mental  energy  and  Will  ?  We  have 
already  seen  that  such  evidence  as  we  have  is  all  tending  the 
other  way.  The  conclusions  forced  upon  us  have  been  these  : 
— first,  that  the  more  we  know  of  Nature  the  more  certain  it 
appears  that  a  multiplicity  of  separate  forces  does  not  exist, 
but  that  all  her  forces  pass  into  each  other,  and  are  but  modifi- 
cations of  some  One  Force  which  is  the  source  and  centre  of 
the  rest :  secondly,  that  all  of  them  are  governed  in  their 
mutual  relations  by  principles  of  arrangement  which  are  purely 
mental :  thirdly,  that  of  the  ultimate  seat  of  Force  in  any  form 


164  THE    REIGN    OF    LAW. 

we  know  nothing  directly :  and  fourthly,  that  the  nearest  con- 
ception we  can  ever  have  of  Force  is  derived  from  our  own 
consciousness  of  vital  power. 

If  these  conclusions  be  true,  it  follows  that,  whether  as 
regards  that  in  which  Force  in  itself  consists,  or  as  regards  the 
conditions  under  which  Force  is  used,  it  need  not  surprise  us 
if  in  passing  from  the  material  world  to  the  world  of  Mind,  we 
see  that  Law,  in  the  same  sense,  prevails  in  the  phenomena  of 
both.  But  as  this  is  a  subject  of  much  difficulty,  and  of  much 
importance,  it  may  be  well  to  examine  it  a  little  nearer. 

The  first  and  most  palpable  form  in  which  we  see  that  Mind 
is  subject  to  Law,  is  in  its  connection  with  the  Body.  And 
this  connection  is  so  close  that  we  know  neither  where  it  begins 
nor  where  it  ends.  The  extent  and  nature  of  it  can  be  known 
only  by  the  same  kind  of  reasoning  and  observation  by  which 
we  attain  to  any  knowledge  of  the  external  world.  For  indeed 
our  Bodies  seem  part  of  the  external  world  to  us.  We  see 
their  form  as  we  see  the  form  of  other  things,  but  we  do  not 
see  their  structure,  neither  do  we  feel  it,  nor  can  we  arrive  at 
it,  except  as  a  matter  of  obscure  and  difficult  research.  It  is 
literally  true  that  some  of  the  most  distant  objects  in  the  Uni- 
verse are  more  accessible  to  our  observation,  and  in  some 
respects  more  intelligible  to  our  understanding,  than  the  ma- 
terial frame  in  which  we  live-  Man  had  discovered  much 
concerning  the  circulation  of  the  Planets  before  he  had  discov- 
ered anything  concerning  the  circulation  of  his  own  blood.* 
Yet  so  near  is  the  current  of  that  blood  to  him,  so  much  is  it  a 
part  of  himself,  that  when  it  stops,  in  an  instant  "  all  his 
thoughts  perish."  Nevertheless,  the  Mind  is  not  conscious  of 
its  own  dependence  on  material  organs.  Even  in  respect  to 
those  exertions  of  the  Will  which  are  expressed  in  movements 
of  the  Body,  we  are  conscious  only  of  the  Will,  and  of  the  Will 
being  exerted  with  success  ;  but  we  are  entirely  unconscious  of 
the  machinery,  which  intervenes  between  the  intention  and  the 
accomplishment  of  the  act  intended.  Such  movements  of  the 
Body  appear  to  us  as  if  they  were  direct  acts  of  Will.  Yet 
nothing  can  be  more  certain  than  that  the  communication  is 

*  Kepler  and  Harvey  were  contemporaries  ;  but  Copernicus  had  preceded  them  by 
nearly  a  hundred  years. 


THE    REIGN    OF    LAW    IN    THE    REALM    OF    MIND.  165 

not  direct  but  indirect — and  even  elaborately  circuitous.  It  is 
only  when  the  ropes  and  pulleys  are  broken  that  we  discover 
how  that  which  we  call  our  Will  can  only  run  in  appointed 
channels — which  channels  are  material,  and  are  laid  down 
upon  a  plan,  like  conducting  wires,  as  if  for  the  conveyance  of 
a  material  Force. 

Nor  does  it  end  here — this  close  connection  between  Mind 
and  Matter.  So  far  from  being  less  close,  it  seems  to  be  only 
closer  and  closer  when  we  pass  to  mental  operations  in  which 
no  apparent  movements  of  the  Body  are  concerned.  In  the 
exercise  of  pure  Reason,  in  passing  from  one  mental  concep- 
tion to  another,  when  by  an  effort  of  our  Will  we  turn  our  atten- 
tion to  a  new  question,  and  in  the  twinkling  of  an  eye  pursue  a 
fresh  train  of  thought, — above  all,  when  our  affections  go  forth 
towards  those  who  are  the  objects  of  them — in  all  these  opera- 
tions, if  anywhere,  we  feel  as  if  we  were  free  from  mechanism — 
from  "  organs  " — from  Matter  in  any  form.  So  it  seems  till  we 
are  brought  face  to  face  with  the  terrible  phenomena  of  dis- 
ease. Then  our  delusion  is  dispelled,  and  we  know  how  frail  we 
are.  Then  we  find  that  the  same  stroke  which  paralyzes  the 
movement  of  a  limb,  may  paralyze,  not  less  effectually,  all  the 
powers  of  Reason,  of  Memory,  and  of  Will.  And  the  Affec- 
tions,— what  becomes  of  them  ?  These  too,  which  seem  so 
purely  spiritual,  we  find  out  to  be  dependent  on  material  struct- 
ure. Every  physician  knows  that  a  frequent  consequence  of 
cerebral  disease  is  a  total  change  of  character.  There  is  no 
symptom  of  insanity  more  common  than  the  growth  of  dislike 
and  aversion  to  those  who,  in  health,  had  been  the  most  loved 
on  earth.  Change  of  every  kind  and  degree  in  the  character 
and  structure  of  Mind  is  the  immediate  result  of  corresponding 
changes  in  the  structure  and  substance  of  the  Brain.  The  pure 
may  become  impure  ,  the  loving  may  become  malignant ;  the 
simple-minded  may  become  suspicious  ;  the  generous  may  be- 
come engrossed  with  self  ,  the  strong-minded  may  become  im- 
becile,— the  whole  man  may  be  broken  down,  and  may  live  for 
years  without  consciousness  and  without  emotion.  How  pain- 
fully does  the  Brain  sometimes  indicate  its  functions  !  What 
is  it  in  the  aspect  of  Idiotcy,  in  many  of  its  forms,  which  we 
instantly  recognize,  and  never  can  mistake  ?  In  that  low, 


1 66  THE   REIGN   OF   LAW. 

pinched,  and  retiring  brow,  we  see  instinctively  that  Reason 
cannot  hold  her  seat.  These  facts  do  not  stand  alone.  Not 
only  are  there  some  parallel  facts,  but  all  the  living  world  is  full 
of  them.  The  whole  range  of  animal  creation,  from  Man  down 
to  the  Reptile  and  the  Fish,  testifies  to  the  universal  law  of  an 
ascending  scale  of  mental  capacity  being  coincident  with  an 
ascending  degree  of  cerebral  organization.  No  series  oMacts, 
tending  to  the  establishment  of  any  physical  truth,  is  more  com- 
plete or  more  conclusive  than  the  chain  which  connects  the 
functions  of  the  Brain  with  the  phenomena  of  Mind. 

But  here,  again,  let  us  beware  of  the  fallacies  which  may 
arise  from  a  failure  to  recognize  the  exact  import  of  the  words 
we  use.  In  the  ears  of  many  it  sounds' like  Materialism  to  say 
that  Thought  is  a  function  of  the  Brain.  But  it  has  been  already 
shown  in  a  previous  chapter  that  Function  is  merely  the  word 
by  which  we  describe  that  work  which  any  given  piece  of  mech- 
anism has  been  adjusted  to  perform.  The  Power,  or  Force, 
which  is  developed  by  means  of  an  "organ,"  is  not  identical 
with  that  organ,  nor  with  any  of  its  parts,  nor  with  the  materials 
of  which  it  is  composed,  nor  even  with  its  mechanism  as  a  whole. 
It  does  not  follow,  for  example,  that  Electricity  is  identical  with 
the  tissues  of  a  fish,  because  it  is  developed  out  of  the  battery 
of  a  Torpedo  or  a  Gymnotus.  Yet  it  is  true  that  the  develop- 
ment and  discharge  of  Electricity  is  the  "  function  "  of  those 
Fish-organs  : — that  is  to  say,  this  is  the  work  which  they  have 
been  adjusted  to  perform.  Still  less  do  we  confound  Thought 
with  Brain  when  we  acknowledge  the  fact  that  Brain  in  our  Or- 
ganism is  inseparably  connected  with  the  power  of  thinking. 

Yet  inferences  as  false  as  this,  and  very  nearly  related  to  it, 
have  actually  been  drawn  by  eminent  men  from  the  facts  of  cer- 
ebral action.  Thus  it  has  been  declared  that  a  knowledge  of 
Brain,  under  a  name  which  is  in  itself  a -fallacy— Phrenology- 
is  the  only  sure  foundation  of  Mental  Science.  This  is  a  mere 
confusion  of  thought,  even  if  the  phrenological  mapping  of  the 
Brain  were  as  certainly  correct  as  it  is  really  doubtful.  That 
particular  faculties  of  the  Mind  may  be  connected  with  particu- 
lar portions  of  the  Brain,  is  not  in  itself  more  difficult  to  under- 
stand or  to  believe  than  that  the  Mind,  as  a  whole,  is  connected 
with  the  Brain  as  a  whole.  Whether  it  be  so  or  not  is  a  ques- 


THE    REIGN    OF    LAW    IN    THE    REALM    OF    MIND.  167 

tion  purely  of  observation  and  of  fact.  But  this,  at  least,  is 
certain, — that  the  different  faculties  and  affections  of  the  Mind 
must  be  discriminated  from  each  other  before  it  is  possible  to 
assign  to  them  a  local  habitation.  The  Mind  must  be  mapped 
first,  and  then  its  Organ.  No  additional  knowledge  is  given  to 
us  of  any  one  mental  faculty,  by  proving  that  it  is  connected 
with  some  special  bit  of  the  mysterious  substance  of  which  that 
organ  is  composed.  Love  is  Love,  and  nothing  else  ;  Hatred 
is  Hatred,  and  nothing  else  ;  Reverence  is  Reverence,  and  noth- 
ing else ;  the  pure,  intellectual  perception  of  a  Logical  Neces- 
sity is  itself,  and  nothing  else ; — however  clearly  it  may  be 
proved  that  each  of  these  is  a  function  of  some  separate  re- 
gion of  the  Brain.  When  the  phrenologist,  taking  in  his  hand 
a  human  skull,  and  lifting  its  upper  cover,  tells  us  that  the  oval 
of  convoluted  matter  which  is  thus  exposed  to  view  "  manifests 
the  moral  sentiments,"  what  light  does  he  throw  on  these  ? 
The  moral  sentiments  ! — what  do  these  include  ?  The  power 
of  seeing  Moral  Beauty,  and  of  loving  Truth — the  sense  of 
Justice,  and  the  desire  of  serving  in  her  cause — Conscience  and 
Benevolence,  Charity  and  Faith — all  that  is  best  and  noblest 
in  the  human  spirit — these  are  "  manifested  "  in  that  bit  of 
Matter  !  What  new  information  does  this  give  us  on  the  nature 
or  the  office  of  those  glorious  attributes  which  are  the  joy  of 
Earth  and  Heaven?  None  at  all.  They  are  just  what  we 
knew  them  before  to  be. 

Phrenology  is  no  longer  popular,  as  it  once  was,  among  Phys- 
iologists. Its  mapping  of  the  Brain  is  now  generally  admitted 
to  be  imaginary.  But  the  fundamental  error  of  the  Phrenolog- 
ical School  did  not  lie  merely,  or  even  mainly,  in  any  mistake 
as  to  the  mapping  of  the  Brain.  It  lay  in  the  idea  that  a  Sci- 
ence of  Mind  can  be  founded  in  any  shape  or  form  upon  the 
discoveries  of  anatomy.  Their  error  lay  in  the  notion  that  Phys- 
iology can  ever  be  the  basis  of  Psychology.  And  this  is  an 
error,  and  a  confusion  of  thought,  which  survives  Phrenology. 
A  profound  interest  indeed  attaches  to  every  new  fact  which 
connects  together  the  parallel  phenomena  of  Mind  and  of  Or- 
ganization. But  it  is  the  phenomena  of  Mind,  and  it  is  these 
alone,  of  which  we  are  directly  cognizant,  and  it  is  from  these 
that  we  must  start  as  the  basis  of  all  Psychological  research, 


1 68  THE    REIGN    OF    LAW. 

This  is  true  even  of  those  phenomena  of  the  mind  which  are 
most  purely  animal.  Sensation,  for  example,  may  be  traced 
with  absolute  demonstration  to  certain  nerves.  This  may 
throw  a  new  light  on  the  method  by  which  Sensation  is  ren- 
dered possible  ;  but  it  throws  no  new  light  whatever  upon  what 
Sensation  is.  It  is  that  which  we  know  and  feel  it  to  be,  and 
it  is  neither  more  nor  less  since  the  knife  of  the  anatomist  has 
laid  bare  the  channels  along  which  it  comes.  Still  more  is  this 
true  of  the  Intellectual  Powers.  Yet  there  are  Philosophers 
who  appear  to  think  that  some  new  light  is  cast  upon  Sensation 
when  they  call  it  an  affection  of  the  "  Sensory  Ganglia  ;'•  that 
Thought  is  in  some  measure  explained  when  it  is  called  "  Cere- 
bration," and  that  the  Laws  of  Intellect  are  reduced  to  scien- 
tific expression  when  they  are  described  as  the  working  of  the 
4t  Cerebral  Ganglia."  All  this  is  a  mere  idle  play  on  words.  It 
is  an  attempt  to  put  that  first  which  must  be  last,  and  that  last 
which  must  be  first.  The  general  fact  of  the  dependence  of 
Mind  on  a  Bodily  organization  is  a  fact  which  contains  within 
itself  all  the  lesser  facts  of  Physiological  discovery.  They  are 
not,  and  they  cannot  be,  new  in  kind.  They  do  not  even  help 
us  to  conceive  how,  through  any  mechanism,  the  power  of 
Thought  can  be  evolved.  Still  less  do  they  give  us  any  new 
view  of  that  which  Thought,  in  itself,  is. 

This  connection,  therefore,  between  Mind  and  Brain,  al- 
though it  is  a  universal  "  law  "  of  our  being,  is  a  law  recognized 
by  us  only  in  the  sense  in  which  Law  is  applied  to  "  an  observed 
Order  of  facts."  But  like  every  other  Order  of  this  kind, 
it  implies  a  Force  or  an  arrangement  of  Forces  out  of  which  the 
Order  comes.  It  implies,  too,  that  this  arrangement  of  Forces  is 
necessary  to  the  evolution  and  play  of  mental  faculties  in  the 
form  in  which  they  are  possessed  by  us.  Consequently  these 
faculties  are  seen  taking  their  place  among  all  the  other  phe- 
nomena of  the  world.  They  are  seen  to  be  under  the  Reign  of 
Law  in  this  largest  and  highest  sense  of  all — that  they  depend 
upon  Adjustment,  and  that  adjustment  so  delicate  that  the 
slightest  disturbance  of  it  deranges  the  whole  resulting  phe- 
nomena of  Mind.  Mind,  as  developed  in  us,  has  its  very  ex- 
istence and  working  dependent  on  imperative  physical  con- 
ditions, which  conditions  are  met  only  by  elaborate  contrivance. 


THE    REIGN    OF    LAW    IN    THE    REALM    OF    MIND.  169 

We  have  no  knowledge  what  the  Forces  are  which  demand 
this  obedience,  and  which  call  for  this  contrivance.  We  have 
even  an  insuperable  difficulty  in  conceiving  what  they  can  be. 
It  almost  seems  as  if  there  were  a  barrier  in  the  very  nature  of 
our  minds  against  the  possibility  of  conceiving  how  any  com- 
bination of  material  forces  can  either  result  in  Mind,  or  can  be 
necessary  to  the  working  of  its  powers,  or  can  be  concerned 
even  in  giving  it  an  abode.*  "  We  cannot  conceive,"  says  Dr. 
Andrew  Combe,  "  even  in  the  remotest  manner,  in  what  way 
the  Brain — a  compound  of  water,  albumen,  fat,  and  phosphate 
salts — operates  in  the  generating  of  Thought."  And  yet  there 
is  one  experience  which  brings  the  fact  of  this  close  connection 
within  the  direct  recognition  of  Consciousness.  We  know  and 
feel  that  the  act  of  severe  thinking  is  attended  with  the  expen- 
diture of  Force.  The  close,  steady,  continuous  application  of 
the  mind  to  any  subject  requiring  the  exercise  of  our  higher  in- 
tellectual faculties,  is  well  known  to  be  "  hard  work."  With- 
out causing  any  bodily  movement  of  which  we  are  conscious, 
it  produces,  nevertheless,  bodily  exhaustion.  It  occasions 
the  expenditure  of  a  physical  force,  or  at  least  of  a  force 
for  which  we  have  no  other  name.  It  is  not  uncommon  for 
men  of  great  age  to  be  able  to  exert  undiminished  powers  of 
mind  for  one  or  two  hours,  and  then  to  lapse  into  comparative 
imbecility.  Thus  the  exertion  of  the  Brain  is  like  the  exertion 
of  a  muscle,  and  is  attended  with  the  same  effects.  There  is 
fatigue  ;  and  with  excessive  fatigue  the  power  of  motion  stops. 

Yet  such  facts  as  these  only  puzzle  us — they  do  not  help  us  to 
any  clear  idea  of  the  nature  or  manner  of  a  connection  which  is 
indeed  incomprehensible.  We  know  of  Mind  only  as  itself, 
and  as  nothing  else.  The  difference  between  it  and  all  other 
things  seems  infinite  and  immeasurable.  No  doubt  this  diffi- 
culty, or  at  least  part  of  it,  arises  not  from  any  misconception 
as  to  what  Mind  is,  (for  of  this  our  knowledge  is  direct,)  but 
from  a  misconception  as  to  what  Matter  is — and  what  the  Forces 
are  which  we  call  material.  Close  analysis  of  the  phenomena 
of  Nature,  and  of  our  own  ideas  in  regard  to  them,  has  already 

*  "  Aperta  simplexque  mens,  nulla  re  adjunctaquse  sentire  possit,  fugere  intelligen- 
tiae  nostrae  vim  et  notionem  videtur." — Cicero,  "  De  Nat.  Deor."  lib.  x.  c.  u. 

This  is  true  only  in  one  sense.  It  is  very  far  from  being  true,  that  the  connection 
between  Mind  and  Matter  is  a  necessity  of  thought. 


170  THE    REIGN    OF    LAW. 

prepared  us  to  believe,  that  these  Forces  which  work  in  Matter 
and  produce  in  us  the  impressions  from  which  we  derive  our 
conceptions  of  it,  are  themselves  immaterial,  and  can  be  traced 
running  up  into  a  region  where  they  are  lost  in  the  light  of 
Mind.  The  Christian  doctrine  of  the  Resurrection  of  the 
Body  sanctions  and  involves  the  notion  that  there  is  some  deep 
connection  between  Spirit  and  Form  which  is  essential,  and 
which  cannot  be  finally  sundered  even  in  the  divorce  of  Death. 
The  affections  hold  to  this  idea  even  more  firmly  than  the  intel- 
Ject.  Hence  the  noble  and  passionate  exclamation  of  the 

Poet — 

"  Eternal  Form  shall  still  divide 
The  Eternal  Soul  from  all  beside, 
And  I  shall  know  him  when  we  meet." 

"  In  Memoriam"  xlvi. — TENNYSON. 

But  this  first  sense  in  which  Mind  is  under  the  Reign  of  Law 
— that  is,  its  dependence  on  the  Body,  prepares  us  for  yet  other 
senses  in  which  it  lies  under  the  same  dominion.  The  very 
fact  that  the  Mind  is  itself  unconscious  of  its  dependence  upon 
Matter,  and  of  the  manner  and  conditions  of  its  connection 
with  "  organs,"  teaches  us  that  there  is  a  large  class  of  phe- 
nomena connected  with  Mind,  of  which  we  should  be  entirely 
ignorant  if  we  trusted  to  the  direct  evidence  of  Consciousness 
alone.  This  ought  not  to  inspire  us  with  any  distrust  of  Con- 
sciousness in  those  matters  in  which  it  is  a  competent  and  indeed 
the  only  witness.  But  there  is  a  large  class  of  phenomena  of 
which  Consciousness  properly  so  called,  that  is,  the  direct  per- 
ception of  the  Mind  of  its  own  present  workings,  does  not  inform 
us.  The  Mind  looking  in  upon  itself  sees  itself  only,  and  does 
not  see  either  the  mechanism  through  which  it  is  able  to  work 
at  all,  nor  many  of  the  forces  which  operate  in  it  and  upon 
it.  These,  some  of  them  at  least,  can  only  be  arrived  at  by  the 
same  processes  of  reasoning  and  observation  which  we  apply 
to  the  external  world,  and  by  which  we  ascertain  the  action  and 
reaction  of  involuntary  agents. 

There  is  nothing  of  which  it  is  so  difficult  to  persuade  ourselves 
as  of  this.  In  the  apprehension  of  Consciousness  the  sense  of 
Will  is  so  strong  within  us  that  it  blinds  us  to  the  insuperable 
conditions  which  limit  both  what  we  will  and  what  we  do.  That 


THE    REIGN    OF    LAW    IN    THE    REALM    OF    MIND.          .     171 

our  Wills,  of  whose  freedom  we  are  conscious,  should  often  be 
determined  by  influences  of  which  we  have  no  consciousness  at 
all ;  that  our  opinions  should  as  often  be  the  result  of  causes 
and  not  of  reasons  ;  that  our  actions  should  follow  a  course 
marked  out  by  conditions  which  we  fail  to  recognize  as  having 
any  determining  effect  upon  them — these  are  conclusions  against 
which  we  are  apt  to  rebel — as  depriving  us  of  a  part  of  our  free 
and  intelligent  agency.  Hence  the  indignation  with  which 
men  resent  being  told  that  they  have  been  impelled  by  motives 
other  than  the  motives  which  are  avowed,  and  other  than  the 
motives  which  are  consciously  entertained.  Yet  the  fact  of 
their  being  so  impelled  is  often  perfectly  plain  to  those  around 
them.  The  reply,  however,  is  always  ready  :  "  You  seem  to 
know  my  motives,  and  the  causes  of  my  conduct  better  than  I 
know  them  myself," — as  if  the  proposition  so  stated  were  evi- 
dently absurd.  But  it  is,  on  the  contrary,  a  proposition  which 
may  well  be  true.  Bystanders  very  often  see  the  forces  telling 
upon  our  Will  much  more  clearly  than  we  see  them  ourselves. 
It  is  possible,  indeed,  by  a  vigorous  effort  of  self-analysis  to  see 
all  that  others  see,  and  a  great  deal  more.  Those  who  are  able 
really  to  look  in  upon  themselves,  can  often  detect  the  influences 
which  have  been  acting  on  their  minds,  coloring  their  opinions, 
and  determining  their  conduct  in  a  degree  which  the  higher 
faculties  would  be  glad  to  disown  and  disavow.  There  is  noth- 
ing more  wonderful  in  the  constitution  of  our  minds  than  -the 
power  we  have  of  standing  aside,  as  it  were,  for  a  time,  from 
the  ordinary  channel  of  our  own  thoughts,  and  of  looking  back 
upon  their  currents  coming  down  from  the  hills  of  Memory  and 
Association  to  join  their  issues  in  our  present  life.  But  this 
sort  of  looking  in  upon  ourselves,  and  treating  ourselves  as  a 
subject  of  natural  history,  is  to  all  men  a  difficult,  and  to  most 
men  an  impossible,  operation.  They  have  neither  time  for  it 
nor  thought  for  it.  The  conscious  energies  of  the  Will  are  so 
near  us,  and  so  ever  present  with  us,  that  they  shut  out  our 
view  of  the  forces  which  lie  behind.  Yet  there  are  some  facts 
common  in  the  experience  of  all  men  which  may  help  us  to  a 
conception  of  the  truth.  One  of  these  is  the  fact  of  Mind 
growing  with  the  growth  of  years — a  fact  determined  by  the  rec- 
ollection of  childhood,  of  youth,  and  of  maturity.  By  compar- 


172  THE    REIGN    OF    LAW. 

ing  ourselves  with  ourselves  at  former  periods  of  life — by  the 
memory  of  feelings,  and  of  opinions,  and  of  methods  of  thought 
which  we  have  outgrown  and  left  behind  us,  we  can  detect  the 
action  of  forces  which  have  told  upon  our  minds — traces,  in 
short,  of  the  laws  to  which  they  have  been  subject.  Some  of 
these  laws  have  been  nothing  more  than  laws  of  physical  growth 
— the  conceptions  of  the  Mind  undergoing  a  development  con- 
sequent on  the  growth  of  our  Material  Organism. 

Another  fact  bearing  on  the  same  question,  but  which  is 
more  easily  observed  in  others  than  in  ourselves,  is  the  fre- 
quent determination  of  mental  qualities  by  hereditary  trans- 
mission. The  famous  question,  as  to  the  Origin  of  our  Ideas, 
and  how  far  they  are  due  respectively  to  Experience,  to  Associa- 
tion, or  to  Intuition,  has  been  discussed  by  Metaphysicians  with 
far  too  little  reference  to  the  organic  phenomena  which  are  so 
closely  related  to  the  phenomena  of  Mind.  It  is  not  true,  in- 
deed, that  Psychology  is  subordinate  to  Physiology  ,  but  it  is 
true  that  these  two  are  so  intimately  connected,  that  neither  is 
independent  of  the  other.  Man  is  not  a  disembodied  Spirit, 
but  a  Being  whose  mental  powers  are  subject  to  the  laws  of  a 
material  organization.  And  so  it  is  that  almost  every  fact  in 
Physiology  has  an  intimate  bearing  on  some  question  or  other 
in  the  Philosophy  of  Mind.  No  better  illustration  could  be 
given  than  one  which  arises  out  of  this  question  of  the  Origin 
of  our  Ideas.  In  one  of  the  many  formula?  of  expression  to 
which  Mr.  J.  S.  Mill  has  reduced  the  assertion  that  Experience 
is  the  source  and  origin  of  all  our  thoughts  and  actions,  he  is 
obliged  to  except  from  the  sweep  of  that  assertion  the  volun- 
tary movements  of  the  Body.  He  says,  "  We  bring  about  any 
fact,  other  than  our  own  muscular  contractions,  by  means  of  some 
other  fact  which  experience  has  shown  to  be  followed  by  it." 
Now  let  us  observe  the  immense  significance  which  attaches 
to  this  exception.  Why  is  Mr.  Mill  compelled  to  make  it  ? 
Because  he  mixes  up  in  one  assertion  two  propositions  which 
are  totally  distinct,  one  being  true  universally,  and  the  other 
being  true  only  partially.  The  first  proposition  is,  that  all 
facts  which  we  can  "  bring  about,"  must  be  so  brought  about 
by  the  use  of  means.  This  is  true  universally.  The  second 

*  "  Auguste  Comte  and  Positivism,''  by  J.  S.  Mill,  p.  7. 


THE    REIGN    OF    LAW    IN    THE    REALM    OF    MIND.  173 

proposition  is,  that  we  are  guided  to  the  knowledge  of  those 
means  by  Experience  alone.  Now,  this  last  proposition  is  not 
true,  as  Mr.  Mill  is  obliged  to  confess,  of  the  whole  class  of 
facts  which  are  brought  about  by  vital  effort.  But  the  mus- 
cular contractions  of  the  Body  are  no  exception  whatever  to  the 
mere  general  affirmation  that  all  actions  must  have  a  cause,  or 
in  other  words,  must  be  brought  about  by  the  use  of  means. 
Exceptions  they  are,  however,  to  the  affirmation  that  the  nature 
of  those  means  is  made  known  to  us  by  Experience.  The 
sentence,  in  so  far  as  it  asserts  the  universal  Law  of  Causation, 
might  have  been  so  framed  as  to  require  no  abatement  or  ex- 
ception whatever.  "We  bring  about  any  fact  by  means  of 
some  other  fact  which  we  know  either  by  experience  or  by 
Intuition  to  be  followed  by  it."  In  this  form  the  sentence  is 
absolutely  true,  and  applies  to  "  our  own  muscular  contrac- 
tions," as  well  as  to  every  other  action.  But  philosophers  who 
support  the  doctrine  of  Experience  do  not  like  the  word  "  in- 
tuition ;"  and  though  they  cannot  do  without  it  altogether,  they 
use  it  as  seldom  as  they  can.  They  feel  very  naturally,  and 
very  truly,  that  if  Intuition  be  admitted  in  regard  to  the  ultimate 
phenomena  of  Volition,  the  idea  will  not  easily  be  dispelled  that 
Intuition  may  extend  also  to  the  ultimate  phenomena  of 
Thought.  Now  the  muscular  contractions  of  the  Body  stand 
at  the  very  fount  and  origin  of  all  we  do  ;  and  it  is  more  than 
probable  that  analogous  movements  of  the  Brain  stand  as  near 
to  the  origin  of  all  we  think. 

The  bearing  of  this  question  on  the  Philosophy  of  Mind  cannot 
be  mistaken.  The  muscular  contractions  of  the  Body  are  of  two 
kinds — one  kind  is  constant,  automatic,  and  lasting  with  the  dura- 
tion of  life  itself.  The  other  kind  is  intermittent,  voluntary,  and 
capable  of  being  destroyed  whilst  the  Consciousness,  and  the 
Intelligence,  and  the  Will  are  still  in  use.  Both  these  kinds  of 
action  are  rendered  possible  by  the  use  of  means :  but  it  is 
only  in  the  case  of  one  of  them  that  those  means  are  placed 
at  the  bidding  of  the  Will.  Yet  it  is  not  Experience  which 
teaches  us  how  to  use  those  means.  It  is  purely  Instinct  or 
Intuition.  We  are  not  even  conscious  of  the  very  existence 
of  the  means  which  we  employ,  and  the  profoundest  researcl^s 
of  Science  do  not  even  yet  give  us  the  faintest  notion  what 


174  THE    REIGN    OF    LAW. 

their  ultimate  nature  is.  No  experience  whatever  is  required 
to  teach  a  child  how  to  extend  its  limbs  or  how  to  exert  its 
voice.  Nevertheless,  neither  of  these  things  can  be  done  ex- 
cept through  the  use  of  means.  The  only  difference  between 
these  actions  and  actions  of  a  more  complicated  kind  is.  that 
the  appropriate  means  are  resorted  to  and  employed  by  Intui- 
tion. The  Will  which  moves  the  limbs,  and  moves  them 
through  the  use  of  a  complicated  machinery,  is  born  with  the 
Organism  of  which  that  machinery  forms  a  part,  and  has  an 
instinctive  knowledge  how  to  use  it.  Now,  it  is  against  the 
analogy  of  Nature  to  suppose  that  this  great  class  of  facts  re- 
specting the  powers  of  the  Body  are  without  some  corresponding 
facts  respecting  the  powers  of  Mind.  Indeed,  all  vital  phenom- 
ena of  this  kind  are  in  themselves  necessarily  phenomena 
both  of  Body  and  of  Mind.  The  close  connection  which  exists 
between  the  two,  and  the  inseparable  analogies  which  unite  all 
their  workings,  render  it  therefore  almost  certain  that  the  Mind 
is  to  be  regarded  as  having  both  kinds  of  movement  which  the 
physical  Organism  possesses — that  is,  faculties  which  are  auto- 
matic in  their  action — and  other  faculties  which,  though  sub- 
ject to  direction  by  the  Will,  yet  work  upon  the  materials  pre- 
sented to  them  in  a  manner  strictly  intuitive  and  independent 
of  all  experience. 

And  as  the  abnormal  phenomena  of  disease,  or  of  malfor- 
mation, often  throw  an  important  light  on  the  structure  of  the 
body,  so  do  certain  abnormal  intellectual  phenomena  give  us 
strange  glimpses  occasionally  into  the  powers  of  Mind.  Among 
those  phenomena,  none  are  more  curious  than  the  intuitive 
powers  of  numerical  computation  which  a  few  individuals  have 
possessed.  There  are  well  attested  cases  of  this  power  in  virtue 
of  which  the  mind  reaches  the  result  of  difficult  calculations  by 
a  species  of  Intuition — that  is  to  say,  without  any  consciousness 
of  the  process  by  which  that  result  is  made  apparent  to  the  Mind. 
This  is  not  a  proof  that  there  is  no  process,  but  only  that  it  is  a 
process  gone  through  as  a  machine  goes  through  a  process — 
that  is,  according  to  its  own  pre-adjusted  laws  of  Motion.  Per- 
haDs,  indeeed,  this  process  may  not  be  different  in  kind  from 
thPprocess  by  which  the  average  mind  reaches  the  most  ele- 
mentary of  arithmetical  truths. .  The  product  of  one  and  one, 


THE    REIGN    OF    LAW    IN    THE    REALM    OF    MIND.  175 

or  of  two  and  two,  may  be  self-evident  to  all  of  us  only  in  the 
same  way  in  which  the  product  of  a  long  series  of  figures  may 
be  self-evident  to  minds  with  an  abnormal  gift  of  the  arithmetical 
faculty.  Thus  the  distinction  breaks  down  between  self-evident 
truths  and  truths  which  are  not  self-evident.  A  truth  may  be 
self-evident  to  one  mind  which  is  not  self-evident  to  another, 
but  may  require,  on  the  contrary,  a  laborious  process  of  verifi- 
cation. And  does  not  this  again  lead  us  to  see  how  entirely 
dependent  are  the  phenomena  of  Mind  upon  the  power  of 
special  Faculties,  and  how  this  power  is  itself  dependent  on  the 
Adjustments  of  Organization  ?  In  the  world  of  Physics,  we 
know  that  we  are  surrounded  by  movements  which  never  make 
themselves  sensible  to  us — pulsations  which  excite  in  our  eyes  no 
sense  of  light — and  others  which  excite  in  our  ears  no  sense  of 
sound, — and  all  this  for  want  of  adjusted  organs.  And  so  it 
would  seem  as  if  the  Mind  of  Man  were  an  Instrument  attuned 
only  to  a  certain  range  of  knowledge,  but  as  if  within  that  range 
it  were  capable  of  finer  and  finer  adjustments  to  the  harmonies 
of  Truth.  These  cannot  make  themselves  heard  where  there  is 
no  organ  to  catch  the  sound.  Nor  could  that  organ  translate 
them  into  Thought — into  that  conscious  apprehension  of  which 
an  Idea  essentially  consists, — had  it  not  its  own  preadjusted 
relation  to  the  Verities  of  the  World. 

It  must  be  remembered,  however,  that  in  the  discussion  of 
such  questions  as  to  the  Origin  of  our  Ideas,  there  has  been  a 
great  want  of  definition  in  the  use  of  terms.  Are  fear,  and  love, 
and  hatred,  and  anger,  and  jealousy,  and  remorse,  and  joy, — 
are  these  "  ideas,"  or  are  they  only  conditions  or  powers  of  mind  ? 
If  by  Ideas  we  mean  those  imaginings  which,  as  the  very  word 
implies,  involve  "  images  "  of  external  things,  it  is  certain  that 
contact  with  external  impressions,  and,  in  this  sense,  Experience, 
is  essential  to  the  formation  of  them.  But  if  by  Ideas  we  mean 
the  elementary  passions,  or  if  we  mean  even  those  peculiarities 
•of  thought — those  special  tendencies  of  mind  which  lead  us  to 
view  things  in  some  particular  light  rather  than  in  others,  and 
which  constitute  the  essential  distinction  between  the  ideas  of 
different  men — if,  in  short,  we  include  in  the  term  anything 
which  belongs  to  the  Thinking  Faculty  itself,  or  anything  of  the 
method  according  to  which  it  works  up  the  raw  material  of 


176  THE    REIGN    OF    LAW. 

Thought — then  it  is  equally  certain  that  Ideas  in  this  sense  are 
born  with  all  of  us,  and  that  Imitation,  and  Experience,  and 
Association,  do  but  pour  their  material  into  moulds  already  cast 
for  their  reception. 

But  in  reality  here,  as  in  many  other  questions,  the  rival  dis- 
putants have  each  had  some  portion  of  the  truth.  They  have 
been  both  right  and  both  wrong.  An  Idea  is  not  a  simple,  but 
a  composite  thing.  It  has  not  one  origin,  but  a  plurality  of 
origins.  An  Idea  is,  as  it  were,  a  fabric  of  which  the  threads 
come  from  the  spinner,  and  the  weaving  from  the  loom.  Or  it 
is,  as  it  were,  an  organic  growth,  of  which  the  materials  are 
supplied  from  the  external  world,  and  the  structure  from  the 
world  within.  There  are  many  elements  in  every  Idea  which 
come,  and  can  only  come,  from  without.  There  are  other  ele- 
ments, and  among  them  the  Formative  Power,  which  come,  and 
only  can  come,  from  within.  The  Mind  stands  in  pre-established 
relations  to  the  things  around  it — bound  to  them  by  the  infinite 
adjustments  which  may  be  called  External  Correlations  of 
Growth.  Out  of  these  relations  it  is  not  itself,  nor  do  its  powers 
possess  the  materials  whereon  to  work.  We  cannot  conceive  a 
mind  having  no  points  of  contact  with  the  external  world. 
From  that  world  must  come  all  the  exciting  causes  of  Thought 
and  of  Emotion.  But  the  form  into  which  these  are  cast — the 
tissue  into  which  these  are  woven — the  force  by  which  Ideas 
become  a  Power — all,  in  short,  that  constitutes  Thought  as  dis- 
tinguished from  the  things  about  which  we  think — all  this  comes 
from,  and  belongs  to,  the  Mind  itself. 

Among  the  lower  animals,  young  ones,  taken  from  the  litter 
or  the  nest,  and  brought  up  under  conditions  wholly  removed 
from  the  teaching  of  their  parents,  whether  by  imitation  or 
otherwise,  will  reproduce  exactly  all  those  habits  of  their  race 
which  belong  to  their  natural  modes  of  life.  Many  of  these 
habits,  perhaps  it  may  be  safely  said  all  of  them,  imply  Ideas 
— that  is  to  say,  they  imply  instincts ;  and  instincts  are  in  the 
nature  of  ideas — that  is  to  say,  they  belong  to  the  phenomena 
of  Mind.  And  of  this  there  is  another  indication  in  a  fact 
which  at  first  sight  may  seem  trivial  or  irrelevant.  It  has  been 
often  said  that  one  great  difficulty  in  reasoning  on  this  subject, 
is  the  inaccessibility  to  observation  of  the  mental  condition  of 


THE   REIGN   OF   LAW   IN   THE   REALM   OF   MIND.  177 

all  infant  creatures.  But  even  if  this  were  more  true  than  it 
really  is,  there  are  some  creatures,  not  low  in  the  scale  of  crea- 
tion, of  which  it  may  be  said  that,  comparatively,  they  have  no1 
infancy  at  all.  These  are  the  Gallinaceous  Birds  in  general, 
and  some  Species  in  particular.  They  come  forth  from  the  egg 
perfect  miniatures  of  their  parents,  and  with  minds  as  fully 
equipped  with  parental  instincts  as  their  bodies  are  provided 
with  feather  or  their  wings  with  quills.  Antecedent  to  all  ex- 
perience of  injury,  they  exhibit  fear,  and  not  only  fear,  but  fear 
of  the  proper  objects.  They  will  flee  when  they  see  a  hawkr 
and  they  will  carefully  avoid  a  stinging  insect.  In  Europe  the 
young  of  the  Woodgrouse  or  Gelinotte  are  able  to  fly  from  the 
moment  they  break  the  shell.  In  Australia,  and  the  great 
group  of  islands  which  connect  Australia  with  the  Asiatic  con- 
tinent, there  is  a  still  more  curious  example  of  the  same  fact. 
There  is  a  Family  of  Birds  (Megapodidce)  of  which  the  young 
are  hatched,  not  by  the  incubation  of  the  parents,  but  by  the 
heat  of  fermentation  generated  in  earthen  mounds,  scraped  to- 
gether for  the  purpose.  From  the  moment  the  young  are 
hatched  they  feed  themselves,  and  run,  and  fly,  and  roost  on- 
trees,  as  if  the  world  on  which  they  have  just  opened  their  eyes' 
had  been  long  familiar.  It  is  said,  indeed,  that  the  Parent 
Bird  watches  the  Hatching  Mound,  and  is  ready  to  escort  the- 
chicks  upon  their  first  appearance  in  the  surrounding  scrub. 
But  the  recognition  of  the  Parent  by  the  young,  and  the  answer 
to  her  call,  are  the  most  remarkable  of  all  among  these  proofs 
of  intuitive  ideas.  "  As  a  moth  emerges  from  a  Chrysalis,  dries 
its  wings,  and  flies  away,  so  the  young  Telegallus,  when  it 
leaves  the  egg,  is  sufficiently  perfect  to  be  able  to  act  indepen- 
dently.* .Nor  is  this  all ;  the  curious  instinct  by  which  the  Bird 
prepares  an  artificial  Incubator  for  its  young  is  an  instinct  born 
with  it — an  Innate  Idea  expressing  itself  in  congenital  habits 
of  body.  The  chick  of  another  Species  of  this  singular  family 
of  Birds,  the  Megapode,  was  found  in  confinement  to  be  inces- 
santly scraping  up  sand  and  gravel  into  heaps,  and  the  rapidity 
and  power  with  which  it  effected  this  operation  is  described 
with  astonishment  by  its  captor. 

These  may  seem  far-fetched  illustrations,  and  of  slight  value: 

*  Gould's  "  Birds  of  Australia." 
12 


178  THE    REIGN    OF    LAW. 

in  so  dark  a  subject ;  but  let  us  remember  that  there  are  no 
solitary  facts  in  Nature.  There  are  indeed  extreme  cases, — 
extreme  examples  of  universal  laws, — that  is  to  say,  of  laws 
whose  operation  is  ordinarily  restrained  within  narrower  limits. 
But  there  is  no  fact  standing  really  alone — net  one  which  is  not 
bound  to  the  whole  Order  of  Nature  by  deep  analogies.  That 
any  creatures  should  be  ushered  into  life  so  completely  organ- 
ized and  furnished  as  the  young  of  the  Gallinaceous  Birds  and 
of  the  Megapodes,  is  a  fact  of  immense  significance  in  the  phe- 
nomena of  Organic  Life.  (See  note  E.) 

In  Man  analogous  facts  appear,  modified  by  his  infinitely 
wider  range  of  character,  and  the  infinite  degrees  in  which  the 
different  elements  of  Mind  are  capable  of  being  mixed  in  him. 
But  although  these  conditions  greatly  complicate  the  result,  the 
general  phenomena  are  the  same.  Orphans,  who  have  never 
had  any  opportunities  of  acquiring,  by  imitation,  the  peculiari- 
ties of  their  parents,  will  often,  nevertheless,  reproduce  these 
peculiarities  with  curious  exacntess.  This  is  a  familiar  fact, 
and  how  much  this  fact  implies !  Even  when  the  inheritance  is 
merely  some  congenital  habit  of  body,  or  some  trick  of  manner, 
it  may,  probably,  imply  some  resemblance  deeper  than  appears. 
For  the  Body  and  the  Mind  are  in  such  close  relationship,  that 
congenital  habits  of  Body  are  sure  to  be  connected  with  con- 
genital habits  of  Mind.  But  the  inheritance  is  very  often,  so 
far  as  we  can  see,  purely  mental.  How  often  do  we  recognize 
the  tone,  character,  and  the  very  turn  of  thought  of  dead 
friends,  in  the  conversation  and  conduct  of  their  children ! 
The  innate  tendency  to  look  at  things  in  the  same  point  of 
view,  is  evidenced  in  the  reproduction  of  the  same  mental  com- 
binations, of  the  same  images,  of  the  same  opinions,  in  short, 
of  the  same  ideas.  Cases,  more  remarkable  than  others  of  this 
kind,  attract  our  attention,  and  we  at  once  recognize  ideas  as 
innate  which  are  so  obviously  determined  by  the  forces  of  her- 
editary transmission.  But  we  forget  how  often  these  laws  of 
inheritance  must  be  working  invisibly  where  they  never  break 
ground  upon  the  surface.  And  thus  it  is  brought  home  to  us 
how  the  Mind  may  be  subject  to  laws  of  which  it  is  uncon- 
scious— how  its  whole  habit  of  thought,  and  the  aspect  in  which 
different  questions  present  themselves  to  its  apprehension,  are 


THE    REIGN    OF   LAW   IN   THE   REALM    OF   MIND.  179 

in  a  great  measure  determined  by  the  mysterious  forces  of  con- 
genital constitution.  And  what  is  true  in  one  measure  of  the 
individual  mind,  is  true,  also,  in  other  measures,  of  whole  fami- 
lies and  of  races  of  Men. 

But  the  laws  of  Material  Organization  are  not  the  only  laws 
to  which  Mind  is  subject.  Obscure  as  these  laws  are,  there 
are  others  which  are  obscurer  still.  What  we  cannot  see  in 
detail,  we  can  see  in  the  gross.  What  we  cannot  recognize  in 
ourselves,  we  are  able  to  recognize  in  others.  We  can  see 
that  the  actions  and  opinions  of  men,  which  are  the  phenomena 
of  Mind,  do  range  themselves  in  an  observed  Order,  upon 
which  Order  we  can  found,  even  as  we  do  in  the  material 
world,  very  safe  conclusions  as  to  the  phenomena  which  will 
follow  upon  definite  conditions.  And  when  we  go  back  to 
former  generations — to  the  history  of  nations,  and  the  prog- 
ress of  the  human  race — we  can  detect  still  more  clearly  an 
orderly  progress  of  events.  In  that  order  the  operation  of 
great  general  causes  become  sat  once  apparent.  On  the 
recognition  of  such  causes  the  Philosophy  of  History  de- 
pends ;  and  upon  that  recognition  depends  not  less  the  possi- 
bility of  applying  to  the  exigencies  of  our  own  time,  and  of  our 
own  society,  a  wise  and  successful  legislation. 

But  what  are  these  causes,  and  what  is  the  nature  of  those 
"  laws  "  to  which  voluntary  agents  are  unconsciously  obedient  ? 
Is  man's  Voluntary  agency  a  delusion,  or  is  it,  on  the  contrary, 
just  what  we  feel  it  to  be,  and  is  it  only  from  misconception  of 
its  nature  that  we  puzzle  over  its  relation  to  Law  ?  We  speak, 
and  speak  truly,  of  our  Wills  being  free  ;  but  free  from  what  ? 
It  seems  to  be  forgotten  that  Freedom  is  not  an  absolute  but  a 
relative  term.  There  is  no  such  thing  existing  as  absolute  free- 
dom— that  is  to  say,  there  is  nothing  existing  in  the  world,  or 
possible  even  in  thought,  which  is  absolutely  Alone — entirely 
free  from  inseparable  relationship  to  some  other  thing  or 
things.  Freedom,  therefore,  is  only  intelligible  as  meaning  the 
being  free  from  some  particular  kind  of  restraint  or  of  induce- 
ment to  which  other  beings  are  subject.  From  what,  then,  is 
it  that  our  Wills  are  free  ?  Are  they  free  from  the  influence  of 
motives  ?  Certainly  not.  And  what  are  motives  ?  A  motive 
is  that  which  moves,  or  tends  to  move,  the  mind  in  a  particular 


l8o  THE    REIGN    OF    LAW. 

direction.  Like  all  other  words  which  are  used  to  describe  the 
phenomena  of  Mind,  it  is  taken  from  the  language  applicable  to 
material  things,  and  suggests  the  analogies  which  exist  between 
them.  It  belongs  to  the  profound  but  unconscious  metaphysics 
of  Human  Speech.  That  which  moves  the  Mind  in  a  partic- 
ular direction  is  best  conceived  of  as  something  which  exerts 
a  force  upon  it,  and  the  aggregate  of  such  forces  may,  in  a  gen- 
eral sense,  be  called  the  laws  which  determine  human  action 
and  opinions. 

But  here  we  come  upon  the  great  difficulty  which  besets  every 
attempt  to  reduce  to  system  the  laws  or  forces  which  operate  on 
the  Mind  of  Man.  It  is  the  immense,  the  almost  boundless 
variety  and  number  of  them.  This  variety  corresponds  with 
the  variety  of  powers  with  which  his  Mind  is  gifted.  For  pre- 
established  relations  are  necessary  to  the  effect  of  every  force 
whether  in  the  material  or  in  the  moral  world.  Special  forces 
operate  upon  special  forms  of  matter,  and  except  upon  these, 
they  exert  no  action  whatever.  For  no  force  can  operate  ex- 
cept where  there  are  pre-established  relations  between  its  ener- 
gies and  the  things  upon  which  its  energies  are  to  work.  The 
Polar  Force  of  magnetism  acts  on  different  metals  in  different 
degrees,  and  there  is  a  large  class  of  substances  which  are  al- 
most insensible  to  its  power.  In  like  manner  there  are  a  thou- 
sand things  that  exercise  an  attractive  power  on  the  mind  of  a 
civilized  man,  which  would  exercise  no  power  whatever  upon 
the  mind  of  a  savage.  And  in  this  lies  the  only  difference  be- 
tween subjection  to  Law  under  which  the  lower  animals  are 
placed,  and  the  subjection  to  law  which  is  equally  the  condition 
of  Mankind.  Free  Will,  in  the  only  sense  in  which  this  expres- 
sion is  intelligible,  has  been  erroneously  represented  as  the  pe- 
culiar prerogative  of  Man.  But  the  Will  of  the  lower  animals 
is,  within  their  narrow  spheres  of  action,  as  free  as  ours.  A 
man  is  not  more  free  to  go  to  the  right  hand  or  to  the  left  than 
the  Eagle,  or  the  Wren,  or  the  Mole,  or  the  Bat.  The  only  dif- 
ference is,  that  the  Will  of  the  lower  animals  is  acted  upon  by 
fewer  and  simpler  motives.  And  the  lower  the  organization  of 
the  animal,  the  fewer  and  simpler  these  motives  are.  Hence 
it  is  that  the  conduct  and  choice  of  animals — that  is,  the  deci- 
sion of  their  Will  under  given  conditions — can  be  predicted  with 


THE    REIGN    OF    LAW    IN    THE    REALM    OF    MIND.  l8l 

almost  perfect  certainty.  Their  faculties,  few  in  number  and 
limited  in  range,  are  open  only  to  the  small  number  of  forces 
which  are  related  to  them  ;  and  in  the  absence  of  higher  facul- 
ties accessible  to  other  motives,  these  few  attractions  exert  a 
determining  effect  upon  their  Will.  (See  note  F.) 

Accordingly  we  may  see  that,  in  proportion  as  there  is  an  ap- 
proach among  the  lower  animals  to  the  higher  faculties  of 
Mind,  there  is,  in  corresponding  proportion,  a  difficulty  in  pre- 
dicting their  conduct.  Perhaps  the  best  illustration  of  this  is 
a  very  homely  one — it  is  the  effect  of  baits  and  traps.  Some 
animals  can  be  trapped  and  caught  with  perfect  certainty ; 
whilst  there  are  others  upon  which  the  motive  presented  by  a 
bait,  is  counteracted  by  the  stronger  motive  of  caution  against 
danger,  when  a  higher  degree  of  intelligence  enables  the  animal 
to  detect  its  presence.  Yet  the  Will  of  the  cunning  animal  is 
not  more  free  than  the  Will  of  the  stupid  animal, — nor  is  the 
Will  of  the  stupid  animal  more  subject  to  Law  than  the  Will  of 
the  cunning  one.  The  Will  of  the  young  Rat,  which  yields 
to  the  temptation  of  a  bait,  and  is  caught,  is  not  more  sub- 
ject to  Law  than  the  Will  of  the  old  Rat,  who  suspects  strata- 
gem, resists  the  temptation  and  escapes.  They  are  both  sub- 
ject to  Law  in  precisely  the  same  sense  and  in  precisely  the 
same  degree — that  is  to  say,  their  actions  are  alike  determined 
by  the  forces  to  which  their  faculties  are  accessible.  Where 
these  are  few  and  simple,  the  resulting  action  is  simple  also ; 
where  these  are  many  and  complicated,  the  resulting  action  has 
a  corresponding  variety.  Thus  the  conduct  of  animals  is  less 
capable  of  being  predicted  in  proportion  as  it  is  difficult  or  im- 
possible to  foresee  the  nature  or  number  of  the  motive  forces 
which  are  brought  to  bear  upon  the  Will.  Man's  Will  is  free 
in  the  same  sense,  and  in  the  same  sense  only.  It  is  subject  to 
Law  in  the  same  sense,  and  in  the  same  sense  alone.  That  is 
to  say,  it  is  subject  to  the  influence  of  motives,  and  it  can  only 
choose  among  those  which  are  presented  to  it,  or  which  the 
mind  has  been  given  the  power  of  presenting  to  itself.  (See 
note  G.) 

But  in  this  last  power  we  touch  the  secret  of  that  boundless 
difference  which  separates  Man  from  the  highest  of  the  animals 


l82  THE    REIGN    OF    LAW. 

below  him.  There  is  such  a  gulf  between  the  faculties  of  his 
mind  and  those  of  the  lower  animals,  that  the  forces  acting  on 
the  human  spirit  become,  by  comparison,  innumerable,  and  in- 
volve motives  belonging  to  a  wholly  different  class  and  order. 
He  is  exposed,  indeed,  to  the  lower  motives  in  common  with 
the  beasts.  But  there  are  others  which  operate  largely  upon 
him  which  never  can  and  never  do  operate  upon  them.  Fore- 
most among  these  are  the  motives  which  Man  has  the  power  of 
bringing  to  bear  upon  himself,  arising  out  of  his  power  of 
forming  Abstract  Ideas,  out  of  his  possession  of  Beliefs,  and, 
above  all,  out  of  his  Sense  of  Right  and  Wrong.  So  strong 
are  these  motives  that  they  are  able  constantly  to  overpower, 
and  sometimes  almost  to  destroy,  the  forces  which  are  related 
to  his  lower  faculties.  Again,  among  the  motives  which  oper- 
ate upon  him,  Man  has  a  selecting  power.  He  can,  as  it  were, 
stand  out  from  among  them, — look  down  from  above  them, — 
compare  them  among  each  other,  and  bring  them  to  the  test  of 
Conscience.  Nay,  more,  he  can  reason  on  his  own  character  as 
he  can  on  the  character  of  another  Being, — estimating  his  own 
weakness  with  reference  to  this  and  the  other  motive,  as  he  is 
conscious  how  each  may  be  likely  to  tell  upon  him.  When  he 
knows  that  any  given  motive  will  be  too  strong  for  him,  if  he 
allow  himself  to  think  of  it,  he  can  shut  it  out  from  his  mind  by 
"  keeping  the  door  of  his  thoughts."  He  can,  and  he  often 
does,  refuse  the  thing  he  sees,  and  hold  by  another  thing  which 
he  cannot  see.  He  may,  and  he  often  does,  choose  the  Invisi- 
ble in  preference  to  the  Visible.  He  may,  and  he  often  does, 
walk  by  Faith  and  not  by  Sight.  It  is  true  that  in  doing  this 
he  must  be  impelled  by  something  which  is  itself  only  another 
motive,  and  so  it  is  true  that  our  Wills  can  never  be  free  from 
motives,  and  in  this  sense  can  never  be  free  from  "  Law." 
But  this  is  only  saying  that  we  can  never  be  free  from  the 
relations  pre-established  between  the  structure  of  our  minds, 
and  the  system  of  things  in  which  they  are  formed  to  move. 
From  these,  it  is  true  indeed,  that  we  never  can  be  free.  But 
as  a  matter  of  fact,  we  know  that  these  relations  do  not  involve 
compulsion.  It  is  from  compulsion  that  our  Wills  are  free,  and 
from  nothing  else  ;  and  for  this  freedom  we  have  the  only 


THE    REIGN    OF    LAW    IN    THE    REALM    OF    MIND.  185 

evidence  we  can  ever  have  for  any  ultimate  truth  respecting 
the  powers  of  Mind — the  evidence  of  Consciousness — that  is, 
the  evidence  of  observation  turned  in  upon  ourselves. 

The  discussions  of  many  centuries  seem  to  have  resulted,  at 
last,  in  some  real  progress  upon  this  vexed  question  of  Neces- 
sity and  Free-will.  That  progress  lies  mainly  in  a  clearer  defi- 
nition of  terms.  The  most  eminent  living  philosopher  who  rep- 
resents the  doctrine,  commonly  called  the  Doctrine  of  Necessity, 
repudiates  that  name  as  incorrect,  expressly  on  the  ground 
that  the  word  Necessity,  as  commonly  applied,  signifies  com- 
pulsion. Undoubtedly  it  does ;  and  if  this  meaning  be  repudi- 
ated, then  the  word  is  not  used  in  its  ordinary  and  legitimate 
sense.  This,  indeed,  Mr.  Mill  confesses,  whilst  yet*he  casts- 
upon  his  opponents  the  blame  of  a  misunderstanding,  which 
assuredly  lies  with  those  who  do  not  employ  ordinary  words  in 
the  ordinary  signification.  "  The  truth  is,"  he  says,  "  that  the 
assailants  of  the  doctrine  (of  Necessity)  cannot  do  without  the 
associations  engendered  by  the  double  meaning  of  the  word 
Necessity,  which  in  this  application  signifies  only  invariability, 
but,  in  its  common  employment,  compulsion"  *  He  believes, 
therefore,  in  .Necessity  only  in  the  sense  of  Invariability.  But 
if  the  doctrine  which  Mr.  Mill  favors  has  suffered  from  one 
ambiguity,  it  seeks  to  shelter  itself  under  the  protection  of 
another  ambiguity  much  more  deceptive.  If  there  is  a  double 
meaning  in  the  word  Necessity  which  has  exposed  the 
Necessitarian  doctrine  to  unjust  objections,  it  is  equally  true 
that  there  is  a  double  meaning  in  the  word  Invariability 
which  lends  to  that  doctrine  an  undue  advantage.  Invaria- 
bility can  be  predicated  of  mental  action  in  this  vague  general 
sense — that  all  the  movements  of  Mind  must  invariably  arise 
from  some  motive.  But  this  is  a  kind  of  "  Invariability  "  which 
admits  of  any  amount  of  variation.  For,  as  in  the  language 
of  this  philosophy,  Necessity  does  not  mean  compulsion,  so  by 
Invariability,  as  applied  to  the  phenomena  of  Mind,  nothing 
more  is  meant  than  that,  in  respect  to  mental  action,  there  is 
an  "  abstract  possibility  of  its  being  foreseen."  "  If,"  says  Mr, 
Mill,  "  necessity  means  more  than  this  abstract  possibility  of 
being  foreseen  ;  if  it  means  any  mysterious  compulsion,  apart 

*  "  Examination  of  Sir  W.  Hamilton's  Philosophy,"  by  J.  S.  Mill,  p.  492,  note. 


184  THE    REIGN    OF    LAW. 

from  simple  invariability  of  sequence,  I  deny  it  as  strenuously 
as  any  one."  * 

But  now  let  us  insist,  as  in  such  subjects  we  are  bound  to  do, 
on  still  clearer  definitions.  We  shall  find,  in  the  first  place, 
that  the  "  abstract  possibility  of  foreseeing  mental  action  de- 
pends on  nothing  less  than  such  absolute  knowledge  of  charac- 
ter and  of  motive  as  can  belong  to  God  alone.  We  shall  then 
find,  in  the  second  place,  that  this  favorite  phrase,  "  invariability 
of  sequence,"  is  as  ambiguous  as  others  of  the  same  class.  It 
does  not  mean  that  any  particular  sequences  are  invariable,  but 
only  that  there  must  always  be  some  sequence — that  it  is  in- 
variably true  that  everything  which  happens  has  proceeded 
from  something  as  a  cause,  and  leads  to  something  as  a  conse- 
quence. But  this  is  a  proposition  which  evidently,  when  re- 
duced to  its  true  dimensions,  has  no  adverse  bearing  whatever 
on  the  doctrine  of  Free  Will.  The  "  abstract "  possibility  of 
foreseeing  mental  action  depends  on  these  two  propositions  : 
first,  that  where  all  the  conditions  of  that  action  are  constant, 
the  resulting  action  will  be  constant  also  ;  and,  secondly,  that 
absolute  and  perfect  knowledge  of  the  whole  of  those  con- 
ditions would  carry  with  it  sure  foreknowledge  also  of  the 
choice  to  which  they  lead.  But  surely  this  is  not  only  true. 
but  something  very  like  a  truism. t  There  is  nothing  to  object 
to  or  deny  in  the  doctrine,  that  if  we  knew  everything  that  de- 
termines the  conduct  of  a  man,  we  should  be  able  to  know 
what  that  conduct  will  be.  That  is  to  say,  if  we  knew  all  the 
motives  which  are  brought  by  external  agencies  to  bear  upon 
his  mind,  and  //"we  knew  all  the  other  motives  which  that  mind 
evolves  out  of  its  own  powers,  and  out  of  previously  acquired 
materials,  to  bear  upon  itself ;  and  if  we  knew  the  character 
and  disposition  of  that  mind  so  perfectly  as  to  'estimate  exactly 

*  "  Examination  of  Sir  W.  Hamilton's  Philosophy,"  p.  517.    See  Note  H. 

t  Mr.  Mansel,  following  other  philosophers  on  this  point,  reduces  the  modified 
doctrine  of  Necessity  to  this  identical  proposition,  "  that  the  prevailing  motive  pre- 
vails." Mr.  Mill's  reply  is  altogether  unsatisfactory.— Examination  of  Sir  W.  Ham- 
ilton's Philosophy^  pp.  518,  519. 

I  cannot  help  adding  here— although  the  observation  has  reference  to  another  sub- 
ject—that Mr.  Mill  appears  to  me  to  have  exposed  with  great  force  and  clearness  the 
verbal  fallacies  involved  in  Mr.  Mansel'' s  work  on  the  "  Limits  of  Religious  Thought," 
and  especially  in  the  use  he  makes  of  such  forms  of  expression  as  "  The  Absolute,'' 
''The  Infinite,"  etc  —See  the  chapter  (vii.)  on  "The  Philosophy  of  the  Conditioned, 
AS  applied  by  Mr.  Mansel  to  Religion,"  in  the  same  work. 


THE    REIGN    OF    LAW    IN    THE    REALM    OF    MIND.  185 

the  weight  it  will  allow  to  all  the  different  motives  operating 
upon  it, — then  we  should  be  able  to  predict  with  certainty  the 
resulting  course  of  conduct, 

This  is  true,  not  only  as  an  abstract  conception,  but  as  a  mat- 
ter of  experience  in  the  little  way  towards  perfect  knowledge 
along  which  we  can  ever  travel.  We  can  predict  conduct  with 
almost  perfect  certainty  when  we  know  character  with  an  equal 
measure  of  assurance,  and  when  we  know  the  influences  to  which 
that  character  will  be  exposed.  In  proportion  as  we  are  sure  of 
character,  in  the  same  proportion  we  are  sure  of  conduct.  Yet 
we  never  think  of  the  Will  being  the  less  free,  because  we  can 
predict  its  course.  What  we  know  in  such  cases  is  simply  the 
use  which,  under  given  conditions,  will  be  made  of  freedom. 
There  is  no  certainty  in  the  world  of  Physics  more  absolute 
than  some  certainties  in  the  world  of  Mind.  We  know  that  a 
humane  man  will  not  do  a  uselessly  cruel  action.  We  know 
that  an  honorable  man  will  not  do  a  base  action.  And  if  in 
such  cases  we  are  deceived  in  the  result,  we  know  that  it  is  be- 
cause we  were  ignorant  of  some  weakness  or  of  some  corrup- 
tion ;  that  is  to  say,  we  were  ignorant  of  some  elements  of  char- 
acter. But  we  never  doubt  that  if  those  had  been  known,  we 
could  have  foreseen  the  resulting  lapse.  Perfect  knowledge 
must  therefore  be  perfect  foreknowledge.  To  know  the  pres- 
ent perfectly,  is  to  know  the  future  certainly.  To  know  all  that 
is,  is  to  know  all  that  will  be.  To  know  the  heart  of  Man  com- 
pletely, is  to  know  his  conduct  completely  also  ;  for  "  out  of  the 
heart  are  the  issues  of -life."  So  far  from  this  conclusion  be- 
ing dangerous  or  hostile  to  any  part  of  the  Christian  system,  it  is 
a  conclusion  which  enables  us,  in  a  dim  way,  not  merely  to  hold 
as  a  Belief,  but  to  see  as  a  necessary  truth,  that  there  can  be  no 
chance  in  this  world, — and  how  it  is,  and  must  be,  that  to  the 
All-seeing  and  All-knowing  the  Future  is  as  open  as  the  Present 
and  the  Past.  But  none  of  these  ideas  involve  the  idea  of  com- 
pulsion ;  and  the  absence  of  compulsion  is  all  that  can  be 
meant  by  Freedom. 

And  as  by  Freedom,  we  do  not  mean  freedom  from  motives, 
so  neither  do  we  mean  that  any  of  the  phenomena  of  Mind,  any 
more  than  any  of  the  phenomena  of  Matter,  can  arise  without 
"  an  antecedent."  In  this  sense  there  is  no  contradiction  be- 


1 86  THE   REIGN   OF    LAW. 

tween  the  doctrine  of  Free  Will  and  the  amended  doctrine  of 
Necessity.  Man  is  subject  to  law  of  Causation  in  this  sense, 
"  that  his  volitions  are  not  self-caused,  but  determined  by  spirit- 
ual antecedents  in  such  sort  that  when  the  antecedents  are  the 
same,  the  volitions  will  always  be  the  same."  *  But  this  word 
"  antecedent  "  is  one  of  the  many  vague  words  in  which  meta- 
physicians delight.  The  highest  antecedents  which  we  can 
ever  trace  as  determining  conduct,  are  to  be  found  in  the  con- 
stitution of  mind  itself.  Love  is  an  antecedent,  so  is  Reverence, 
so  is  Gratitude,  so  is  the  Hunger  after  Knowledge,  so  is  the  De- 
sire of  Truth.  So  also  is  the  action  of  other  Spirits  upon  our 
own.  Higher  than  these — further  up  the  chain  of  Cause  and 
Effect — we  cannot  go.  And  yet  we  need  not  conceive  of  these 
as  "  Final  Causes,"  nor  does  the  doctrine  of  our  Free  Will  as- 
sign to  the  human  Mind  any  self-originating  power.  Man  has 
nothing  which  he  did  not  receive.  Such  freedom  as  his  Will 
possesses  has  been  given  to  him,  and  given  him,  too,  as  we  have 
dimly  seen,  by  the  employment  and  by  the  device  of  means.  It 
is  a  power  belonging  to  his  structure,  and  derived  from  Him  by 
whom  that  structure  has  been  devised. 

"  Our  Wills  are  ours,  we  know  not  how," 

The  power  which  in  health  we  possess  of  preferring  one  motive 
to  all  others,  whilst  yet  the  influence  of  those  others  may  be 
strongly  felt,  is  a  power  which,  like  every  other,  must  have  its 
own  "  antecedent " — that  is  to  say,  its  own  cause,  and  its  own 
purpose.  But  these  are  to  be  found  in  the*  Adjustment  from 
which  the  power  arises, — in  the  Mind  by  which  that  adjustment 
has  been  contrived,  and  in  the  Purposes  which  it  reveals.  The 
freedom  of  Man's  Will  is  not  more  mysterious,  when  it  is  exert- 
ed in  directing  the  Mind  to  one  motive,  and  averting  it  from 
another,  than  when  it  is  exerted  in  turning  the  Body  to  the 
right  hand  rather  than  to  the  left.f 

*  "  Mill  on  Hamilton,"  pp.  492,  493. 

t  The  whole  of  this  passage  on  Necessity  and  Free  Will  has  been  severely  criticised 
in  an  article  in  the  Dublin  Re-view  for  April  1867,  as  involving  a  practical  abandonment 
of  the  very  doctrine  which  I  profess  to  defend.  The  argument  there  maintained  seems 
to  me  altogether  erroneous  ;  and  I  have  seen  no  reason  to  alter  the  text  in  any  mate- 
rial point.  The  subject,  however,  is  so  important  in  itself,  and  so  interesting  as  regards 
the  history  of  Philosophy,  that  I  have  thought  it  right  to  deal  with  it  in  a  separate 
note  (F)  already  referred  to. 


THE    REIGN  'OF    LAW    IN    THE    REALM    OF    MIND.  187 

The  difficulty  of  reconciling,  in  one  clear  Order  of  Thought, 
the  idea  of  the  Freedom  of  our  own  Will  with  the  idea  of  Caus- 
ation, is  not  really  so  great  a  difficulty  as  the  use  of  ambitious  and 
ambiguous  language  has  made  it  appear  to  be.  There  are  two 
sentences  in  Mr.  J.  S.  Mill's  work,  on  the  Philosophy  of  Comte, 
which  afford  the  best  possible  illustration  both  of  the  true  doc- 
trine on  the  relation  in  which  Will  stands  to  Law,  and  of  the 
false  doctrine  into  which  it  may  be  merged  by  the  ambiguous 
use  of  words.  In  one  passage  Mr.  Mill  defines  the  Positive  as 
distinguished  from  the  Theological  Mode  of  Thought  to  be — 
"  that  all  phenomena,  without  exception,  are  governed  by  invari- 
able laws,  with  which  no  volitions  either  natural  or  supernatural 
interfere"*  It  is  at  least  satisfactory  to  find  in  this  sentence 
so  clear  an  avowal  that  the  idea  of  free  Divine  Volition  in  the 
region  of  the  Supernatural,  and  the  idea  of  free  Human  Volition 
in  the  region  of  the  Natural,  stand  on  the  same  ground,  are  ex- 
posed to  the  same  intellectual  difficulties,  and  are  both  equally 
denied  by  the  new  Philosophy.  But  as  a  definition  of  the 
Positive  mode  of  thought  it  stands  in  curious  contrast  with  an- 
other passage  of  the  same  work,  in  which  Mr.  Milt  says  that 
"  the  Theological  mode  of  explaining  phenomena  was  once  uni- 
versal, with  the  exception,  doubtless,  of  the  familiar  facts  which  be- 
ing even  then  seen  to  be  controllable  by  human  Will  belonged  al- 
ready to  the  Positive  Mode  of  Thought"  f 

These  two  sentences  involve,  on  the  face  of  them,  contradic- 
tory positions.  The  one  affirms  that  no  volitions  can  interfere 
with  the  laws  which  govern  phenomena,  and  that  the  recogni- 
tion of  this  is  the  very  essence  of  the  Positive  Philosophy.  The 
other  affirms  that  the  Positive  Mode  of  Thought  is  involved  in 
the  very  idea  of  facts  being  controllable  by  human  Will. 

It  is  not,  perhaps,  very  important  to  ask  which  of  these  two 
sentences  gives  the  most  accurate  description  of  the  Positive 
Philosophy  ;  but  it  is  of  much  importance  to  ask  which  of  these 
two  positions  is  nearest  to  the  truth  ?  Beyond  all  doubt,  it  is 
the  last.  If  the  Positive  Philosophy  were  content  with  the  as- 
sertion that  the  power  of  Will  over  facts  depends  on  the  invaria- 

*  "  Aug.  Comte  and  Positivism,"  p.  12. 
t  Ibid.  pp.  31,  32. 


l88  THE    REIGN    OF    LAW. 

bility  of  Laws — that  is,  on  the  constancy  of  Natural  Forces — it 
would  be  sound  enough.  And  so,  the  second  of  the  two  sent- 
ences I  have  quoted  sets  forth  the  central  idea  of  that  Philos- 
ophy in  its  most  favorable  light.  But  in  the  first  of  those  two 
sentences  we  have  a  concentration  of  all  that  is  erroneous  in 
Positivism,  and  at  the  same  time  a  typical  example  of  the  am- 
biguities and  obscurities  of  language  on  which  the  fallacies  of 
that  Philosophy  depend.  There  is  hardly  a  single  word  in  that 
sentence  which  is  not  ambiguously  used.  "  Phenomena  "  and 
"facts,"  "govern"  and  "control,"  and  "interfere  with,"  are  all 
used  in  ambiguous  senses ;  whilst,  as  usual,  the  words  "  Law  " 
and  "  Invariable,"  are  used  not  only  ambiguously,  but  unintelli- 
gibly. In  order  to  test  these  ambiguities  we  have  only  to  com- 
pare the  two  sentences  together.  "  Phenomena "  in  the  one 
sentence  seems  to  correspond  with  "facts  "  in  the  other.  Yet, 
we  have  this  result, — that  "  phenomena  "  are  governed  by  Inva- 
riable Law,  whilst  "  facts  "  are  controllable  by  human  Will.  It 
would  appear,  then,  that  the  "  phenomena  "  which  are  governed 
by  Law  cannot  be  the  same  with  the  "facts,"  which  are  con- 
trollable by  Will : — or  else,  if  they  be  the  same,  then  there  must 
be  some  essential  distinction  between  "  controlling  "  and  "  gov- 
erning." What  is  this  distinction  ?  It  is  not  defined,  or  even 
suggested.  Then,  again,  if  no  volitions  can  "interfere  with  " 
Laws,  how  can  volitions  "  control  "  facts  ?  If  Will  controls 
facts,  and  yet  can't  "  interfere  with  "  Laws,  how  is  the  control 
over  facts  exercised  ?  What  is  the  relation  between  the  Laws 
which  no  volitions  can  "  interfere  with,"  and  the  "  facts  "  which 
volitions  do  actually  "  control  ?  "  Can  Will  control  facts,  which 
again  are  governed  by  laws,  (in  some  sense  or  other)  either  by 
interfering  with  those  laws,  or  controlling  them  ? 

If  it  were  possible  to  get  any  definite  meaning  out  of  this  con- 
fusion of  words,  perhaps  it  might  be  said  that  Will  can  "  con- 
trol "  Law,  but  cannot  "  interfere  with  "  it.  There  is  at  least  a 
glimmering  of  the  truth  in  this.  But  no  man  could  gather  from 
those  two  sentences  of  Mr.  Mill  what  the  truth  is,  although, 
after  all,  the  truth  is  plain  enough  if  only  some  care  be  taken 
to  confine  definite  words  to  some  sort  of  definite  meaning.  If 
by  Laws  are  meant  the  elementary  Forces  of  Nature,  and  if  by 
"  interfering  "  with  them  is  meant  any  power  of  altering  their 


THE   REIGN    OF    LAW    IN    THE    REALM    OF    MIND.  189 

own  essential  energies — then  it  is  true  that  no  volitions  of  ours 
can  interfere  with  them.     But  then  it  cannot  be  too  often  re- 
peated that,  in  this  sense,  phenomena  are  NOT  governed  by  In 
variable  Laws ;  because  phenomena  are  never  the  result  of  in 
dividual  Forces,  but  are  always  the  result  of  the  conditions  un 
der  which  several  Forces  are  combined,  and  these   conditions 
are   always  variable.     If,  again,  "  interference "  means  or  in- 
cludes the  power  of  setting  Natural  Forces  (Laws)  to  work  un 
der  new  conditions,  then  it  is  the  reverse  of  truth  to  affirm  that 
they  cannot  be  "  interfered  "  with.     Man  controls  facts  only  be- 
cause (in  this  sense)  he  can,  and  he  does,  interfere  with  Laws. 
His  volitions  can,  and  do,  govern  those  combinations  of  Force 
which  are  the  immediate  cause  of  all  phenomena. 

There  is  no  fault  in  philosophical  discussion  more  pestilent 
than  that  of  using  common  words  in  some  technical  or  artificial 
sense,  without  any  warning  to  the  reader,  (often  apparently  with- 
out any  consciousness  on  the  part  of  the  writer,)  that  ideas  fun- 
damentally involved,  in  the  ordinary  use  of  the  word,  are  elim- 
inated and  set  aside.  We  have  seen  one  instance  of  this  in 
the  word  "  necessity,"  emptied  of  its  meaning  of  compulsion. 
We  have  another  example  in  the  use  made  of  such  words  as 
"  changeable,"  and  others  of  a  like  kind.  Thus  Mr.  Mill  * 
quotes,  with  approbation,  a  remark  of  Comte,  that  ".our  power 
of  foreseeing  phenomena,  and  our  power  of  controlling  them, 
are  the  two  things  which  destroy  the  belief  of  their  being  gov- 
erned by  changeable  Wills."  All  through  this  sentence  there 
run  the  same  confusions  which  have  been  pointed  out  in  the  two 
sentences  already  quoted.  But  there  is,  in  addition,  another  con- 
fusion which  has  a  special  bearing  on  the  subject  of  this  chap- 
ter. Phenomena  which  can  be  controlled  are  phenomena  which 
can  be  changed.  There  is  no  other  meaning  in  the  words. 
The  assertion,  therefore,  is,  that  the  changeability  of  phenom- 
ena through  human  agency  is  a  fact  which  must  destroy  our  be- 
lief in  the  changeability  of  the  human  Will  itself.  The  sent- 
ence thus  rendered  is,  of  course,  either  pure  nonsense,  or  else 
must  be  dependent  for  a  rational  sense  upon  some  artificial 
meaning  being  attached  to  the  word  "  changeable."  A  Will 
under  the  guidance  of  some  settled  principle — that  is  to  say, 

*  "  Auguste  Comte  and  Positivism,"  p.  48. 


190  THE   REIGN   OF    LAW. 

following  habitually  some  prevailing  motives — might,  by  a  cer- 
tain licence  of  language,  be  called  an  unchangeable  Will.  But 
this  has  nothing  to  do  with  that  kind  of  changeability  which 
can  alone  concern  the  power  of  altering  and  controlling  mate- 
rial phenomena.  Stability  of  character,  whether  moral  or 
purely  intellectual,  is  not  only  compatible  with  a  variable  Will, 
but  it  is  inseparably  connected  with  it.  No  man  can  pursue 
one  rule  of  conduct  under  changing  conditions  unless  he  him- 
self retains  his  own  capacities  of  change.  He  cannot  control 
phenomena  without  changing  them,  and  he  cannot  change  phe- 
nomena without  changing  his  own  course  of  action ;  and  a 
change  in  the  course  of  action  is  a  change  in  the  course  of  Will. 
That  which  is  really  at  the  bottom  of  all  this  ambiguity  of 
language,  is  a  constant  endeavor  to  get  rid  altogether  of  an 
essential  element  in  the  very  idea  of  Will, — to  reduce  it  to 
something  different  from  that  which  we  all  know  and  feel  it  to 
be.  The  word  Will  is  indeed  retained  in  the  Positive  vocabu- 
lary, but  some  other  word  is  generally  inserted  before  it,  to 
prejudice  the  common  understanding  of  it,  or  to  impart  some 
element  of  meaning  which  can  with  more  plausibility  be  de- 
nounced. Thus  the  Will  which  is  denied  in  Nature  is  often  de- 
scribed as  an  "  arbitrary  "  Will  or  a  "  capricious  "  Will.  But 
surely  thes*e  qualifying  epithets  do  but  add  to  the  confusion. 
It  is  true,  indeed,  that  the  Will  we  see  in  Nature  is  not  a  ca- 
pricious Will.  But  this  is  not  the  question.  The  question  is, 
whether  there  is,  or  is  not,  such  a  thing  possible  as  caprice  in 
Will.  If  there  be  such  a  thing  as  caprice,  then  the  existence 
of  it,  and  the  power  of  it  "  to  control  phenomena/'  cannot  be 
denied.  If  there  be  no  such  thing,  then  "  capricious  "  is  of  no 
meaning  as  an  epithet  applied  to  Will.  Caprice  implies  not 
only  changeableness,  but,  so  to  speak,  a  double  degree  of 
changeableness — a  changeableness  which  has  no  rule  or  reason 
in  its  shiftings.  It  is  a  fact  that  there  are  human  Wills  of  this 
character,  and  the  mischief  they  have  done  in  the  world  arises 
from  the  power  they  possess,  in  common  with  all  other  Wills, 
of  changing  phenomena  after  their  own  unreasonable  nature. 
The  truth  is,  that  if  the  human  Will  can  be  described  as  un- 
changeable, then  there  is  no  such  thing  as  changeability  even 
conceivable  in  thought.  There  is  no  contrast  so  absolute  be- 


THE    REIGN    OF    LAW    IN    THE    REALM    OF    MIND.  191 

tween  any  two  different  forms  of  Matter,  as  there  is  between 
two  different  states  of  the  same  Mind.  There  is  no  transition 
in  Nature  from  one  physical  condition  to  another  so  absolute 
or  so  radical  as  the  transition  to  which  human  character  is  sub- 
ject when  it  passes  under  the  power  of  new  convictions.  There 
is  no  change  like  the  change  from  hatred  to  affection,  from  vice 
to  virtue,  from  evil  to  good.  And  this  change  in  Mind  is  the 
efficient  cause  of  a  whole  cycle  of  other  changes  among  the 
phenomena  which  the  human  Will  can  and  does  alter,  regulate, 
and  control. 

There  is,  then,  not  much  real  difficulty  after  all  in  disengag- 
ing the  great  facts  of  our  own  Free  Will  from  the  verbal  con- 

o  o 

fusions  of  the  Positive  Philosophy.  Nor  will  the  same  meth- 
ods of  solution  fail  us  when  we  apply  them  to  the  further  ques- 
tion,— How  far,  and  in  what  sense,  are  our  own  volitions  them- 
selves subject  to  law — that  is,  to  the  influence  of  Adjusted 
Forces  ?  For  as  one  great  consequence  of  the  Reign  of  Law 
over  material  things  is  the  necessity  of  resorting  to  the  use  of 
appropriate  means  for  the  accomplishment  of  Purpose,  so 
does  the  same  necessity  arise  out  of  the  same  conditions  among 
the  phenomena  of  Mind.  If  we  wish  to  operate  upon  human 
action,  we  must  go  to  work  by  presenting  to  the  Will  some 
motive  tending  to  produce  the  action  we  desire.  Above  all,  if 
we  seek  to  operate  not  merely  on  individual  actions,  but  upon 
that  which  mainly  determines  conduct,  viz.  human  character, 
we  must  direct  our  efforts  to  place  that  character  under  out- 
ward conditions  which  we  know  to  have  a  favorable  effect  upon 
it.  In  the  material  world  we  should  be  powerless  to  control 
any  event  if  we  did  not  know  it  to  be  subject  to  laws — that  is, 
to  Forces  which,  though  not  liable  to  change  in  essence,  are 
subject  to  endless  change  in  combination  and  in  use.  The 
same  impotency  would  affect  us,  if  in  the  moral  world  also  defi- 
nite conditions  had  not  always  an  invariable  tendency  to  pro- 
duce certain  definite  results.  It  is  a  mere  confusion  of  thought 
and  of  language  which  confounds  the  "  invariability  "  of  "  Laws," 
either  moral  or  material,  with  the  denial  of  the  power  of  Will 
to  vary,  alter,  and  modify  in  infinite  degrees  the  course  of 
things.  It  is  the  fixedness  of  all  Forces  in  one  sense  which 
constitutes  their  infinite  pliability  in  another.  It  is  the  un- 


THE    REIGN    OF    LAW. 


changing  relation  which  they  bear  to  those  mental  faculties  by 
which  we  discover  them  and  recognize  them,  that  renders  them 
capable  of  becoming  the  supple  instruments  of  those  other 
faculties  of  Will,  of  Reason,  and  of  Contrivance  by  which  we 
can  work  them  for  altered  and  better  purposes. 


CHAPTER  VII. 

LAW     IN     POLITICS. 

AT  first  sight  it  may  be  thought  that  the  means  by  which  we 
can  operate  on  the  Wills  of  individual  men,  and  of  communities 
of  men,  are  contained  within  a  narrow  compass,  and  are  such 
as  to  be  all,  if  not  within  easy  reach,  at  least  within  easy  recog- 
nition.    And  it  is  true  that  some  methods  of  operating  on  the" 
minds  of  men  we  do  know  instinctively,  just  as  in  the  material 
world  we  know  by  the  first  rudiments  of  intelligence  how  to  ac- 
complish a  few  physical  results.     But  experience  and  observa-- 
tion  teach  us,  although  they  teach  us  very  slowly,  that  direct1 
appeals  to  the  reason,  or  direct  appeals  to  (he  feelings  of  men,, 
are  entirely  useless,  when  those  faculties  have  nofbeen  placed 
under  conditions  favorable  to  their  exercise  in  a  right  direc- 
tion.    And  as  in  the  material  world,  the  knowledge  we  have' 
acquired  of  the  powers  of  Nature,  and  of  the  methods  of  turn- 
ing them  to  use,  has  been  slowly  gained  in  the  lapse  of  ages, 
and  as  all  we  discover  does  but  reveal  how  much  we  have  yet 
to  know ;  so  in  the  immense  world  of  the  Mind  and  Character 
of  Man,  our  knowledge  of  the  methods  by  which  it  maybe  well 
and   wisely   governed,    has    advanced    only   by   slow   degrees. 
There  is  a  boundless  field  of  discovery  still  open  to  those  who 
investigate  the  laws  which  govern  the  development  of  our  na- 
ture.    When  we  look  at  the  high  degrees  of  excellence  which 
that  nature  so  often  attains  under  favorable  conditions  for  the 
growth  and  exercise  of  its  better  powers,  and  when  we  contrast 
this  with  its  stunted  and  distorted  growth  as  exhibited  among 
large  portions  of  Mankind,  it  becomes  a  question  of  deep  and 
endless  interest  to  know  how  far  these  conditions  are  subject 
to  the  control  of  Will   through   the   use  of   means.     If   such 
means  can  ever  be  devised,  it  must  be  by  knowledge,  first  of 
the  elementary  forces  which  have  a  constant  operation  on  Hu-- 
man  Character,  and  secondly  by  contrivance  in  so  combining: 


THE    REIGN    OF    LAW. 

them  as  to  make  them  operate  in  the  direction  we  desire.  And 
it  is  in  this  search  that  we  discover  the  intimate  blending  and 
inseparable  connection  between  mental  and  material  laws — that 
is,  between  the  forces  which  operate  on  the  material  frame  and 
the  forces  which  operate  on  the  Mind  and  Character  of  Man. 

And  here  we  come  on  a  great  subject — the  function  of  Hu- 
man Law  as  distinguished  from  Natural  Law.  Just  as  the  Will 
of  the  individual  can  operate  upon  itself  by  the  use  of  means, 
some  of  which  are  known  instinctively,  whilst  others  are  found 
out  by  reason  ;  so  can  the  collective  Will  of  Society  operate 
upon  the  conduct  of  its  members  in  two  ways — first,  directly  by 
authority;  and  .secondly,  indirectly  by  altering  the  conditions 
out  of  which  the  most  powerful  motives  spring.  This  last  is  a 
principle  of  government,  which  has  been  distinctly  recognized 
only  in  modern  times,  and  which  admits  of  applications  not  yet 
foreseen.  The  idea  of  founding  Human  Law  upon  the  Laws 
of  Nature,  is  an  idea  which,  though  sometimes  instinctively 
acted  upon,  was  never  systematically  entertained  in  the  ancient 
world.  Indeed,  the  true  conception  of  Natural  Law  is  one 
founded  on  the  progress  of  physical  investigation,  and  growing 
out  of  the  habits  of  scientific  thought.  It  was  long  before  Man 
came  to  apprehend  the  prevalence  of  Law  in  the  phenomena 
of  Matter;  and  it  was  still  longer  before  he  could  even  enter- 
tain the  notion  of  Natural  Law  as  applicable  to  himself.  The 
ancient  lawgivers  were  always  aiming  at  standards  of  Political 
Society,  framed  according  to  some  abstract  notions  of  their 
own  as  to  how  things  ought  to  be,  rather  than  upon  any  attempt 
to  investigate  the  constitution  of  human  nature  as  it  actually  is. 
It  was  a  mistake  in  the  science  of  Politics  analogous  to  that 
which  Bacon  complained  of  so  bitterly  in  the  science  of  Phys- 
ics. Men  were  always  trying  to  evolve  out  of  their  own  minds 
knowledge  which  could  only  be  acquired  by  patient  inquiry  into 
facts.  How  worse  than  useless  this  method  is,  received  an  il- 
lustration in  ancient  philosophy  still  more  striking  than  in  an- 
cient legislation.  Fortunately  for  mankind,  no  actual  legisla- 
tors have  ever  been  quite  so  foolish  as  some  philosophers. 
Perhaps,  all  things  considered,  the  most  odious  conceptions  of 
Human  Society  which  the  world  has  ever  seen,  were  the  con- 
ceptions of  an  intellect  certainly  among  the  loftiest  which  has 


LAW    IN   POLITICS. 

ever  exercised  its  powers  in  speculative  thought.  Plato's  Re- 
public is  an  Ideal  State,  founded  on  abstract  conceptions  of 
the  mind,  and  one  of  its  leading  ideas  is  the  destruction  of 
Family  Life,  and  the  annihilation  of  the  family  affections.  And 
yet  this  result,  odious  and  irrational  as  it  is,  was  arrived  at  from 
reasoning  which  is  not  in  itself  odious,  but  which  is  false, 
chiefly  because  it  takes  no  account  of  the  facts  of  Nature.  The 
welfare  of  the  State  was  to  be  the  one  object  of  desire  in  every 
mind.  All  separate  interests  and  affections  were  to  be  sup- 
pressed, and  amongst  these  the  very  idea  of  special  property  in 
Wife  or  Child.  The  highest  type  of  man  was  to  be  bred  by  the 
Republic  as  the  highest  type  of  dogs  and  horses  is  bred  by  an 
intelligent  owner.*  Such  are  the  humiliating  results  of  abstract 
reasoning,  pursued  in  ignorance  of  the  great  Law,  that  no  pur- 
pose can  be  attained  in  Nature  except  by  legitimate  use  of  the 
means  which  Nature  has  supplied.  For  as  in  the  material 
world,  all  her  Forces  must  be  acknowledged  and  obeyed  before 
they  can  be  made  to  serve,  so  in  the  Realm  of  Mind  there  can 
be  no  success  in  attaining  the  highest  moral  ends  until  due 
honor  has  been  assigned  to  those  motives  which  arise  out  of 
the  universal  instincts  of  our  race. 

Accordingly  it  is  remarkable  that  the  system  of  ancient  phi- 
losophy, which  for  so  many  ages  continued  to  rule  the  thoughts 
of  men — the  philosophy  of  Aristotle — owes  almost  all  the 
strength  it  has  in  Politics  as  in  other  matters,  to  occasional  and 
almost  unconscious  resort  to  the  true  methods  of  scientific 
reasoning  and  investigation.  Aristotle  founds  his  adverse  crit- 
icism on  Plato,  where  it  is  most  successful,  upon  the  actual 
facts  of  what  men,  under  specified  conditions,  naturally  do,  and 
think,  and  feel.  From  these  facts  he  argues  justly  as  to  what 
they  would  do  under  the  artificial  restrictions  of  a  theoretical 
philosophy.  When,  for  example  he  argues  against  communism, 
and  in  favor  of  private  property,  upon  the  ground  of  the  watch- 
fulness and  attention  which  self-interest  produces  in  the  con- 
duct of  business,!  and  when  he  adds,  "  It  is  unspeakable  how 
advantageous  it  is  that  a  man  oald  think  he  has  something 

*  u  The  breeding  is  regulated,  like  that  of  noble  horses  or  dogs,  by  an  intelligent 
proprietor."— Grote's  "  Plato,"  vol.  iii.  p.  203. 

t  /adTi^ov  6'  emti&aovGiv  wf  Troof  idiov  EKCLCTOV  Trpoaedpeiovrog. — "  Aristot.  Pol." 
Bk.  ii.  c.  5. 


196  THE    REIGN   OF   LAW. 

which  he  may  call  his  own,  for  it  is  by  no  means  to  no  purpose 
that  each  person  should  have  an  affection  for  him  self,  for  that 
is  natural"  *  he  touches  the  very  root  idea  of  the  modern  sci- 
ence of  Political  Economy.  He  touches  it,  but  he  does  not 
grasp  it.  It  is  a  line  of  argument  which  is  never  consistently 
maintained  ;  and  though  there  are  perpetual  appeals  to  "  na- 
ture "  —  to  that  which  is  "  natural  "  —  to  that  which  nature 
teaches  —  no  definite  meaning  can  be  attached  to  these  expres- 
sions :  and  dogmas  are  laid  down  as  "  natural  "  which  are  purely 
abstract  and  metaphysical  conceptions.  Nature  is  called  as 
a  witness,  and  then  the  witness  she  gives  is  condemned  and  put 
out  of  court.  Industry  is  occasionally  praised,  whilst  the  means 
and  the  motives  to  industry  are  systematically  despised.  The 
exercise  of  any  mechanical  employment,  or  the  following  of 
merchandise,  is  condemned  in  an  Ideal  Government  as  "  igno- 
ble and  destructive  to  virtue."t  A  maritime  situation  is  recom- 
mended, because  of  its  convenience  in  enabling  a  city  to  receive 
from  others  produce  which  its  own  country  does  not  afford,  and 
to  export  those  necessaries  of  life  of  which  it  has  more  than 
plenty.  This  looks  like  a  perception  of  the  soundest  maxims  of 
Commerce.  But  in  the  next  breath,  the  whole  richness  and 
blessing  of  Commerce,  as  an  element  of  civilization,  is  repudi- 
ated and  destroyed  by  the  stupid  and  selfish  maxim  that  a  city 
must  traffic  to  supply  its  own  wants  only,  and  not  the  wants 
of  others;  "for  those  who  make  themselves  into  an  open 
market  for  every  one,  do  it  for  the  sake  of  revenue  ;  but  if  a 
State  ought  to  have  no  part  in  this  kind  of  gain,  neither  ought 
it  to  furnish  such  a  mart."  \ 

It  is  surely  wonderful  that  such  a  mind  as  that  of  Aristotle 
should  have  supposed  that  it  was  either  possible,  or,  if  possible, 
desirable  that  the  benefits  of  traffic  should  all  be  on  one  side  ; 


*  eri  6e  Koi  Trpof  rj8ovr]v  afj.v6ffTov  bcov  diatiepet  TO  vo/iti^eiv  I6i6v  rr  p.rj  yap 
ov  adrrjv  rrfv  Trpof  avrbv  ambg  £^et  tyddav  f/cajro?,  a/U,'  can  TOVTO  (f>vci.K.6v. 
-Bk.  ii.  c.  5. 

t  ovre  fiavavcov  (3iov  ovf  ayopalov  del  (,rjv  rovt;  Tro/Urftf  •  ayevvr/q  yap  6  roiovTog 
j&'of  Kal  fl-pdf  aperyv  vTrevavrio^.—Ek.  vii.  c.  9.  In  Mr.  Congreve's  edition,  Bk.  iv. 
c.  9. 

J  amij  yap  efiTropiKT/v,  aD!  ov  rolg  d/l/loff  dfc!  elvai  rrfv  Trdhiv.  ol  6e  Trapexovreg 
<T0df  Gvrovf  Traaiv  ayopav  irpooodov  x.apiv  ravra  Trpdrrovciv  f]V  6e  /j.^  del  nokiv 
;,  ovd'  efwdpiov  del  KEKTyadai  Tocovrov.—Bk.  vii.  c.6. 


LAW    IN    POLITICS.  197 

nor  is  it  less  wonderful  that,  with  his  hands,  as  it  were,  upon  the 
spot,  and  touching  with  his  very  fingers  the  foundation-facts, 
he  should  yet  have  failed  to  feel  and  to  seize  the  great  secret 
of  modern  Political  Science — the  links  of  Natural  Consequence 
in  which  the  blessedness  of  Commerce  lies.  But  all  this  comes 
of  thinking  that  we  can  be  wiser  than  Nature,  and  of  failing  to 
see  that  every  natural  instinct  has  its  own  legitimate  field  of 
operation,  within  which  we  cannot  do  better  than  let  it  alone. 
It  comes  from  the  notion  that  we  can  arrive  at  that  which  ought 
to  be,  without  taking  any  note  of  that  which  actually  is. 

The  bondage  under  which  all  true  Science  lies  to  fact — the 
necessity  of  groping  among  the  detail  of  little  and  common 
things — this  is  a  hard  lesson  for  the  human  Intellect  to  learn — 
conscious  as  that  Intellect  is  of  its  own  great  powers — of  its  own 
high  aims — of  its  own  large  capacities  of  intuitive  understand- 
ing. But  it  is  a  lesson  which  must  be  learnt.  There  are  no 
short  cuts  in  Nature.  Her  results  are  always  attained  by  Meth- 
od. Her  purposes  are  always  worked  out  by  Law.  So  must 
ours  be.  For  our  bodies  and  our  spirits  are  both  parts  of  the 
great  Order  of  Nature  ;  and  our  Wills  can  attain  no  end,  an*d 
can  accomplish  no  design,  except  through  knowledge  and 
through  use  of  the  appropriate  and  appointed  means.  Nor  can 
those  means  be  ascertained  except  by  careful  observation,  and 
as  careful  reasoning.  It  is  a  hard  thing  to  know  all  the  forces 
which  operate  even  on  our  own  individual  minds ,  and  it  is  a 
much  harder  problem  to  understand  the  forces  which  arise  out  of 
the  complicated  conditions  of  human  society.  But  the  very  idea 
of  Natural  Law  as  affecting  mankind  is  founded  on  the  possibility 
of  tracing  in  human  nature  the  existence  and  operation  of  forces 
which  under  given  conditions  do  actually  determine  the  course 
of  human  conduct  in  particular  directions.  Amongst  these 
forces  there  are  a  certain  number  which  are  constant,  or  at  least 
so  constant  that  they  may  be  calculated  upon  as  certainly  affect- 
ing the  great  majority  of  mankind.  These  are  chiefly  the  mo- 
tives which  arise  out  of  our  physical  constitution — the  desires 
and  affections  which  are  common  to  the  race.  To  follow  these 
motives — to  be  actuated  by  them — is,  therefore,  natural.  And 
yet  to  follow  these  motives  exclusively,  may,  and  generally  does, 
lead  to  great  evils,  often  to  calamities,  sometimes  to  destruction. 


190  THE    REIGN    OF    LAW. 

How,  then,  can  these  motives  be  controlled  ?  Only  by  ap- 
pealing to  other  motives — to  forces  lying  in  the  higher  re- 
gions of  the  mind,  and  placed  there  like  the  forces  of  external 
Nature,  to  be  at  the  disposal  of  the  Intelligence  and  the  Will. 

Are,  then,  these  higher  motives  not  also  natural  ? — are  they 
above  nature  ? — are  they  supernatural  ?  It  would  really  seem 
as  if  this  were  the  idea  involved  in  the  distinction  which  is  so 
vaguely  drawn  between  that  which  is  said  to  be  natural  and  that 
which  is  said  to  be  not  natural — between  Natural  Law  and 
Positive  Institution.  Yet  Reason,  and  Conscience,  and  Fancy, 
and  Imagination,  and  Belief,  or  whatever  other  faculties  may 
direct,  wisely  or  unwisely,  the  course  of  legislation,  are  all 
equally  natural  to  Man.  They  are  all  as  much  parts  of  his  men- 
tal constitution  as  the  desires  and  instincts  to  which  the  term 
natural  is  usually  confined.  There  is  no  entravagance  of  the 
individual  Will — there  is  no  folly  of  blind  and  irrational  legisla- 
tion which  has  not  been  the  fruit  of  some  part  or  another  of 
Man's  nature.  I  dwell  on  this  only  because  it  is  important  here 
as  in  other  cases,  to  attach  a  definite  meaning  to  the  words  we 
use,  and  especially  to  a  word  which  plays  so  important  a  part  ' 
in  the  language  both  of  Philosophy  and  of  Politics. 

It  appears,  then,  that,  as  applied  to  human  conduct,  we  mean 
by  "  natural  "  conduct  that  which  men  are  prompted  to  pursue 
rather  by  instinct  and  impulse  than  by  calculation  of  conse- 
quences and  by  reason.  Human  Laws,  or  Positive  Institutions, 
as  being  the  result  of  deliberation,  stand  contrasted  with  Natural 
Law  in  this  sense,  and  in  this  sense  alone.  For  as  Reason  and 
Reflection  are  natural  to  Man,  and  are  as  important  parts  of 
his  nature  as  the  highest  of  his  instincts,  so  Laws  founded  on  a 
right  exercise  of  that  Reason  are  Natural  Laws  in  the  best  and 
highest  sense  of  all.  Laws,  however,  whether  in  this  sense 
natural  or  not — that  is,  whether  founded  on  a  right  or  a  wrong 
exercise  of  reason — are  always  intended  to  act  as  restraints  on 
the  actions  of  individuals,  and  to  interfere  with  the  motives  by 
which  their  conduct  would  be  otherwise  determined.  This  re- 
straint may  be  said  to  be  artificial  as  opposed  to  the  natural  re- 
straints of  the  individual  reason  ;  and  this,  perhaps,  is  the  dis- 
tinction most  generally  intended  when  the  natural  conduct  of 
men  is  contrasted  with  their  conduct  under  the  control  of  Posi- 


LAW    IN    POLITICS. 


I99 


tive  Institution.  But  as  the  motives  which  determine  individual 
conduct  are  not  always  reasonable  motives,  so  it  is  clear  that 
what  men  naturally  do  is  no  sure  test  either  of  what  they  ought  to 
do,  or  of  what  they  ought  to  be  allowed  to  do.  It  is  their  nature,, 
under  certain  conditions,  to  do  all  that  is  bad  and  injurious  to 
themselves  and  others.  Hence  it  is  the  most  difficult  of  all  prob- 
lems in  the  Science  of  Government  to  determine  when,  where, 
and  how  it  is  wise  to  interfere  by  the  authority  of  Law  with  the 
motives  which  are  usually  called  the  natural  motives  of  men. 
The  question  is  no  other  than  this  :  How  far  the  abuse  of 
those  motives  can  be  checked  and  resisted  by  that  public  author- 
ity whose  duty  and  function  it  is  to  place  itself  above  the  influ- 
ences which,  in  individual  men,  overpower  the  voice  of  reason 
and  of  conscience  ? 

No  more  signal  illustration  has  been  ever  given  of  the  rela- 
tion between  Natural  Law  and  Human  Law — of  the  circum- 
stances in  which  Natural  Law  may  be  trusted,  and  of  those  in 
which  it  absolutely  requires  to  be  controlled — than  the  illustra- 
tion afforded  by  the  history  of  Legislation  in  our  own  country 
within  the  present  century.  During  that  period  two  great  dis- 
coveries have  been  made  in  the  Science  of  Government  :  the 
one  is  the  immense  advantage  of  abolishing  restrictions  upon 
Trade  ;  the  other  is  the  absolute  necessity  of  imposing  restric- 
tions upon  Labor.  The  rise,  the  growth,  and  the  final  accept- 
ance of  these  two  ideas  as  the  basis  of  practical  Legislation,  is 
a  history  so  curious,  and  having  such  close  relation  to  the  sub- 
ject of  this  chapter,  that  I  propose  to  deal  with  it  somewhat  in 
detail. 

Since  the  dissolution  of  the  Greek  and  Roman  Common- 
wealths, no  nation  has  acted  on  the  one  great  error  of  all  the 
ancient  systems  of  political  philosophy — that  the  natural  desire 
of  men  for  the  accumulation  of  wealth  is  an  evil  to  be  dreaded 
and  repressed.  So  far  as  this  goes  there  is  a  sharp  and  strik- 
ing contrast  between  the  spirit  of  ancient  and  of  modern  poli- 
cy. The  great  object  of  the  ancient  policy,  says  Dugald  Stew- 
art, "  was  to  counteract  the  love  of  money  and  a  taste  for  luxu- 
ry by  positive  institutions,  and  to  maintain  in  the  great  body  of 
the  people  habits  of  frugality  and  a  seventy  of  manners.  The 
decline  of  States  is  uniformly  ascribed  by  philosophers  and 


200  THE   REIGN    OF    LAW. 

historians,  both  of  Greece  and  Rome,  to  the  influence  of  riches 
on  national  character ;  and  the  laws  of  Lycurgus,  which,  during 
a  course  of  ages,  banished  the  precious  metals  from  Sparta,  are 
proposed  by' many  of  them  as  the  most  perfect  model  of  legis- 
lation devised  by  human  wisdom.  How  opposite  to  this  is  the 
doctrine  of  modern  politicians  !  Far  from  considering  poverty 
as  an  advantage  to  a  State,  their  great  aim  is  to  open  new 
sources  of  national  opulence,  and  to  animate  the  activity  of  all 
classes  of  the  people  by  a  taste  for  the  comforts  and  accommo- 
dations of  life."  :  This  is  true,  and  has  been  true  more  or  less 
,of  all  the  modern  nations  of  the  world.  But  although  they 
never  held  the  absurd  doctrine  that  Nature  was  wrong  when 
.she  taught  men  to  desire  wealth,  they  did  hold  the  doctrine, 
hardly  less  mischievous  that  Nature  was  incompetent  to  teach 
.them  how  best  to  acquire  it.  It  would  be  difficult  to  say 
whether  the  law  of  ancient  Sparta,  prohibiting  gold  from  ever 
-coming  into  the  State,  was  worse  than  the  law  of  modern  Spain, 
which  prohibited  gold  from  ever  being  allowed  to  leave  it.  It 
is  certain  that  the  Spanish  law  was  at  least  the  more  irrational 
.of  the  two.  If  a  State  wishes  to  be  poor,  it  is  not  absurd  to 
.prohibit  the  making  of  money.  But  if  a  State  wishes  to  be 
jich,  it  is  mere  stupidity  to  prohibit  the  natural  use  of  the  me- 
dium of  exchange.  Yet  this  law  of  Spain  is  only  an  extreme 
example  of  the  system  and  the  theories  which  governed,  until 
the  other  day,  the  legislation  of  all  the  nations  of  Europe,  and 
which  still  largely  prevails  amongst  them. 

It  was  no  oratorical  exaggeration,  but  a  strict  and  literal 
description  of  the  truth,  when  Mr.  Gladstone  said  f  of  the  old 
commercial  policy  that  it  was  "  a  system  of  robbing  and  plun- 
dering ourselves."  And  how  was  it  so?  What  was  the  es- 
sence of  its  error  ?  These  questions  are  best  answered  by 
another.  What  was  the  central  idea  of  the  new  system  which 
has  superseded  the  old  one  ?  The  essential  idea  of  these  new 
opinions  cannot  be  better  given  than  in  the  words  of  Dugald 
Stewart :  "  The  great  and  leading  object  of  Adam  Smith's 
speculations  is  to  illustrate  the  provision  made  by  Nature  in 

*  "  Account  of  the  Life  and  Writings  of  Adam  Smith,"  by  Dugald  Stewart.—"  Col- 
lected Works  of  Dugald  Stewart,"  vol.  x.  p.  57. 
t  In  his  Speech  at  Glasgow,  Oct.,  1865. 


LAW    IN    POLITICS.  2OI 

the  principles  of  the  human  mind,  and  in  the  circumstances  of 
man's  external  situation,  for  a  gradual  progressive  augmenta- 
tion in  the  means  of  national  wealth ,  and  to  demonstrate 
that  the  most  effectual  plan  for  advancing  a  people  to  great- 
ness is  to  maintain  that  order  of  things  which  Nature  has 
pointed  out ;  by  allowing  every  man,  as  long  as  he  observes 
the  rules  of  justice,  to  pursue  his  own  interest  in  his  own  way, 
and  to  bring  both  his  industry  and  his  capital  into  the  freest 
competition  with  those  of  his  fellow-citizens."  * 

Adam  Smith  found  Positive  Institutions  regulating  and  re- 
stricting natural  human  action  in  two  different  directions.  There 
were  laws  restricting  free  interchange  in  the  products  of  labor : 
and  there  were  other  laws,  restricting  the  free  employment  of 
labor  itself.  He  denounced  both.  Labor  was  deprived  of  its 
natural  freedom  by  laws  forbidding  men  from  working  at  any 
skilled  labor,  unless  they  had  served  an  apprenticeship  of  a 
specified  time.  It  was  also  deprived  of  its  natural  freedom  by 
monopolies,  which  prevented  men  from  working  at  any  trade 
within  certain  localities,  unless  allowed  to  do  so  by  those  who 
had  the  exclusive  privilege.  The  first  mode  of  restriction  pre- 
vented labor  from  passing  freely  from  one  employment  to 
another,  even  in  the  same  place.  The  second  mode  of  restric- 
tion prevented  labor  passing  freely  from  place  to  place,  even 
in  the  same  trade.  Both  of  these  restrictions  were  as  mischiev- 
ous, and  as  destructive  of  their  own  object,  as  restrictions  in 
the  free  interchange  of  goods.  They  both  depended  on  the 
same  vicious  principle  of  attempting  to  obtain  by  Legislation 
results  which  would  be  more  surely  attained  by  allowing  every 
man  to  sell  his  goods  or  his  labor  when,  where,  and  how  he 
pleased.  The  labor  of  a  poor  man  was  his  capital.  He  had  a 
natural  right  to  employ  it  as  he  liked.  And  as  for  protecting 
the  community  from-  bad  or  imperfect  work,  that  would  be  best 
secured  by  unrestricted  competition.  The  natural  instincts  and 
respective  interests  of  producers  and  consumers  would  secure 
mutual  adaptation.  Perfect  freedom  of  exchange  in  goods,  the 
products  of  labor,  and  perfect  freedom  in  the  application  of 
labor  itself — this  was  the  rule  to  follow.  Natural  Law  was  the 

*  Account,  see  p.  72. 


202  THE    REIGN    OF    LAW. 

best  regulator  of  both.  Such  were  the  doctrines  of  Adam 
Smith,  then  new  in  the  world. 

It  is  not  a  little  remarkable  that,  during  {he  same  years  in 
which  Adam  Smith  was  working  out  his  memorable  Inquiry,, 
other  minds,  working  in  a  very  different  department  of  human 
thought,  were  preparing  events  which  were  to  bring  to  a  speedy 
test  how  far  these  doctrines  of  Natural  Law  were  true  absolutely,, 
or  true  only  under  limitations,  which  he  did  not  foresee.  When 
Adam  Smith  was  lecturing  with  applause  in  Glasgow  from 
the  chair  of  Moral  Philosophy,  James  Watt  was  selling  mathe- 
matical instruments  in  an  obscure  shop  within  the  precincts 
of  the  same  University.  It  may  seem  as  if  no  two  depart- 
ments of  human  thought  are^more  widely  separated  than  those 
in  which  these  two  men  were  working.  One  was  a  region  purely 
mental.  The  other  was  a  region  purely  physical.  The  one 
had  reference  to  the  Laws  of  Matter.  The  other  had  refer- 
ence to  the  Laws  of  Mind.  Yet  the  work  of  James  Watt  and 
the  work  of  Adam  Smith  were  inseparably  connected,  not  only 
as  involving  analogous  methods  of  investigation,  but  as  show- 
ing in  their  result  the  blending  and  co-operation  of  mental  and 
material  laws. 

It  was  the  labor  of  Watt  to  reduce  to  obedience,  under  the 
power  of  Mind,  one  of  the  most  tremendous  Forces  of  Nature,. 
and  this  he  did  through  many  years  of  curious  inquiry,  and 
of  laborious  contrivance.  He  found  only  a  rude  and  imperfect 
mechanism  through  which  this  great  Force  had  been  misdirected 
and  dissipated  and  lost.  He  collected  it  in  fitter  vessels  ;  he 
led  it  into  smoother  channels ;  he  opened  for  it  doors  of  pas- 
sage, through  which  the  rushing  of  its  escape  did  for  him  what 
he  wanted  it  to  do.  Other  forces,  which  before  had  conspired 
against  it,  were  so  guided  as  to  work  along  with  it,  not  only  in 
perfect  harmony,  but  in  close  alliance.  He  made,  in  shortr 
itsj  invariable  energies  subject  to  the  variable  conditions  of 
Adjustment.  And  so,  he  governed  it  and  controlled  it,  and 
handed  it  over  to  the  Human  Family  as  the  servant  of  their 
Will  forever. 

The  work  of  Adam  Smith  was  not  dissimilar  in  its  relation 
to  the  Reign  of  Law.  It  was  his  labor  to  prove  that  in  the 
rude  contrivances  of  Legislation,  due  account  had  not  been 


LAW   IN    POLITICS.  203 

taken  -of  the  natural  forces  with  which  it  had  to  deal.  He 
showed  that  among  the  very  elements  of  human  character 
there  were  instincts,  and  desires,  and  faculties  of  contrivance, 
all  of  which  by  clumsy  machinery  had  been  impeded,  and  ob- 
structed, and  diverted  from  the  channels  in  which  they  ought 
to  work.  He  could  not,  however,  test  his  reasoning  as  the 
Inventor  could,  by  continual  experiment.  He  had  to  rely  on 
abstract  reasoning,  and  on  such  verification  as  could  be  drawn 
from  the  complicated  phenomena  of  the  Body  Politic.  In  this 
respect  the  work  of  Adam  Smith  was  harder  than  the  work  of 
Watt.  And  why  it  was  harder  is  a  question  which  it  may  be 
well  to  ask.  It  is  not  surprising  that  the  methods  of  applying 
to  our  own  use  the  Powers  of  external  Nature,  should  be 
matter  of  difficult  research.  But  it  may  well  seem  strange 
that  the  forces  which  have  their  seat  within  ourselves — in  the 
Mind  and  Character  of  Man — should  be  so  unknown  to  us  as  to 
require  careful  reasoning  and  observation  before  we  know  how 
to  use  them  with  success  for  the  attainment  of  our  ends.  Yet 
so  it  is.  The  conscious  energies  of  the  Will  are  ever  tempted 
to  march  directly  upon  objects  which  can  only  be  reached  by 
circuitous  methods  of  approach.  And  so  the  Wealth  of  Na- 
tions, and  the  skill  of  Crafts,  and  the  success  of  Trade,  had 
all  been  hindered  by  the  measures  designed  for  their  protec- 
tion. The  promptings  of  individual  interest  had  been  checked 
and  thwarted  and  driven  into  channels  less  fruitful  than  those 
which  they  would  have  naturally  found. 

On  the  other  hand,  the  discovery  of  the  Steam  Engine,  like 
every  other  weapon  placed  at  the  disposal  of  Mind,  gave  a  new 
stimulus  to  the  motives,  and  a  new  form  to  the  conditions, 
by  which  the  conduct  of  thousands  was  determined.  Little 
did  the  brilliant  Professor  know  that  the  discoveries  of 
his  humble  friend  would  yet,  in  their  results,  serve  to  limit 
the  conclusions  of  his  own  Philosophy.  In  the  mean  time,' 
all  that  he  knew  of  Watt  and  of  his  personal  history  seemed 
to  be,  and  really  was,  a  signal  illustration  of  the  follies  of 
restriction.  For  no  other  reason  than  that  he  had  not  been 
born  in  Glasgow,  Watt  could  not  legally  sell  the  products  of 
his  ingenuity  and  labor  in  that  City.  The  spirit  and  the  laws 
of  corporate  monopoly  rigidly  excluded  him  ;  and  the  company 


2O4  THE   REIGN   OF   LAW. 

of  "  Hammermen  "  insisted  on  the  exclusion  being  maintained, 
for  fear  of  "  loss  and  skaith  to  the  Burgesses  and  Crafts- 
men of  Glasgow,  by  the  intrusion  of  strangers."  *  The  work- 
ing-classes themselves  were  among  the  most  strenuous  support- 
ers of  a  system  which  diminished  the  value  by  restricting  the 
area  of  their  labor.  Fortunately  the  University  had  privi- 
leges of  its  own,  which,  within  its  own  property,  excluded  the 
jurisdiction  of  a  Municipality  and  a  Craft  not  more  ignorant 
or  more  selfish  than  their  contemporaries  at  the  time.  It  may 
well  be  supposed,  that  Adam  Smith's  opinions  on  freedom  of 
labor  must  have  been  influenced  by  personal  observation  of  the 
working  of  such  laws  in  the  case  of  a  man  who,  though  still 
obscure,  was  even  then  appreciated  by  those  who  knew  him  for 
ingenuity  and  resource. 

In  looking  at  restrictions  such  as  these,  there  was  nothing 
then  to  suggest  to  Adam  Smith  the  consequences  which  might 
arise  from  the  entire  freedom  of  labor,  when  that  labor  was 
placed  under  new  conditions.  He  had  no  knowledge,  and  he 
could  then  have  no  conception,  what  these  new  conditions  were 
to  be.  Yet  they  were  being  silently  prepared  and  determined  in 
the  very  years  in  which  he  spoke  and  wrote.  His  friend  Watt 
was  a  principal  agent  in  the  great  impending  change.  But 
Watt  was  not  alone.  Other  minds  were  working  at  the  same  time 
whose  labors  were  to  match  with  a  curious  fittingness  into  his. 
Indeed,  the  work  which  was  going  on  in  those  years  is  only 
one  example  of  a  law  of  which  many  other  examples  may  be 
found.  It  is  an  order  of  facts  observable  in  the  progress  of 
Mankind,  that  long  ages  of  comparative  silence  and  inaction 
are  broken  up,  and  brought  to  an  end,  by  shorter  periods  of 
almost  preternatural  activity.  And  that  activity  is  generally 
spent  in  paths  of  investigation,  which,  though  independent,  are 
converging.  Different  minds,  pursuing  different  lines  of 
thought,  find  themselves  meeting  upon  common  ground.  Such, 
in  respect  to  literature,  was  the  period  of  the  Revival  of  Learn- 
ing :  such,  in  respect  to  Religion,  was  the  period  of  the  Reforma- 
tion :  such,  in  respect  to  the  abstract  sciences,  was  the  period 
of  Tycho  Brahe,  of  Galileo,  and  of  Kepler.  Hardly  less  mem- 
orable than  these,  certainly  not  less  powerful,  as  affecting  the 

*  Smiles'  "  Life  of  Watt,"  p.  105. 


LAW    IN    POLITICS.  205 

condition  of  society,  were  those  few  years  in  the  last  quarter 
of  the  eighteenth  century,  which  were  marked  by  such  an  ex- 
traordinary burst  of  Mechanical  Invention.  Hargreaves,  and 
Arkwright,  and  Watt,  and  Crompton,  and  Cartwright,  were  all 
contemporaries.  They  were  all  working  at  the  same  time,  and 
in  the  same  direction.  Out  of  their  inventions  there  arose  for 
the  first  time  what  is  now  known  as  the  Factory  system ;  and 
out  of  the  Factory  system  arose  a  condition  of  things  as  affect- 
ing human  labor,  which  was  entirely  new  in  the  history  of  the 
world.  The  change  thus  effected  is  a  signal  illustration  of  the 
relation  in  which  Natural  Law  stands  to  Positive  Institution  in 
the  realm  of  Mind.  Let  us  look  for  a  moment  at  its  history 
and  results. 

The  Common  Law  of  England  had  placed  no  restrictions 
upon  labor.  The  only  restrictions  which  existed  arose  either 
from  the  special  monopolies  of  Corporate  Bodies,  or  from  the 
General  Statute  of  Apprenticeship.  This  statute  had  been 
passed  in  the  reign  of  Elizabeth.  It  provided  that  no  man 
should  work  at  any  craft  on  his  own  account  until  he  had  served 
an  apprenticeship  of  seven  years.  But  the  Statute  of  Appren- 
ticeship being  in  derogation  of  common  rights,  had  always  been 
construed  strictly  by  the  Courts  of  Law ;  and  so  it  had  come  to 
pass  that  two  great  rules  of  limitation  had  been  applied  to  it. 
First,  it  was  held  to  apply  only  to  such  crafts  of  skill  as  were 
known  at  the  time  of  its  being  passed  ;  and  secondly,  it  was  held 
not  to  apply  at  all  to  rural  districts,  but  only  to  market  towns. 
From  these  two  rules  of  limitation,  it  resulted,  first,  that  all 
trades  and  employments  were  free  which  had  arisen  since  the 
commencement  of  the  seventeenth  century,  and,  secondly, 
that  even  the  older  crafts  were  free  also  if  they  were  prosecuted 
outside  the  boundaries  of  towns. 

Such  was  the  condition  of  the  law  when  the  inventions  of 
Adam  Smith's  contemporaries  brought  into  existence  employ- 
ments which  were  entirely  new,  and  opened  them  to  that  unre- 
stricted competition,  the  advantage  of  which  he  had  laid  down 
as  a  universal  doctrine. 

Spinning  and  weaving  were  not  new.  They  were  as  old  as 
the  memory  of  Mankind.  But  the  simple  mechanism  by  which 
these  arts  were  prosecuted  were  almost  equally  old,  and  had 


206  THE   REIGN    OF    LAW. 

undergone  little  change  and  little  improvement.  In  1760  the 
Spinning- Wheel,  and  the  common  Loom,  as  used  by  the  peo- 
ple of  Yorkshire,  were  little  in  advance  of  the  implements  for 
the  same  purpose  which  had  been  in  use  beyond  the  reach  of 
History.  The  Spindle  which  is  depicted  on  the  monuments  of 
Egypt  was,  until  a  few  years  ago,  familiar  in  the  Highlands. 
The  essential  feature  of  this  ancient  industry,  so  far  as  its  ef- 
fects upon  social  conditions  are  concerned,  was  that  it  was  sep- 
arate and  not  gregarious.  It  did  not  interfere  with,  but  rather 
was  congenial  to,  Family  Life,  for  thousands  of  years, 

"  Maids  at  the  Wheel,  the  Weaver  at  his  Loom, 
Sat  blithe  and  happy."  * 

But  the  pressure  of  new  necessities  had  arisen,  and  these 
could  be  met  only  by  new  inventions.  Towards  the  middle  of 
the  eighteenth  century,  the  greatest  difficulty  was  experienced 
by  weavers  and  spinners  in  England  in  maintaining  their  posi- 
tion in  the  markets  of  the  world.  It  is  curious  how  each  new 
mechanical  invention  gave  rise  to  the  necessities  out  of  which 
the  next  arose.  The  invention  of  the  Fly  Shuttle  in  weaving,  so 
early  as  1733,  seems  to  have  given  the  first  impulse  to  all  that 
followed.  By  means  of  this  invention  the  power  of  weaving 
overtook  the  power  of  spinning.  An  adequate  supply  of  yarn 
could  not  be  procured  under  the  ancient  methods  of  that  most 
ancient  industry.  New  conditions  gave  rise  to  new  motives, 
and  new  motives  called  into  play  the  latent  energies  of  Mind. 
The  time  and  the  cost  of  collecting  the  products  of  so  many 
scattered  laborers  enhanced  unduly  the  cost  of  manufacture, 
and  even  when  the  remuneration  was  reduced  to  the  lowest 
point  compatible  with  existence,  that  cost  was  still  too  high. 
Something  was  imperatively  required  to  economize  the  work  of 
human  hands — some  more  elaborate  contrivance  to  make  that 
work  go  further  than  before.  And  so  Hargreaves'  invention 
arose,  not  before  the  time.f  And  when  his  Spinning  Jenny 
had  been  invented,  a  still  more  elaborate  and  powerful  combi- 
nation of  mechanical  adjustments  was  soon  perfected  in  the 

*  Wordsworth's  noble  sonnet — 

"  Nuns  fret  not  at  their  convent's  narrow  room." 
1 1765-67. 


LAW    IN    POLITICS.  2 07 

hands  of  Arkwright.*  When  the  Spinning  Frame  was  invented, 
and  when  Crompton's  farther  invention  of  the  Mule  Jenny 
speedily  followed,f  the  new  order  of  things  had  been  fairly  in- 
augurated. The  great  change  had  come,  and  the  survivance 
of  the  ancient  domestic  industries  of  so  many  centuries  was  no 
longer  possible. 

And  just  as  Hargreaves  and  Arkwrigh't  and  Crompton  were 
inventing  the  new  machines  which  were  to  be  moved,  Watt 
was  laboring  at  the  new  Power  which  was  to  move  them.  But 
meanwhile,  before  the  Steam  Engine  had  been  made  available, 
the  Factory  system  had  begun  under  the  old  motive-power  of 
Water ;  and  here  it  is  very  curious  to  observe  how  each  stage 
in  the  progress  of  discovery  had,  by  way  of  natural  conse- 
quence, its  own  special  effect  on  the  conduct  and  the  Wills  of 
men.  Very  soon  the  course  of  every  mountain  stream  in  Lan- 
cashire and  Yorkshire  was  marked  by  Factories.  This  again 
had  another  consequence.  It  was  a  necessity  of  the  case  that 
such  Factories  must  generally  be  situated  at  a  distance  from 
pre-existing  populations,  and,  therefore,  from  a  full  supply  of 
labor.  Consequently  they  had  to  create  communities  for  them- 
selves. From  this  necessity,  again,  it  arose  that  the  earlier 
mills  were  worked  under  a  system  of  Apprenticeship.  The 
due  attendance  of  the  requisite  number  of  "hands"  was  se- 
cured by  engagements  which  bound  the  laborer  to  his  work  for 
a  definite  period. 

And  now  for  the  first  time  appeared  some  of  the  conse- 
quences of  gregarious  labor  under  the  working  of  Natural  Laws, 
and  under  no  restrictions  from  Positive  Institution.  The  mill- 
owners  collected  as  Apprentices  boys  and  girls,  and  youths  and 
men,  and  women,  of  all  ages.  In  very  many  cases  no  provision 
adequate,  or  even  decent,  was  provided  for  their  accommoda- 
tion. The  hours  of  labor  were  excessive.  The  ceaseless  and 
untiring  agency  of  machines  kept  no  reckoning  of  the  exhaus- 
tion of  human  nerves.  The  Factory  system  had  not  been  many 
years  in  operation  when  its  effects  were  seen.  A  whole  gener- 
ation were  growing  up  under  conditions  of  Physical  degener- 
acy, of  mental  ignorance,  and  of  moral  corruption. 

*  1769-71. 


208  THE   REIGN    OF    LAW. 

The  first  public  man  to  bring  it  under  the  notice  of  Parlia- 
ment with  a  view  to  remedy,  was,  to  his  immortal  honor,  a 
master  manufacturer,  to  whom  the  new  industry  had  brought 
wealth,  and  power,  and  station.  In  1802  the  elder  Sir  Robert 
Peel  was  the  first  to  introduce  a  bill  to  interfere  by  law  with  the 
natural  effects  of  unrestricted  competition  in  human  labor.  It 
is  characteristic  of  the  slow  progress  of  new  ideas  in  the  Eng- 
lish mind,  and  of  its  strong  instinct  to  adopt  no  measure  which 
does  not  stand  in  some  clear  relation  to  pre-existing  laws,  that 
Sir  Robert  Peel's  bill  was  limited  strictly  to  the  regulation  of 
the  labor  of  Apprentices.  Children  and  young  persons  who  were 
not  Apprentices  might  be  subject  to  the  same  evils,  but  for 
them  no  remedy  was  asked  or  provided.  The  notion  was,  that 
as  Apprentices  were  already  under  Statutory  provisions,  and 
were  subjects  of  a  legal  contract,  it  was  permissible  that  their 
hours  of  labor  should  be  regulated  by  positive  enactment.  But 
the  Parliament  which  was  familiar  with  restrictions  on  the  pro. 
ducts  of  labor,  and  with  restrictions  of  monopoly  on  labor  itself 
— which  restrictions  were  for  the  purpose  of  securing  supposed 
economic  benefits,  would  not  listen  to  any  proposal  to  regulate 
"free"  labor  for  the  purpose  of  avoiding  even  the  most  fright- 
ful moral  evils.  These  evils,  however  great  they  might  be, 
were  the  result  of  "  natural  laws,"  and  were  incident  to  the  per- 
sonal freedom  of  Employers  and  Employed.  In  the  case  of 
Apprentices,  however,  it  was  conceded  that  restriction  might 
be  tolerated.  And  so  through  this  narrow  door  the  first  of  the 
Factory  Acts  was  passed.  It  is  a  history  which  illustrates,  in 
the  clearest  light,  the  sense  in  which  human  conduct,  both  in- 
dividually and  collectively,  is  determined  by  Natural  Law.  If 
Watt's  Steam  Engine  had  been  invented  earlier — if  mills  had 
not  been  at  first  erected  away  from  the  centres  of  population,  in 
order  to  follow  the  course  of  streams — if  consequently  the  evils 
of  the  Factory  system  had  not  begun  to  be  observable  in  the 
labor  of  Apprentices,  there  is  no  saying  how  much  longer  those 
evils  might  have  been  allowed  to  fester  without  even  an  asser- 
tion of  the  right  to  check  them.  The  Act  of  1802,*  though 
useless  in  every  other  sense,  was  invaluable  at  least  in  making 
this  assertion. 

*  42  and  43  Geo.  III.,  cap.  73. 


LAW   IN    POLITICS. 

Meanwhile  Watt's  great  invention  had  been  completed.  And 
now  a  new  cycle  of  events  began,  arising  by  way  of  natural 
consequence  out  of  the  Reign  of  Law.  When  the  perfected 
Steam  Engine  became  applicable  to  mills,  it  was  no  longer  al- 
ways cheaper  to  erect  them  in  rural  districts ;  on  the  contrary,, 
it  was  often  cheaper  to  have  them  in  the  towns,  near  a  full  sup- 
ply of  labor,  and  a  cheap  supply  of  fuel.  With  this  change 
came  the  abandonment  of  the  system  of  Apprenticeship.  It 
was  now  "free  "  labor  which  more  and  more  supplied  the  mills. 
But  this  only  led  to  the  same  evils  in  an  aggravated  form. 
Children  and  women  were  especially  valuable  in  the  work  of 
mills.  There  were  parts  of  the  machinery  which  might  be  fed' 
by  almost  infant  "  hands."  The  earnings  of  children  became 
an  irresistible  temptation  to  the  parents.  They  were  sent  to 
the  factory  at  the  earliest  age,  and  they  worked  during  the 
whole  hours  that  the  machinery  was  kept  at  work.  The  result 
of  this  system  was  soon  apparent.  In  1815,  thirteen  years  af- 
ter he  had  obtained  the  Act  of  1802,  Sir  Robert  Peel  came 
back  to  Parliament  and  told  them  that  the  former  Act  had  be- 
come useless — that  mills  were  now  generally  worked,  not  by 
water,  but  by  steam — that  Apprentices  had  been  given  up,  but 
that  the  same  exhausting  and  demoralizing  labor,  from  which' 
Parliament  had  intended  to  relieve  Apprentices,  was  the  lot  of 
thousands  and  thousands  of  the  children  of  the  free  poor.  In  the1 
following  year,  1816,  pressing  upon  the  House  of  Commons  a 
new  measure  of  restriction,  he  added,  that  unless  the  Legislat- 
ure extended  to  these  children  the  same  protection  which  it 
had  intended  to  afford  to  the  Apprentice  class,  it  had  come  to> 
this — that  the  great  mechanical  inventions  which  were  the  glory 
of  the  age  would  be  a  curse  rather  than  a  blessing  to  the  coun- 
try. These  were  strong  words  from  a  master  manufacturer; 
but  they  were  not  more  strong  than  true.* 

Thus  began  that  great  debate  which  in  principle  maybe  said 
to  be  not  ended  yet : — the  debate,  how  far  it  is  legitimate  or  wise 
in  Positive  Institution  to  interfere  for  moral  ends  with  the  free- 
dom of  the  individual  Will  ?  Cobbett  denounced  the  opposi- 
tion to  restrictive  measures  as  a  contest  of  "  Mammon  against 

*"  Hansard  Parl.  Deb."  vols.  xxxi.  and  xxxiii.— Sir  Robert's  Speech  on  Motion  for 
a  Committee,  April  3,  1816. 
14 


•210  THE    REIGN    OF    LAW. 

Mercy."  No  doubt  personal  interests  were  strong  in  the  form- 
ing of  opinion,  and  some  indignation  was  natural  against  those 
who  seemed  to  regard  the  absolute  neglect  JJL"  a  whole  genera- 
tion, and  the  total  abandonment  of  them  to  the  debasing  effects 
of  excessive  toil,  as  nothing  compared  with  the  slightest  check 
on  the  accumulations  of  the  Warehouse.  But  the  opposition 
was  not  in  the  main  due  either  to  selfishness  or  indifference. 
False  intellectual  conceptions — false  views  both  of  principle 
and  of  fact — were  its  real  foundation.  Some  of  the  ablest  men 
in  Parliament,  who  were  wholly  unaffected  by  any  bias  of  per- 
sonal interest,  declared  that  nothing  would  induce  them  to  in- 
terfere with  the  labor  which  they  called  "free."  Had  not  the 
working  classes  a  right  to  employ  their  children  as  they  pleased  ? 
Who  were  better  able  to  judge  than  fathers  and  mothers  of  the 
capacities  of  their  children  ?  Why  interfere  for  the  protection 
of  those  who  already  had  the  best  and  most  natural  of  all  pro- 
tections ?  Such  were  some  of  the  arguments  against  interfering 
with  free  labor. 

Now  in  what  sense  was  this  labor  free  ?  It  was  free  from 
legal  compulsion — that  is  to  say,  it  was  free  from  that  kind  of 
compulsion  which  arises  out  of  the  public  Will  of  the  whole 
community  imposed  by  authority  upon  the  conduct  of  individ- 
uals. But  there  was  another  kind  of  force  from  which  this 
labor  was  not  free — the  force  of  overpowering  motive  operating 
on  the  Will  of  the  laborers  themselves.  If  one  parent,  more 
careful  than  others  of  the  welfare  of  his  children,  and  moved 
less  exclusively  by  the  desire  of  gain,  withdrew  his  children  at 
.an  earlier  hour  than  others  from  Factory  Work,  his  children 
were  liable  to  be  dismissed  and  not  employed  at  all.*  On  the 
other  hand,  motives  hardly  less  powerful  were  in  constant  oper- 
ation on  the  masters.  The  ceaseless,  and  increasing,  and  unre- 
stricted competition  amongst  themselves, — the  eagerness  with 
which  human  energies  rush  into  new  openings  for  capital,  for 
enterprise,  and  for  skill, — made  them,  as  a  class,  insensible  to 
the  frightful  evils  which  were  arising  from  that  competition  for 
the  means  of  subsistence  which  is  the  impelling  motive  of  labor. 

Nor  were  there  wanting  arguments,  founded  on  the  constancy 

*This  was  very  forcibly  explained,  both  by  Sir  Robert  and  by  his  son,  Mr.  Peel,  in 
fhe  debate  of  Feb.  23, 1818. 


LAW    IN    POLITICS.  21 1 

of  Natural  Laws,  against  any  attempt  on  the  part  of  Legislative 
authority  to  interfere  with  the  "  freedom  "  of  individual  Will. 
The  competition  between  the  possessors  of  capital  was  a  com- 
petition not  confined  to  our  own  country.  It  was  also  an  inter- 
national competition.  In  Belgium  especially,  and  in  other 
countries,  there  was  the  same  rush  along  the  new  paths  of  in- 
dustry. If  the  children's  hours  of  labor  were  curtailed,  it  would 
involve  of  necessity  a  curtailment  also  of  the  adult  labor,  which 
would  not  be  available  when  left  alone.  This  would  be  a  cur> 
tailment  of  the  working  time  of  the  whole  mill ;  and  this  would 
involve  a  corresponding  reduction  of  the  produce.  No  similar 
reduction  of  produce  would  arise  in  Foreign  mills.  In  compe- 
tition with  them  the  margin  of  profit  was  already  small.  The 
diminution  of  produce  from  restricted  labor  would  destroy  that 
margin.  Capital  would  be  driven  to  countries  where  labor  was 
still  free  from  such  restrictions,  and  the  result  would  be  more 
fatal  to  the  interest  of  the  working  classes  of  the  English  towns 
than  any  of  the  results  arising  from  the  existing  hours  of  work. 
All  these  consequences  were  represented  as  inevitable.  They 
must  arise  out  of  the  operation  of  invariable  laws. 

Such  were  the  arguments — urged  in  every  variety  of  form, 
and  supported  by  every  kind  of  statistical  detail — by  which  the 
first  Factory  Acts  were  vehemently  opposed. 

And,  indeed,  in  looking  back  at  the  debates  of  that  time,  we 
cannot  fail  to  see  that  the  reasoning  of  those  who  opposed 
restriction  on  Free  Labor  met  with  no  adequate  reply.  Not 
only  were  the  supporters  of  restriction  hampered  by  a  desire  to 
keep  their  conclusions  within  the  scope  of  a  very  limited 
measure  ;  not  only  were  they  anxious  to  repudiate  consequences 
which  did  legitimately  follow  from  their  own  premises  ;  but  they 
were  themselves  really  ignorant  of  the  fundamental  principles 
which  were  at  issue  in  the  strife.  Their  conclusions  were 
arrived  at  through  instincts  of  the  heart.  The  pale  faces  of 
little  children,  stunted  and  outworn,  carried  them  to  their  re- 
sult across  every  difficulty  of  argument,  and  in  defiance  of  the 
alleged  opposition  of  inevitable  laws.  And  yet,  if  the  support- 
ers of  the  Factory  Acts  had  only  known  it,  all  true  abstract 
argument  on  the  subject  was  their  own.  The  conclusions  to 


212  THE    REIGN    OF    LAW. 

which  they  pointed  were  as  true  in  the  light  of  Reason,  as  they 
felt  them  to  be  true  in  the  light  of  Conscience. 

The  truth  is,  that  some  of  the  finest  distinctions  in  Philos- 
ophy were  then  for  the  first  time  emerging  on  the  stage  of 
Politics.  The  newest  debates  of  Parliament  were  circling  uncon- 
sciously round  one  of  the  oldest  disputations  of  the  Schools. 
A  question  of  practical  legislation  had  arisen  which  involved 
one  of  the  most  difficult  problems  in  metaphysical  analysis.  On 
the  one  hand,  Freedom  was  asserted  for  the  Will  under  con- 
ditions and  in  a  sense  in  which  it  did  not  exist.  On  the  other 
hand,  Freedom  was  denied  to  the  Will  in  a  sense  in  which  the 
instincts  of  humanity  testified  to  its  presence,  and  to  the  possi- 
bility of  its  being  exerted  with  effect.  The  true  Doctrine  of 
Necessity  was  exemplified  in  the  conduct  of  Employers  and 
Employed — that  conduct  being  determined  in  a  wrong  direction 
by  the  force  of  overpowering  motives.  The  false  Doctrine  of 
Necessity  was  exemplified  in  the  argument,  that  this  conduct 
could  not  be  changed  under  the  force  of  higher  motives  assert- 
ing themselves  through  the  Will  of  the  Community  in  the  form 
of  Law. 

The  antagonism  which  was  and  still  is  so  often  assumed 
between  Natural  Law  and  Human  Law,  or  in  other  words 
between  Natural  Law  and  Positive  Institution,  is  an  antagonism 
which  may  indeed  exist,  and  does  very  often  exist.  But  it  is 
also  an  antagonism  which  may  be  eliminated,  and  must  be 
eliminated,  if  Legislation  is  ever  to  be  attended  with  permanent 
success.  It  is,  alas,  a  Natural  Law  that  men  should  be  thoughtless 
and  selfish,  and  reckless  of  moral  consequences,  when  they  are 
bent  exclusively  on  material  results.  But  when  the  consequences 
of  this  conduct  have  been  brought  home  to  their  convictions  by 
the  force  of  imminent  danger  or  of  actual  calamity,  it  is  a  law  not 
less  natural  that  they  should  take  alarm,  that  they  should  retrace 
their  steps,  and  that  by  walking  in  another  course  they  should 
bring  about  conditions  of  a  better  kind.  The  Laws  of  Man 
are  also  Laws  of  Nature,  when  founded  on  a  true  perception  of 
natural  tendencies  and  a  just  appreciation  of  combined  results. 
On  the  other  hand,  Human  Laws  are  at  variance  with,  or 
antagonistic  to  the  Laws  of  Nature,  when  founded  either  on 
the  desire  of  attaining  a  wrong  end,  or  on  the  attempt  to  reach 


LAW    IN   POLITICS.  213 

a  right  end  by  mistaken  means.  In  either  of  these  cases  Posi- 
tive Institution  and  Natural  Law  become  opposed,  and  thus  a 
bad  contrivance  in  Legislation,  like  a  bad  contrivance  in  me- 
chanics, comes  always  to  some  dead-lock  at  last.  Time  and 
Natural  Consequence  are  great  Teachers  in  Politics  as  in  other 
things.  Our  sins  and  our  ignorances  find  us  out.  Both  in  con- 
duct and  in  opinion  Natural  Law  is  ever  working  to  convict 
error,  to  reveal  and  to  confirm  the  truth.* 

And  so  it  was  that  the  sad  phenomena  of  Factory  labor  were 
beginning  to  indicate  the  great  difference  between  the  results 
of  perfect  freedom  of  exchange  in  the  products  of  labor  and 
the  results  of  perfect  freedom  of  competition  in  labor  itself. 
Perhaps  that  difference  ought  to  have  been  foreseen,  for  the 
cause  of  it  is  plain  enough.  There  are  certain  results  for  the 
attainment  of  which  the  natural  instincts  of  individual  men  not 
only  may  be  trusted,  but  must  be  trusted  as  the  best  and  in- 
deed the  only  guide.  There  are  other  results  of  which  as  a 
rule  those  instincts  will  take  no  heed  whatever,  and  for  the 
attainment  of  which,  if  they  are  to  be  attained  at  all.  the  higher 
faculties  of  our  nature  must  impose  their  Will  in  authoritative 
expressions  of  Human  Law.  In  all  that  wide  circle  of  opera- 
tions which  have  for  their  immediate  result  the  getting  of 
wealth,  there  is  a  sagacity  and  a  cunning  in  the  instincts  of 
labor  and  in  the  love  of  gain  compared  with  which  all  legisla- 
tive wisdom  is  ignorance  and  folly.  But  the  instincts  of  labor, 
having  for  their  conscious  purpose  the  acquisition  of  wealth, 
are  instincts  which,  under  the  stimulus  and  necessities  of 
modern  society,  are  blind  to  all  other  results  whatever.  They 
override  even  the  love  of  life;  they  silence  even  the  fear  of 
death.  Trades  in  which  the  laborers  never  reach  beyond 
middle  life — trades  in  which  the  work  is  uniformly  fatal  within 
a  few  years — trades  in  which  those  who  follow  them  are  liable 
to  loathsome  and  torturing  disease — all  are  filled  by  the  enlist- 
ment of  an  unfailing  series  of  recruits.  If,  therefore,  there  be 
some  things  desirable  or  needful  for  a  Community  other  than 
the  acquisition  of  wealth, — if  mental  ignorance,  and  physical 
degeneracy,  be  evils  dangerous  to  social  and  political  pros- 

*  4i  Opinionum  enim  commenta  delet  dies ;  naturae  judicia  confirmat."— Cicero, 
"  De  Nat.  Deor."  lib.  ii.  c.  3. 


214  THE    REIGN    OF    LAW. 

perity,  then  these  results  cannot  and  must  not  be  trusted  to  the 
instincts  of  individual  men.  And  why  ?  Because  the  few 
motives  which  bear  upon  them,  and  which  consequently  de- 
termine their  conduct,  have  become  almost  as  imperious  as  the 
motives  which  determine  the  conduct  of  the  lower  animals.  Ob- 
servers whose  duties  have  called  them  to  a  close  investigation  of 
the  facts  have  never  failed  to  be  impressed  with  those  facts  as  the 
result  of  Laws  against  which  the  individual  Will  is  unable  to  con- 
tend. Overpowering  motives  arise  out  of  the  conditions  of  society 
— out  of  the  force  of  habit — out  of  the  helplessness  of  poverty — 
out  of  the  thoughtlessness  of  wealth — out  of  the  eagerness  of 
competition — out  of  the  very  virtues  even  of  industrial  skill. 
These  constitute  an  aggregate  of  power  tending  in  one  direc- 
tion, which  make  the  resulting  action  of  Mind  as  certain  as  the 
action  of  Inanimate  Force.  "  Thus,"  says  Mr.  Baker,  one  of 
the  most  experienced  of  our  Factory  Inspectors,  "  most  of  the 
workshops  of  this  great  commercial  country  are  found  to  have 
fallen  into  the  inevitable  track  of  competitive  industry,  when  un- 
restricted by  law, — namely,  to  cheapen  prices  by  the  employ- 
ment of  women  and  children  in  the  first  instance,  and  then  to 
increase  production  by  protracted  hours  of  work,  without  much 
regard  to  age,  to  sex,  or  to  physical  capability."  This  is  the 
result  of  Nature — of  Nature,  at  least,  such  as  ours  now  is.  But 
it  is  the  result  of  that  Nature  with  all  its  nobler  powers  allowed 
to  sleep.  Power  to  control  such  evils  has  been  given  to  Man, 
and  he  is  bound  to  use  it.  "  Free  labor,  even  in  a  free  coun- 
try," as  Mr.  Baker  says,  "  requires  the  strong  arm  of  the  law 
to  protect  it  from  the  cupidity  and  ignorance  of  parents."* 
And  by  the  "  strong  arm  of  the  law  "  is  meant  nothing  but  the 
law  of  Conscience  and  of  Reason  asserting  itself  over  the  lower 
instincts  of  our  nature.  If  under  such  conditions  of  society 
higher  motives  are  ever  to  prevail,  they  must  be  supplied  from 
without,  and  must  be  imposed  in  authoritative  form  through 
the  legitimate  organs  of  Positive  Institution. f 

And  so  the  Factory  Acts  instead  of  being  excused  as  excep- 

*  "  Reports  of  the  Inspectors  of  Factories,  half-year  Oct.  1864,"  p.  84. 

t  Bad  as  the  consequences  were  of  individual  freedom  under  unrestricted  compe- 
tition in  the  case  of  labor  in  factories,  the  results  were  still  more  horrible  in  the  case 
of  labor  in  mines.  In  1842  it  was  found  absolutely  necessary  to  prohibit  altogether 
the  labor  of  women  and  young  children  in  mines  and  collieries. 


LAW    IN    POLITICS.  215 

tional,  and  pleaded  for  as  justified  only  under  extraordinary 
conditions,  ought  to  be  recognized  as  in  truth  the  first  Legisla- 
tive recognition  of  a  great  Natural  Law,  quite  as  important  as 
Freedom  of  Trade,  and  which  like  this  last,  was  yet  destined 
to  claim  for  itself  wider  and  wider  application. 

Accordingly,  since  the  year  when  the  first  Sir  Robert  Peel 
pleaded  the  cause  of  Factory  Apprentices,  there  has  been  go- 
ing on  a  double  movement  in  Legislation,  one  a  movement  of 
retreat,  the  other  a  movement  of  advance.  Step  by  step  Legis- 
lation has  retired  from  a  Province  once  considered  peculiarly 
its  own  :  step  by  step  it  has  advanced  into  another  Province 
within  which  the  Schools  of  Political  Economy  would  have  de- 
nied it  a  foot  of  ground.  Since  1802,  there  have  been  passed 
a  long  series  of  laws  removing,  one  after  another,  all  restric- 
tions which  aimed  at  guiding  the  individual  Will  in  its  sharp 
and  sagacious  pursuit  of  material  wealth.  During  the  same 
period  there  have  been  passed  another  long  series  of  Acts  im- 
posing restrictions  more  and  more  stringent  on  the  individual 
Will  in  its  blind  and  reckless  disregard  of  moral  ends.*  In 
neither  of  these  movements  was  Parliament  impelled  by  the 
light  of  reason,  but  under  the  blessed  teaching  which  belongs 
to  the  Reign  of  Law.  False  theory  and  mistaken  conduct  have 
been  found  out  by  the  working  of  Natural  Consequence.  The 
abstract  reasonings  of  Adam  Smith  had  indeed  long  before  pre- 
pared the  minds  of  a  few  to  perceive  the  true  theory  of  unre- 
stricted competition  in  the  interchange  of  goods.  But  as  it 
needed  the  practical  results  of  restriction — distress,  discontent, 
and  the  danger  of  civil  commotion — to  bring  home  to  the 
national  understanding  the  economic  error  of  the  old  commer- 
cial systems  ;  so  also  as  regards  the  grievous  results  of  unre- 

*It  was  not  till  1819  that  Sir  Robert  Peel  succeeded  in  passing  an  Act  restricting" 
the  labor  of  unapprenticed  children.  This  Act  (59  Geo.  III.  c.  66)  is  therefore,  prop- 
erly speaking,  the  first  of  the  Factory  Acts— the  first  which  affirmed  the  principle  of 
restriction  as  legitimately  applicable  to  "  Free  "  Labor.  But  this,  as  well  as  a  subse- 
quent Act  passed  in  1825,  at  the  instance  of  Sir  J.  Hobhouse,  were  practically  inopera- 
tive from  defective  enforcing  clauses.  It  was  thus  apparent  that  the  State  must 
charge  itself  not  only  with  laying  down  the  law,  but  also  with  the  duty  of  seeing  it 
obeyed.  It  was  not  till  this  great  question  was  taken  in  hand  by  Lord  Ashley  that 
any  effectual  measure  was  passed.  His  Bill  became  Law  in  1833,  as  3  and  4  Will.  IV. 
c.  103.  Nothing  but  a  stringent  system  of  Government  Inspection  was  of  any  avail 
against  the  powerful  combination  of  motives,  out  of  which  the  evils  of  the  Factory 
system  arose. 


2l6  THE    REIGN    OF    LAW. 

stricted  competition  in  human  labor,  our  only  effective  teach- 
ing has  been  that  of  hard  experience.  The  doctrines  of  Adam 
Smith,  when  applied  here,  were  a  hindrance  and  not  a  help. 
The  Political  Economists  were,  almost  to  a  man,  hostile  to  re- 
strictive legislation.  They  did  not  see  what  would  be  the  work, 
ing  of  Natural  Law  upon  the  Human  Will,  when  that  Will  was 
exposed  to  overpowering  motives  under  debased  conditions  of 
understanding  and  of  heart.  They  did  not  see  the  higher  Law 
which  Parliament  was  asserting  when  it  was  driven  by  sheer 
instinctive  horror  of  actual  results,  to  prohibit  "free  "  laborers 
from  disposing  as  they  pleased  of  the  labor  of  their  children. 

To  this  hour  the  principle  on  which  this  great  counter-move- 
•ment  rests  as.  regards  our  ideas  of  the  legitimate  province  of 
Legislation,  has  never  been  philosophically  treated.  The  Laws 
on  which  it  depends,  and  which  it  does  but  recognize,  have  never 
•been  scientifically  defined.  We  are  still  in  a  state  of  tutelage — 
advancing  with  slow  and  reluctant  steps  *  in  the  path  indicated 
by  the  teachings  of  Natural  Consequence.  The  last  Report 
on  the  Employment  of  Children  shows  that  evils  as  bad  as  ever 
existed  before  the  passing  of  the  Factory  Acts,  prevail  at  this 
.moment  among  large  classes  of  our  operative  population,  and 
demand  again,  as  imperatively  as  before,  an  authoritative  in- 
terference of  Positive  Institution  with  the  freedom  of  the  indi- 
vidual Will.  The  fact  of  such  legislation  has  indeed  gained  a 
sort  of  silent  acquiescence,  and  some  of  the  old  opponents  have 
admitted  that  their  fear  of  the  results,  in  an  economical  point 
of  view,  has  proved  erroneous.  But  there  is  still  no  clear  and 
well-grounded  intellectual  perception  of  the  deep  foundations  of 

*  The  steps  here  referred  to  are  certainly  becoming  every  year  less  slow  and  less  re- 
luctant. Since  this  work  was  published,  the  "  Factory  Acts'  Extension  Act  "  of  1867 
has  extended  the  provisions  of  those  Acts  to  all  establishments  which  employ  fifty  per- 
sons ;  and  the  u  Workshop  Regulation  Act  "  of  the  same  year,  has  carried  the  protec- 
tion of  the  law  into  the  precincts  of  "  any  room  or  place  whatever  in  which  any  handi- 
.craft  is  carried  on."  Nay  more,  it  extends  that  protection  even  to  children  who  are 
working,  not  for  wages  at  all,  but  only  "  under  a  parent."  The  principle  of  "  State 
interference  "  is  here  carried  to  its  utmost  length.  It  is  characteristic  of  the  cautious 
and  tentative  character  of  English  Legislation  that  it  becomes  gradually  committed  to 
great  general  principles,  not  through  any  perception  of  the  truth  and  value  of  those 
principles  in  the  abstract,  but  gradually,  and  through  the  compulsion  of  particular 
necessities.  And  to  the  last  possible  moment  the  general  application  of  such  princi- 
ples is  always  resisted.  But  no  argument  can  be  used  in  favor  of  compulsory  educa- 
tion, as  regards  children  in  u  workshops,"  which  is  not  equally  applicable  to  all  chil- 
dren whatever. 


LAW    IN    POLITICS.  2 17 

principle  on  which  it  rests.  Nor  is  there  among  a  large  section 
of  Politicians  any  adequate  appreciation  of  the  powerful  influ- 
ence it  has  had  in  improving  the  physical  condition  of  the  peo- 
ple, and  securing  their  contentment  with  the  Laws  under  which 
they  live. 

When,  however,  we  think  for  a  moment  of  the  frightful  nature 
of  the  evils  which  this  Legislation  has  checked,  and  which  to  a 
large  extent  it  has  remedied — when  we  recollect  the  inevitable 
connection  between  suffering  and  political  disaffection — when 
we  consider  the  great  moral  laws  which  were  being  trodden  un- 
der foot  from  mere  thoughtlessness  and  greediness — we  shall 
be  convinced  that  if,  during  the  last  fifty  years,  it  has  been  given 
to  this  country  to  make  any  progress  in  Political  Science,  that 
progress  has  been  in  nothing  happier  than  in  the  Factory  Leg- 
islation. The  names  of  those  who  strove  for  it,  and  through 
whose  faith  and  perseverance  it  was  ultimately  carried,  are,  and 
ever  will  be,  in  the  history  of  Politics,  immortal  names.  No 
Government  and  no  Minister  has  ever  done  a  greater — perhaps, 
all  things  considered,  none  has  ever  done  so  great  a  service. 
It  was  altogether  a  new  era  in  Legislation — the  adoption  of  a 
new  principle — the  establishment  of  a  new  idea.  Nor  is  that 
principle  and  that  idea  even  now  thoroughly  understood.  The 
promptings  of  individual  self-interest  are  still  relied  upon  for  the 
accomplishment  of  good  which  it  does  not  belong  to  them  even  to 
suggest,  and  which  they  can  never  be  trusted  to  pursue.  Pro- 
posals for  legislative  interference  with  a  view  to  arrest  some  of 
the  most  frightful  evils  of  Society,  are  still  constantly  opposed, 
not  by  careful  analysis  of  their  tendency,  but  by  general  asser- 
tions of  Natural  Law  as  opposed  to  all  legislation  of  the  kind. 
"  You  cannot  make  men  moral  by  Act  of  Parliament  " — such 
is  a  common  enunciation  of  Principle,  which,  like  many  others 
of  the  same  kind,  is  in  one  sense  a  truism,  and  in  every  other 
sense  a  fallacy.  It  is  true  that  neither  wealth,  nor  health,  nor 
knowledge,  nor  morality,  can  be  given  by  Act  of  Parliament. 
But  it  is  also  true  that  the  acquisition  of  one  and  of  all  of  these 
can  be  impeded  and  prevented  by  bad  laws,  as  well  as  aided 
and  encouraged  by  wise  and  appropriate  legislation. 

There  is  no  doctrine  in  Physics  more  certainly  true  than  this 
doctrine  in  Politics — that  every  practice  which  the  authority  of. 


2l8  THE    REIGN    OF    LAW. 

Society  recognizes  or  supports  has  its  own  train  of  consequences 
which,  for  evil  or  for  good,  can  be  modified  or  changed  in 
an  infinite  variety  of  degrees  according  as  that  sanction  is  given 
or  withheld.  Innumerable  illustrations  of  this  truth  will  arise, 
wherever  we  take  the  trouble  to  trace  any  social  or  political 
phenomena  through  the  sequences  of  cause  and  effect  from 
which  they  come.  Not  unfrequently  these  illustrations  are  of  a 
melancholy  kind,  and  give  us  much  to  think  of  respecting  the 
better  understanding  and  the  better  management  of  our  compli- 
cated nature.  Thus,  for  example,  there  seems  good  reason  to  be- 
lieve there  is  a  direct  relation  between  the  amount  of  life  and 
property  annually  sacrificed  by  shipwreck,  and  the  legislation 
which  recognizes  and  sanctions  Insurance  to  the  full  amount 
of  the  value  of  ship  and  cargo.  The  cause  of  this  is  obvious. 
Care  for  life  is  less  eager  and  less  wakeful  than  care  for  property. 
This  is  true  even  when  men  are  dealing  equally  with  their  own 
property,  and  with  their  own  lives.  It  is  still  more  true  when 
they  are  dealing  not  only  with  property  which  is  their  own,  but 
with  lives  which  belong  to  others.  The  inevitable  effect  of  such 
Insurance  is  therefore  to  relax  the  motives  of  self-interest,  which 
are  the  strongest  incitements  to  precaution.*  Similar  results 
appear  in  a  thousand  other  cases,  both  of  laws  still  existing, 
and  of  laws  which  have  been  repealed.  The  conduct  of  men  de- 
pends on  the  balance  of  motives  which  are  brought  to  bear  upon 
them.  In  supplying  those  motives,  external  conditions  and 
mental  character  act  and  react  upon  each  other.  Both  of  these 
can  be  affected,  and  affected  powerfully,  by  Positive  Institution. 
The  restraints  of  Positive  Institution  are  not,  however,  the 
only  means, — very  often  they  are  not  the  best  means  by  which 
to  lighten  the  overpowering  pressure  of  particular  motives  upon 
the  individual  Will.  For  as  the  Reason  and  the  Conscience  of 
the  whole  Political  Community  can  interfere  by  the  exercise  of 
authority,  so  also  may  adequate  remedies  be  found  in  the  reason 
and  the  conscience  of  Voluntary  Societies.  The  external  con- 
ditions which  tell  upon  the  individual  Will  are  themselves  very 
often  nothing  but  conditions  depending  on  the  aggregate  Will 

*  A  curious  and  instructive  Paper  upon  this  subject  has  been  published  by  Mr.  Ed- 
win Chadwick,  having  been  read  before  a  recent  meeting  of  the  Social  Science  Asso- 
ciation. 


LAW    IN    POLITICS.  2 19 

of  those  around  us  ;  and  if  upon  them,  by  any  means,  new  mo- 
tives can  be  brought  to  bear,  then  the  whole  of  those  external 
conditions  may  be  changed.  The  language  which  is  used  in  the 
name  of  Economic  Science  constantly  involves  in  this  matter 
the  same  fallacy  which  has  already  been  pointed  out  in  the  lan- 
guage used  in  the  name  of  Physical  Science.  It  is  often  said 
that  the  conduct  and  condition  of  men  are  governed  by  invari- 
able laws ;  and  the  conclusion  is  that  the  evils  which  arise  by 
way  of  natural  consequence  out  of  the  action  of  those  laws,  are 
evils  against  which  the  struggles  of  the  Will  are  hopeless.  But 
the  facts  on  which  this  conclusion  is  founded,  are,  as  usual,  in- 
accurately stated.  The  conditions  of  human  life  and  conduct, 
like  the  conditions  of  all  natural  phenomena,  are  never  governed 
by  those  separate  and  individual  forces  which  alone  are  invari- 
able, but  always  by  combinations  among  those  forces — which 
combinations  are  of  endless  variety,  and  of  endless  capability 
of  change.  Different  motives  arise  out  of  the  inborn  gifts  of 
character,  and  out  of  the  conditions  of  external  circumstance. 
It  is  true,  indeed,  that  there  are  in  the  mind  of  Man,  as  there 
are  in  Nature,  certain  forces  originally  implanted,  which  are  un- 
changeable in  this  sense,  that  they  have  an  invariable  tendency 
to  determine  conduct  in  a  particular  direction.  But  as  in  Na- 
ture we  have  a  power  of  commanding  her  elementary  forces  by 
the  methods  of  adjustment,  so  in  the  Realm  of  Mind  we  can 
operate  on  the  same  principle,  by  setting  one  motive  to  coun- 
teract another :  and  by  combination  among  many  motives,  we 
caq  influence  in  a  degree,  and  to  an  extent  as  yet  unknown, 
the  conduct  and  the  condition  of  Mankind. 

Nor  are  the  resources  of  Contrivance  limited  to  adjustment 
among  the  motives  which  arise  only  out  of  existing  conditions. 
New  motives  can  be  evoked  and  put  in  action  by  the  adopting 
of  appropriate  means.  The  mere  founding,  for  example,  of  a 
Voluntary  Society  for  any  given  purpose,  evolves  out  of  the 
primary  elements  of  human  character  a  latent  force  of  the  most 
powerful  kind  ;  namely,  the  motive — the  sentiment — the  feeling 
— the  passion  as  it  often  is,  of  the  Spirit  of  Association.  This 
is  a  passion  which  defies  analysis.  The  cynic  may  reduce 
it  to  a  form  of  selfishness — and  undoubtedly  the  identification 
of  the  interests  and  the  desires  of  Self  with  the  Society  for 


22O  THE    REIGN    OF    LAW. 

which  this  passion  is  conceived,  lies  at  its  very  root  and  is  of 
its  ver}  essence.  It  is  true,  also,  that  it  is  a  passion  so  power- 
ful as  to  need  strong  control — without  which  control  it  gener- 
ates some  of  the  very  meanest  emotions  of  the  heart.  Out 
of  it  there  has  come,  and  there  comes  again  and  again  from  age 
to  age,  a  spirit  of  hatred  even  against  good  itself,  when  that 
good  is  the  work  of  any  one  who  "  followeth  not  us."  It  is  a 
force,  nevertheless,  rooted  in  the  Nature  of  Man,  implanted 
there  as  part  of  its  constitution,  and  like  all  others  of  this  char, 
acter,  given  him  for  a  purpose,  and  having  its  own  legitimate 
field  of  operation.  Nor  is  that  field  a  narrow  one.  The  spirit 
of  Association  is  the  fountain  of  much  that  is  noblest  in  human 
character,  and  of  much  that  is  most  heroic  in  human  conduct. 
For  all  the  desires  and  aspirations  of  Self  are  not  selfish.  The 
interests  of  Self,  justly  appreciated  and  rightly  understood,  may 
be,  nay  indeed  must  be,  the  interests  also  of  other  men — of 
Society — of  Country — of  the  Church,  and  of  the  World. 

And  so  it  is  that  when  the  aim  of  any  given  Association  is  a 
high  aim,  directed  to  ends  really  good,  and  seeking  the  attain- 
ment of  them  by  just  methods  of  procedure,  the  spirit  it  evokes 
becomes  itself  a  new  "  Law  " — a  special  force  operating  power- 
fully for  good  on  the  mind  of  every  individual  subject  to  its  in- 
fluence. Some  pre-existing  motives  it  modifies — some  it  neu- 
tralizes— some  it  suppresses  altogether — some  it  compels  to 
work  in  new  directions.  But  in  all  cases  the  Spirit  of  Associa- 
tion is  in  itself  a  power — a  force — a  Law  in  the  Realm  of  Mind. 
What  it  can  do,  and  what  it  cannot  do,  in  affecting  the  condi- 
tions of  Society,  is  a  problem  not  to  be  solved  so  easily  and  so 
summarily  as  some  dogmatists  in  political  philosophy  would 
have  us  to  believe.  It  is  a  question  which,  like  so  many  others, 
is  not  likely  to  be  solved  by  abstract  reasoning  without  the  help 
of  actual  experiment.  And  this  experiment  is  being  tried. 
The  instincts  of  men,  truer  often  than  the  conclusions  of  phi- 
losophy, have  rebelled  against  the  doctrine  that  they  are  the 
sport  of  circumstances.  Yet  finding  by  hard  experience  that 
this  is  often  true  of  the  individual  Will  when  standing  by 
itself,  they  have  resolved  to  try  whether  it  is  equally  true  of 
the  Collective  Will,  guided  by  the  spirit  and  strengthened  un- 
der the  discipline  of  Association.  Hence  the  phenomena  of 


LAW    IN    POLITICS.  221 

Combination  as  a  means  of  affecting  the  condition  of  labor — 
phenomena  so  alarming  to  many  minds,  and  certainly  so  well 
deserving  of  attention.  Let  us  look  for  a  moment  at  the  im- 
portant illustrations  of  the  Reign  of  Law  which  these  phe- 
nomena afford. 

A  moment's  consideration  will  convince  us  that  the  same 
necessities  of  labor  which  were  found  to  determine  so  fatally 
the  condition  of  women  and  children,  are  necessities  which 
apply  without  any  abatement  to  the  labor  of  adult  men.  They 
must  be  subject  to  the  same  pressure  of  inducements.  Nay, 
more,  it  is  only  through  them  that  this  pressure  can  reach  the 
women  who  are  their  wives,  and  the  children  who  are  their 
children.  If  overpowering  motives  did  not  equally  determine 
the  conduct  and  condition  of  adult  men,  no  legislation  would 
have  been  required  for  the  protection  of  their  families.  If  a 
man  is  placed  under  such  conditions  that  he  cannot  save  his 
wife  and  child  from  exhausting  labor,  it  is  certain  that  the  same 
conditions  will  impose  a  like  necessity  upon  himself.  Never- 
theless, Parliament  has  resolutely  and  wisely  refused  to  inter- 
fere on  his  behalf.  And  why  ?  Because  the  argument  is  that 
the  adult  man  is  able,  or  ought  to  be  able,  to  defend  himself. 
And  so  he  can  ;  but  how  ?  Only  by  combination.  The  "  law  " 
which  results  in  excessive  labor  is  the  law  of  competition — that 
is,  it  is  the  attraction  exerted  upon  the  Wills  of  a  multitude 
of  individual  men  by  the  rewards  of  labor.  The  pressure  of 
this  attraction  can  only  be  lightened  by  bringing  those  Wills 
under  the  power  of  counter  motives,  which  may  induce  them  to 
postpone,  to  some  higher  interest,  the  immediate  appetites  of 
gain.  And  this  is  the  work  which  Combination  does.  It  comes 
in  the  place  of  Positive  Institution.  Those  who  are  under  it 
"  are  a  Law  unto  themselves." 

Nor  is  it  unimportant  to  observe  that  what  Combination 
does  for  the  protection  of  labor,  it  does  better,  and  with  better 
consequences,  than  Positive  Institution  can  ever  do.  Men  are 
driven  to  excessive  labor,  because  if  they  don't  work  exces- 
sively, others  will.  But  it  is  the  effect  of  Combination  that 
others  won't.  Under  Positive  Institution  they  are  not  allowed. 
Under  Combination  they  are  determined  not.  And  as  the 
forming  of  an  intelligent  resolution,  and  the  abiding  by  it,  are 


222  THE    REIGN    OF    LAW. 

higher  exercises  of  mind  than  the  mere  passive  obedience 
to  authority,  .so  is  the  good  effected  by  Combination  a  higher 
good  than  that  resulting  from  Factory  Legislation.  It  tends 
to  form  and  to  strengthen  character.  It  tends  to  subordi- 
nate the  present  to  the  future,  and  the  temporary  interests  of 
Self  to  the  permanent  welfare  of  a  Brotherhood  of  men.  And 
this  it  tends  to  do  in  classes  otherwise  prone  to  follow  only 
the  impulse  of  the  moment,  and  to  consider  only  the  apparent 
interests  of  the  individual. 

These  considerations  should  disabuse  our  minds  of  the  un- 
just and  unreasonable  prejudice  against  the  principle  of  Com- 
bination which  still  betrays  itself  so  strongly  in  the  language  of 
many  politicians.  When  the  Working  Classes  combine  for  the 
protection  of  their  own  labor  against  the  effects  of  unrestricted 
competition,  they  are  simply  taking  that  course  which  is  recom- 
mended alike  by  reason  and  by  experience.  It  is  the  course 
which  Parliament  has  indicated  as  the  right  course  both  by 
what  it  has  itself  done,  and  by  what  it  has  declined  to  do.  Nor 
can  there  be  any  greater  mistake  than  to  suppose  that  this 
course  involves  necessarily  any  rebellion  against  the  laws  of 
economic  science.  Combination  is  an  appeal  to  the  most 
fundamental  of  all  Natural  Laws — to  the  law  of  Contriv- 
ance— to  the  power  of  Adjustment — wielding,  through  Reason 
and  Conscience,  the  elementary  forces  of  Human  Character. 
Of  the  constancy  and  "  invariability  "  of  these  no  doubt  or  de- 
nial is  involved.  Rather  the  reverse.  It  is  upon  instinctive 
trust  in  that  constancy  that  all  social  and  political  Contriv- 
ance rests.  And  so  we  need  not  be  surprised  to  find  that, 
through  the  organized  efforts  of  communities  of  men,  the 
evils  which  arise  by  way  of  natural  consequence  out  of  the 
helplessness  and  thoughtlessness  of  the  individual  Will,  are 
evils  which  to  a  large  extent  can  be  met  and  overcome. 

But  though  all  this  is  true,  universally,  of  the  principle  of 
Combination,  it  is  vary  far  from  being  true,  universally,  of  the 
particular  purposes  to  which  Combination  is  applied.  All  the 
sources  of  error  which  have  so  long  perverted  Legislation,  are 
equally  powerful  in  perverting  the  aims,  and  in  misdirecting  the 
efforts  of  Voluntary  Association.  If  the  upper  classes,  with  all 
the  advantages  of  leisure,  and  of  culture,  and  of  learning, 


LAW    IN    POLITICS.  223 

have  been  so  unable,  as  we  have  seen  them  to  be,  to  measure 
the  effect  of  the  laws  they  made,  how  much  more  must  we  ex- 
pect errors  and  misconceptions  of  the  most  grievous  kind  to 
beset  the  action  of  those  who — through  poverty  and  ignorance, 
and  often  through  much  suffering — have  been  able  to  do  little 
more  than  strike  blindly  against  evils  whose  pressure  they  could 
feel,  but  whose  root  and  remedy  they  could  neither  see  nor 
understand  ? 

Accordingly,  the  history  of  Combination  among  the  Working 
Classes  has,  until  a  very  recent  period,  been  a  sad  history  of 
misdirected  effort — of  strength  put  forth  only  in  violence  and 
disorder,  and  of  the  virtues  of  Brotherhood  lost  in  tyrannical 
suppression  of  all  individual  freedom.  Its  heaviest  blows 
have  been  often  aimed  at  the  most  powerful  agencies  for  good. 
One  of  the  very  earliest  forms  of  Combination  has  been  that 
which  was  directed  against  the  introduction  and  improvements 
of  machinery.  The  Working  Classes  have  always  encountered 
with  jealousy  and  fear  those  triumphs  of  Mechanical  Invention 
whose  function  it  is  to  economize  labor  and  to  multiply  the 
fruits  of  industry,  It  would  be  hard  to  blame  them.  What 
class  is  there  which  can  say  with  truth  that  they  have  themselves 
been  able  always  to  follow  with  intelligent  foresight  the  links 
of  Natural  Consequence  through  the  darkness  into  which  they 
so  often  lead  ?  For  almost  every  great  step  in  the  advance  of 
civilization  plunges  at  first  through  some  passage  which  seems 
dangerous,  or  at  least  obscure.  The  happiest  achievements  of 
Contrivance  have  their  own  aspects  of  apparent  danger,  and 
their  own  real  incidents  of  temporary  evil.  Every  new  machine 
displaces  and  disorganizes  pre-existing  forms  of  labor ;  and  we 
have  seen  that,  even  in  its  ultimate  effects,  the  advance  of 
Mechanical  Invention  developed  new  dangers  to  the  Working 
Classes — dangers  only  to  be  avoided  by  measures  which  were 
not  taken,  and  by  precautions  which  were  not  adopted. 

It  would  be  well  if,  from  the  past  convicted  errors,  both  of 
Legislation  and  of  Combination,  we  could  extract  some  con- 
clusions of  general  principle  capable  of  helping  us  in  the 
difficulties  of  our  own  time.  In  looking  at  the  root  of  those 
errors,  it  would  seem  that,  in  order  to  avoid  them,  two  things 
are  necessary — first,  unshaken  faith  in  great  Natural  Lawsj 


224  THE    REIGN    OF    LAW. 

and,  secondly,  a  faith  not  less  assured  in  the  free  agency  of 
Man  to  secure  by  appropriate  means  the  working  of  those  laws 
for  good.  Thus,  the  love  of  gain  is  an  instinct  implanted  in 
the  human  mind,  and  the  endeavor  to  suppress  it  has  always 
been  the  violation  of  a  Natural  Law.  In  like  manner,  Mechan- 
ical Invention  is  a  Law  of  Nature  in  the  highest  and  strictest 
sense.  The  power  of  it  and  the  love  of  it  are  among  the 
elementary  forces  of  human  character.  Each  fresh  exertion 
of  it  is,  and  must  be,  according  to  the  constitution  and  course 
of  Nature — leading  to  higher  and  higher  fulfilments  of  the 
original  Purpose  of  Man's  Creation,  which  was,  that  he  should 
not  only  inhabit  the  Earth,  as  the  beasts  inhabit  it,  but  that  he 
should  subdue  it. 

So  also  combination  is  natural  to  Man.  The  desire  for  it 
and  the  need  of  it,  grow  with  the  growth  of  knowledge  and 
with  the  increasing  complications  of  Society.  It  has  now,  for 
the  most  part,  emerged  from  the  stage  of  rude  ignorance  which 
led  to  the  breaking  of  machinery.  It  is  conducted,  compara- 
tively at  least,  with  high  intelligence,  and  aims  for  the  most 
part  at  legitimate  objects  of  desire.  Yet  in  the  rebellion  which 
has  been  roused  against  the  doctrines  of  Necessity,  founded  on 
false  conceptions  of  Invariable  Law,  there  is  a  constant  danger 
lest  the  Spirit  of  Association  should  attempt  to  act  against 
Nature  instead  of  acting  with  it.  There  is,  for  example,  a  Law 
— an  observed  order  of  facts — in  respect  to  Man,  which  the 
working  Classes  too  often  forget,  but  which  can  neither  be 
violated  nor  neglected  with  impunity.  That  Law  is  the  Law  of 
inequality — the  various  degrees  in  which  the  gifts  both  of  Body 
and  of  Mind  are  shared  among  men.  This  is  one  of  the  most 
fundamental  facts  of  human  nature.  Nor  is  it  difficult  to  see 
how  it  should  be  also  one  of  the  most  beneficent.  But  it  is  a 
fact  against  which  the  spirit  of  combination  is  very  apt  to 
assume  an  attitude  of  permanent  insurrection.  It  is,  of  course, 
the  business  and  the  function  of  Combination  to  subordinate  in 
some  things  the  Individual  to  the  Class ;  and  the  temptation  is 
to  make  that  subordination  exclusive  and  complete.  Hence 
the  jealousy  so  often  shown  of  wages  measured  by  the  amount 
of  work  performed.  This  is  a  jealousy  of  the  superiority  of 
reward  which  is  naturally  due  to  superiority  of  power,  of  indus- 


LAW    IN    POLITICS. 


22S 


try,  or  of  skill.  But  these  are  things  which  God  has  joined  to- 
gether, and  which  no  man  or  combination  of  men  have  a  right 
to  put  asunder.  It  is  a  marriage  made  in  the  morning  of  the 
world,  and  in  every  step  of  human  progress  we  see  its  blessing 
and  its  fruit.  If  it  be  stupid  to  break  machines  and  to  pro- 
scribe Mechanical  Invention,  it  is  not  less  stupid  to  be  jealous 
of  this  primeval  adjustment  between  the  varying  energies  of 
human  character  and  the  varying  results  which  they  are  com- 
petent to  attain. 

This  is  not  the  place  to  enter  in  detail  on  the  difficult  and 
complicated  question  as  to  the  limits  within  which  Combina- 
tions can,  and  beyond  which  they  cannot,  affect  the  rewards  of 
labor.  They  have  certainly  succeeded  in  limiting  the  hours 
of  labor  in  cases  where  Legislation  could  not  well  have  inter- 
fered ;  *  and  wherever  the  hours  of  labor  are  reduced  without  a 
corresponding  reduction  in  wages,  a  substantial  economic  advan- 
tage is  unquestionably  secured.  Equal  confidence  is  expressed 
by  many  Associations,  that  as  a  matter  of  experience  and  of  fact, 
they  have  succeeded  in  establishing  higher  rates  of  wages  than 
would  have  accrued  under  the  system  of  unrestricted  competi- 
tion. This  may  very  well  be  true.  It  is  a  truth  which  casts  no 
doubt  whatever  on  the  invariability  of  Economic  Laws  when 
these  are  rightly  understood.  They  are  invariable  in  the  same 
sense,  and  in  no  other,  in  which  all  other  Natural  Laws  are  in- 
variable. That  is  to  say,  they  represent  tendencies  in  human 
character  determined  by  motives,  which  tendencies  are  con- 
stant, and  may  surely  be  relied  on  as  producing  always,  under 
like  conditions,  their  own  appropriate  effects.  It  is  upon  this 
constancy  that  Combination  must  rely  for  any  power  it  can 
ever  have  ;  and  it  is  the  same  constancy  in  the  action  of 
specific  motives  which  sets  bounds  to  the  power  of  Combina- 
tion, beyond  which  it  can  never  pass.  The  same  motive  which 
impels  the  Workman  to  secure  an  adequate  reward  for  his 

*  Of  this  the  Baking  Trade  is  a  good  example.  The  hours  of  adult  labor  in  this, 
trade,  under  the  effects  of  unrestricted  competition,  had  come  to  be  most  injurious 
and  oppressive.  In  Glasgow  and  in  Edinburgh  this  condition  of  things  has  been- 
effectually  remedied  by  a  Combination,  whose  exertions  were  successful,  without  (I 
believe)  resort  being  ever  had  to  the  extreme  measure  of  a  Strike.  The  Baking  Trade 
in  London  is  still  afflicted  by  the  same  oppressive  hours  of  labor,  because  of  the 
difficulty  which  has  hitherto  been  experienced  in  organizing  there  any  Combination 
equally  complete 
I? 


226  THE    REIGN    OF    LAW. 

labor,  impels  the  Manufacturer  or  the  Trader  to  secure  an 
adequate  reward  for  his  capital,  his  knowledge,  and  his  skill. 
And  although  the  desire  of  gain  is  not  the  only  motive,  and  is 
often  not  the  strongest  motive,  which  impels  men  to  persevere 
in  enterprises  once  begun,  yet  if  Combinations  of  Workmen 
should  attempt  to  raise  wages  so  high  as  to  trench  upon  the 
minimum  rate  of  profit  which  will  induce  men  to  carry  on  any 
given  trade,  then  by  a  natural  consequence,  not  less  certain  than 
any  other,  capital  and  enterprise  and  skill  will  be  withdrawn 
from  that  trade,  and  those  who  depend  upon  it  will  be  the  first 
to  suffer.  Short,  however,  of  this  extreme  result,  there  is 
generally  a  margin  of  ground  upon  which  Combination  may 
act  with  more  or  less  effect.  It  may  prevent  arbitrary  or 
capricious  changes  ;  and  as  there  are  practically  many  impedi- 
ments in  the  way  of  men  moving  their  capital  from  one  employ- 
ment to  another,  Combination  may  compel  them  to  submit  to 
lower  rates  of  profit  than  would  otherwise  content  them  if  those 
difficulties  did  not  exist. 

But  to  all  these  possibilities  of  influence  there  is  a  limit  in  the 
nature  of  things — in  Natural  Laws — that  is,  in  the  new  motives 
which  are  brought  into  operation  by  new  conditions.  What  that 
limit  is,  it  must  always  be  difficult  to  determine  except  by  actual 
experiment.  It  is  enough  here  to  observe  that  in  this,  as  in 
every  other  department  of  human  conduct,  men  are  being  led 
gradually  to  a  knowledge  of  the  truth  by  the  teachings  of  Nat- 
ural Consequence.  It  is  by  the  experience  of  actual  results  that 
we  are  taught  both  as  to  the  objects  which  are  legitimate  objects 
of  desire,  and  as  to  the  proper  methods  by  which  these  may  be 
attained.  The  very  attempt  of  the  Working  Classes  to  govern 
through  Combination  their  own  affairs,  and  to  determine  their 
own  condition,  is  an  Education  in  itself.  On  the  extended  scale 
in  which  that  attempt  is  being  made,  it  must  accustom  them  to 
consider  great  general  causes,  and  to  estimate  the  manner  and 
the  degree  in  which  these  can  be  effected  by  the  methods  of 
Adjustment.  Last,  not  least,  it  must  lead  them  to  study  and  to 
recognize  the  moral  duties  which  are  indeed  the  most  funda- 
mental of  all  Natural  Laws.  For  it  ought  to  be  remembered, 
that  the  first  and  most  important  object  of  Combinations  is  one 
against  which  there  can  be  no  opposition  founded  on  the  doc- 


LAW    IN    POLITICS.  227 

trines  of  Economic  Science.  That  object  is  to  secure  for  the 
Working  Classes  those  provisions  against  misfortune,  sickness, 
accident,  and  age,  which  are  amongst  the  first  duties  of  all  or- 
ganized societies  of  men.  How  far  through  such  agency  the 
causes  of  pauperism  may  be  successfully  attacked,  is  a  question 
on  which  we  are  only  entering.  In  like  manner,  the  conditions 
and  limitations  under  which  Combination  may  succeed  in  blend- 
ing the  functions  and  in  uniting  the  profits  of  Capital  and  of 
Labor — this  also  is  a  question  to  be  determined  by  Natural 
Laws,  not  yet  fully  explored  or  understood.  But  enough  is 
known,  and  results  sufficiently  determinate  have  already  been 
secured,  to  convince  us  that  in  this  great  department  of  Natural 
Law,  as  in  every  other,  the  Will  of  Man  is  not  powerless  when 
its  energies  are  directed  by  wisdom,  and  when  the  choice  of  its 
methods  is  founded  upon  knowledge. 

This  is,  indeed,  the  great  lesson  to  be  learnt  from  every  in- 
quiry into  the  constitution  and  course  of  things.  Nature  is  a 
great  Armory  of  weapons,  and  implements,  for  the  service  and 
the  use  of  Will.  Many  of  them  are  too  ponderous  for  Man  to 
wield.  He  can  only  look  with  awe  on  the  tremendous  Forces 
which  are  everywhere  seen  yoked  under  the  conditions  of  Ad- 
justment— on  the  smoothness  of  their  motions, — on  the  magni- 
tude and  the  minuteness,  on  the  silence  and  the  perfection,  of 
their  work.  But  there  are  also  many  weapons  hung  upon  the 
walls  which  lend  themselves  to  human  hands — lesser  tools  which 
Man  can  use.  He  cannot  alter  or  modify  them  in  shape  or 
pattern — in  quality,  or  in  power.  The  fashion  of  them  and  the 
nature  of  them  are  fixed  forever.  These  are,  indeed,  invariable. 
Only  if  we  know  how  to  use  them,  then  that  use  is  ours.  Then 
also  the  lesser  contrivances  which  we  can  set  in  motion  are  ever 
found  to  work  in  perfect  harmony  with  the  vaster  mechanisms 
which  are  moving  overhead.  And  as  in  the  material  world  no 
effort  gives  so  fully  the  sense  of  work  achieved  as  the  subjuga- 
tion of  some  Natural  Force  under  the  command  of  Will,  so  in 
the  world  of  Mind  no  triumphs  of  the  Spirit  are  happier  than 
those  by  which  some  natural  tendency  of  Human  Character  is 
led  to  the  accomplishment  of  a  purpose  which  is  wise  and  good. 
It  is  for  the  gaining  of  these  triumphs  that  Man  has  been  gifted 
with  the  desire  of  Knowledge,  and  with  the  sense  of  Right, 


228  THE    REIGN    OF    LAW. 

and  with  the  faculties  of  Contrivance.  In  such  triumphs  lie  the 
aim  and  purpose  of  all  Natural  Laws — for  these  they  were  all 
established — for  these  they  all  work,  whether  by  way  of  encour- 
agement, or  of  restraint,  or  of  retribution. 

Nothing  is  more  striking  in  the  history  of  Discovery  than  the 
ages  during  which  men  have  been  blind  to  the  suggestions  of 
Natural  Law — suggestions  which  now  appear  so  obvious  that 
we  wonder  how  the  interpretation  of  them  could  have  been 
missed  so  long.  It  is  very  easy  to  feel  this  wonder  concerning 
others  ;  it  is  much  more  difficult  to  remember  that  the  same  won- 
der will  certainly  be  felt  concerning  ourselves.  Such  as  we  now 
see  to  have  been  the  position  of  former  generations  in  respect 
to  things  which  they  failed  to  understand, — such,  we  may  de- 
pend upon  it,  is  precisely  our  own  position  in  regard  to  innumer- 
able phenomena  now  constantly  passing  before  our  eyes.  We 
may  be  sure  of  this ;  and  we  ought  to  be  as  glad  of  it  as  we  are 
sure.  For  the  world  is  not  so  prosperous  or  so  happy  as  that  we 
should  readily  or  willingly  believe  in  the  exhaustion  of  the  means 
which  are  at  our  disposal  for  its  better  guidance.  Especially  in 
the  great  Science  of  Politics,  which  investigates  the  complicated 
forces  whose  action  and  reaction  determine  the  condition  of  Or- 
ganized Societies  of  men,  we  are  still  standing,  as  it  were,  only 
at  the  break  of  day.  Our  command  over  the  external  elements 
of  Nature  is,  beyond  all  comparison,  in  advance  of  our  com- 
mand over  the  resources  of  Human  Character. 

Special  causes  retard  the  progress  of  knowledge  in  this  de- 
partment of  inquiry.  Many  problems  so  difficult  and  intricate 
that  they  never  can  be  solved  except  by  patient  observation,  pa- 
tient thought,  and  yet  more  patient  action,  are  as  yet  hardly 
recognized  to  be  problems  at  all.  We  look  on  the  facts  of  Na- 
ture and  of  human  life  through  the  dulled  eyes  of  Custom  and 
Traditional  Opinion.  And  when  some  misery  worse  than 
others  forces  itself  upon  the  acknowledgment  of  the  world,  men 
are  slow  to  discover  or  admit  their  own  power  over  the  sources 
whence  such  miseries  come  to  be.  That  which  is  needed  to 
open  our  eyes  to  such  questions,  is  not  mere  intellectual  power. 
Rarer  and  finer  qualities  have  this  work  to  do.  Among  the  char- 
acteristics of  the  individual  men  who  have  exerted  the  most 
powerful  influence  for  good  on  the  condition  of  Society,  no 


LAW    IN    POLITICS.  229 

• 

quality  has  been  more  remarkable  than  a  certain  natural  open- 
ness and  simplicity  of  mind.  Readiness  to  entertain,  willing- 
ness to  accept,  and  enthusiasm  to  pursue,  a  new  idea,  have  al- 
ways been  among  the  most  fruitful  gifts  of  genius. 

Is  it  vain  to  hope  that  the  thoughtfulness  and  candor  which 
have  been  the  natural  inheritance  of  a  few,  may  yet  be  more 
common  among  all  educated  men  ?  The  whole  constitution  and 
course  of  things  would  receive  an  earlier  fulfilment  did  we  carry 
about  with  us  an  habitual  belief  in  the  inexhaustible  treasures 
which  it  holds — in  the  power  of  the  agencies  which  it  offers  to 
Knowledge  and  Contrivance.  For  then  the  results  of  Natural 
Consequence  would  be  accepted  for  that  which  they  teach,  and 
not  simply  submitted  to  for  that  which  they  inflict.  The  dis- 
orders of  Society  would  not  so  often  be  supinely  regarded  as  the 
result  of  inevitable  laws,  but  would  be  seen  as  the  fruit  always 
of  some  ignorance  or  of  some  rebellion  ;  and  so  the  exhilarating 
conviction  would  be  ours,  that  those  disorders  are  within  the 
reach  of  remedy  through  larger  Knowledge  and  a  better  Will. 

We  hear  much  now  of  the  "  blessed  light  of  Science  ,  "  *  and 
if  the  methods  and  conditions  of  Physical  inquiry  were  applied 
in  a  really  philosophical  spirit  to  Spiritual  Phenomena,  the  in- 
fluence of  Science  for  good  would  be  more  powerful  than  it  is. 
Meanwhile  it  is  well  to  remember  that  although  readiness  to  ac- 
cept a  new  idea  is  essential  to  Discovery,  it  is  equally  true  that 
new  dangers  beset  and  surround  all  new  aspects  of  the  truth. 
Paradoxical  as  it  may  sound  to  say  so,  this  is  a  consequence  of 
the  splendor  of  Man's  endowments,  of  his  freedom  from  direc- 
tion,— of  the  swiftness  and  the  subtlety  of  his  mental  powers. 
On  her  own  narrow  path  Instinct  is  a  surer  guide  than  Reason, 
and  accordingly  it  is  often  the  higher  faculties  of  the  mind 
which  are  the  most  misleading.  The  Speculative  Faculty  is  im- 
patient of  waiting  upon  Knowledge,  and  is  ever  as  busy  and  as 
ingenious  in  finding  out  new  -paths  of  error  as  in  supplying  new 
interpretations  of  the  truth.  Hence  in  Philosophy  the  most 
extravagant  errors  have  been  constantly  associated  with  the 
happiest  intuitions,  and  it  has  remained  for  the  successors  of 
great  men  in  another  generation  to  separate  their  discoveries 
from  their  delusions.  Hence  also  in  Politics  the  great  move- 

*  See  a  remarkable  passage  in  the  concluding  pages  of  "  Ecce  Homo." 


230  THE    REIGN    OF    LAW. 

ments  of  Society  have  seldom  been  accomplished  without  rais- 
ing many  false  interpretations  of  the  Past,  and  many  extrava- 
gant anticipations  of  the  Future.*  It  cannot,  indeed,  be  said 
with  truth  that  the  calamities  of  Nations  have  generally  arisen 
from  too  great  play  being  given  to  novel  or  theoretical  conclu- 
sions. Rather  the  reverse.  They  have  arisen,  for  the  most 
part,  from  too  little  attention  being  paid  to  the  progress  of  opin- 
ion, and  to  the  insensible  development  of  new  conditions. 

The  question  has  been  often  raised,  whether  there  is  any  law 
of  growth,  of  progress,  and  of  decay  prevailing  over  Nations, 
as  over  individual  Organisms.  Whatever  the  solution  of  this 
question  may  be,  it  is  certain  that  some  causes  are  no  longer  in 
existence  which  produced — not  indeed  the  corruption,  but — the 
final  overthrow  of  the  great  historical  Nations  of  Antiquity. 
The  epoch  of  conquering  Races  destroying  the  Governments, 
and  reconstructing  the  Populations  of  the  World,  is  an  epoch 
which  has  passed  away.  Whatever  causes  there  may  be  now  of 
political  decline  are  causes  never  brought  to  such  rough  detec- 
tion, and  never  ending  in  catastrophes  so  complete.  Yet,  in 
modern  days  a  condition  of  stagnation  and  decline  has  been 
the  actual  condition  of  many  Political  Societies  for  long  periods 
of  time.  It  is  a  condition  prepared  always  by  ignorance  or 
neglect  of  some  moral  or  economic  laws,  and  determined  by 
long-continued  perseverance  in  a  corresponding  course  of  con- 
duct. Then  the  laws  which  have  been  neglected  assert  them- 
selves, and  the  retributions  they  inflict  are  indeed  tremendous. 
In  the  last  generation,  and  in  our  own  time,  the  Old  and  the 
New  Worlds  have  each  afforded  memorable  examples  of  the 
Reign  of  Law  over  the  course  of  Political  events.  Institutions 
maintained  against  the  natural  progress  of  Society  have  "  foun- 
dered amidst  fanatic  storms."  Other  institutions  upheld  and 
cherished  against  justice,  and  humanity,  and  conscience,  have 
yielded  only  to  the  scourge  of  War. 

It  is  in  the  wake  of  such  convulsions  that  reactions  of  opinion 
so  often  sweep  over  the  Human  Mind,  as  hurricanes  sweep 
over  the  surface  of  the  Sea.  But  whatever  new  forms  of  error 
are  begotten  of  reaction,  it  is  a  comfort  to  believe  that  there 

*  "  Nos  peres  en  1789  ont  ete  condamnes  £  passer  des  perspectives  du  Paradis  aux 
scenes  de  1'Enfer."— Guizot,  "  L'Eglise  et  la  Soci^te,"  p.  218. 


LAW    IN    POLITICS.  231 

are  always  some  steps  gained  which  are  never  lost.  No  man 
can  look  back  on  the  history  of  modern  civilization  without  see- 
ing that  it  presents  the  phenomena  of  development  and  growth. 
Nor  can  it  be  doubted,  surely,  that  whatever  may  be  the  decline 
of  particular  Communities,  the  progress  of  mankind,  on  the 
whole,  is  a  progress  to  higher  and  better  things.  And  if  this 
be  true,  no  particular  exceptions  should  shake  our  faith  in  the 
general  rule  that  all  safe  progress  depends  on  timely  recognition 
being  given  to  the  natural  developments  of  Thought.  They 
can  never  be  resisted  in  the  end,  and  they  are  most  liable  to 
take  erroneous  directions  when  they  are  resisted  long.  For 
this  is  among  the  most  certain  of  all  the  laws  of  Man's  nature 
— that  his  conduct  will  in  the  main  be  guided  by  his  moral  and 
intellectual  convictions.  "  All  human  society  is  grounded  on  a 
system  of  fundamental  opinions."  Such  is  the  Law  arrived  at 
by  the  newest  of  modern  Philosophies,*  and  it  would  be  well  if 
all  its  discoveries  were  as  near  the  truth.  This  is  the  Law  to 
which  Christianity  appeals,  and  in  which  its  very  roots  are  laid, 
when  it  asserts,  as  no  other  Religion  has  ever  asserted,  the 
power  and  virtue  of  Belief.  And  in  this  Law  lies  the  error 
which  those  commit  who  imagine  they  can  hold  by  the  Ethics 
of  Christianity,  whilst  regarding  with  comparative  indifference 
its  History  and  its  Creed.  This,  too,  is  the  Law  which  lends 
all  their  importance  to  the  speculations  of  Philosophy.  False 
conceptions  of  the  truth,  in  apparently  the  most  distant  prov- 
inces of  Thought,  may  and  do  relax  the  most  powerful  springs 
of  action.  Among  these  false  conceptions  of  the  truth,  none 
are  now  more  prevalent  than  those  which  concern  the  defini- 
tion, and  the  function  and  the  power  of  "  Law."  Instead  of 
regarding  the  Constancy  of  Nature  as  incompatible  with  the 
energies  of  Will,  we  must  learn  to  see  in  it  the  most  powerful 
stimulus  to  inquiry,  and  the  most  cheering  encouragement  to 
exertion. 

The  superstition  which  saw  in  all  natural  phenomena  the  ac- 
tion of  capricious  Deities  was  not  more  irrational  than  the  su- 
perstition which  sees  in  them  nothing  but  tfye  action  of  Invari- 
able Law.  Men  have  been  right  and  not  wrong,  when  they  saw 
in  the  facts  of  Nature  the  Variability  of  Adjustment  even  more 

*  "The  Positive  Philosophy  of  Aug.  Comte,"  by  J.  S.  Mill,  p.  301. 


232  THE   REIGN    OF    LAW. 

•clearly  and  more  surely  than  they  saw  the  Constancy  of  Force. 
They  were  right  when  they  identified  these  phenomena  with  the 
phenomena  of  Mind.  They  were  right  when  they  regarded 
their  own  faculty  of  Contrivance  as  the  nearest  and  truest  anal- 
ogy by  which  the  Constitution  of  the  Universe  can  be  conceived 
and  its  order  understood.  They  were  right  when  they  regarded 
its  arrangements  as  susceptible  of  Change ,  and  when  they 
looked  upon  a  change  of  Will  as  the  efficient  cause  of  other 
changes  without  number  and  without  end.  It  was  well  to  feel 
this  by  the  force  of  Instinct ;  it  is  better  still  to  be  sure  of  it  in 
the  light  of  Reason.  It  is  an  immense  satisfaction  to  know 
that  the  result  of  Logical  Analysis  does  but  confirm  the  testi- 
mony of  Consciousness,  and  run  parallel  with  the  primeval 
Traditions  of  Belief.  It  is  an  unspeakable  comfort  that  when 
we  come  to  close  quarters  with  this  vision  of  Invariable  Law 
seated  on  the  Throne  of  Nature,  we  find  it  a  phantom  and  a 
dream — a  mere  nightmare  of  ill-digested  Thought,  and  of 
"  God's  great  gift  of  speech  abused."  We  are,  after  all,  what 
we  thought  ourselves  to  be.  Our  freedom  is  a  reality,  and  not 
a  name.  Our  faculties  have  in  truth  the  relations  which  they 
seem  to  have  to  the  Economy  of  Nature.  Their  action  is  a 
real  and  substantial  action  on  the  Constitution  and  Course  of 
things.  The  Laws  of  Nature  were  not  appointed  by  the  great 
Lawgiver  to  baffle  His  creatures  in  the  sphere  of  Conduct,  still 
less  to  confound  them  in  the  region  of  Belief.  As  parts  of  an 
Order  of  things  too  vast  to  be  more  than  partly  understood, 
they  present,  indeed,  some  difficulties  which  perplex  the  intel- 
lect, and  a  few  also,  it  cannot  be  denied,  which  wring  the  heart. 
But,  on  the  whole,  they  stand  in  harmonious  relations  with  the 
Human  Spirit.  They  come  visibly  from  One  pervading  Mind, 
and  express  the  authority  of  one  enduring  Kingdom.  As  re- 
gards the  moral  ends  they  serve,  this,  too,  can  be  clearly  seen, 
that  the  purpose  of  all  Natural  Laws  is  best  fulfilled  when  they 
are  made,  as  they  can  be  made,  the  instruments  of  intelligent 
Will,  and  the  servants  of  enlightened  Conscience. 


NOTES. 


NOTE  A. — PAGE  28. 

THE  article  by  Mr.  Wallace  in  the  Jotirnal  of  Science  (No.  XVI.)  for  Oct. 
1867,  on  "  Creation  by  Law,"  implies  much  misconception  of  the  whole 
drift  and  aim  of  the  observations  I  have  made  on  Mr.  Darwin's  "  Theory 
of  the  Origin  of  Species." 

Two  separate  questions  arise  in  respect  to  that  Theory  : — 

ist.  Does  it  adequately  explain  the  Physical  Agencies  by  which  new 
Forms  have  come  to  be  ? 

2d.  Does  it,  wen  if  successful  in  this  explanation,  supplant  or  impair  the 
argument  for  Purpose  and  Design,  as  founded  both  on  the  results  and  on 
the  methods  of  Creation  ? 

Of  these  questions,  which  are  entirely  distinct,  the  last  is  by  far  the  most 
important  of  the  two  :  and  this  second  question  is  the  one  which  I  have 
chiefly  dealt  with  in  the  "  Reign  of  Law."  As  regards  the  first  question, 
indeed,  I  have  indicated  my  opinion  that  the  explanation  of  Physical 
Agencies  is  very  far  from  being  complete,  and  that  the  hypothesis  can 
always  be  driven  back  to  some  starting  point  where  the  very  condition  of 
things  is  assumed  for  which  the  theory  professes  to  account.  In  this  edition, 
and  in  answer  to  Mr.  Wallace's  challenge,  I  have  added  some  farther  indi- 
cation of  the  difficulties  which  remain  unsolved,  and  indeed  untouched. 

But  my  main  argument  has  been  addressed  to  the  second  question,  and 
has  been  aimed  chiefly  at  this  conclusion — that  even  supposing  the  theory 
to  be  established,  so  far  as  it  can  go,  it  cannot  affect  or  disturb  the  insep- 
arable relation  which  exists  between  the  intricate  adjustments  of  Nature 
and  Mental  Purpose — as  their  sole  conceivable  origin  and  cause.  In  re- 
spect to  this  argument,  Mr.  Wallace  virtually  admits  all  I  have  maintained, 
when  he  says,  "  It  is  simply  a  question  of  how  the  Creator  has  worked."  * 
I  have  said  nothing  of  "  incessant  interference,"  of  "  continual  re-arrange- 
ment of  details,"  or  of  "  the  direct  action  of  the  Mind  and  Will  of  the  Creator." 
On  the  contrary,  I  have  said  that  no  purpose  is  ever  attained  in  Nature 
except  by  the  enlistment  of  Laws  as  the  means  and  instruments  of 
attainment ;  t  that  although  Law  "  is  never  present  as  a  master,  it  appears 
never  to  have  been  absent  as  a  servant,"  f  that  we  have  "  no  certain  reason 
to  believe  that  God  ever  works  otherwise  than  through  the  use  of  means  ;  " 

*  Journal  of  Science,  p.  473.  t  P.  100.  $  P.  208. 


234  NOTES. 

• 

or,  in  other  words,  through  the  instrumentality  of  those  elementary  forces- 
or  properties  of  matter  and  of  mind  which  we  call  "  Laws."  The  idea  of 
"  incessant  interference,"  is  one  which  I  hold  to  be  essentially  erroneous. 
It  involves  the  idea  of  natural  forces  being  agencies  altogether  external  to, 
and  independent  of,  the  Creative  Mind.  This  is  the  very  idea  to  which 
Mr.  Wallace  himself  gives  expression  in  its  extremest  form,  when  he  limits  the 
function  of  the  Creator  to  that  of  so  co-ordinating  general  laws  "  at  the  first 
introdiidion  of  life  upon  the  earth,"  *  as  that  they  shall  work  "  of  neces- 
sity "  and  "  by  themselves  "  the  results  we  see.  This  is  unquestionably  the 
way  in  which  they  appear  to  us  to  work.  It  remains  true  that "  no  man  hath 
seen  God  at  any  time."  But  even  this  conception  does  not  make  the  word 
"  contrivance  "  (to  which  Mr.  Wallace  objects)  less  applicable  to  the  ad- 
justments of  nature.  On  the  contrary,  it  makes  it  more  strictly  and  literally 
applicable  than  any  other  conception,  because  it  likens  the  creative  process 
more  closely  to  those  methods  adopted  by  human  ingenuity,  to  which  the 
word  contrivance  specially  refers.  The  highest  efforts  of  that  ingenuity  are 
precisely  those  in  which  natural  forces  are  made  to  work  "  necessarily  "  and 
"by  themselves."  Self-acting  machines  are  the  most  ingenious  machines  of 
all.  The  self-action  of  the  "governor  "  in  a  Steam-engine  is  the  most  beau- 
tiful of  the  contrivances  by  which  the  elementary  expansivQjforce  of  steam 
is  made  to  do  the  work  of  Will.  Mr.  Wallace  thinks  it  "  aw  extraordinary 
idea  to  imagine  the  Creator  of  the  Universe  contriving  the  various  compli- 
cated parts  of  an  Orchis,  as  a  mechanic  might  contrive  an  ingenious  toy  or 
puzzle."  t  But  this  is  precisely  the  idea  he  himself  supports,  when  he  re- 
duces the  Creator's  work  to  the  first  starting  of  the  forces  of  organic  life, 
and  to  the  foresight  merely  of  the  consequences  which  must  naturally  and 
necessarily  arise  from  their  first  co-ordination.  This  is  an  accurate  descrip- 
tion of  the  method  in  which  a  mechanic  contrives  the  most  ingenious  self- 
operating  machines.  No  doubt  the  idea  of  Omnipresence,  which  is  the 
distinctive  idea  of  God's  work  as  distinguished  from  Man's  work,  is  an  idea 
which  it  is  difficult  for  us  to  grasp  or  to  keep  steadily  in  view.  I  do  not 
deny  or  dispute  that  "  self-action  "  is  and  must  be  the  aspect  in  which  Nature 
presents  herself  to  us.  It  could  not  be  otherwise,  unless  the  Invisible 
were  to  become  the  object  of  sight  and  touch.  But  in  proportion  as  we 
appreciate  the  infinite  intricacy  of  Natural  Adjustments,  in  the  same  pro- 
portion do  we  estimate  the  impossibility  of  conceiving  them  as  the  result 
of  Mechanical  Necessity,  which  indeed  is  an  inadequate  explanation  even 
of  our  own  methods  of  operation  upon  the  material  world. 

Mr.  Wallace's  article  is  an  excellent  example  of  the  arguments  used  in 
support  of  the  Darwinian  theory,  both  in  their  strength  and  in  their  weak- 
ness. Their  strength  lies  in  the  hold  they  have  of  the  idea  and  of  the  fact 
that  nature  is  one  vast  system  of  Invisible  Forces  in  a  condition  of  mutual 
adjustment.  Their  weakness  lies  in  the  idea  that  the  methods  of  that 
adjustment  can  ever  be  explained  as  the  result  of  mechanical  necessity,  or 
of  the  mere  elementary  properties  of  matter  working  "  by  themselves." 

*  Journal  of  Science^  p.  474.  t  Ibid. 


NOTES.  235 

NOTE  B. — PAGE  51. 

Although  the  distinction  I  have  made  between  Purpose  as  a  general  in- 
ference, and  Purpose  as  a  particular  fact,  is  a  distinction  which  seems  to 
me  to  be  clear  enough  when  it  is  pointed  out ;  yet  it  may  be  well  to 
give  some  further  illustrations  here  which  could  not  be  conveniently  added 
to  the  text.  What  Positivists  profess  to  insist  upon  is,  that  in  describing  a 
scientific  fact,  we  shall  not  import  into  it  ideas  which  it  does  not  necessa- 
rily involve,  and  which  are  in  the  nature  of  inferences  from  the  fact. 
What  we,  their  opponents,  have  an  equal  right  to  insist  on  is  this — that  in 
describing  scientific  facts,  the  description  must  not  Delude  any  of  the  ideas 
which  the  facts  do  involve,  and  that  the  full  and  adequate  description  of 
those  facts  be  not  evaded  in  order  to  keep  out  an  idea  which  the  describer 
may  choose  to  call  an  inference.  Let  us  take  an  illustration.  Let  us  sup- 
pose that  we  find  a  tube  placed  anyhow  in  such  a  position  that  we  can  look 
through  it  to  the  sky  at  night.  We  do  so,  and  we  see  a  star.  The  facts 
may  be  such  that  this  description  fully  exhausts  them.  That  the  tube  was 
intended  to  bear  upon  that  particular  star,  or  upon  any  star,  would  be  a 
mere  inference.  But  now  let  us  suppose  that,  when  we  look  again  after  some 
considerable  interval  of  time,  we  find  that  the  tube  still  bears  upon  the 
same  star,  and  let  us  further  suppose  the  same  experiment  repeated  with 
the  same  result  during  some  hours,  then  we  should  not  describe  the  fact 
fully  by  simply  stating  that  the  tube  bore  upon  the  star.  It  would  be  nec- 
essary, in  order  to  exhaust  the  facts,  to  say  that  the  tube  was  so  adjusted  as 
to  folltnv  the  apparent  motion  of  the  sidereal  heavens,  and  so  to  counteract 
the  natural  effects  of  the  earth's  motion  as  to  keep  its  axis  always  upon  the 
same  star.  Here  instantly  we  have  the  language  of  intention,  because  the 
idea  of  intention  is  inseparable  from  the  facts.  We  might  know  nothing  of 
the  method  by  which  this  adjustment  is  achieved — nothing  more  of  the 
Mind  that  had  devised  the  method  than  the  bare  fact  of  the  intention. 
But  that  bare  fact  is  an  essential  part  of  the  observed  phenomena.  And 
the  same  argument  applies  to  the  mechanism — if  that  also  were  discovered 
— by  which  the  adjustment  is  effected  between  the  axis  of  the  tube  and  the 
apparent  motion  of  the  star.  That  mechanism  could  not  be  fully  described 
unless  it  were  described  as  a  mechanism  so  contrived  as  to  bring  about  the 
adjustment  which  is  actually  effected. 

Take  again  another  case,  from  the  organic  world.  A  calf,  or  any  other 
young  animal,  discovers  by  smell  or  by  accident,  the  fact  that  milk  is  con- 
tained inside  a  skin  or  bag,  and  that,  by  applying  its  mouth  or  its  tongue 
to  some  opening,  it  can  get  at  the  milk.  The  whole  fact  in  this  case  is 
exhausted  when  we  say  that  the  calf  gets  the  milk.  It  is  no  part  of  this 
fact  that  the  calf  was  intended  to  get  it.  But  when  a  calf  goes  for  milk  to 
its  mother's  udder — when  the  lacteal  glands  of  the  cow  are  recognized  as 
an  apparatus  for  secreting  that  milk,  and  the  teat  for  delivering  it, — then 
the  facts  are  not  exhausted,  the  scientific  description  is  not  complete  or 
truthful,  unless  we  use  language  importing  this  adjustment  of  apparatus 
to  Purppse  in  the  plan  by  which  nourishment  is  afforded  to  the  young  in 


236  NOTES. 

all  mammalia.  This  idea  cannot  be  expelled  from  science  as  a  mere  "  in- 
ference," except  on  the  same  arguments  of  bad  metaphysics,  as  I  hold  them 
to  be,  by  which  also  the  existence  of  Matter  and  of  an  External  World  are 
referred  to  the  same  category. 


NOTE    C. — PAGE  52. 

In  illustration  of  the  assertion  in  the  text,  that  the  relations  of  Number, 
which  are  the  very  basis  of  all  "verifiable  "  knowledge,  may  be  reduced  by 
similar  arguments  to  mere  creations  of  the  Mind,  I  may  here  remind  the 
reader  of  the  passage  which  relates  to  this  subject  in  the  famous  argument 
of  Berkeley : — 

"  That  number  is  entirely  the  creature  of  the  mind,  even  though  the  other 
qualities  be  allowed  to  exist  without,  will  be  evident  to  whoever  considers 
that  the  same  thing  bears  a  different  denomination  of  number  as  the  mind 
views  it  with  different  respects.  Thus  the  same  extension  is  one,  or  three, 
or  thirty-six,  according  as  the  mind  considers  it  with  reference  to  a  yard,  a 
foot,  or  an  inch.  Number  is  so  visibly  relative  and  dependent  on  men's 
understanding,  that  it  is  strange  to  think  how  any  one  should  give  it  an 
absolute  existence  without  the  mind.  We  say  one  book,  one  page,  one  line  ; 
all  these  are  equally  units,  though  some  contain  several  of  the  others. 
And  in  each  instance  it  is  plain  the  unit  relates  to  some  particular  combina- 
tion of  ideas  arbitrarily  put  together  by  the  mind." — Prin,  of  Hum.  KnowL, 
Part  I.  §  xii. 


NOTE  D. — PAGE  122. 

Mr.  Mill,  in  his  "  System  of  Logic"  (Book  I.  c.  iii.,  §§  6,  7,  8)  has  told  us 
that  both  of  Bodies  and  of  Minds,  "philosophers  have  at  length  provided 
us  with  a  definition  which  seems  unexceptionable."  As  regards  body,  this 
definition  is — "  The  external  cause,  and  (according  to  the  more  reasonable 
opinion)  the  unknown  external  cause,  to  which  we  refer  our  sensations." 
This  definition,  though  very  defective,  is  at  least  not  erroneous.  It  is  nec- 
essary, however,  to  observe  that  the  word  "  unknown  "  cannot  be  accurately 
predicated  of  that  respecting  which  the  very  terms  of  the  definition  imply 
that  something  is  known.  The  definition  of  Body  is  the  definition  of  that 
which  is  known  respecting  it.  Three  things  are  involved  in  this  definition,  as 
known  respecting  Body; — these  are  (i)  Externality,  (2)  Extension,  and  (3) 
Causation — that  is  to  say,  the  power  of  causing  or  exciting  sensations  in 
sentient  beings.  Or  perhaps  these  three  items  of  knowledge  may  be  merged 
in  one — the  knowledge  of  Force  acting  from  outside  upon  us,  and  exciting 
sensations  in  us.  But  this  is*  knowledge.  When  the  word  "  unknown  " 
therefore  is  inserted  in  the  terms  of  the  definition  given  by  Mr.  Mill,  it  can 
only  mean  that  other  things  still  remain  to  be  known  respecting  the  nature 
and  properties  of  Body.  In  this  sense — that  is,  when  translated  into  "  par- 
tially known  " — no  philosopher  would  deny  the  correctness  of  its  applica- 
tion. The  definition  of  both  Body  and  Mind  is  given  by  Mr.  Mill  in  Another 


NOTES.  237 

passage,  which,  also,  so  far  as  it  goes,  is  unexceptionable.  "  As  Body  is 
understood  to  be  the  mysterious  something  which  excites  the  mind  to  feel, 
so  Mind  is  the  mysterious  something  which  feels  and  thinks."  The  same 
two  fundamental  ideas  of  Externality  and  Causation  are  here  also  implicitly 
and  inextricably  involved.  Mr.  Mill  adds  that  the  farther  discussion  of  this 
question  belongs  not  to  Logic  but  to  Metaphysics,  to  which  science  he 
leaves  it. 

Two  chapters,  accordingly,  in  Mr.  Mill's  "  Examination  of  Hamilton  " 
(xi.  and  xii.),  are  devoted  to  a  discussion  of  the  "  Psychological  Theory  of 
the  Belief  in  a'n  External  World,"  and  of  the  question  how  far  the  same 
theory  may  or  may  not  be  also  applicable  to  Mind.  The  conclusion  to 
which  I  have  referred  in  the  text  is  the  conclusion  defended  in  the  first  of 
these  chapters.  It  is  the  conclusion  of  a  Pure  Idealism — an  Idealism  much 
more  extreme  than  the  theory  of  Berkeley.  It  is  true  that  Berkeley  denied 
the  existence  of  Matter  as  a  thing  apart  from  Mind — not,  be  it  observed,  as 
a  thing  apart  from  our  minds,  but  as  a  thing  apart  from  some  mind.  But 
this  was  only  because  he  sublimed  it  into  the  action  of  another  Spirit  upon 
our  own.  In  his  system  the  idea  of  Causation  was  tenaciously  retained. 
The  very  essence  of  his  argument  was  that  our  ideas  must  have  a  cause — 
"  some  cause  whereon  they  depend,  and  which  produces  them  and  changes 
them."  As  this  cause  could  not  be  the  ideas  themselves  (which  ideas  are 
all  that  we  know  of  matter),  "  it  remained  that  the  cause  of  Ideas  is  an 
incorporeal  active  substance  or  spirit."  *  This  argument  is  repeated  in 
several  forms,  as  again  where  he  says,t  that  men  were  "  conscious  that 
they  were  not  the  authors  of  their  own  sensations,  which  they  evidently 
knew  were  imprinted/>w/2  without,  and  which  therefore  must  have  some  cause 
distinct  from  the  Minds  on  which  they  were  imprinted."  But  the 
Psychological  Theory  of  Mr.  Mill  involves  all  the  weak  points  of  the 
Berkeleian  theory  with  none  of  its  strength.  Mr.  Mill's  formula  is  expressly 
framed  so  as  to  eliminate  as  much  as  possible  the  idea  of  Causation,  and  to 
keep  out  of  sight  the  connection  which  exists  between  our  sensations  and 
that  which  excites  them.  The  attempt,  indeed,  is  not  successful,  because 
Mr.  Mill  cannot  express  himself  through  many  consecutive  sentences  with- 
out assuming  the  very  ideas  which  he  is  trying  to  account  for  as  a  mere 
product  of  more  elementary  conceptions.  This  has  been  shown  clearly, 
and  with  abundant  illustration,  in  Dr.  M'Cosh's  "  Examination  of  Mr.  J.  S. 
Mill's  Philosophy."  Mr.  Mill  pleads  upon  this  point  that  he  must  use 
common  language,  but  that  the  whole  of  this  language  has  its  own  special 
meaning  under  the  Psychological  Theory  as  well  as  under  the  common 
Realistic  Theory.  This  may  be  true ;  but  there  are  certain  words  which 
must  have  the  same  meaning  under  all  theories  ;  and,  in  spite  of  his  efforts, 
he  is  compelled  to  employ  words  which  show  that  neither  he  nor  any  one 
else  can  maintain  consistently  a  purely  subjective  conception  of  Matter, — 
that  is  to  say,  a  conception  which  dispenses  with  an  external  agency  or 
force.  He  says,  that  "  almost  all  philosophers,  who  have  narrowly  exam- 

m 

*  "  Prin.  of  Hum.  Know."  §  xxvi. 
t  Ibid.  §  Ivi. 


238  NOTES. 

ined  the  subject,  have  decided  that  Substance  need  only  be  postulated  as  a 
support  for  phenomena,  or  as  a  bond  of  connection  to  hold  a  group  or  series 
of  otherwise  unconnected  phenomena  together.  Mr.  Mill  goes  on  with 
much  simplicity :  "  Let  us  only  then  think  away  the  support,  and  suppose 
the  phenomena  to  remain,  and  to  be  held  together  in  the  same  groups  and 
series  by  some  other  agency,  or  without  any  agency  but  an  internal  law — and 
every  consequence  follows  without  Substance,  for  the  sake  of  which  Sub- 
stance is  assumed.*  The  demand  here  made  upon  us,  to  "  think  away  " 
the  support  of  phenomena  is  certainly  made  less  formidable  when,  in  the 
next  breath,  we  are  told  to  think  it  back  again  under  another  form  of  words 
as  "  another  agency,"  or  as  an  "  internal  law." 

The  same  vain  attempt  to  get  behind  ultimate  ideas  may  be  traced  in  the 
word  "  Permanent,"  with  which  Mr.  Mill  qualifies  Matter  considered  as 
"A  Possibility  of  Sensation."  The  new  formula  is  "A  Permanent  Possi- 
bility of  Sensation."  Why  permanent?  Permanent  means  enduring.  But 
what  has  the  element  of  Time  to  do  with  it  ?  The  percipient  minds  are  not 
permanent,  so  far  as  the  sensations  of  their  existing  organism  is  concerned. 
In  what  sense,  then,  are  the  "  Possibilities  of  Sensation  "  permanent  ?  What 
is  it  that  is  described  as  permanent?  Not  the  sensations — not  the  individ- 
ual sentient  beings.  What  then  ?  Clearly  the  Power  or  Agency  which 
causes,  or  is  capable  of  exciting  sensations  in  organisms  that  are,  or  that 
are  to  be.  Here,  then,  we  have  the  ideas  of  Externality  and  of  Causation 
brought  back  under  the  covering  of  Time.  "  What  is  it  we  mean,"  asks 
Mr.  Mill,  "when  we  say  that  the  object  we  preceive  is  external  to  us,  and 
not  a  part  of  our  own  thoughts  ?  The  reply  to  this  question,  in  the  first 
Edition,  ran  as  follows  :  We  mean  that  there  is  in  our  perceptions  something 
which  exists  when  we  are  not  thinking  of  it,  which  existed  before  we  ever 
thought  of  it,  and  would  exist  if  we  were  annihilated."  In  the  recent  Edition, 
this  reply  has  been  altered  so  as  to  avoid  the  obvious  absurdity  of  supposing 
that  things  which  are  conceived  to  exist  only  in  "our  perceptions,"  could 
nex^ertheless  continue  to  exist  "  if  we  were  annihilated."  Accordingly  the 
reply  now  runs  thus  :  "  We  mean  that  there  is  concerned  in  our  perceptions," 
etc.  Yes ;  but  how  concerned  ?  As  an  exciting  Force  or  producing  Cause, 
and  in  no  other  way.  Similar  observations  apply  to  the  word  "  Possibility," 
as  applied  in  Mr.  .Mill's  Psychological  Theory.  Possible  can  only  mean 
Potential.  A  Possibility  of  sensation  must  mean  a  Potential  cause  of  sensa- 
tion. And  here,  again,  we  have  the  same  fundamental  ideas  involved  in 
the  very  language  by  which  it  is  attempted  to  evade  them. 

Mr.  Mill  appears  to  me  to  be  equally  unsuccessful  in  starting  fairly  in 
this  .Psychological  Theory — that  is  to  say,  in  the  definition  of  postulates 
which  steer  clear  of  involving  the  very  ideas  for  which  he  professes  to 
account.  His  first  postulate  is  that  the  Human  Mind  is  capable  of  Expec- 
tation. Certainly  ;  but  what  does  Expectation  involve  ?  It  involves  acts  of 
Memory,  and  of  Comparison,  and  of  Reason.  In  particular,  it  involves, 
or  at  least  he  is  not  entitled  to  deny  that  it  may  involve,  the  intuitive 
belief  that  actual  sensations  already  experienced  arose  from  an  external 

*  Appendix  to  chaps,  xi.  and  xii.    "  Mill  on  Hamilton,"  6th  ed.  p.  246. 


NOTES.  239 

cause,  and  that  the  same  cause  is  capable  of  exciting  them  again.  My  belief 
is  that  the  mind  cannot  place  itself  in  the  attitude  of  expectation  without 
the  presence  of  ideas  which  involve  the  whole  question  in  dispute. 

I  am  disposed,  therefore,  to  agflee  with  Mr.  Mill,  that  the  existence  of  an 
external  material  world  cannot  be  proved  ; — just  in  the  same  sense,  and  for 
the  same  reason,  that  the  proposition — "  Things  that  are  equal  to  the  same 
thing  are  equal  to  one  another,"  cannot  be  proved. 

Mr.  Mill  thinks  that,  though  the  existence  of  an  external  Material 
world  cannot  be  proved,  an  external  Immaterial  world  can  be  proved — 
that  is  to  say,  the  existence  of  other  minds  can  be  proved.  I  think  he  only 
succeeds  in  showing  that  our  belief  in  this  existence  can  be  confirmed  by 
corroborative  evidence.  But  such  corroboration  and  confirmation  is  equally 
available  in  support  of  the  belief  in  the  existence  of  Matter,  considered  as 
an  External  Cause  of  sensation.  The  truth  is,  our  knowledge  of  other 
minds  is  only  reached  through  our  previous  knowledge  of  Matter,  and  of 
the  impressions  it  makes  upon  us.  My  own  mind,  as  well  as  the  mind  of 
all  the  beings  around  me,  is,  or  seems  to  be,  inseparably  connected  with  a 
Material  Organization,  and  there  are  no  manifestations  of  Mind  which  do 
not  come  to  me  directly  or  indirectly  through  material  signs. 

Mr.  Mill  has  often  warned  us,  and  I  accept  the  warning,  against  the  system  of 
discussing  metaphysical  questions,  under  the  threat,  as  it  were,  that  the  con- 
clusions to  which  we  are  opposed  are  inconsistent  with  some  one  or  more  The- 
ological Beliefs.  We  know  that  the  Ideal  Theory,  in  the  form  at  least  which 
it  took  in  the  hands  of  Berkeley,  was  put  forward  in  the  interests  of  Religion. 
41  The  existence  of  matter,  or  bodies  unperceived,  has  not  only  been  the 
main  support  of  Atheists  and  Fatalists,  but  on  the  same  principle  doth 
Idolatry  likewise,  in  all  its  various  forms,  depend.  Did  men  but  consider 
that  the  sun,  moon,  and  stars,  and  every  other  object  of  the  senses,  are  only 
so  many  sensations  in  their  own  minds,  which  have  no  other  existence  but 
barely  being  perceived,  doubtless  they  would  never  fall  down  and  worship 
their  own  Ideas,  but  rather  address  homage  to  that  Eternal  Invisible 
Mind  which  produces  and  sustains  all  things."  *  Such  was  the  animating 
principle  of  the  Bishop  of  Cloyne's  famous  speculation.  I  confess  I  have 
a  profound  distrust  of  all  attempts  to  found  the  teachings  of  Faith  upon  the 
principles  of  Scepticism.  I  am  not  tempted,  in  order  to  escape  the  danger 
of  Materialism,  to  deny  the  existence  of  that,  which  I  know  by  my  own 
structure,  and  by  the  structure  of  all  around  me,  to  be  different  from  Mind. 
I  am  content  to  understand  the  world  as  my  own  faculties  have  been  co- 
ordinated with  external  things  to  reveal  those  things  to  me.  I  look  in  my 
friend's  face,  and  I  see  the  expression  of  power,  and  of  intellect,  and  of 
goodness.  These  are  attributes  of  Mind.  I  do  not  know  how  these  attrib- 
utes can  be  shown  forth  so  evidently  in  the  colors  and  in  the  lines  of  flesh 
and  blood.  But  I  do  not  try  to  persuade  myself  that  his  hand  or  his  face 
are  the  same  things,  either  with  the  perceptions  which  they  excite  in  me, 
or  with  the  emotions  which  they  express  in  him.  I  do  not  pretend  to  un- 
derstand the  nature  of  the  connection  between  these  Material  Forms  and 

*  u  Prin.  of  Hum.  Knowl."  §  xciv. 


240  NOTES. 

the  qualities  of  Mind.  But  after  their  own  diverse  kinds  and  measures, 
they  are  both  equally  "  real  "  to  me.  I  will  not  deceive  myself  by  verbal 
quibbles — pretending  to  be  able  to  stand  outside  myself,  and  to  prove  by 
reason  that  the  very  tools  with  which  retson  works  are  rotten  in  her  hands. 
There  is  but  one  sentence  in  these  two  chapters  of  Mr.  Mill's  work  which 
conveys  any  really  important  truth.  In  regard  to  the  existence  of  Matter, 
as  well  as  in  regard  to  the  nature  of  Memory  and  of  Mind,  we  may  indeed 
well  say  with  him  :  "  By  far  the  wisest  thing  we  can  do  is  to  accept  the  inex- 
plicable facts,  without  any  theory  how  it  takes  place ;  and  when  we  are 
obliged  to  speak  of  them  in  terms  which  assume  a  theory,  to  use  them  with 
a  reservation  as  to  their  meaning." 


NOTE  E.— PAGE  178. 

When  I  wrote  this  passage  in  the  text,  I  had  not  read  a  curious  note  by 
Sir  W.  Hamilton  in  his  edition  of  Reid's  Works.*  It  is  almost  droll  in 
its  confession  of  the  puzzling  significance  of  such  facts,  in  respect  to  ani- 
mals, as  those  I  have  referred  to.  "  Nothing  in  the  compass  of  inductive 
reasoning  appears  more  satisfactory  than  Berkeley's  Demonstration  of  the 
necessity  and  manner  of  our  learning,  by  a  slow  process  of  observation  in 
comparison  alone,  the  connection  between  the  perception  of  vision  and 
touch,  and,  in  general,  all  that  relates  to  the  distance  and  real  magnitude 
of  external  things.  But  although  the  same  necessity  seems  in  theory  equally 
incumbent  on  the  lower  animals  as  on  man,  yet  this  theory  is  provokingly(!) 
— and  that  by  the  most  manifest  experience — found  totally  at  fault  with 
regard  to  them  ;  for  we  find  that  all  the  animals  who  possess  at  birth  the 
power  of  regulated  motion  (and  these  are  those  only  through  whom  the 
truth  of  the  theory  can  be  brought  to  the  test  of  a  decisive  experiment),, 
possess  also  from  birth  the  whole  apprehension  of  distance,  etc.,  which  they 
are  ever  known  to  exhibit.  The  solution  of  this  difference  by  a  resort  to 
instinct  is  unsatisfactory ;  for  instinct  is  in  fact  an  occult  principle — a  kind 
of  natural  revelation, — and  the  hypothesis  of  instinct,  therefore,  only  a 
confession  of  our  ignorance :  and  at  the  same  time,  if  instinct  be  allowed 
in  the  lower  animals,  how  can  we  determine  whether  and  how  far  instinct 
may  not  in  like  manner  operate  to  the  same  result  in  man  ? 

Well  might  Sir  W.  Hamilton  ask  this  question.  It  is  one  which  Philos- 
ophers will  find  it  hard  to  answer.  My  own  conviction  is  that  more  than 
half  the  "  inductive  reasoning  "  by  which  men  have  pretended  to  account 
for  their  intuitive  perceptions  is  altogether  unsound.  Man,  besides  being 
man,  is  also  an  animal — and  through  his  animal  organization  the  mechanics 
of  his  mind  are  to  a  large  extent  regulated  on  the  same  principles  which 
regulate  the  lower  Intelligences  around  him — that  is  to  say,  by  processes 
unconsciously  pursued.  This  is  the  proper  definition  of  operations  which 
are  Instinctive  ;  and,  as  Sir  W.  Hamilton  observes,  they  may  best  be  con- 
ceived as  the  result  of  "  Natural  revelation." 
*  Vol.  I.  p.  182,  note. 


NOTES.  24! 

NOTE  F.— PAGE  181. 

In  the  number  of  the  Dud/in  Review  iox  April,  1867,  there  is  an  article  ore 
"  Science,  Prayer,  Free  Will  and  Miracles,"  in  which  some  portions  of  this 
work  are  criticised.  With  much  of  that  criticism  I  have  every  reason  to  be 
satisfied.  The  main  objection  taken  may  be  stated  in  two  sentences.  I 
have  said  that  (under  certain  limitations  as  to  the  meaning  of  the  words)  the 
"  abstract  predictability  of  human  conduct "  may  be  admitted  without 
involving  the  denial  of  anything  essential  to  the  doctrine  of  Free  Will. 
Dr.  Ward  denounces  this  concession  as  absolutely  fatal  to  that  doctrine, 
and  maintains  that  in  making  such  a  concession,  as  well  as  in  other  more 
direct  forms  of  statement,  my  view  comes  to  be  "  precisely  identical  with 
Mr.  Mill's,"  which,  nevertheless,  I  am  "  professing "  to  oppose.  This 
position  he  proceeds  to  support  by  an  elaborate  argument,  which  I  shall 
here  examine  with  all  the  care  due  to  the  gravity  of  the  question  raised, 
and  to  the  duty  of  using  no  language  upon  such  a  subject  which  is  not 
justified  by  as  much  precision  of  thought  as  is  attainable  in  regard  to  it. 

As  Dr.  Ward  speaks  upon  this  subject  with  some  warmth  of  feeling,  per- 
haps I  may  explain  at  once  that  he  is  mistaken  in  supposing  that  I  am  "a 
Calvinist,"  in  the  sense  of  holding  "  the  Necessitarian  Doctrine."  I  hold 
the  doctrine  of  Free  Will  in  the  only  sense  in  which  it  is  to  me  intelligible. 
I  set  the  highest  value  upon  it ;  and  in  the  result,  though  not  in  this  par- 
ticular argument,  I  believe  I  agree  with  Dr.  Ward  himself.  I  am  willing  to1 
accept  without  reservation  the  definition  which  he  quotes  from  certain 
Jesuit  theologians  :  "  Potentia  libera  est  quae,  positis  omnibus  requisitis  ad' 
agendum,  potest  agere  et  non  agere."  But  Dr.  Ward  does  not  seem  to' 
observe  that  in  this  definition  the  whole  question  in  dispute  may  be  covered 
under  its  contingent  clause.  Everything  depends  on  the  further  definition; 
to  be  given  of  "all  the  requisites  for  action."  Is,  or  is  not,  the  condition 
of  thj  mind  itself  to  be  considered  as  one  of  those  "requisites?"  Is 
knowledge,  and  the  possession  of  those  motives  which  knowledge  gives, 
a  "requisite  "  or  not  ?  Do  the  "  requisites  "  intended  by  the  Jesuit  defini- 
tion, refer  to  nothing  more  than  the  presence  or  absence  of  physical 
constraint  ?  The  trufh  is,  that  such  abstract  definitions  go  very  little  way 
in  explanation  of  themselves.  I  have  asserted  the  freedom  of  the  Will  under 
several  forms  of  statement  which  are  much  more  explicit,  because  much 
more  full  and  more  detailed.  Thus,  I  have  said,  "Among  the  motives- 
which  act  upon  mind,  Man  has  a  selecting  power.  He  can,  as  it  were, 
stand  out  from  among  them — look  down  from  above  them — compare  them 
among  each  other,  and  bring  them  to  the  test  of  conscience."  This  is 
freedom,  if  there  be  such  a  thing  conceivable  in  thought.  But  Dr.  Ward's 
impetuous  zeal  in  favor  of  Free  Will  blinds  him  to  certain  truths  which  are 
perfectly  compatible  with  this  doctrine,  and  which  not  only  must  be  admit- 
ted, but  must  be  claimed,  if  we  are  ever  to  wield  against  Necessitarians  the 
weapon  of  analysis.  The  principal  object  of  this  work  has  been  to  show 
that,  in  so  far  as  science  has  successfully  established  in  physics  the  idea  of 
the  Reign  of  Law,  that  idea  does  not  affect  or  traverse  the  Reign  of  Mind,, 
16 


242  NOTES. 

and  the  supremacy  of  Purpose.  In  like  manner,  I  think  it  can  be  shown 
that  in  so  far  as  Psychology  can  successfully  establish  the  idea  of  Causa- 
tion, as  applicable  to  Mind,  that  idea  is  perfectly  compatible  with  the  true 
freedom  of  the  Will.  Dr.  Ward  says  very  truly  that  the  Necessitarian  doc- 
trine has  in  all  ages  been  embraced  by  many  powerful  minds.  This  indi- 
cates that,  in  so  far  as  it  is  false  at  all,  its  falseness  probably  depends  on 
some  partial  aspects  of  truth  mingled  with  the  fallacies  of  definition.  My 
own  opinion  unquestionably  is,  that  when  Necessitarians  have  been  com- 
pelled to  disown  and  abjure  the  idea  of  compulsion,  their  doctrine  ceases 
to  be  the  doctrine  of  Necessity  at  all  in  any  legitimate  sense  of  the  word. 
What  I  mean  by  freedom  is  freedom  from  compulsion,  and  nothing  else. 
When  I  say  that  the  Will  is  free,  I  do  not  mean  that  its  movements  can  be 
separated  from  the  inducements  internal  and  external  under  which  it  moves. 
But  then  I  insist  that  "  Motive  "  shall  have  the  widest  meaning — that  it 
shall  include  such  motives,  evolved  out  of  the  very  constitution  of  the 
mind  itself,  as  "  Love,  and  Reverence,  and  Gratitude,  and  Hunger  after 
Knowledge  and  Desire  of  Truth."  Of  course  this  is  not  given  as  a  com- 
plete list,  but  only  a  sample  of  the  things  which  must  be  claimed  as 
"motives."  In  this  sense,  not  only  is  the  determining  power  of  Motive 
inseparable  from  the  very  idea  of  Mind  ;  but  the  higher  is  the  quality  of  a 
mind,  the  more  certain  and  definite  will  be  the  motives  of  its  action.  By 
some  strange  confusion  of  thought,  Dr.  Ward  seems  to  regard  with  horror 
the  idea  of  the  Will  being  regarded  as  part  of  "  the  constitution  of  the 
mind."  This  is  a  mere  question  of  words.  But  if  by  Will,  Dr.  Ward 
does  not  understand  a  particular  power  of  mind,  I  do  not  know  what  he 
means.  To  analyze  Mind  at  all,  we  must  of  course  consider  its  different 
powers  as  separate  from  each  other ;  but  it  does  not  the  less  remain  true 
that  they  are  all  parts  of  one  whole.  In  this  point  of  view,  Dr.  Ward's  own 
definition  of  Free  Will  is  far  from  clear.  "  The  Will,  we  maintain,  has  a 
.certain  power  of  deciding  for  itself  \i\&.\.  weight  it  shall  attach  to  motives." 
Certainly,  if  the  Will  be  understood  as  including  the  Deliberative  Faculty 
whose  function  it  is  to  "  weigh."  But  in  coming  to  this  decision  it  must  be 
guided  by  something,  which  something  may  always  itself  be  resolved  into 
another  "  motive." 

And  if  this  appears  to  be  a  mere  play  on  words,  I  grant  it.  It  is  the 
very  point  and  object  of  my  argument  to  show  that  in  so  far  as  the  Neces- 
sitarian doctrine  has  any  apparent  force,  it  does  depend  on  mere  ambi- 
guities of  language.  For  example — exclude  from  the  word  "  motive  "  all 
the  influences  which  come  upon  the  spirit  from  the  mind  itself — from  con- 
science, from  the  action  upon  it  of  another  Spirit,  human  or  divine — con- 
fine the  word  "  motive  "  (as  many  do,  tacitly  by  implication,  though  not  con- 
sciously) to  that  class  of  motives  which  come  from  external  and  material 
things, — in  short,  confine  it  to  the  appetites  or  desires,  then  it  absolutely 
ceases  to  be  true  that  the  Will  is  determined  by  "  motives."  On  the  other 
hand,  include  in  the  word  "  motive  "  all  that  can  ever  influence  the  mind, 
whether  from  within  or  from  without,  then  it  ceases  as  absolutely  to  be 
,true  that  the  Will  can  ever  be  "  free  "  from  such  motives.  But  then,  in  this 


NOTES.  243 

sense,  the  Necessitarian  doctrine  resolves  itself,  as  Mr.  Mansei  says,  into 
the  identical  proposition  that  "  the  prevailing  motive  prevails."  It  becomes 
perfectly  harmless,  because  in  reality  perfectly  unmeaning.  Dr.  Ward  is 
very  indignant  that  I  should  represent  my  view  as  "  a  mere  truism."  But 
it  is  not  my  own  view,  but  the  Necessitarian  doctrine,  when  thus  reduced  by 
analysis  to  its  real  value,  which  I  have  represented  as  a  mere  truism. 

All  these  fallacies  and  confusions  of  thought  arise,  in  my  opinion,  from 
neglect  of  the  fact  that  freedom  has  no  absolute,  but  only  a  relative  mean- 
ing. Freedom  can  only  mean  "  the  not  being  bound,"  and  bonds  can  only 
consist  in  something  binding.  Freedom  of  the  Will  can  only  mean  that  the 
Will  is  free  from  compulsion.  If  Necessity  does  not  mean  compulsion,  it 
either  means  nothing  at  all,  or  nothing  inconsistent  with  freedom  when 
properly  defined  and  understood. 

We  now  come  to  what  is  called  the  "  Abstract  predictability  of  human 
conduct."  This  is  the  phrase  into  which  Mr.  Mill  retreats,  as  containing 
the  residuum  of  truth  which  still  belongs  to  the  Necessitarian  doctrine  after 
it  has  abjured  the  idea  of  compulsion.  It  is  not  my  phrase,  or  one  which 
I  approve  of,  because  it  involves  a  great  number  of  assumptions  which  lie, 
as  it  were,  concealed  within  it.  But  I  adhere  to  the  opinion  that,  when 
strictly  defined,  the  idea  it  involves  is  perfectly  capable  of  being  reconciled 
with  the  freedom  of  the  Will.  The  truth  is,  that  it  is  capable  of  being 
resolved  into  the  same  identical  proposition  as  the  Necessitarian  doctrine 
in  other  forms. 

If  by  "  abstract  predictability  "  is  meant  that  prediction  would  be  pos- 
sible under  the  conditions  of  complete,  universal  and  perfect  knowledge, 
I  do  not  see  either  how  it  can  be  denied,  or  to  what  purpose  it  can  be 
affirmed.  The  proposition  is  that,  if  ALL  the  conditions  were  known  which 
determine  the  Will  in  deciding  for  itself,  or  "  in  giving  weight  to  motives," 
the  result  of  that  decision  would  thereby  become  also  known.  Of  the 
Necessitarian  doctrine  expressed  in  this  general  form,  I  have  said,  and  I 
repeat,  that  it  is  "  very  like  a  truism."  But  if  it  is  useless  as  an  affirma- 
tion, it  is  at  least  not  capable  of  denial.  Dr.  Ward,  however,  does  deny  it, 
and  supports  his  denial  by  reasoning  which  is  clearly  untenable,  as  an 
admission  made  by  himself  will  show.  His  idea  seems  to  be,  that  no 
"  predictable  "  conduct  can  be  "  free  ;  "  that  nothing  which  can  be  abstractedly 
foreseen  can  be  the  result  of  freedom.  But  Dr.  Ward  does  not,  and  cannot 
maintain  this  view  consistently.  He  admits  that,  "  taking  any  given  man 
at  any  given  moment,  there  are  certain  things  so  good,  and  certain  things  so 
bad,  that  we  may  infallibly  calculate  he  will  do  neither  the  one  nor  the 
other."  Would  Dr.  Ward  then  admit  that  as  regards  those  "  very  bad,"  and 
those  "very  good,"  deeds,  this  man  is  not  "  free  ?  "  Or  does  he  think  he 
escapes  this  difficulty,  by  putting  the  man's  conduct  in  the  negative  instead 
of  the  positive  form  ?  As  regards  the  action  of  the  Will,  no  such  distinc- 
tion is  of  any  avail.  The  not  doing  one  thing  is  the  doing  of  another.  The 
not  doing  a  very  good  deed  which  he  has  power  to  do  ("  positis  omnibus 
requisitis  ad  agendum  "),  is  willing  not  to  do  it.  The  not  doing  a  very  bad 
deed  is  willing  to  do  something  else.  If  then  the  conduct  of  the  man  in 


244  NOTES. 

those  cases  "  can  be  calculated  with  perfect  certainty,"  it  is  so  calculable 
only  because  knowledge  of  his  character  is  convertible  into  knowledge  of 
the  manner  in  which  his  Will  is  sure  to  act.  Is  it  not  then  a  clear  violation, 
both  of  the  ordinary  and  of  the  philosophical  use  of  language,  to  say  that 
a  man  is  not  "  free  "  to  do  a  very  bad  act,  because  we  know  certainly  before- 
hand that  his  character,  and  the  motives  on  which  he  habitually  acts,  will 
prevent  him  from  doing  it  ? 

But  then  Dr.  Ward  proceeds  to  argue  that  though  infallible  calculation 
may  be  possible  in  respect  to  deeds  very  good,  and  very  bad,  it  will  not  be 
possible  in  regard  to  deeds  only  a  little  good  and  a  little  bad.  But  how 
does  this  greater  difficulty  arise  ?  Is  it  not  because  the  number  of  motives 
telling  on  the  Will  is  greater,  more  nicely  balanced,  and  therefore  less 
known  ?  And  is  not  this  difference  precisely  the  kind  of  difference  which 
would  disappear,  if  he  could  pass  from  knowledge  which  is  partial  only,  to 
knowledge  which  is  complete  and  absolute  ?  But  whatever  difficulty  may 
arise  from  imperfect  knowledge  is  (as  I  understand  the  phrase)  eliminated 
by  the  word  " abstract,"  as  qualifying  "predictability."  No  one  asserts 
that  prediction  can  be  founded  on  partial  knowledge.  But  the  question 
raised  is  whether  even  perfect  knowledge  of  all  the  elements  of  motive  and 
of  character  can  render  predictable  the  conduct  of  a  really  Free  Agent. 
The  question  is  one  involving  a  logical  principle,  which,  if  applicable  to  the 
conduct  of  a  Free  Agent  in  any  case,  must  be  equally  applicable  to  his 
conduct  in  all  cases.  If  it  is  abuse  of  terms,  or  a  confusion  of  thought,  to 
affirm  that  a  man's  Will  is  not  free  to  do  or  not  to  do  very  bad  actions, 
because  we  can  calculate  infallibly  the  decision  of  his  Will  in  regard  to 
them,  it  must  be  equally  fallacious  to  affirm  that  his  Will  would  not  be  free 
in  regard  to  lesser  degrees  of  vice  and  virtue,  if  in  like  manner,  we  were  able 
from  perfect  knowledge  of  his  character  to  predict  his  conduct  also  in 
respect  to  them.  The  doctrine  of  Free  Will,  like  every  other  doctrine  of 
Mental  Science  can  only  be  defended  by  clear  definitions  of  what  it  is.  Its 
defenders  have  in  my  opinion  established  their  case  when  they  have  com- 
pelled Necessitarians  to  discard  the  idea  of  compulsion.  All  attempts  to 
deny  that  the  Will  is  determined  by  "  motives  "  are  futile,  and  only  result 
in  giving  a  seeming  victory  to  those  who  have  in  reality  been  defeated. 

In  order  to  illustrate  what  I  mean,  I  will  suppose  a  particular  case ;  and 
to  comply  with  the  conditions  of  Dr.  Ward's  argument,  it  shall  be  a  case 
where  no  determination,  either  very  good  or  very  bad,  is  involved.  I  will 
suppose  that  in  arguing  with  a  friend  on  the  subject  of  Free  Will,  a  plate 
of  oranges  is  offered  to  me.  My  friend  tells  me  that  "  he  knows  which  of 
these  oranges  I  shall  choose.  "  I  tell  him  he  cannot  possibly  know  this — 
that  my  Will  is  free,  and  therefore  he  cannot  predict  my  choice.  He  in- 
sists upon  it  that  he  can.  I  then  observe  that  one  orange  has  a  smoother 
skin  than  the  others,  and  is  of  a  deeper  yellow  color.  I  then  recollect  that 
I  had  once  mentioned  in  my  friend's  hearing  that  I  considered  a  pale  color, 
or  a  rough  skin,  as  indications  of  sour  or  tasteless  oranges ;  and  remember- 
ing this  fact,  I  at  once  perceive  that  my  friend  is  calculating  my  conduct 
from  a  motive  which,  as  he  knows,  does  habitually  determine  my  choice  of 


NOTES.  245 

oranges.  I  am  conscious  also  that  in  this  particular  case  I  should  have 
been  so  determined — if  this  dispute  had  not  arisen.  But  in  order  to  show 
my  friend  that  my  Will  is  really  free  from  this  power  of  "motive,"  I  deter- 
mine to  exert  that  freedom  by  choosing  the  palest,  or  the  roughest  orange 
in  the  plate,  and  I  accordingly  do  so.  This  is  an  assertion  of  my  Free  Will 
— a  practical  denial  of  the  doctrine  that  I  am  the  slave  of  "  motives."  But 
is  it  not  clear  in  this  case,  that  my  conduct  has  been  determined  after  all 
only  by  another  and  a  stronger  motive  than  the  one  which  usually  acts  with 
me  in  the  matter — even  by  the  motive  of  proving  to  my  friend  that  he  was 
wrong,  and  that  I  was  right  ? — a  motive  which  is  strong  with  all  men,  and 
is  supposed  to  have  special  attractions  for  a  Scotchman.  And  is  it  not 
equally  clear,  that  if  my  friend  had  had  more  perfect  knowledge  of  my 
character,  and  had  known  that  I  recollected  the  former  conversation,  and 
could  therefore  guess  the  grounds  of  his  prediction,  he  might,  and  would 
have  been  able  to  foresee  correctly  the  new  motive  which  had  thus  arisen  to 
overpower  the  other  ?  And  finally,  is  it  not  equally  evident  that,  if  he  had 
been  able  by  this  extraordinary  sagacity  to  predict  my  choice  correctly,  the 
correctness  of  that  prediction  would  not  have  implied  the  existence  of  any 
constraint  on  the  freedom  of  my  Will,  but,  on  the  contrary,  would  have  been 
founded  on  his  knowledge  of  my  freedom  to  pass  from  the  old  motive  and 
to  give  effect  to  the  new  one  ? 

A  thousand  different  examples  of  the  same  kind  might  be  given.  That 
on  which  the  Will  finally  determines  to  act  may  always  be  called,  and  is 
always  properly  called,  a  motive.  And  this  is  observable  in  respect  to  the 
whole  question,  that  precisely  in  proportion  to  the  high  qualities  of  any 
given  mind — in  proportion  to  its  intellectual  power  and  its  moral  strength 
— in  proportion  to  its  keen  insight  into  the  causes  and  tendencies  of  things, 
and  its  appreciation  of  truth  and  righteousness — in  the  same  proportion 
will  the  distinction  vanish  in  its  eyes  between  things  "  very  bad,"  and  things 
only  a  little  bad.  In  the  same  proportion,  therefore,  will  its  own  conduct 
be  guided  by  definite  and  certain  motives:  in  the  same  proportion,  finally, 
will  that  conduct  become  predictable,  because  in  the  exercise  of  its  freedom 
it  is  governed  by  moral  laws  which  never  change. 

NOTE  G. — PAGE  181. 

Mr.  Mahaffy,  in  his  article  in  the  Contemporary  Review,  has  taken  objec- 
tion to  the  breadth  of  meaning  which  I  have  given  in  this  passage  to  the 
word  "  motive."  He  says,  I  have  "  surely  fused  together  two  opposite  the- 
ories under  the  ambiguous  meaning  of  motive"  This  is  precisely  what  I 
have  done,  and  what  I  meant  to  do.  I  adopt  all  that  I  consider  to  be  true 
in  the  so-called  Necessitarian  Doctrine,  which,  when  cleared  from  the  idea 
of  compulsion,  is  no  doctrine  of  necessity  at  all.  The  residuum  of  truth  is, 
that  the  Will  must  always  act  on  some  motive.  I  have  taken  also  all  that 
is  of  any  value  in  the  Doctrine  of  Free  Will,  which  is — that  among  the 
"  motives  "  of  the  mind  must  be  reckoned  those  inducements  which  arise 
out  of  its  higher,  as  well  as  out  of  its  lower  faculties.  But  Mr.  Mahaffy  is, 


246  NOTES. 

in  my  opinion,  clearly  wrong  when  he  objects  to  the  word  "  motive  "  being 
employed  with  this  breadth  of  meaning.  His  objection  indeed  is  explained 
to  be  that  the  word  "  motive  "  ought  not  to  be  applied  to  the  "  action  of  the 
Will  upon  itself."  But  I  have  not  so  applied  it,  because  I  have  no  notion 
what  "  the  action  of  the  Will  upon  itself "  means.  Mr.  Mahaffy  gives  a 
farther  explanation  of  this  expression,  when  he  speaks  of  the  Will  "  creat- 
ing principles  of  action  for  itself."  But  I  deny  altogether  that  the  "  creat- 
ing "  of  anything  is  the  function  of  the  Will.  It  is  by  an  act  of  Will  that 
we  fix  our  attention  upon  any  given  motive,  or  turn,  on  the  contrary,  our 
attention  from  it.  But  if  we  are  to  analyze  the  mind  at  all,  if  for  the  con- 
venience of  thought  and  of  discussion,  we  are  to  divide  its  inseparable 
Unity  into  different  powers,  we  must  make  the  division  as  logical  as  we  can 
— that  is,  as  consistent  as  possible  with  definite  ideas  of  distinct  mental 
functions.  In  considering  the  Will  as  a  separate  Power,  we  must  strictly 
confine  it  to  what  may  be  called  the  Executive  of  the  Mind.  In  this  light 
it  would  be  altogether  incorrect  to  ascribe  the  "  creation  "  of  any  motive  to 
the  Will.  Motives  of  all  kinds,  both  the  highest  and  the  lowest,  may  rise, 
and  do  rise  unbidden  in  the  mind.  It  is  by  an  act  of  Will  that  we  summon 
different  motives  to  the  presence  of  the  Deliberative  Faculties,  that  we 
cherish  one  and  dismiss  another,  or  determine  to  spend  thought  and  time 
in  making  our  choice  between  motives  which  are  conflicting.  But  the  Will 
cannot  with  accuracy  be  said  to  be  the  creator  of  motives.  Intellectual  and 
moral  conceptions,  held  together  by  the  bonds  of  Memory,  are  the  foun- 
tains from  which  the  highest  motives  come.  Mr.  Mahaffy  admits  that  "  any- 
thing brought  to  bear  upon  the  Will  from  without  itself,  even  from  the 
intellectual  part  of  the  mind,  is  a  motive."  But  according  to  my  definition 
of  the  Will  all  motives  come  equally  from  outside  the  Will,  and  assuredly 
I  see  no  ground  for  the  distinction  Mr.  Mahaffy  seems  to  draw  between  the 
Intellectual  and  the  Moral  faculties.  In  denying  the  name  of  motive  to 
those  inducements  which  come  from  the  affections  or  from  the  sense  of 
right  and  wrong,  he  imposes  a  restriction  on  the  meaning  of  the  word  which 
is  not  less  inconsistent  with  common  usage  than  with  philosophical  accu- 
racy. Affection  and  gratitude,  the  love  of  man  and  the  love  of  God,  are  all 
surely  "  motives  "  in  the  most  proper  sense  of  the  term.  Yet  Mr.  Mahaffy 
asks,  "  Is  it  not  an  abuse  of  language  to  say  that  the  man  who  resists 
temptation  by  creating  within  his  breast  a  strong  feeling  of  moral  responsi- 
bility is  determined  by  motives  ? "  To  this  question  I  reply  at  once  (pass- 
ing over  the  question  of  the  "  creation  "  of  motives)  that  it  is  no  abuse  of 
language,  but,  on  the  contrary,  the  employment  of  language  in  its  natural 
and  ordinary  sense.  On  what  principle  is  the  love  of  knowledge  (being 
intellectual)  to  be  called  a  motive,  if  the  love  of  God  is  not  ?  On  what 
principle  is  a  desire  of  producing  physical  results  to  be  called  a  motive,  if 
the  desire  of  attaining  moral  ends  is  denied  the  name  ?  No  such  distinc- 
tion is  tenable  in  a  philosophical  point  of  view,  and  no  such  distinction  is 
known  in  the  usual  and  familiar  employment  of  the  word  "  motive."  Mr. 
Mahaffy,  however,  in  making  this  objection,  has  put  his  finger  upon  the 
point  on  which  the  whole  discussion  turns.  Like  many  other  metaphysical 


NOTES.  247 

questions,  it  depends  almost  entirely  on  a  definition  of  terms.  If  the  word 
"  motive  "  be  arbitrarily  limited  to  mental  affections  of  one  or  two  particu- 
lar kinds,  if  it  be  confined  to  the  lower  appetites  and  desires,  or  even  if  it 
be  extended  to  the  higher  appetites  of  the  Intellect,  whilst  it  is  denied  to 
the  inducements  of  morality,  of  conscience,  of  Religion, — then  it  ceases  to 
be  true  that  the  mind  is  determined  by  motives  alone.  The  result  is  that 
the  so-called  "  Necessitarian  "  Doctrine,  in  so  far  as  it  is  true  at  all,  must 
not  only  exclude  the  idea  of  compulsion,  but  it  must  include  all  that  class 
of  inducements,  on  the  pre-existence  of  which,  and  on  the  power  of  choice 
among  them,  the  responsibility  of  the  Will  depends. 

The  view  presented  in  the  text  of  the  great  question  of  Necessity  and 
Free  Will  does  fuse  together  some  portions  of  the  two  opposite  Theories 
which  have  so  long  divided  men's  minds  regarding  it.  But  in  this  fusion  I 
do  but  follow  the  process  pursued  by  Dante  in  a  profound  and  beautiful 
passage  of  his  "  Purgatorio  "  (Canto  iSth).  To  Necessity  he  ascribes  the 
existence  and  the  power  of  Motive.  Motives  arise  out  of  the  relations  pre- 
established  between  the  Human  Spirit  and  all  the  Influences  by  which  it  is 
surrounded.  No  other  account  can  be  given  of  them.  Dante  sees  no  diffi- 
culty, as  some  modern  defenders  of  the  Free  Will  doctrine  do,  in  compar- 
ing the  ultimate  nature  and  origin  of  all  our  mental  desires  with  the  nature 
and  origin,  equally  inexplicable,  of  the  Instincts  of  the  lower  animals* 
Hear  the  lines,  not  less  musical  in  sense  then  they  are  in  sound — 

"  Per6,  la.  onde  venga  lo  intelletto 
Delle  prime  notizie,  uomo  non  sape 
E  de'  primi  appetibili  1'affetto  ; 
Che  sono  in  voi,  si  come  studio  in  ape 
Di  far  lo  mele." 

To  Free  Will  he  ascribes  the  power  of  Counsel — of  deliberation  and  of 
choice  among  the  motives  which  thus  arise  from  the  very  nature  and  con- 
stitution of  the  Mind.  This  power  guards  the  "  Threshold  of  Assent :" — 

"  Innata  v'£  la  virtu  che  consiglia, 
E  dell'  assenso  de'  tener  la  soglia." 

On  this  power  depends  the  responsibility  of  conduct : — 

"  Quest'  e'l  principio  Ik  onde  si  piglia 
Cagion  di  meritare  in  voi,  secondo 
Che  buoni  amori  o  rei  accoglie  e  viglia. 

The  passage  closes  with  these  beautiful  and  striking  lines  : — 

"  Color  che  ragionando  andaro  al  fondo 
S'accorser  d'esta  innata  libertate  ; 
Per6  moralitk  lasciaro  al  mondo. 
Onde  pognam  che  di  necessitate 
Surga  ogni  amor,  che  dentro  a  voi  s'accende  ; 
Di  ritenerlo  e  in  voi  lapotestate." 

It  would  be  difficult  to  give  so  much  philosophy  in  fewer  words. 


248  NOTES. 

NOTE:  H. — PAGE  184. 

In  the  last  edition  of  Mr.  Mill's  work  (1867),  he  has  made  an  addition  to 
the  sentence  quoted  in  the  text,  so  that  it  now  runs  thus : — "  I  deny  it  as 
Strenuously  as  any  one,  in  the  case  of  human  volitions,  but  I  deny  it  just  as 
much  of  all  other  phenomena. "  If  Mr.  Mill  means,  by  this  addition,  to 
imply  that  he  can  deny  compulsion  (for  example)  in  the  behavior  of  a 
billiard-ball,  when  it  is  struck,  "  just  as  much  "  as  he  can  deny  it,  of  the 
behavior  of  a  man  when  he  is  insulted,  he  renders  his  previous  explana- 
tion valueless,  and  restores  again  to  the  doctrine  of  Necessity  that  very 
element  of  meaning  which  he  professes  to  disclaim.  Compulsion  is  pred- 
icable  of  the  effects  of  Physical  Force  exerted  upon  Matter,  in  a  sense  in 
which  it  is  not  predicable  of  the  effects  of  Moral  or  Intellectual  induce- 
ments exerted  upon  Mind.  This  is  precisely  the  distinction  which  Necessi. 
tarians  are  perpetually  confounding ;  and  so  long  as  they  do  confound  it, 
their  doctrine  is  justly  open  to  the  objection  implied  in  the  name  usually 
assigned  to  it.  Even  if  it  be  true,  as  Mr.  Mill  holds,  that  we  have  no  other 
idea  of^Physical  Causation  than  that  of  uniform  and  invariable  sequence, — 
no  idea  of  Necessity  in  Causation, — still  it  remains  true  that  Compulsion^, 
is,  apparently  to  us,  involved  in  the  effects  of  Physical  Forces  upon  Matter, 
in  a  sense  in  which  it  is  not  involved  in  the  effects  of  "  Motive  "  upon 
Mind. 

UNIVERSITY, 


INDEX. 


ABORTED  Limbs  in  various  animals,  116  ; 
Member,  no,  in  man,  120  ;  Organs,  to  be 
read  either  in  the  light  of  History,  or 
of  Prophecy,  122  ;  Organs,  existence  of, 
the  fact  most  difficult  to  disengage  from 
the  Theory  of  Development,  158. 

Abstract  Conceptions,  Law  as  applied  to, 
40;  Men's  Idols  nowadays  their  own,  67. 

Acland,  Dr.  H.  W.,  on  u  Purpose,"  50. 

"  Act  of  Parliament,  you  cannot  make 
men  moral  by,"  in  what  sense  a  truism, 
in  what  a  fallacy,  217. 

Adapted  coloring  in  the  Animal  Kingdom, 
106,  et  seq. 

"  Adherence  to  Type,"  in  the  nature  of  a 
Mental  Purpose,  154 ;  these  words  ex- 
press a  Purpose  fulfilled  in  Organic 
Forms,  160. 

Adjusted  Organs,  Man's  want  of  certain, 
175  •  Forces,  how  far  our  Volitions  are 
subject  to,  IQI. 

Adjustment,  Principle  of,  no  meaning 
except  as  the  result  of  Purpose,  47  ; 
fundamental  Principles  of,  never  al- 
tered through  the  whole  scale  of  Organ- 
ic Life,  159  ;  as  applied  to  the  Mental 
Faculties,  168  ;  how  Watt  subjected  the 
invariable  energies  of  Steam  to  the 
variable  conditions  of,  202  ;  Variability 
of,  in  the  facts  of  Nature,  231. 

Adjustments  of  Organization,  phenomena 
of  Mind  mediately  dependent  on,  175. 

Affections,  the  dependent  on  material 
structure,  165. 

African  Savages  debating  a  great  Homo- 
logical  Question,  118. 

Agassiz'  Geological  Sketches,  166. 

Air,  Navigation  of  the,  a  beautiful  exam- 
ple of  Animal  Mechanics,  77  ;  Elasticity 
of,  the  Law  which,  in  the  flight  of  birds, 
counteracts  gravity,  79  ;  French  scien- 
tific men  in  advance  of  English  on  the 
subject  of  locomotion  in,  102. 

Albatross,  the  mechanism  of  flight  in,  90  ; 
the  flight  of,  described,  91  ;  how  it  sails 
or  wheels  round  a  ship,  92. 

Ammonites,  great  beauty  of,  113. 


Analogy  between  the  operations  of  God 
and  the  operations  of  men's  minds,  illus- 
trated by  every  known  instance  of  Con- 
trivance, 77. 

Analogy  in  Use  and  Homology  in  struct- 
ure, 119. 

Ancient  Lawgivers  always  aiming  at 
Standards  of  Political  Society,  194. 

Andes,  the,  species  of  Humming  birds 
peculiar  to,  35. 

A  ngraecuin  Sesquipedale,  27. 

Animal  Creation,  the  Power  of  God  as 
manifested  in  ;  Professor  Owen's  work 
quoted,  156. 

Animals,  a  definite  Pattern  for  each  class 
of,  126. 

Antecedents,  no  phenomena,  mental  or 
physical,  without,  186. 

Anthropoid  Apes,  skeletons  of,  157. 

Apprenticeship,  earlier  mills  worked  un- 
der a  system  of,  207. 

Apteryx,  useless  wing-bones  m,  116. 

Archetypal  arrangement  in  Orchids,  27. 

Argus  Pheasant,  115. 

Aristotle,  Philosophy  of,  195-196. 

Arkwright,  205-207. 

Ashley,  Lord,  first  effectual  measure  on 
the  Factory  Question  passed  through 
the  exertions  of,  215. 

Asiatic  Deserts,  Sand-grouse  of,  their 
coloring,  109. 

Assimilative  Coloring  not  extended  to 
Woodpeckers,  107. 

Association,  conditions  under  which  the 
spirit  it  evokes  becomes  a  new  "  Law," 

220. 

Associations,  higher  rates  of  wages  es- 
tablished under,  than  under  unrestricted 
competition,  225. 

Astronomy,  according  to  Sir  G.  C.  Lewis, 
an  interest  almost  purely  scientific  be- 
longing to,  8 ;  Sir  J.  Herschel's  Out- 
lines of,  73. 

Atheism,  false  charge  of,  against  Profes- 
sor Huxley,  54. 

Atmosphere,  the,  resisting  force  of,  to  a 
body  moving  through  it,  79. 


250 


INDEX. 


Automatic  Faculties  in  Mind  as  well  as 
in  Body,  173. 

"Azoic"  Rocks,  the  Rhizopods  discov- 
ered near  the  very  lowest  of,  125. 

BACKWARD  flight  in  a  bird,  why  :tpnossj- 
ble,  84. 

Bacon  quoted,  3. 

Baking  Trade,  the,  in  Edinburgh  and 
Glasgow,  good  effects  of  combination 
in,. 

Bats'  fbgei -bones,  how  modified,  101. 

Beauty,  love  of,  a  purpose  we  see  fulfilled 
in  Nature,  161. 

Being,  the  great  mystery  of  our,  161. 

Beliefs,  intelligent  spiritual,  only  widened 
by  the  progress  of  Physical  Science,  68. 

Biblical  Narrative  of  Creation,  the,  room 
left  in  it  for  a  Material  Process,  16. 

Bilateral  Arrangement  of  Organisms,  147. 

Bird,  a,  and  a  Balloon,  difference  be- 
tween, 78. 

Birds,  aerial  evolutions  of,  made  possible 
by  weight,  not  buoyancy,  85  ;  condition 
of  the  atmosphere  indispensable  to  the 
soaring  of,  86 ;  bones  of,  lighter  and 
more  hollow  than  those  of  mammals,  87  ; 
stationary  power  of,  on  what  it  depends, 
96  ;  the  Humming,  furnish  the  most  re- 
markable examples  of  the  machinery  of 
flight,  100  ;  species  of,  amongst  which 
the  law  of  assimilative  coloring  almost 
exclusively  prevails,  108  ;  bright  colors 
and  conspicuous  ornaments  in  male,  147. 

"  Blessed  Light  of  Science,"  the,  229. 

Bodies,  our,  seem  part  of  the  external 
world  to  us,  164. 

Body,Congenital  Habits  of  the,  connected 
with  Congenital  Habits  of  the  Mind,  178. 

Body  Politic,  the,  Verification  drawn  by 
Adam  Smith  from  the  complicated  phe- 
nomena of,  204. 

Borelli's  erroneous  theory  of  steerage  in 
flight,  98. 

Brain,  the,  no  additional  knowledge 
gained  by  proving  the  connection  be- 
tween any  one  mental  faculty  and  a 
special  bit  of,  166 ;  changes  in  the  sub- 
stance and  structure  of,  cause  of  changes 
in  the  character  of  the  Mind,  165  ;  how 
Thought  is  a  Function  of,  166 ;  exer- 
tion of,  like  the  exertion  of  the  Mus- 
cle, 169. 

Butler,  Bishop,  on  our  ignorance  of  God's 
notion  of  means  and  ends,  48. 

Butler's,  Bishop,  position,  that  all  the 
truths  and  difficulties  of  Religion  have 
their  type  in  Natures,  16. 


CARPENTER,  DR.,  on  Life  preceding  Organ- 
ization, 71. 

Cartwright,  205. 

Cats,  blue  iris  in,  associated  with  deaf- 
ness, 147  ;  tortoise-shell  color  in,  asso- 
ciated with  the  female  sex,  147. 

f'ausatior.  of  ie  World,  the,  agency  of 
Man's  Mind  -:md  Will,  the  first  and  fore- 
most agency  in,  4. 

Central  America,  Orchids  in  the  forests 
of,  135- 

u  Cerebration,"  philosophers  who  fancy 
Thought  is  explained  by  calling  it. 
168. 

Cerebal  Organization,  ascending  scale  oi% 
coincident  with  ascending  scale  of  Men- 
tal capacity,  166. 

Chadwick,  MrM  on  Insurance  of  ships  and 
cargoes  as  relaxing  the  motives  of  self- 
interest,  218. 

Chameleon,  the,  106. 

Chance,  no  such  thing  as,  a  necessary 
truth,  185. 

"  Changeable  Wills,"  Comte's  confused 
idea  of  phenomena  not  being  governed 
by,  189. 

Chemical  Combination,  laws  of,  amongst 
the  most  wonderful  and  beautiful,  56. 

Children  in  Factories,  liable  to  dismissal 
if  properly  cared  for  by  their  parents, 

2IO. 

Christian  miracles,  the  idea  of  Law  made 
the  very  basis  of,  14. 

Christianity,  what  lies  at  its  root,  accord- 
ing to  M.  Guizot,  i  ;  Gibbon's  attempt 
to  account  for  the  spread  of,  by  natural 
causes,  12  -r  does  not  require  a  belief  in 
any  exception  to  the  universal  preva- 
lence of  Law,  31. 

Cicero,  De  Nat.  Dear,  120,  169,  213. 

Circulation  of  the  Blood  not  discovered 
before  the  discovery  of  much  concern- 
ing the  circulation  of  the  Planets,  162. 

Civilization,  Modern,  its  development 
and  growth,  231. 

Classification,  the  marshalling  of  physical 
facts  in  an  ideal  order,  the  basis  of 
Science,  51. 

Coal,  how  correlated  with  the  needs  and 
powers  of  man,  154  ;  these  external  cor- 
relations of,  arise  out  of  Internal  Cor- 
relations, 155. 

Cobbett,  on  the  opposition  to  the  restrict- 
ive measures  which  were  proposed  by 
Sir  R.  Peel  the  Elder,  209. 

Cogito,  ergo  sum,  4. 

Color,  power  in  fish  to  change  rapidly 
106  j  determined  in  young  animals 


INDEX. 


251 


through  the  eyes  of  the  female  parent, 
106. 

Coloring,  adapted,  in  the   Animal  King- 
dom, object  of,  106  ;  apparent  rule  un- 
der   which    applied,   106 ;   assimilated, 
not  extended,  as  Mr.  Darwin  fancies,  to 
Green  Woodpeckers,  107. 
Combe,  Dr.  A.,  on  our  ignorance  of  how 
the    Brain     operates     in     generating 
Thought,  169. 
Combination  and  affinity  in   Chemistry, 

laws  of,  41,  56. 

Combination, — in  Nature,  for  the  accom- 
plishment of  Purpose,  48  ;  this  an  ascer- 
tained fact  in  Science,  51 ;  and  adjust- 
ment as  regards  the  phenomena  of  the 
Mind,  163  ;  coming  in  the  place  of  Posi- 
tive Institution,  221  ;  resort  to,  for  the 
protection  of  labor,  recommended  by 
reason  and  experience,  222  ;  all  this  true 
universally  of  the  principle  of,  but  not 
true  universally  of  the  particular  pur- 
poses to  which  applied,  222  ;  its  history 
amongst  the  Working  Classes,  until  re- 
cently a  sad  history  of  misdirected  effort, 
223  ;  desire  for,  and  need  of  grows  with 
the  growth  of  knowledge,  and  with  the 
increasing  complications  of  society, 
224;  business  of,  in  some  things,  to 
subordinate  the  individual  class,  224 ; 
what  s,ets  bounds  to,  225  ;  most  impor- 
tant objects  of,  amongst  the  first  duties 
of  organized  society,  226 ;  conditions 
under  which  it  may  blend  the  functions, 
and  unite  the  profits,  of  Capital  and 
Labor,  a  question  to  be  determined  by 
Natural  Laws  not  yet  explained  or  un- 
derstood, 227. 

Combinations  of  Force,  having  reference 
to  the  fulfilment  of  Purpose  or  the  dis- 
charge of  Function,  40. 

Combinations,  limits  of,  as  affecting  re- 
wards of  Labor,  225. 

"  Comet  "  Humming  Bird,  138. 

Commercial  Policy,  Modern,  its  central 
idea,  200. 

Common  Words,  pestilent  fault  of  using 
them  in  an  artificial  sense,  189. 

Community  of  Aspect  in  created  Things, 
what  it  suggests,  133. 

Comparative  Anatomy,  Professor  Owen 
on,  61  ;  Professor  Huxley  on,  71. 

Competition,  International,  between  Cap- 
italists, arguments  based  on,  211. 

Competition,  the  "Law"  of ,  results  in  ex- 
cessive labor,  221. 

Competitive  Industry,  inevitable  track 
of,  214. 


Comte,  Augusie,  on  "  Changeable  Wills," 

189. 

Conditions,  favorable,  uselessness  of  di- 
rect appeals  to  men's  faculties  and  feel- 
ings when  these  have  not  been  placed 
under,  193  ;  external,  which  tell  on  the 
individual  Will,  are  but  conditions  de- 
pending on  the  aggregate  Will  of  those 
around  use,  218. 

"  Coney  "  of  Scripture,  the,  148. 
Congenital     Constitution,    character    of 

Mind  determined  by,  178. 
Conscience,  how  man,  unlike  the  lower 
animals,  can  bring  his  motives  to  the 
test  of,  182. 
Consciousness,  direct  evidence  of,  large 

class  of  phenomena  beyond  the,  170. 
Conservation    of    Energy,  modern  doc- 
trine of,  73. 
Constancy  in   Nature  not  incompatible 

with  the  energies  of  Will,  231. 
Constitution  and  Course  of  Things,  the 
whole,  under  what  conditions  it  would 
receive  an  earlier  fulfilment,  229. 
Constitution  of  the  Universe,  the,  man's 
faculty  of  Contrivance,  the  nearest  an- 
alogy by  which  to  understand,  232. 
Contractions,    muscular,   two    kinds  of, 
stand  near  the  origin  of  all  we  do,  123  ; 
of  the  Brain,  probably  stand  near  the 
origin  of  all  we  think,  173. 
Contrivance,  in  Orchids,  to  be  traced  as 
clearly  as   in  the  different  parts  of  a 
steam-engine,  22. 

Contrivance  and  Adjustment,  doctrine  of, 
not  so  metaphysical  as  the  doctrine  of 
Homologies,  50. 

Contrivance,  the  word,  impossibility  of 
dispensing  with  it  in  describing  physi- 
cal phenomena,  54  ;  what  is  ?  76  ;  in  Na- 
ture, never  reduced  to  a  single  pur- 
pose, in  ;  happiest  achievements  of 
the,  have  their  own  aspects  of  apparent 
danger,  223. 

"  Coquette  "  Humming  Bird,  the,  Prin- 
ciple of  ornament  in,  139. 
Correlation  of  Growth,  the,  Mr.  Darwin's 
idea  of,  143  ;  has  a  deeper  significance 
than  this,  144  ;  in  another  and  higher 
sense,  145  ;  in  its  simplest  form,  and 
in  visible  connection  with  its  immedi- 
ate cause,  145  ;  having  reference  to  cer- 
tain mental  purposes,  146  ;  two  entirely 
separate  classes  of  phenomena  grouped 
by  Mr.  Darwin  under  the  name  of,  146 ; 
general  impression  left  by  the  observ- 
ance of  organic,  148  ;  required  in  the 
establishment  of  a  new  form  of  Life, 


252 


INDEX. 


149  ;  high  and  complex,  the  most  con- 
stant and  obvious  of  all  the  facts  of 
Nature,  149  ;  apparent,  between  webb- 
ed feet  and  spoon-shaped  bills,  150 ; 
real,  between  both  these  conditions  and 
external  conditions  of  Life,  150 ;  be- 
*  tween  a  particular  kind  of  feather  and 
a  particular  member  of  the  body,  in 
all  birds  capable  of  flight,  151  ;  in  all 
birds^Jbetween  the  auricular  feathers 
and  tlie  ear-bones,  151  ;  Internal,  in 
Nature,  entirely  subordinate  to  Exter- 
nal, 152  ;  External  correlation  between 
the  Retina  and  certain  vibrations,  153  ; 
as  connected  with  Origin  of  Species, 
154  ;  Forces  of,  in  flowers,  independent, 
as  Mr.  Darwin  admits,  of  Natural  Se- 
lection, 158 ;  inference  from  this  ad- 
mission concerning  a  time  before  Nat- 
ural Selection  had  room  to  play,  159  ; 
External,  between  the  Mind  and  the 
Things  around  it,  176  . 
Correspondences,  perception  of,  as  much 
a  fact  as  the  sight,  or  touch,  of  the 
things  in  which  they  appear,  20. 
Cotopaxi,  special  forms  of  Humming 

birds,  peculiar  to,  135. 
Creation, — of  Man,  the,  out  of  "  the  dust 
of  the  ground/'  an  indication  of  the 
personal  agency  of  God,  16 ;  the  em- 
bodiment of  a  Divine  Idea,  18  ;  work  of, 
carried  on  under  rules  of  adherence  to 
Typical  Forms,  46  ;  history  of,  "  an 
Observed  Order  of  Facts  "  in,  124  ;  by 
Law,  idea  of,  on  what  founded,  126; 
adaptation  and  arrangement  of  Natural 
Forces,  in  what  sense  of  the  Nature  of, 
129 ;  idea  of  centres  of,  suggested  by 
the  geographical  distribution  of  Hum- 
ming Birds,  134  ;  by  Law,  only  senses 
in  which  we  get  a  glimpse  of  it  from 
the  theory  of  Natural  Selection,  155; 
spoken  of  as  not  Creation,  unless  it  work 
from  nothing  as  its  material,  and  by 
nothing  as  its  means,  156 ;  doctrine  of, 
only  possible  serious  adversaries  of,  156; 
by  Birth,  how  it  explains  the  existence 
of  useless  organs,  158  ;  nearest  methods 
of,  probably  behind  a  veil  too  thick  for 
man  to  penetrate,  162. 
Creative  Power,  the  rule  which  seems  to 
have  guided,  in  the  origin  of  New 
Species,  136. 

Creeds,  decay  in,  resulting  from  dissoci- 
ating in  the  popular  exposition  of  them 
the  doctrines  of  Religion  from  the  an- 
alogy and  course  of  Nature.  31. 
Crompton,  205,  207. 


Custom  and  Traditional  Opinion,  on  the 
facts  of  Nature  and  Human  Life,  as 
seen  through  the  dulled  eyes  of,  228. 

Cuvier's  Science  of  Homologies,  118. 

Cynanthus  Humming  Bird,  ornament  in 
the,  changing  from  blue  to  green, 
142. 

DARWIN,  MR.,  his  conclusion  as  to  "  silent 
members,"  20;  his  work  on  the  fertil- 
ization of  Orchids,  22  ;  answers  the 
question  of  Intention  with  precision 
and  success,  23  ;  fails  to  solve  the 
question,  out  of  what  "  primordial  ele- 
ments" the  parts  of  the  Orchids  were 
developed,  23 ;  idea  of  special  use  as 
the  controlling  principle  of  construction 
never  absent  from  his  mind,  24  ;  his 
reduction  of  the  forms  of  Orchids  to 
the  archetypal  arrangement  of  Threes 
within  Threes,  26 ;  cannot  conceive 
how  a  voltaic  battery  can  be  made  out 
of  the  tissues  of  a  fish,  63  ;  his  curious 
mistake  concerning  Green  Woodpeck- 
ers, 105  ;  his  reference  to  the  discovery 
of  "  Rhizopods  "  near  the  bottom  of 
"Azoic"  Rocks,  125;  his  theory  of 
Development  suggests  less  of  anything 
approaching  to  a  Law  in  Creation  than 
did  the  earlier  theories,  127  ;  his  theory 
of  Development,  to  what  extent  an  es- 
tablished scientific  truth,  130  ;  his 
theory  self-condemned,  131 ;  claims  for 
it  a  wider  range  than  belongs  to  it, 
131  ;  mere  advantage,  in  Mr.  Darwin's 
sense,  not  the  rule  in  the  Origin  of 
New  Species  in  Humming  Birds,  136 ; 
his  theory  does  not  account  for  the 
origin  or  spread  of  Humming  Birds, 
139  ;  offers  no  explanation  how  new 
Births  may  be  the  means  of  introduc- 
ing New  Species,  142  ;  his  theory  on 
Natural  Selection  has  no  bearing  on  the 
Origin  of  Species,  143  ;  admits  that  the 
doctrine  of  Natural  Selection  "  takes 
cognizance  of  Variations  only  after 
they  have  arisen,  and  regards  Varia- 
tion as  due  to  chance,"  143  ;  groups  un- 
der the  name  "  Correlation  of  Growth  " 
two  classes  of  phenomena,  entirely 
separate  in  idea.  146  ;  shows  how  an 
improved  Bill,  once  produced,  will  be 
preserved,  149;  on  the  phrase  "Ad- 
herence to  Type,"  154  ;  on  Inheritance, 
what  it  is,  156. 

Decaying  fallen  leaves,  imitation  of,  in 
the  Woodcock's  plumage,  109. 

Design  and  Mental  Purpose,  exhibited  in 


INDEX. 


253 


the  Correlation  of  the  Retina  with 
certain  vibrations,  153. 

Detected  Method  in  Nature,  the  Ulti- 
mate Question,  above  and  behind 
every,  161. 

Development,  hypotheses  of,  the,  in  the 
form  which  they  have  as  yet  assumed, 
are  deprived  of  all  scientific  basis,  18  ; 
theories  of,  what  they  have  simply 
been,  19;  theories,  idea  common  to  all, 
that  a  new  species  is  simply  an  unusual 
birth,  127  ;  Mr.  Darwin's  theory  of,  dif- 
ference between  it  and  other  theories 
of  development,  130;  of  Man's  Nature, 
boundless  discoveries  open  to  those 
who  would  investigate  the  laws  gov- 
erning the,  193  ;  and  growth  of  Modern 
Civilization,  231. 

Diatomacecp,  113. 

Digestive  Organs,  the,  Mechanism  of  the, 
extends  through  a  long  range  of  Cre- 
ation, 159. 

Discovery,  outbreak  of  old  Delusions  on 
every  fresh,  68  ;  the  most  striking  thing 
in  the  history  of,  228. 

Disease  brings  out  correlations  not  per- 
ceived in  health,  147. 

Divine  Government,  Divine  Thoughts, 
Divine  Purposes  and  Divine  Affections, 
rules  and  principles  of,  32. 

Divine  Will,  the  ONE  FORCE,  perhaps  in 
itself  a  mode  of  action  of  the,  76. 

Diving  Birds,  Correlation  in,  150. 

ECONOMIC  Error  of  the  Old  Commercial 
Systems,  215. 

Economic  Science,  Combination  involves 
no  Rebellion  against  the  Laws  of,  222. 

Economists,  Political,  hostile  to  Restric- 
tion, 216. 

Electric  Ray,  or  Torpedo,  an  instance  of 
an  extraordinary  result  produced  by  a 
common  law  yoked  to  extraordinary 
conditions,  61  ;  Fish  and  Electric  Tel- 
egraph, absolute  necessity  of  conform- 
ing to  definite  conditions  in  making 
each,  61  ;  Telegraph,  the,  Babbage's 
Calculating  Machine,  the  Steam-En- 
gine, and  the  Solar  System,  all  work  by 
Natural  Consequence,  65. 

Everlasting  Will,  the,  some  purpose  of 
it  to  be  seen  working  everywhere,  74. 

Experience,  Association,  or  Intuition, 
origin  of  our  ideas  how  far  due,  re- 
spectively to,  172  ;  Mr.  J.  S.  Mill  on,  172. 

Explanation,  the  mere  ticketing  and  or- 
derly assortment  of  external  facts,  not, 
2  ;  what  it  is,  48. 


External  Correlations  provided  before- 
hand by  Utility,  153  ;  Elements  of  Na- 
ture, our  command  over  the,  in  advance 
of  our  command  over  the  resources  of 
Human  Character,  228. 

"  Eyes  "  in  the  wing  of  the  Argus  Pheas- 
ant, compared  to  the  "  ball  and  socket " 
ornament  in  Art,  115. 

FACT,  Purpose  not  an  Inference  merely, 
but  a,  50  ;  Purpose  as  a  general  in- 
ference, and  as  a  particular,  distinction 
between  them  not  sufficiently  ob- 
served ,  50. 

Facts,  the,  of  Function,  constitute  not 
Final,  but  immediate  Purpose,  49  ;  Man 
controls,  only  because  he  interferes 
with  Laws,  189  ;  Men  always  trying  to 
evolve  out  of  their  own  minds  knowl- 
edge only  to  be  acquired  by  patient  in- 
quiry into,  194. 

Factories,  effects  of  u  free  "  labor  in,  209  ; 
Labor  of  children  in,  in  what  sense 
"  free,"  210  ;  in  what  sense  not  "  free," 
210  ;  Owners  of,  powerful  motives  in 
operation  on  the,  210;  Inspectors  of, 
in  1864,  214. 

Factory  System,  the,  how  it  arose,  205  ; 
Act  of  1802,  in  what  sense  invaluable, 
208  ;  Acts,  false  intellectual  conceptions 
at  the  bottom  of  opposition  to,  210  ; 
Acts,  the,  the  first  Legislative  recog- 
nition of,  a  great  Natural  Law  quite  as 
important  as  Freedom  of  Trade,  215 ; 
Legislation,  Progress  of  Political  Sci- 
ence in  nothing  happier  than  in,  217  ; 
Combination  effects  a  higher  good  than 
that  resulting  from,  221. 

Fallacies,  Verbal,  of  Mr.  Mansel  exposed 
by  Mr.  Mill,  184. 

False  Theory  and  mistaken  Conduct 
found  out  by  the  working  of  Natural 
Consequence,  215. 

Feather,  Wing,  a  production  wholly  un- 
like any  other  animal  growth,  101. 

Feathers,  of  a  bird's  wing,  three-fold  di- 
vision of  the,  93  ;  one  fundamental  plan 
in,  151. 

Final  ends  not  to  be  seen,  48. 

Fish,  power  of  many,  to  change  color 
rapidly,  106. 

Flight,  the  true  theory  of,  may  be  tested 
by  the  eye,  84. 

Fly  Shuttle  inWeaving,  invention  of  the, 
the  impulse  it  gave,  206. 

Flying  Animal,  no,  lighter  than  the  air  it 
moves  in,  88. 

Foraminifera,  71. 


254 


INDEX. 


Force,  or  Forces,  an  observed  Order  of 
Facts  is  the  Index  and  the  result  of  the 
working  of  some,  41 ;  the  Law  of 
Gravitation  is  that,  the  exact  measure 
of  whose  operation  was  numerically 
ascertained  by  Newton,  42 ;  each,  if 
left  to  itself,  would  be  destructive  of 
the  Universe,  55;  what  is  it?  71;  the 
idea  of  ^.traced  to  its  Fountain  Head, 
72  ;  ON~.  all  natural  Forces  resolvable 
perhaps  into,  76  ;  this,  perhaps,  in  itself 
a  mode  of  action  of  the  Divine  Will, 
76  ;  of  Gravitation,  the  most  familiar 
of  all  Forces  in  all  Ages,  78  ;  this  Force, 
chiefly  that  concerned  in  flight,  78  ;  or 
Forces,  to  which  the  phenomena  of 
Life  can  be  traced,  no  knowledge  of 
the,  126  ;  a,  emanating  from  External 
things,  and  moulding  the  structure  of 
an  organist^1  in  harmony  with  them- 
selves, no  conception  of,  149  ;  Furnish- 
er of,  no  substance  comparable  as  a,  to 
Coal,  155  ;  One,  the  source  and  centre 
of  the  rest,  163 ;  ultimate  seat  of,  the, 
we  know  nothing  directly  of,  163  ;  near- 
est conception  of  this  derived  from  our 
own  consciousness,  164 ;  or  Power,  de- 
veloped through  an  organ,  not  identi- 
cal with  that  organ,  166 ;  or  Forces, 
implied  in  an  "  Observed  Order  of 
Facts,"  168 ;  Expenditure  of,  in  severe 
Thinking,  169. 

Forces,  Correlation  of,  modern  doctrine 
of  the,  4;  Law  as  applied  to  individ- 
ual, the  measure  of  whose  operation 
has  been  more  or  less  defined,  or  ascer- 
tained, 39  ;  Law  in  its  most  habitual 
sense,  as  Natural,  related  to  Purpose, 
and  subservient  to  the  discharge  of 
Function,  48  ;  irresistible  tendency  in 
the  language  of  Science  to  personify, 
54  ;  no  phenomena  visible  to  man  gov- 
erned by  zVzvariable,  but  by  variable 
combinations  of  invariable  forces,  59  ; 
Convertibility  of,  modern  doctrine  of 
the,  73  ;  Natural,  Law  in  what  sense  the 
co-operation  of,  working  together  for 
fulfilment  of  obvious  Intention,  128  ; 
Vital,  how  made  to  evolve  a  new  Form 
of  Life,  155  ;  all,  in  their  mutual  rela- 
tions, governed  by  principles  of  ar- 
rangement purely  Mental,  163 ;  Mate- 
rial, manifestations  of  mental  Energy 
and  Will,  163  ;  apparent  barrier  against 
our  conceiving  how  any  combination 
of,  can  result  in  mind,  169  ;  Material, 
misconception  of,  169 ;  Immaterial, 
working  in  matter,  170;  Bystanders 


often  see  the,  telling  on  our  Wills, 
more  clearly  than  we  do  ourselves,  171 ; 
Action  of,  on  our  minds,  how  to  be 
traced,  172  ;  aggregate  of  what,  may 
be  called  the  Laws  which  determine 
human  action  and  opinions,  180 ;  or 
Laws  which  operate  on  the  Mind, 
exceedingly  difficult  to  reduce  them  in 
their  boundless  variety  to  system,  180  ; 
our  Volitions  how  far  subject  to  ad- 
justed, 191  ;  the  fixedness  of  all,  in  one 
sense,  constitutes  their  infinite  pliabil- 
ity in  another,  191  ;  of  Nature,  one  of 
the  most  tremendous  of  the,  reduced 
to  obedience  by  Watt,  202;  Separate 
and  Individual,  in  Man  and  Nature, 
alone  invariable,  219  ;  Combinations  of 
these,  of  endless  variety  and  endless 
capability  of  change,  219. 

Foreknowledge,  Perfect  knowledge  must 
be  perfect,  185. 

Form,  of  Life,  new,  correlation  required 
in  the  establishment  of  a,  149 ;  such 
correlation,  as  far  as  we  can  see,  with- 
out any  Physical  cause,  149  ;  and  Spirit, 
the  connection  between,  sanctioned  by 
the  doctrine  of  the  Resurrection,  170. 

Forms,  Typical,  work  of  Nature  carried 
on  under  rules  of  adherence  to,  46  ;  of 
Life,  successive  introduction  of,  higher 
and  higher,  125 ;  allied,  specific  and 
generic,  bond  of  connection  between 
them,  130. 

Forward  Motion,  the  power  of,  how 
given  to  birds,  83. 

Fossil  Remains,  what  Forms  to  be  traced 
in,  125  ;  Animals,  approximating  to  the 
Forms  of  the  Horse  and  the  Ox,  Pro- 
fessor Owen  on,  126. 

Fossils  designated  "  the  Sports  of  Na- 
ture," 159. 

Free  Agency  of  Man,  faith  required  in 
the,  to  secure  the  working  for  good  of 
great  Natural  Laws,  224. 

Free  Labor,  those  who  opposed  restric- 
tions on,  met  with  no  adequate  reply, 
211 ;  advocates  of  Restriction  on,  igno- 
rant of  the  principles  at  issue,  211. 

Free  Will,  erroneously  called  the  peculiar 
Prerogative  of  Man,  180 ;  and  Neces- 
sity, progress  at  last  on  the  vexed  ques- 
tion of,  183. 

Freedom,  a  relative  term,  not  an  abso- 
lute, 179. 

Freedom  of  Exchange,  in  the  products  of 
Labor,  results  of,  compared  with  the 
results. of  perfect  freedom  of  competi- 
tion in  Labor  itself,  213. 


INDEX. 


255 


Freedom  of  Man's  Will  not  more  myste- 
rious in  directing  the  Mind  to  one  mo- 
tive, and  diverting  it  from  another, 
than  in  the  turning  of  the  Body  to  the 
right  hand  rather  than  the  left,  186. 

Fulmars,  mechanism  of  flight  in,  90. 

Function,  definition  of,  166  ;  of  Coal  in 
the  world,  154. 

Function  of  an  Organ,  the,  its  Purpose,  50. 

GALILEO,  period  of,  204. 

Gallinaceous  Birds,  sort  of  wings  in,  93  ; 
comparatively  no  infancy  in,  177 ;  fact 
of  immense  significance  connected 
with,  178. 

Gannet,  the,  diving  for  fish,  87. 

Genesis  of  Organic  Life,  modern  idea  of 
the,  18. 

Geographical  distribution  of  Humming 
Birds, 133. 

Gipsies,  case  of  the,  not  parallel  with 
that  of  the  Jews,  12. 

Gladstone's,  Mr.,  description  of  the  old 
Commercial  Policy,  200. 

God's  Will,  extraordinary  manifestations 
of,  how  they  may  be  wrought,  10. 

God,  operations  of,  and  of  Men's  Minds, 
light  thrown  on  the  analogy  between 
them  by  every  known  instance  of  Con- 
trivance, 77. 

Gold,  laws  relating  to,  in  Ancient  Sparta 
and  in  Modern  Spain,  200. 

Gould,  Mr.,  on  the  action  of  the  wing  in 
Humming  Birds,  100 ;  on  the  reason 
for  the  gorgeous  coloring  of  those 
birds,  137  ;  his  description  of  ditto,  138  ; 
on  the  absence  of  Hybridism  between 
any  two  species  of  Humming  Birds, 
141 ;  on  certain  local  varieties  near  Bo- 
gota, whose  ornament  is  changing 
color,  142 ;  his  "  Birds  of  Australia," 
177. 

Government,  Divine  ;  see  Divine  Gov- 
ernment. 

Government,  principle  of,  only  recog- 
nized in  modern  times,  194 ;  the  Science 
of,  two  great  discoveries  made  in,  dur- 
ing the  present  century,  199. 

Gravitation,  Law  of,  the  discovery  of  it 
the  highest  exercise  of  pure  intellect 
through  which  the  Human  Mind  has 
found  its  way,  44  ;  the  most  familiar  of 
all  Forces  in  all  Ages,  78 ;  the  chief 
Force  in  flight,  78. 

Grote's  u  Plato,"  195. 

Grouse,  feathers  of  the,  close  imitation 
in,  to  the  tinting  and  mottling  of  the 
ground  on  which  they  lie,  108. 


Growth,  Correlations  of ;  see  Correlations 
of  Growth. 

Growth,  Progress  and  Decay,  whether 
any  Law  of,  in  Nations  as  in  Individual 
Organisms,  220. 

Gurzot,  M.,  on  the  Supernatural,  i,  13,  17, 
18,  31  ;  on  the  only  serious  adversaries 
of  the  doctrine  of  Creation,  156  ;  on  the 
introduction  of  the  human  pair  into  the 
world,  160;  on  misconceptions  of  the 
Past,  and  false  anticipations  of  the  Fu- 
ture, 230. 

HAMILTON,  SIR  WILLIAM,  examination  of 
the  Philosophy  of,  by  Mr.  J.  S.  Mill, 
183,  et  seq. 

Hargraves,  205,  207. 

Hawks,  classified  as  "noble,"  or  "igno- 
ble," 94. 

Hebrides,  remarkable  chase  of  a  Merlin 
after  a  Snipe,  in  the,  95. 

Hereditary  Transmission  of  Mental 
Qualities,  172  ;  of  Innate  Ideas,  178. 

Heron's  Wing,  curious  experiment  with 
an  outstretched,  84. 

Herschel,  Sir  John,  quoted,  44,  73. 

Homology,  of  Orchids,  26  ;  in  Structure, 
and  Analogy  in  Use,  119. 

Homologies,  doctrine  of,  doctrine  of 
Contrivance  and  Adjustment  not  so 
metaphysical  as  the,  50  ,  Science  of,  as 
developed  by  Cuvier,  Hunter,  Owen, 
and  Huxley,  an  intricate,  almost  a 
transcendental,  Science,  118. 

Horse,  the,  "  silent  members  "  in,  116. 

Hudibras  quoted,  no. 

Hum^n  Action  and  Opinions,  aggregate 
of  Forces  which  may  be  called  Laws 
which  determine,  180. 

Human  Character,  elementary  Forces 
having  a  constant  operation  on,  193. 

Human  Law,  function  of,  as  distin- 
guished from  Natural  Law,  194 ;  Law, 
idea  of  founding  it  on  the  Laws  of  Na- 
ture never  systematically  entertained 
in  the  Ancient  World,  194. 

Human  Society,  odious  conceptions  of, 
in  Plato's  Republic,  194. 

Human  Instincts,  and  facuhies  of  Con- 
trivance, impeded  by  clumsy  machin- 
ery, 203. 

Human  Labor,  Factory  System  as  affect- 
ing, 205. 

Human  Spirit,  Natural  Laws  in  harmoni- 
ous relation  with  the,  232. 

Humming  Birds,  the  most  remarkable 
examples  of  the  machinery  of  flight, 
99  ;  peculiarities  of,  132  :  their  distinct- 


256 


INDEX. 


iveness  from  all  other  families  of 
birds,  132  ;  geographical  distribution  of, 
133  ;  divisible  only  into  two  Sub-fami- 
lies, 134  ;  generic  and  specific  differ- 
ences between  these,  134  ;  species  of, 
peculiar  to  Cotopaxi,  to  Chimborazo, 
Juan  Fernandez,  etc.,  135 ;  a  curious 
example  of  Ornament  for  Ornament's 
sake,  139  ;  the  Creation  of  separate 
species-jof,  suggests  the  idea  of  some 
Creati  :£  Law,  of  the  nature  and  con- 
ditions of  which  we  know  nothing, 
140. 

Hunting  Grounds  of  Eagles,  Falcons,  and 
Hawks,  108. 

Hutton,  Captain,  on  the  flight  of  the 
Albatross,  99. 

Huxley,  Professor,  false  charge  of  Athe- 
ism against,  54  ;  his  assertion  that  Life 
precedes  Organization,  71  ;  rhetorical 
designation  of  "  Life  "  in  his  "Elements 
of  Comparative  Anatomy,"  127;  front- 
ispiece to  his  "  Man's  Place  in  Nature," 
265. 

Hybridism  unknown  between  two  species 
of  Humming  Birds,  141. 

Hyrax,  or  "Coney,"  the,  teeth  and  hoofs 
of,  resemble  those  of  the  Rhinoceros, 
148. 

IDEAS,  in  what  sense  born  with  us,  176 ; 
formation  of,  all  that  comes  from  the 
Mind  itself  in  the,  176. 

Identic  Shapes,  Forces  which  aggregate 
particles  of  matter  in,  159. 

Idols,  Men's,  nowadays  their  own  ab- 
stract Conceptions,  67. 

Immediate  Purpose,  Facts  of  Adjustment 
and  of  Function  constitute  not  Final, 
but,  49. 

Imponderable,  the  Great,  91. 

Incubator,  Artificial,  prepared  by  the 
Megapode,  177. 

Individual  Force,  Law  immutable  only  as 
an,  58  ;  Will,  Laws  against  which,  can- 
not contend,  214 ;  Will,  the,  helpless- 
ness and  thoughtlessness  of,  to  a  great 
extent  to  be  overcome,  222. 

Inductive  Sciences,  Whewell's  History 
of  the,  66. 

Inequality  of  Men,  in  the  sense  of  gifts 
of  Mind  and  Body,  224. 

Inheritance,  bond  of,  according  to  Mr. 
Darwin,  130  ;  Theory  of,  when  it  star- 
tles us,  156. 

Inorganic  Compounds,  relations  of  cer- 
tain to  the  Chemistry  of  Life,  57. 

Inspectors  of  Factories,  Reports  of,  214. 


Instinct,  or  Intuition,  not  Experience,. 
teaches  us  unconsciously  how  to  use 
the  machinery  causing  Muscular  Con- 
tractions, 173. 

Instincts  of  the  nature  of  Ideas,  176 ; 
Natural,  when  to  be  trusted,  213  ;  when 
the  Higher  Faculties  must  impose  their 
Will  on  the,  213. 

Institution,  Positive,  Authoritative  In- 
terference of,  with  the  freedom  of  the 
Individual  Will,  still  required  in  Fac- 
tories, 216. 

Institutions,  Positive,  stand  contrasted 
with  Natural  Law  in  one  sense  only, 
198. 

Intellect,  Laws  of,  Philosophers  who- 
fancy  they  are  reduced  to  scientific  ex- 
pression when  described  as  the  working 
of  the  "  cerebral  ganglia,"  168. 

Intention,  exhibited  in  the  mechanism  of 
Orchids,  the  question  Mr.  Darwin  se.ts 
himself  to  answer,  23  ;  Obvious,  Law 
in  what  sense  meant  as  the  co-operation 
of  Natural  Forces,  working  together 
for  the  fulfilment  of,  128  ;  and  Purpose,, 
the  Law  of  Structure  entirely  subordi- 
nate to  the  Law  of,  157. 

Intuition,  Origin  of  our  Ideas  how  far 
due  to,  172  ;  a  word  not  liked  by  sup- 
porters of  the  doctrine  of  Experience, 
i73- 

Intuitions,  Copernicus,  Kepler,  and 
Galileo  guided  in  their  profound*  con- 
ceptions of  visible  phenomena  by,  66 ; 
the  most  extravagant  errors  in  Philoso- 
phy often  associated  with  the  happiest, 
229. 

Invariability,  double  meaning  of,  in  the 
Necessitarian  Philosophy,  183  ;  of  Se- 
quence, an  ambiguous  phrase,  184. 

Invariable  Law,  Phenomena  not  governed 
by,  189;  Vision  of,  on  the  Throne  of 
Nature,  232. 

Invention,  Mechanical,  Scientific  Men 
forced  to  borrow  the  language  of,  153  ; 
triumphs  of,  regarded  often  with  fear 
and  jealousy  by  the  Working  Classes, 
223;  a  Law  of  Nature  in  the 'strictest 
sense,  224. 

Invisible,  the,  all  the  Realities  of  Nature 
are  in  the  region  of,  71. 

JELLY,  blobs  of,  without  parts,  or  organs, 
or  visible  structure,  Vital  Force  in, 

71- 
Jevons,  Mr.  W.  S.,  on  the  Coal  Question, 

155- 
Jews,  preservation  of  the,  a  striking  il- 


INDEX. 


257 


lustration  of  departure  from  the  ordi- 
nary course  of  Nature  effected  through 
Natural  means,  12. 

Job  on  the  Stars,  68. 

Juan  Fernandez,  three  species  of  Hum- 
ming Birds  peculiar  to,  135. 

KEPLER,  three  Laws  of,  41. 
Kestrel  hovering,  91. 

"  Knowing  how  to  do  it,"  in  Nature  as 
in  Art,  all  done  seems  done  by,  77. 

LABELLUM  in  Orchids,  its  use,  24. 

Labor,  Restrictions  on,  denounced  by 
Adam  Smith,  201  ;  Children's,  in  Fac- 
tories, in  what  sense  "  free,"  in 
what  not  "free,"  210;  instincts  of, 
when  blind  to  all  results  save  money- 
making,  213  ;  resort  to  Combination  for 
the  protection  of,  recommended  by 
Reason  and  Experience,  222  ;  Rewards 
of,  Limits  within  which  Combinations 
can,  and  beyond  which  they  cannot, 
affect  the,  225. 

Languages  grow  and  change  by  rules  of 
which  the  men  speaking  them  are  un- 
conscious, 46. 

Law,  Idea  of,  made  the  basis  of  the 
Christian  miracles,  14  ;  highest,  known 
to  Man,  37;  the  word,  in  its  primary 
signification,  39  ;  FIVE  different  senses 
in  which  the  word  is  habitually  used — 
first,  as  applied  to  an  Observed  Order 
of  Facts  ;  secondly,  to  that  Order  as  in- 
volving the  action  of  some  Force,  or 
Forces,  of  which  nothing  more  may  be 
known  ;  thirdly,  as  applied  to  individ- 
ual Forces,  the  measure  of  whose  oper- 
ations has  been  more  or  less  defined 

'  and  ascertained,  39 ;  fourthly,  as  ap- 
plied to  Combinations  of  Force  having 
reference  to  the  fulfilment  of  Purpose 
or  the  discharge  of  Function  ;  fifthly, 
as  applied  to  abstract  conceptions  of 
the  Mind — these  five  great  leading  sig- 
nifications of,  the  questions  they  circle 
round,  40 ;  neatest  illustrations  of  used 
in  the  first  sense,  to  be  found  in  Kep- 
ler's Three  Laws,  40 ;  in  the  second 
sense,  the  index  and  result  of  the  work- 
ing of  some  Force,  or  Forces,  41 ;  of 
Gravitation  defined,  42  ;  in  its  highest 
sense,  as  Natural  Forces  related  to  Pur- 
pose, and  subservient  to  the  discharge 
of  Function,  48 ;  a,  only  immutable  as 
an  Individual  Force,  58  ;  the  term,  as 
used  to  designate  an  Abstract  Idea, 
65 ;  illustration  of  this  in  the  "  First 

17 


Law  of  Motion,"  65  ;  in  what  sense 
meant  as  the  co-operation  of  Natural 
Forces  working  together  for  the  fulfil- 
ment of  Obvious  Intention,  128;  differ- 
ence between  that  to  which  the  Lower 
Animals  are  subject  and  that  to  which 
Man  is  subject,  180. 

Laws— of  Nature,  Man's  Mind  strangely 
excluded  by  Professor  Tyndall  from 
the,  4 ;  if  not  unchangeable,  could  not 
be  used  as  instruments  of  Will,  58 ; 
Natural,  unchangeableness  and  uni- 
versality of,  essential  to  their  use  as 
instruments  of  Will,  88  ;  or  Forces,  the, 
which  operate  on  the  Mind,  exceeding- 
ly difficult  to  reduce  them  to  system, 
180  ,  interference  with,  the  only  way  in 
which  Man  can  control  Facts,  189 ; 
against  which  Individual  Will  cannot 
contend,  214  ;  Economic,  invariability 
of,  rightly  understood,  225. 
Lecky,  Mr.,  on  the  Rise  and  Influence  of 

Rationalism  in  Europe,  10. 
Legislation,  Wise  and  successful,  on  the 
recognition  of  what  causes  it  depends, 
179 ;   double  movement  in,  ever  since 
the  First  Factory  Act,  215. 
Leverage,  Law  of,  as  applied  to  Wings, 

90. 

Lewes,  Mr.  G.  H.,  42,  70,  74,  121. 
Lewis,  Sir  G.  C.,  on  Astronomy,  8. 
Life,    the    Cause    of    Organization,    71 ; 
Leading  Types  of,  in  Geological  ages, 
an  orderly  gradation  in,  125  ;  Origin  of, 
nothing  known  or  guessed  at  in,  corre- 
sponding with  Law  in  its  strictest  sense, 
126  ;  New  Forms  of,  if  developed  from 
the    Old,    the    working    of    Creative 
Power,  129. 

Living  Effort,  our  conceptions  of  Force 
formed  from  our  own  consciousness  of, 
72. 
Lizards,  Flying,  in  other  Ages  of    the 

World,  101. 
Locke,  quoted,  15. 
Longfellow,  Professor,  78. 

MACHINE,  Idea  and  Essence  of  a,  54. 
McCosh,  Dr.,  on  the  Supernatural  in  re- 
lation to  the  Natural,  n. 
Malformation,  Correlations  brought  out 

by,  147. 

Man,  Is  he  Supernatural  ?  5. 

Man's  agency,  relation  of,  to  the  Phys- 
ical Laws  of  Nature,  19. 

Man  and  the  Lower  Animals,  common 
Relationship  of,  by  descent,  at  least 
conceivable,  18. 


258 


INDEX. 


Man  and  Nature,  works  of  both  done 
through  the  means  of  Law,  64 ;  and  the 
Lower  Animals,  amount  and  kind  of 
difference  between,  spite  of  close  affin- 
ities of  bodily  structure,  156 ;  and  the 
highest  Animals  below  him,  secret  of 
the  boundless  difference  between,  182  ; 
in  what  sense  subject  to  the  Law  of 
Causation,  186 ;  Reason,  Conscience, 
Imagination,  Belief,  as  much  a  part  of, 
as  til!  desires  and  instincts,  198  ;  Com. 
bi nation  natural  to,  224. 

Mankind,  Combination,  among  many 
Motives,  a  means  of  influencing,  to  an 
extent  as  yet  unknown,  the  conduct 
and  condition  of,  219  ;  progress  of,  to 
higher  and  better  things,  231. 

Mansel's,  Mr.,  "Essay  on  Miracles,"  n  ; 
his  Limits  to  Religious  Thought,  its 
Verbal  fallacies,  exposed  by  Mr.  J.  S. 
Mill,  184. 

Mantis,  strange  imitation  of  Vegetable 
growths  in  the  body  of  the,  no. 

Marine  Mollusca,  beautiful  shells  of,  113. 

Material,  World,  increasing  power  exer 
cised  over  the,  by  Man's  Will,  58; 
World,  the,  and  the  world  of  Mind, 
Law  in  the  same  sense  prevails  in  the 
phenomena  of  both,  163 ;  Frame,  in 
which  we  live,  some  of  the  most  distant 
objects  of  the  Universe  more  accessible 
to  our  observation  and  intelligible  to 
us  than,  164  ;  Structure,  our  Affections 
dependent  on,  165. 

Materialism,  Suggestions  of,  lie  thickest 
on  the  surface  of  things,  68  ;  two  great 
enemies  to,  in  the  heart  and  the  intel- 
lect, 69. 

Matter,  Immaterial  Forces  working  in, 
176. 

Means,  God  governing  fhe  world  by  the 
choice  and  use  of,  TO  ;  and  Ends,  our 
ignorance  of  God's  notions  of,  49. 

"  Measure,"  inaccurately  termed  the 
"  verifiable  element "  in  our  knowledge, 
42. 

Mechanism  of  Orchids,  Intention  exhib 
ited  in  the,  24 ;  of  Flight  in  the  Alba- 
tross and  in  Seagulls,  90. 

Megapodes,  Innate  Ideas  in  the,  177. 

Memory  often  paralyzed  by  the  stroke 
which  paralyzes  a  Limb,  165. 

Men,  in  what  sense  "  fellow-workers  with 
God,"  and  made  "  partakers  of  the  Di- 
vine Nature,"  6. 

Mental  Purpose  and  Physical  Cause, 
ideas  of,  not  antagonistic,  19  •  and  Re- 
solve, the  one  thing  our  Intelligence 


perceives  with  direct  and  intuitive 
recognition,  21  ;  Purposes,  Correlation 
having  reference  to  certain,  146. 

Merlin,  a,  swooping  on  its  prey,  87  ;  chase 
of  a,  after  a  Snipe  in  the  Hebrides,  95. 

Metaphors,  the,  employed  in  Language, 
generally  founded  on  Analogies  in- 
stinctively and  often  unconsciously 
perceived,  79. 

Method  of  Nature,  proper  object  of  Sci- 
ence to  detect,  if  she  can,  the,  161. 

Methods,  some,  of  operating  on  Men's 
Minds  known  to  us  instinctively,  194. 

Mill,  Mr.  J.  S.,  his  admission  that  our 
muscular  contractions  are  not  the  re- 
sult of  "  Experience,"  172  ;  Comments 
on  this  admission,  173,  et  seq. ;  on  the 
meaning  of  the  word  "  Necessity,"  183  ; 
his  use  of  the  vague  word  "  Antece- 
dent," 186  ;  his  definition  in  "  Auguste 
Comte  and  Positivism,"  of  the  Positive 
as  distinguished  from  the  Theological 
Mode  of  Thought,  187  ;  dissection  of 
these  phrases,  187,  188  ;  on  "  Change- 
able Wills,"  189. 

Mind  and  Will  of  Man  in  one  sense  "sep- 
arate "  from  "  Nature  "  and  belonging 
to  the  "  Supernatural,"  5. 

Mind,  Character  of,  expressed  in  lines 
and  shapes  of  matter,  157  ;  Phenomena 
of,  an  observed  Order  of  Facts  in  the, 
163  ;  the,  unconscious  of  its  dependence 
on  the  Body,  165;  first  to  be  mapped, 
and  then  its  Organ,  167  ;  and  Organi- 
zation, parallel  Phenomena  of,  167  ;  and 
Brain,  connection  between  them  recog- 
nized as  a  Law  by  us  only  in  the  sense 
of  an  "  Observed  Order  of  Facts,"  168; 
the,  to  be  regarded  as  having,  like  the 
Body,  Automatic  Faculties,  174 ;  Phe- 
nomena of,  words  used  to  describe  the, 
suggestive  of  analogies  between  Mental 
and  Material  things,  179  ;  influences 
which  attract  the  Polar  Force  com- 
pared to,  180;  and  Character  of  Man, 
knowledge  of,  how  it  may  be  governed, 
to  be  obtained  only  by  slow  degrees, 
194  ;  Human,  Love  of  Gain  an  instinct 
implanted  in  the,  224 ;  openness  and 
simplicity  of,  great  characteristics  of 
Men  who  have  exercised  an  influence 
for  good  on  Society,  228. 

Mineral  Salt,  Crystallizing  under  a  Vol- 
taic current,  Correlation  of  Growth  in 
its  simplest  form,  145. 

Miracle,  a,  commonly  understood  as  a 
suspension  or  violation  of  the  Laws  of 
Nature,  10. 


INDEX. 


259 


Miracles,  when  they  loose  every  element 
of  inconceivability,  14  ;  Christian,  idea 
of  Law  made  the  very  basis  of  the,  14 ; 
the  idea  of,  performed  by  the  use  of 
means,  regarded  by  many  with  jealousy 
and  suspicion,  16. 

Modern  Policy  and  Ancient,  striking  dif- 
ference between  the  spirit  of,  200  ;  Poli- 
ticians, great  aim  of,  to  open  new 
sources  of  national  opulence,  200  •  Po- 
litical Societies,  stagnation  and  decline 
the  actual  condition  of  many,  220. 

Moilusca,  the  Vital  Forces  in,  made  to 
work  to  order,  128. 

Monkeys,  "  Silent  members  "  in,  116. 

Muscles,  the  seat  of  two  opposing  Forces, 

47- 

Muscular  Power,  great  concentration  of, 
in  the  Organism  of  Birds,  80. 

NARWHAL,  the  Aborted  Germ  in,  117. 

Nasmyth,  Mr.  James,  on  the  shadows 
and  "  high  light  "  in  the  "  eyes  "  in  the 
wing  of  the  Argus  Pheasant,  115. 

Nations,  calamities  of,  their  origin  in  the 
insensible  development  of  New  Con- 
ditions, 230. 

Natural  Consequence,  way  of,  Steam 
Engine  and  Solar  System  both  worked 
by,  65. 

Natural  Forces,  Idea  of,  quite  separate 
from  the  ascertained  measure  of  their 
energy,  43  ;  found  to  operate  under 
rules  having  strict  reference  to  Space 
and  Time,  45  ;  must  be  conformed  to  and 
obeyed,  76. 

Natural  Law,  Common  Idea  of  the  Su- 
pernatural as  at  variance  with,  above, 
or  in  violation  of,  3  ;  True  conception 
of,  on  what  founded,  194  ;  the  idea  of, 
as  affecting  mankind,  on  what  founded, 
197 ;  in  what  sense  contrasted  with 
Positive  Institution,  198  ;  Law,  Signal 
illustration  in  England  this  century 
of  circumstances  in  which,  may  be 
trusted,  and  of  those  in  which  it  required 
to  be  controlled,  199  ;  and  Positive  Insti- 
tution, antagonism  between,  212  ;  ever 
working  to  convict  error  and  confirm 
truth,  213  ;  working  on  the  Human 
Will  while  exposed  to  overpowering 
motives  and  under  debased  conditions 
of  the  understanding  and  the  heart, 
216.- 

Natural  Laws,  founded  on  the  right  ex- 
ercise of  Reason  in  the  highest  and 
best  sense,  198 ;  best  fulfilled  when 
made  the  instruments  of  intelligent 


Will,  and  the  servants  of  enlightened 
Conscience,  232. 

"  Natural  Selection  "  can  do  nothing  ex- 
cept with  the  materials  presented  to  it, 
130 ;  what  it  accounts  for  and  what  it 
does  not  account  for,  131  ;  the  only 
point,  with  reference  to  the  Sub-Fami- 
lies of  Humming  Birds,  in  which  it  has 
any  bearing,  though  it  does  not  touch 
the  facts  of  the  case,  134  ;  does  not  ac- 
count for  the  origin  or  spread  of  Hum- 
ming Birds,  140 ;  real  bearing  of,  143  ; 
seizes  on  External  Correlations,  but 
cannot  enter  the  womb  and  shape  the 
New  Form  in  harmony  with  the  modi- 
fied conditions  of  External  Life,  152  ; 
operates  only  through  the  agency  of 
use  and  disuse  on  organs  already  ex- 
isting, and  capable  of  discharging 
function,  158;  Selection,  idea  of,  ex- 
cluded by  the  theory  of  Creation  by 
Birth,  158. 

Nature,  Power  and  Works  of,  all  Super- 
human, i  ;  glorious  result  of  a  right 
method  in  the  study  of,  3  ;  what,  in  the 
largest  sense,  to  be  understood  as  in- 
cluding, 3 ;  in  the  narrow  sense  of 
Physical  Nature,  4 ;  and  the  Super- 
natural, Dr.  Bushnell  on,  5 ;  Man's, 
Phenomena  of,  included  in  the  term 
"  Natural,"  7  ;  ordinary  course  of,  8;  the 
superhuman  and  the  Supermaterial, 
familiar  facts  in,  14 ;  the  Great  Para- 
ble, 32  ;  Universal  Presence  of  com- 
binations of  Force  in,  46  ;  Relation  of 
an  Organic  Structure  to  its  Purpose  in, 
60;  comparison  illustrative  of  this  be- 
tween the  Menai  Bridge  and  the  Shells 
of  Barnacles,  60 ;  one  vast  system  of 
Contrivance,  76  ;  Mechanics  of,  high- 
est problem  in,  80 ;  Purpose  of  partic- 
ular structures  in,  often  misconceived, 

105  ;  Laboratory  of,  process  in  the,  by 
which  natural  tints  can   be  transferred 
to  substances  prepared  to  receive  them, 

106  ;  Facts  of,  High  and  Complex  Cor- 
relation the  most  constant  and  obvious 
of  all  the,  149 ;    no  fictions  or  bad  jokes 
in,  159  ;  no  short  cuts  in,  197  ;  a  great 
Armory  for  the  use  of  Will,  227  ;  Man's 
command  over  the  external  elements  of, 
in  advance  of  his  command  over  the 
resources  of   Human    Character,  228  ; 
Man's  most  certain  of  all  the  Laws,  of, 
231. 

"Necessity,"  Progress  at  last  on  the 
vexed  question  of,  183  ;  Rebellion 
against  the  Doctrines  of,  founded  on 


260 


INDEX. 


false  conceptions  of  Invariable  Law, 
224. 

New  Forms,  Mr.  Darwin's  Theory,  how 
far  it  suggests  anything  of  the  nature  of 
Creative  Law  to  explain  the  introduc- 
tion of,  131. 

New  Species,  a,  according  to  Mr.  Dar- 
win, snnply  an  unusual  birth,  130 ; 
Creatioi^  of,  has  followed  some  plan  in 
which  variety  is  in  itself  an  aim,  136 ; 
a,  must  be  born  male  and  female,  141  ; 
of  Humming  Birds,  if  born  from  the 
Old,  how  they  must  be  born,  142. 

Newton,  Sir  Isaac,  his  agitation  on  dis- 
covering the  Law  of  Gravitation,  45. 

Numerical  computation,  intuitive  powers 
of,  174  ;  Relations,  Ideas  of  Order  based 
on,  meet  us  in  Nature  at  every  turn,  30. 

ORCHIS,  the  Madagascar,  its  long  and 
deep  nectary,  how  developed,  27. 

Orchids,  Fertilization  of,  22 ;  Intention 
in  the  mechanism  of,  the  question  Mr. 
Darwin  sets  himself  to  answer,  23 ; 
Labellum  in,  its  use,  24;  large  Family  of, 
in  the  forests  of  Central  America,  135. 

Observed  Order  of  Facts,  an,  implies  a 
Force,  or  arrangement  of  Forces,  out 
of  which  the  Order  comes,  168. 

Order,  a  subtle  and  pervading,  binding 
together  all  Living  things,  124  ;  of  Na- 
ture, the,  very  complicated,  the  Mind 
perplexed  by  the  vast  variety  of  sub- 
ordinate Facts,  103 ;  of  Thought,  the 
basis  of  all  other  Order  in  the  works  of 
Man  and  of  Nature,  49. 

Organic  Forms,  Mr.  Darwin's  denial  that 
Beauty  for  its  own  sake  can  be  an  end 
in,  112 ;  Growth,  symmetry  to  be 
detected  in  all  variations  of,  144 ; 
Growths,  general  impression  left  by 
the  observance  of  Correlation  between, 
148  ;  Life,  never  any  alteration  in  the 
whole  scale  of,  in  those  principles  of 
Chemical  and  Mechanical  adjustment 
on  which  Respiration,  Circulation,  and 
Reproduction  have  been  provided  for, 
160. 

Organism,  Parts  of  an,  bound  together 
as  one  whole  by  a  pervading  system  of 
Correlations,  147. 

Organisms,  Inheritance  the  only  cause 
which  can  produce,  quite  like  or  nearly 
like  each  other,  157  ;  Bilateral  Arrange- 
ment common  to  all,  down  to  the  Ra- 
diata,  159  ;  New,  no  knowledge  of  the 
Laws  connected  with  the  Creation  or 
development  of,  127. 


Origin  of  New  Forms,  Darwin's  Theory 
does  not  profess  to  trace  to  a  definite 
Law  the,  129  ;  of  our  Ideas,  how  far 
due  respectively  to  Experience,  Asso- 
ciation, or  Intuition,  172 ;  clear  defini- 
tion of  terms  greatly  required  in  the 
discussion  of  such  questions  as  the, 

175; 

Origin  of  Species,  the  true,  in  what  it 
consists,  143 ;  only  sense  in  which  we 
can  get  from  the  Theory  of  the,  a 
glimpse  of  Creation  by  Law,  155  ;  New 
Species,  rule  which  seems  to  have  gov- 
erned Creative  Power  in  the,  136. 

Ornament  in  Nature  in  itself  a  Purpose, 
112  ;  was  so  before  Man  was  born,  113  ; 
for  Ornament's  sake,  the  rule  in  refer- 
ence to  which  Creative  Power  seems 
to  have  worked  in  Humming  Birds, 
138. 

Ornament  and  Use ;  see  Use  and  Orna- 
ment. 

Ornithoryncus  Paradoxus,  150. 

Owen,  Professor,  on  the  Mental  concep- 
tion of  the  Plan  of  all  Vertebrate  Skele- 
tons, 20  ;  on  the  Battery  of  the  Electric 
Ray,  61  ;  on  Fossil  Approximations  to 
the  forms  of  the  Horse  and  the  Ox,  126. 

PARABLE,  why  so  much  can  be  conveyed 
in  the  Form  of,  32. 

Parliament,  refusing  to  regulate  "  Free 
Labor,"  208  ;  Combination  indicated  as 
the  right  course  by,  222. 

Pauperism,  in  how  far  to  be  attacked 
through  Combination,  227. 

Peel,  Sir  Robert,  the  Elder,  the  first  to 
interfere  by  law  with  unrestricted  com- 
petition in  Human  Labor,  208  •,  his  Bill 
limited  to  the  regulation  of  the  labor  of 
Apprentices,  208  ;  presses  a  new  meas- 
ure of  Restriction,  209. 

Penguins,  89. 

Peregrine  Falcon,  sharp-pointed  struct- 
ure of  wing  in  the,  93. 

Perfect  Knowledge,  the  little  way  we  can 
ever  travel  towards,  185. 

Personal  Agency  of  God,  the  Creation  of 
Man  "•  out  of  the  dust  of  the  ground  " 
an  indication  of  the,  16. 

Personal  Will,  the  Idea  of,  separable 
from  the  Forces  which  work  in  Nature, 
in  a  sense  the  projection  of  our  own 
Personality,  74. 

Personality  and  Will,  impossibility  of  de- 
scribing any  facts  in  Science  without 
investing  the  Laws  of  Nature  with,  55. 

Petrels,  Mechanism  of  flight  in,  90. 


INDEX. 


261 


Phasma  in  the  British  Museum,  Specimen 
of,  with  wings  spotted  like  a  larva- 
eaten  leaf,  112. 

Phenomena  of  Life,  no  knowledge  of  the 
Force  or  Forces  to  which  the,  can  be 
traced,  126;  of  Mind,  the,  an  Observed 
Order  of  Facts,  163  ;  Law  in  one  sense 
prevails  in  the,  both  of  the  Material 
and  Mental  world,  164  ;  never  the  re- 
sult of  individual  Forces,  but  always 
of  the  variable  conditions  under  which 
several  individual  Forces  are  combined, 
189. 

Philosophy  of  History,  on  the  recogni- 
tion of  what  causes  it  depends,  179. 

Phrenological  School,  fundamental  error 
of  the,  167. 

Phrenology,  a  name  which  is  itself  a 
fallacy,  166. 

Physical  Cause  and  Mental  Purpose, 
Ideas  of,  not  antagonistic,  19. 

Physical  Cause,  Correlation  in  the  estab- 
lishment of  a  New  Form  of  Life,  so  far 
as  we  can  see,  without  any,  149. 

Physical  Forces  all  working  to  Order, 
i54- 

Physical  Laws  of  Nature,  relation  of 
Man's-  agency  to  the,  7 ;  advancing 
knowledge  of,  accompanied  with  ad- 
vancing power  over  the  Physical 
World,  8. 

Physical  Science,  advances  in,  can  only 
widen  intelligent  Spiritual  Beliefs,  68. 

Physics,  World  of,  Certainties  in  the 
world  of  Mind  as  absolute  as  any  in  the, 
185. 

Physiological  Discovery,  the  Dependence 
of  Mind  on  Bodily  Organization,  a  fact 
containing  within  itself  the  lesser  facts 
of,  168. 

Physiology,  recent  Investigations  in,  as 
to  the  Muscles,  47 ;  every  fact  in,  its 
intimate  bearing  on  some  question  of 
the  Philosophy  of  Mind,  172. 

Planets,  the,  much  discovered  by  man 
concerning  the  circulation  of,  before  he 
discovered  the  circulation  of  the  blood, 
r,54. 

Plants,  basis  of  many  Correlations  of 
Growth  in,  144. 

Plato's  Republic,  195. 

Polar  Force  of  Magnetism,  180. 

Polarity,  in  Magnetic  Force,  ultimate 
nature  and  source  of,  146. 

Polarity,  Principle  of,  developed  in  a 
circle  in  the  Radiata,  159. 

Policy,  Modern  Commercial,  Central 
idea  of,  200. 


Political  Society,  Ancient  Law-givers  al- 
ways aiming  at  standards  of,  194 ; 
Events,  memorable  Examples  in  the 
last  and  present  generations  of  the 
Reign  of  Law  over  the  course  of,  220. 

Positive  Institution,  and  Natural  Law, 
antagonism  between,  212  ;  Combination 
coming  in  the  place  of,  221. 

Positive  Philosophy,  the  word  Will,  how 
used  in,  190. 

Positivism,  a  sentence  the  concentration 
of  all  that  is  erroneous  in,  188. 

Posterity's  worfder  respecting  ourselves, 
228. 

Potential  Use  in  Nature,  120. 

Power,  Law  in  its  primary  signification, 
the  authoritative  expression  of  Human 
Will  enforced  by,  39 ;  of  God,  Profes- 
sor Owen's  Instances  of  the,  as  mani- 
fested in  his  Animal  Creation,  156. 

Prayer,  real  Essence  of,  37. 

Primeval  Traditions  of  Belief,  immense 
satisfaction  to  know  that  Logical  An- 
alysis confirms  the  testimony  of  Con- 
sciousness and  runs  parallel  with  theT 
232. 

Problem,  the  most  difficult  of  all,  in  the 
Science  of  Government,  199. 

Progress  of  Mankind,  order  of  facts  ob- 
servable in  the,  that  long  ages  of  silence 
and  inaction  are  broken  up  and  brought 
to  an  end  by  shorter  periods  of  almost 
preternatural  activity,  204. 

Protection,  a  hindrance  to  the  Wealth  of 
Nations,  the  skill  of  Crafts,  and  the 
success  of  Trade,  203. 

Psychology  and  Physiology,  neither  in- 
depen^dent  of  the  other,  172. 

Ptarmigan,  close  imitation  in  the  Plu- 
mage of  the,  to  the  mottling  of  ground,. 
108. 

Purpose,  the  only  thing  we  can  surely 
know  in  the  relation  of  Created  Forms- 
to  our  own  Minds,  20;  Principle  of  Ad- 
justment no  meaning  except  as  the  re- 
sult of,  47 ;  Function  of  an  Organ,  itsr 
50 ;  as  a  general  inference,  and  as  a  par- 
ticular fact,  distinction  between  them 
not  sufficiently  observed,  50  ;  in  Nature 
attained  only  by  the  enlistment  of  Laws 
as  Means,  60;  instance  of  this  in  the 
Electric  Ray,  where  an  extraordinary 
result  is  produced  by  a  common  Law 
yoked  to  extraordinary  conditions,  61  ; 
Contrivance  necessary  for  the  accom- 
plishment of,  76 ;  Contrivance  in  Nature 
never  reduced  to  a  single,  m  ;  of  the 
One  Plan  of  Organic  Life,  117;  how 


262 


INDEX. 


Material  Laws  follow  the  steps  of,  124; 
Mental,  Correlation  of  Growth  having 
reference  to  a  certain,  146 ;  Correlation 
of  Growth  in  the  only  sense  we  connect 
it  with  the  Origin  of  Species  not  a  Phys- 
ical cause  but  a  Mental,  154 ;  and  In- 
tention-txthe  Law  of  Structure  entirely 
subord;Tfete  to,  158 ;  only,  to  be  de- 
tected in  the  adaptability  of  the  Verte- 
brate Type  to  the  Infinite  varieties  of 
Life,  161. 

RADCLIFFE'S,  DR.,  Theory  of  Muscular 
and  Nervous  Action,  47. 

Radiata,  the,  159. 

Reason,  Doctrine  that  things  contrary  to, 
were  noc  beyond  his  faith,  held  by  a 
late  eminent  clergyman  of  the  English 
Church,  37  ;  and  Imagination,  falling 
impotently  on  analogy  and  conjecture 
in  endeavoring  to  get  at  Nature's 
method,  161 ;  paralyzed  by  the  same 
stroke  which  paralyzes  a  limb,  165  ;  and 
Feelings,  direct  appeals  to  the,  entirely 
useless  when  these  faculties  have  not 
been  placed  under  favorable  conditions, 
193 ;  on  what  path  Instinct  a  surer 
guide  than,  220. 

Regions  where  means  of  investigation 
cease,  and  processes  of  Verification  are 
of  no  avail,  229. 

Reign  of  Law,  the,  in  Nature,  so  far  as 
we  can  see  it,  Universal,  3  ;  Universal, 
perfectly  consistent  with  a  power  of 
making  those  laws  subservient  to  de- 
sign, 13 ;  the,  the  reign  of  Creative 
Force,  directed  by  Creative  Knowl- 
edge, worked  under  the  control  of 
Creative  Power,  and  in  fulfilment  of 
Creative  Purpose,  162. 

Religion,  Nothing  in,  incompatible  with 
the  belief  that  all  exercises  of  God's 
Power  are  effected  through  the  instru- 
mentality of  Means,  13,  30  ;  or  Nature, 
the  Will  of  the  Supreme  either  in,  one 
in  which  "  there  is  no  variableness," 
31  ;  and  Science,  Doctrine  that  they 
should  be  thought  separate  open  to  one 
fatal  objection,  35  ;  disastrous  effect  of 
the  belief  in  their  separation,  36. 

Research,  Physical,  Transcendental  char- 
acter of  the  results  of,  70. 

Restrictions  on  Labor,  great  discovery 
of  the  absolute  necessity  of  imposing, 
199 ;  from  Trade,  immense  advantage 
of  removing,  199. 

Restriction  on  Free  Labor,  those  who  op- 
posed, met  with  no  adequate  reply,  211 ; 


Advocates  of,  ignorant  of  the  funda- 
mental principles  at  issue,  211. 

Resurrection,  Connection  between  Spirit 
and  Form  sanctioned  by  the  doctrine 
of  the,  170. 

Retina,  external  Correlations  of,  153. 

Rhizopods  of  enormous  size  found  near 
the  bottom  of  "  Azoic  "  Rocks,  125. 

Rudimentary  Organs,  said  to  be  intended 
merely  to  suggest  a  History  which  was 
never  true,  and  a  Method  which  was 
never  followed,  159. 

SAND-GROUSE  of  Asiatic  Deserts  and  their 
coloring,  109. 

Sand  Partridges  of  ditto,  109. 

Science,  the  great  Quest  of,  43  ;  Classifi- 
cation the  basis  of,  51  ;  Astronomical, 
ultimate  fact  of,  55 ,  included  in  Phi- 
losophy, 68  ;  the  u  understanding  by 
Faith"  mentioned  by  the  writer  of  the 
Epistle  to  the  Hebrews,  now  an  assured 
doctrine  of,  70 ;  Proper  object  of,  to 
detect  the  method  of  nature,  if  she  can, 
161 ;  True,  bondage  under  which  it 
lies,  197 ;  of  Government,  two  great 
discoveries  made  in  the,  during  the 
present  century,  199 ;  of  Politics,  the, 
still  in  its  infancy,  228. 

Sciences,  Physical,  remarkable  product 
of  the  immense  development  of 
the,  2. 

Scientific  Truth,  a  sharp  eye  to  be  cast 
on  every  form  of  words  professing  to 
represent,  34 ;  Men  who,  though  trust- 
worthy on  the  facts  of  their  own  sci- 
ence, are  not  to  be  trusted  on  the  place 
of  those  facts  in  the  general  system  of 
truth,  68. 

Scripture,  Language  of,  nowhere  con- 
scious of  a  distinction  between  the 
Natural  and  the  Supernatural,  18. 

Seagulls,  Mechanism  of  flight  in  the  soar- 
ing of,  86,  90. 

Seasons,  Revolutions  of  the,  dependent 
on  a  multitude  of  Laws,  each  of  which 
would  produce  utter  confusion  if  not 
balanced  against  others  in  the  right 
proportion,  56. 

Seers,  great,  of  the  Old  Testament,  cor- 
respondence of  their  language  with  a 
great  modern  Scientific  Idea,  77. 

Self-consciousness  the  truth  in  the  light 
of  which  all  other  truths  are  known,  4. 

Self-evident  Truths,  and  Truths  not  self- 
evident,  breakdown  of  the  distinction 
between,  175. 

Sensation,  no  new  light  thrown  on,  be- 


INDEX. 


263 


cause  Sensation  can  be  traced  to  certain 
nerves,  168. 

11  Sensory  Ganglia,"  Philosophers  who 
think  they  cast  new  light  on  Sensation 
by  calling  it  an  affection  of  the,  168. 

"Silent  members"  in  Animal  Frames, 
views  on  the  subject  by  Mr.  Darwin, 
20 ;  deeper  and  wider  views  of  Profes- 
sor Owen  on,  20. 

Silurian  Sea,  Old,  richly  carved  shells 
and  corals  of  the,  113. 

"  Slowworm,"  the  Common,  "  Blade 
bone"  and  "Collar  bone"  of,— 
"  aborted  limbs"  in,  117. 

Smiles'  Life  of  Watt,  204. 

Smith,  Adam,  200  et  seq.  :  work  of,  in- 
separably connected  with  the  work  of 
James  Watt,  202 ,  not  dissimilar  to 
Watt's  work  in  its  relation  to  the  Reign 
of  Law,  202 ,  opinions  influenced  by 
personal  observation  of  the  ill-treat- 
ment of  Watt  by  the  "  Burgesses  and 
Craftsmen  of  Glasgow,"  203  :  doctrines 
of,  where  a  hindrance,  not  a  help,  216. 

Snakes,  rudiments  of  Legs  in,  117. 

Snipe  chased  by  a  Merlin  in  the  Heb- 
rides, 95. 

Snipes,  Feathers  of  imitating  the  color  of 
bleached  vegetable  stalks,  no. 

Society,  Sanction  of,  given,  or  withheld, 
its  influence  for  evil,  or  good,  218  ;  de- 
sire and  need  for  Combination  grows 
with  the  growth  of  knowledge  and 
with  the  increasing  complications  of, 
224  ,  openness  and  simplicity  of  mind 
great  characteristics  of  those  men  who 
have  exerted  an  influence  for  good  on, 
228  ;  disorders  of,  the  fruit  of  ignorance 
or  rebellion,  229. 

Solar  System,  the,  like  the  Steam  Engine, 
works  by  way  of  Natural  Consequence, 

65- 

Space  and  Time,  can  we  say  more  of 
their  wonders  than  was  said  by  David 
and  Job  ?  68. 

Spain,  Modern,  prohibition  of  gold  from 
leaving  the  State,  200. 

Sparrow  Hawk  chased  and  "  chaffed  J>  by 
little  birds,  95. 

Sparta,  Ancient,  Law  of,  prohibiting  gold 
from  ever  coming  into  the  State,  200. 

Species,  the  Preservation  and  Distribu- 
tion of,  when  they  have  arisen,  the  real 
bearing  of  the  doctrine  of  Natural  Se- 
lection, 143. 

Spindle,  the,  on  Egyptian  monuments,  a 
similar  instrument  familiar  in  the 
Highlands  until  a  few  years  ago,  206. 


Spinning  Jenny,  the,  coming  to  econo- 
mize the  work  of  human  hands,  206. 

Spinning  Wheel  in  Yorkshire  in  1760,  206. 

Spontaneousness  of  Nature,  no  such 
thing  as,  according  to  Professor  Tyn- 
dall,  4  ;  illustration  of  "spontaneous" 
design  in  the  Professor's  own  mind,  8. 

Statute  of  Apprenticeship  in  Watt's  time, 
205. 

Steam  Engine,  Discovery  of  the.  a  new 
stimulus  to  the  mind's  motives,  203. 

Stewart's,  Dugald,  account  of  the  Life 
and  Writings  of  Adam  Smith,  200. 

11  Strong  Arm  of  the  Law,"  what  it  really 
is  as  proposed  by  Mr.  Baker,  the  Fac- 
tory Inspector,  214. 

Structure,  Bodily,  Affinities  between  the, 
of  Man  and  that  of  the  Lower  Animals, 
amongst  the  profoundest  mysteries  of 
Nature,  156. 

"  Struggle  for  Existence,"  the,  of  Organ- 
isms, 131. 

Stunted  and  distorted  growth  in  large 
portions  of  mankind,  m  how  far  these 
conditions  are  subject  to  the  control  of 
Will  through  the  use  of  Means,  193. 

Superhuman,  much  that  was  once 
thought,  not  thought  so  now,  8. 

Superhuman  and  the  Supermaterial,  the, 
familiar  facts  in  nature,  14. 

Supernatural,  Belief  in  the,  essential  to 
all  Religion,  an  assertion  true  only  in  a 
special  sense,  31. 

Supreme  V7ill  and  Supreme  Intelligence 
in  the  Laws  of  Nature,  our  own  Wills 
and  Intelligence  enable  us  to  conceive 
of  a,  14. 

Swallow,  Common,  sharp-pointed  struct- 
ure of  Wing  in  the,  94. 

Swift,  the,  dropping,  not  flying  back- 
wards, 85  ,  its  wonderful  and  unceas- 
ing evolutions,  89. 

Sylph  Humming  Bird,  the,  138. 

Symmetry  a  relation  we  detect  in  all 
variations  of  Organic  Growth,  144. 

TAILS  in  Birds,  97. 

Taylor,  Jeremy,  on  Resemblances,  32. 

Teachers  in  Politics,  Time  and  Natural 
Consequence  the  great,  153. 

Tennyson's  Idylls  of  the  King,  37 ;  Maud, 
60  ;  In  Memoriam,  32,  70,  170. 

Terns,  Mechanism  of  Flight  in,  90. 

"  Theine,"  and  "Strychnine,"  identical 
in  elements,  differ  only  m  the  propor- 
tions in  which  they  are  combined,  57. 

Theology,  Systematic,  an  idea  which  it 
regards  with  suspicion,  31. 


264 


INDEX. 


"THINGS  HOPED  FOR,"  the  Power  of,  a 
Power  which  never  dies,  69. 

Thought  and  Emotion,  exciting  Causes 
of,  must  come  from  the  external  world, 
176. 

Threes  within  Threes,  Archetypal  Ar- 
rangem^nt  of,  in  Orchids,  26. 

Time,  sa-^to  be  a  powerful  Factor,  156. 

Torpedo,  number  of  Hexagonal  columns 
in  the  battery  of  the,  61. 

Trade,  immense  advantage  of  abolishing 
Restrictions  on,  199  ;  success  in,  hin- 
dered by  Protection,  203. 

Triumphs,  for  which  man  has  been  gifted 
with  knowledge,  a  sense  of  right,  and 
faculties  of  Contrivance,  228. 

Truth,  every  one,  connected  with  every 
other  Truth  in  the  Universe,  34  ;  Ulti- 
mate, beyond  the  reach  of  Science,  162. 

Tulloch,  Principal,  quoted,  14. 

Tycho  Brahe,  204. 

Tyndall,  Professor,  quoted,  4,  153. 

Type,  or  Pattern,  a  definite,  for  each 
class  of  Animal  adhered  to,  126. 

Typical  Forms,  work  of  Creation  carried 
on  under  rules  of  adherence  to,  46. 

ULTIMATE  Question,  the,  What  is  it  by 
which  this  is  done  ?  lies  above  and  be- 
hind every  detected  Method  in  Na- 
ture, 162  ;  Force,  seat  of,  we  know 
nothing  directly  of,  163. 

Unconscious  Metaphysics  of  Human 
Speech,  180. 

Unity  of  design  amid  Variety  of  Form,  a 
universal  feature  m  Nature,  177. 

Unknown  and  Unknowable,  the,  result 
to  Professor  Huxley  of  using  this  vague 
phrase,  54. 

Universe,  question  lying  at  the  root  of 
our  conceptions  of  the,  38  ,  constitution 
of  the,  Man's  faculty  of  Contrivance 
the  nearest  analogy  by  which  to  under- 
stand the,  232. 

Unusual  Birth,  an,  Idea  common  to  all 
Development  Theories  that  a  New 
Species  is  simply,  127. 

Use  and  Ornament  in  Nature  may  often 
arise  out  of  the  same  conditions,  115. 

Useless  Organs,  how  explained  by  the 
Theory  of  Creation  by  Birth,  158. 

Utility,  acting  through  Motive  as  a  Men- 
tal Purpose,  the  provider  beforehand 
of  external  Correlations,  152  ;  Correlated 
Growth  in  Flowers,  the  Forces  of,  ac- 
cording to  Mr.  Darwin,  modify  struct- 
ures independent  of  Utility,  and  there- 
fore of  Natural  Selection,  152. 


VARIABILITY  of  Adjustment  in  the  facts 
of  Nature,  231. 

Variable  Combinations  of  /^variable 
Forces,  Phenomena  governed  by,  59. 

Variation,  Laws  of,  Mr.  Darwin  confesses 
"our  ignorance  of  the  Laws  of  Varia- 
tion is  profound,"  130  ;  so-called  Laws 
of,  for  the  most  part  simply  observed 
Facts  in  respect  to  Variation,  143. 

Variety  in  itself  an  object  in  the  creation 
of  New  Species,  136. 

Velocity  of  Flight,  the  heavier  a  bird  the 
greater  its  possible,  87. 

Vertebrate  Type,  Purpose  m  the  adapta- 
bility of  the,  to  the  infinite  varieties  of 
Life,  123,  161. 

Verities  of  the  World,  a  pre-adjusted  re- 
lation to  the,  175. 

Virgil,  quoted,  144. 

Vital  Force,  the  Great  Imponderable,  91. 

Vital  Power,  the  nearest  conception  we 
can  ever  have  of  Force  derived  from 
our  consciousness  of,  164. 

Volitions,  our,  how  far  subject  to  Ad- 
justed Forces,  191. 

Voltaic  Battery,  Mr.  Darwin  cannot  con- 
ceive how  a,  can  be  made  out  of  the 
tissues  of  a  fish,  63. 

Voltaic  Current,  Mineral  Salt  crystalliz- 
ing under  a,  correlation  of  growth  in 
its  simplest  form,  145. 

Voluntary  Society,  the  mere  founding  of 
a,  the  powerful  latent  force  it  evolves, 
219. 

WAGES,  Economic  Advantages  gained 
when  hours  of  labor  are  reduced  with- 
out corresponding  reduction  in,  225. 

Wallace,  Mr.,  his  description  of  Humming 
Birds  balancing  themselves  in  the  air, 
100. 

vl  Watch  Force,"  and  "  Vital  Force," 
analogy  between  them  precise  and  ac- 
curate, 74. 

Water,  the  Old  Motive  Power,  Factory 
System  begun  under,  207. 

Watt,  James,  202,  et  seq. 

Wealth,  views  of  the  accumulation  of,  in 
Ancient  Political  Philosophy,  200;  of 
Nations  hindered  by  Protection,  203. 

Wenham,  Mr.  F.  H.,  on  the  Mechanical 
Principle  involved  in  the  sufficiency  of 
very  narrow  Wings,  93. 

Whales,  Teeth  in  young,  which  never  cut 
the  gum,  117. 

What  men  naturally  do,  no  sure  test  of 
what  they  ought,  or  ought  to  be  al- 
lowed, to  do,  199. 


INDEX. 


265 


Whewell,  Dr.,  on  the  leading  characters 
in  the  minds  of  great  Scientific  Discov- 
erers, 125. 

Will,  Man's,  instruments  of,  7  ;  real  diffi- 
culty in  the  idea  of,  exercised  without 
the  use  of  means,  9  ;  God's  extraordi- 
nary manifestations  of,  how  they  may 
be  wrought  by  the  use  of  Laws  of 
which  Man  knows  nothing,  10;  God'a 
seeking  and  effecting  the  fulfilment  ot 
designs  as  our  living  Wills  in  their 
little  sphere  effect  their  little  objects, 
13  ;  Human,  Law  in  its  primary  signifi- 
cation, the  authoritative  expression  of, 
enforced  by  Power,  39  ;  Man's  increas- 
ing power  exercised  by,  over  the  Ma- 
terial World,  58  ;  the  Everlasting,  some 
Purpose  of  it  to  be  seen  working  every-, 
where,  74 ;  relation  of,  to  Law,  and 
Law  to  Will,  in  Man's  works  and  in 
God's,  76 ;  Unchangeableness  and  Uni- 
versality of  the  Natural  Laws  essential 
to  their  use  as  instruments  of,  86  •  cases 
in  which  Law  does  not  seem  subservi 
ent  to,  103 ;  manifested  in  Material 
Forces,  163  ;  circuitous  communication 
between  direct  acts  of  the,  and  move- 
ments of  the  Body,  164 ;  the,  often 
paralyzed  by  the  stroke  which  para- 
lyzes a  limb,  165  ;  the,  its  instinctive 
knowledge,  how  to  use  the  Organism 
born  with  it,  174 ;  in  the  Lower  Ani- 
mals, acted  on  by  fewer  and  simpler 
motives  than  Will  in  Man,  180 ;  Men's 
"free"  in  one  sense,  and  in  one  only, 
181 ;  a  Variable,  indispensable  to  sta- 
bility of  Character,  190;  the  Human, 
if  unchangeable,  then  no  such  thing 
as  changeability  conceivable,  190 ;  of 
Society,  collective,  two  ways  in  which  it 
operates  on  the  conduct,  194  ;  conscious 
energies  of  the,  ever  tempted  to  march 
directly  on  objects  only  to  be  reached 
circuitously,  203;  Individual,  Laws 
against  which  it  cannot  contend,  214 , 
Natural  Law  working  on  Human,  216  ; 
Individual,  Authoritative  Interference 
of  Positive  Institution  with  the  freedom 
of  still  required  as  regards  Factories, 
216;  Individual,  external  conditions 
which  tell  on,  often  nothing  but  condi- 
tions depending  on  the  aggregate  Will 
of,  those  around  us,  218  ;  Energies  of, 
Constancy  of  Nature  not  incompatible 
with  the,  231  ;  Change  of,  the  efficient 
cause  of  numberless  other  changes,  232. 

Wills,  conclusions  regarding  our,  against 
which  we  are  apt  to  rebel,  171 ;  our,  not 


free  from  motives,  179  ;  free  from  com- 
pulsion, and  from  nothing  else,  182. 

Wilson's,  Professor,  Sonnet,  "  A  Cloud," 
92. 

Wing,  Bird's,  pulsations  in  a,  usually  im- 
possible to  count ;  instances  in  the 
Partridge,  Pheasant,  Blackcock,  Pig- 
eon, and  Diver,  80  ;  Birds,  downward 
blow  of  a,  indispensable  to  flight,  81 . 
convex  and  concave  surfaces  of  a,  in- 
dispenable  to  flight,  82  ;  sort  of,  re- 
quired by  Birds  which  seek  their  food 
in  the  air,  88  ;  peculiarity  of,  in  Divers, 
89  ;  peculiarity  of,  in  Birds  which  feed 
on  the  surface  of  the  sea,  90 ;  peculiar- 
ity of,  in  Birds  of  great  and  long-sus- 
tained powers  of  flight,  90 ;  a  long,  the 
implement  used  by  the  Bird's  Vital 
Force  against  the  force  of  Gravity,  91  ; 
threefold  division  of  the  feathers  of  a 
Bird's,  93  ;  sharpness  of  a,  on  what  it 
depends,  93 ;  a  Rook's,  an  example  of 
what,  94  ;  Bones  of  a  Bird's,  the  bones 
of  the  Mammalian  arm  and  hand,  101. 

"Windhover,"  machinery  of  flight  in 
the,  95. 

Wings,  Bird's,  Law  of  Leverage  appealed 
to  in,  90 ;  sort  of,  in  Gallinaceous 
Birds,  93  ;  Birds  with  short,  93 ;  Birds 
with  short  and  blunt,  how  they  catch 
their  prey,  95  ;  Humming  Birds,  amaz- 
ingly rapid  motion  of,  99. 

Wolf,  Mr.  J.,  his  drawing  of  the  wing  of 
the  Golden  Plover,  94 ;  his  illustration 
of  a  Kestrel  hovering,  96. 

Woodcock's  Plumage,  the,  colored  like 
decaying  leaves,  109 ;  Tail  Feathers 
capable  of  forming  a  beautifully  tinted 
fan,  109  ;  lustrous  black  eye  betrayed 
it  to  the  fowler,  no. 

Woodpeckers.  Law  of  Assimilative  color- 
ing not  extended  to,  107. 

Words  which  should  be  the  servants  of 
Thought,  too  often  its  masters,  39. 

Wordsworth  on  Nature,  as  including  all 
"  in  the  Mind  of  Man,"  3  ;  his  Ode  to 
Immortality,  36. 

Working  Classes,  always  regard  with 
fear  and  jealousy  those  triumphs  of 
mechanical  invention  which  tend  to 
the  economizing  of  labor,  223  ;  Combi- 
nation amongst  the,  an  Education  in 
itself,  226  ;  Men,  Combination  the  only 
means  by  which  adult  working,  can 
defend  themselves,  221. 

"  ZAMBESI  and  its  Tributaries,"  Dr. 
Livingstone's  work  quoted,  118. 


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